INDIANA v. EDWARDS

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Syllabus
INDIANA v. EDWARDS
certiorari to the supreme court of indiana
No. 07–208. Argued March 26, 2008—Decided June 19, 2008
After Indiana charged respondent Edwards with attempted murder and
other crimes for a shooting during his attempt to steal a pair of shoes,
his mental condition became the subject of three competency proceed
ings and two self-representation requests, mostly before the same trial
judge. Referring to the lengthy record of psychiatric reports, the trial
court noted that Edwards suffered from schizophrenia and concluded
that, although it appeared he was competent to stand trial, he was not
competent to defend himself at trial. The court therefore denied Ed
wards’ self-representation request. He was represented by appointed
counsel at trial and convicted on two counts. Indiana’s intermediate
appellate court ordered a new trial, agreeing with Edwards that the
trial court’s refusal to permit him to represent himself deprived him of
his constitutional right of self-representation under the Sixth Amend
ment and Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806. Although finding that
the record provided substantial support for the trial court’s ruling, the
Indiana Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed the intermediate appellate
court on the ground that Faretta and Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389,
required the State to allow Edwards to represent himself.
Held: The Constitution does not prohibit States from insisting upon repre
sentation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial but who
suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not compe
tent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Pp. 169–179.
(a) This Court’s precedents frame the question presented, but they
do not answer it. Dusky v. United States, 362 U. S. 402, and Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U. S. 162, 171, set forth the Constitution’s “mental compe
tence” standard forbidding the trial of an individual lacking a rational
and factual understanding of the proceedings and sufficient ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under
standing. But those cases did not consider the issue presented here,
namely, the relation of that “mental competence” standard to the
self-representation right. Similarly the Court’s foundational “self
representation” case, Faretta, supra—which held that the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments include a “constitutional right to proceed with
out counsel when” a criminal defendant “voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so,” 422 U. S., at 807—does not answer the question as to
the scope of the self-representation right. Finally, although Godinez,

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supra, presents a question closer to the one at issue in that it focused
upon a borderline-competent defendant who had asked a state trial
court to permit him to represent himself and to change his pleas from
not guilty to guilty, Godinez provides no answer here because that de
fendant’s ability to conduct a defense at trial was expressly not at issue
in that case, see 509 U. S., at 399–400, and because the case’s constitu
tional holding that a State may permit a gray-area defendant to repre
sent himself does not tell a State whether it may deny such a defendant
the right to represent himself at his trial. Pp. 169–174.
(b) Several considerations taken together lead the Court to conclude
that the Constitution permits a State to limit a defendant’s self
representation right by insisting upon trial counsel when the defendant
lacks the mental competency to conduct his trial defense unless repre
sented. First, the Court’s precedent, while not answering the question,
points slightly in that direction. By setting forth a standard that fo
cuses directly upon a defendant’s ability to consult with his lawyer,
Dusky and Drope assume representation by counsel and emphasize
counsel’s importance, thus suggesting (though not holding) that choosing
to forgo trial counsel presents a very different set of circumstances than
the mental competency determination for a defendant to stand trial.
Also, Faretta rested its self-representation conclusion in part on pre
existing state cases that are consistent with, and at least two of which
expressly adopt, a competency limitation on the self-representation
right. See 422 U. S., at 813, and n. 9. Second, the nature of mental
illness—which is not a unitary concept, but varies in degree, can vary
over time, and interferes with an individual’s functioning at different
times in different ways—cautions against using a single competency
standard to decide both whether a defendant who is represented can
proceed to trial and whether a defendant who goes to trial must be
permitted to represent himself. Third, a self-representation right at
trial will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who lacks the mental
capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel, see
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 176–177, and may undercut the
most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objectives, providing a fair
trial. The trial judge—particularly one such as the judge in this case,
who presided over one of Edwards’ competency hearings and his two
trials—will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental ca
pacity decisions, tailored to the particular defendant’s individualized
circumstances. Pp. 174–178.
(c) Indiana’s proposed standard, which would deny a criminal defend
ant the right to represent himself at trial if he cannot communicate
coherently with the court or a jury, is rejected because this Court is
uncertain as to how that standard would work in practice. The Court

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also declines Indiana’s request to overrule Faretta because today’s opin
ion may well remedy the unfair trial concerns previously leveled against
the case. Pp. 178–179.
866 N. E. 2d 252, vacated and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined.
Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined, post,
p. 179.
Thomas M. Fisher, Solicitor General of Indiana, argued
the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Steve
Carter, Attorney General, and Julie A. Brubaker, Justin F.
Roebel, and Heather L. Hagan, Deputy Attorneys General.
Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With
him on the brief were former Solicitor General Clement,
Assistant Attorney General Fisher, and William M. Jay.
Mark T. Stancil argued the cause for respondent. With
him on the brief were David T. Goldberg, Daniel R. Ortiz,
and Michael R. Fisher.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Ohio
et al. by Marc Dann, Attorney General of Ohio, William P. Marshall,
Solicitor General, Robert J. Krummen, Michael Dominic Meuti, and
Kimberly A. Olson, Deputy Solicitors, and Kelly A. Borchers, Assistant
Solicitor, and by the Attorneys General and other officials for their respec
tive States as follows: Troy King, Attorney General of Alabama, Talis J.
Colberg, Attorney General of Alaska, Terry Goddard, Attorney General of
Arizona, John W. Suthers, Attorney General of Colorado, Bill McCollum,
Attorney General of Florida, Mark J. Bennett, Attorney General of
Hawaii, Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois, Thomas J. Miller,
Attorney General of Iowa, Stephen N. Six, Attorney General of Kansas,
Michael A. Cox, Attorney General of Michigan, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon,
Attorney General of Missouri, Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General
of Nevada, Albert Lama, Chief Deputy Attorney General of New Mexico,
Hardy Myers, Attorney General of Oregon, Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., Attor
ney General of Pennsylvania, Henry McMaster, Attorney General of South
Carolina, Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah, and Robert M.
McKenna, Attorney General of Washington; and for the American Bar

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Opinion of the Court
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case focuses upon a criminal defendant whom a state
court found mentally competent to stand trial if represented
by counsel but not mentally competent to conduct that trial
himself. We must decide whether in these circumstances
the Constitution prohibits a State from insisting that the de
fendant proceed to trial with counsel, the State thereby de
nying the defendant the right to represent himself. See
U. S. Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806
(1975). We conclude that the Constitution does not forbid a
State so to insist.
I
In July 1999, Ahmad Edwards, the respondent, tried to
steal a pair of shoes from an Indiana department store.
After he was discovered, he drew a gun, fired at a store
security officer, and wounded a bystander. He was caught
and then charged with attempted murder, battery with a
deadly weapon, criminal recklessness, and theft. His men
tal condition subsequently became the subject of three com
petency proceedings and two self-representation requests,
mostly before the same trial judge:
1. First Competency Hearing: August 2000. Five months
after Edwards’ arrest, his court-appointed counsel asked for
a psychiatric evaluation. After hearing psychiatrist and
neuropsychologist witnesses (in February 2000 and again in
August 2000), the court found Edwards incompetent to stand
trial, App. 365a, and committed him to Logansport State
Hospital for evaluation and treatment, see id., at 48a–53a.
Association by William H. Neukom, Jon May, Robert Buschel, John
Parry, and Rory K. Little.
Richard G. Taranto filed a brief for the American Psychiatric Associa
tion et al. as amici curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Criminal Justice Legal Founda
tion by Kent S. Scheidegger; and for the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers by Kevin P. Martin, Abigail K. Hemani, Dahlia S.
Fetouh, William F. Sheehan, and Barbara Bergman.

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2. Second Competency Hear ing: March 2002. Seven
months after his commitment, doctors found that Edwards’
condition had improved to the point where he could stand
trial. Id., at 63a–64a. Several months later, however, but
still before trial, Edwards’ counsel asked for another psychi
atric evaluation. In March 2002, the judge held a compe
tency hearing, considered additional psychiatric evidence,
and (in April) found that Edwards, while “suffer[ing] from
mental illness,” was “competent to assist his attorneys in his
defense and stand trial for the charged crimes.” Id., at
114a.
3. Third Competency Hear ing: Apr il 2003. Seven
months later but still before trial, Edwards’ counsel sought
yet another psychiatric evaluation of his client. And, in
April 2003, the court held yet another competency hearing.
Edwards’ counsel presented further psychiatric and neuro
psychological evidence showing that Edwards was suffering
from serious thinking difficulties and delusions. A testify
ing psychiatrist reported that Edwards could understand the
charges against him, but he was “unable to cooperate with
his attorney in his defense because of his schizophrenic ill
ness”; “[h]is delusions and his marked difficulties in thinking
make it impossible for him to cooperate with his attorney.”
Id., at 164a. In November 2003, the court concluded that
Edwards was not then competent to stand trial and ordered
his recommitment to the state hospital. Id., at 206a–211a.
4. First Sel f-Representation Request and First Trial:
June 2005. About eight months after his commitment, the
hospital reported that Edwards’ condition had again im
proved to the point that he had again become competent to
stand trial. Id., at 228a–236a. And almost one year after
that, Edwards’ trial began. Just before trial, Edwards
asked to represent himself. Id., at 509a, 520a. He also
asked for a continuance, which, he said, he needed in order
to proceed pro se. Id., at 519a–520a. The court refused the
continuance. Id., at 520a. Edwards then proceeded to trial

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represented by counsel. The jury convicted him of criminal
recklessness and theft but failed to reach a verdict on the
charges of attempted murder and battery.
5. Second Self-Representation Request and Second Trial:
December 2005. The State decided to retry Edwards on the
attempted murder and battery charges. Just before the re
trial, Edwards again asked the court to permit him to repre
sent himself. Id., at 279a–282a. Referring to the lengthy
record of psychiatric reports, the trial court noted that Ed
wards still suffered from schizophrenia and concluded that
“[w]ith these findings, he’s competent to stand trial but I’m
not going to find he’s competent to defend himself.” Id.,
at 527a. The court denied Edwards’ self-representation
request. Edwards was represented by appointed counsel
at his retrial. The jury convicted Edwards on both of the
remaining counts.
Edwards subsequently appealed to Indiana’s intermediate
appellate court. He argued that the trial court’s refusal
to permit him to represent himself at his retrial deprived
him of his constitutional right of self-representation. U. S.
Const., Amdt. 6; Faretta, supra. The court agreed and or
dered a new trial. The matter then went to the Indiana
Supreme Court. That court found that “[t]he record in this
case presents a substantial basis to agree with the trial
court,” 866 N. E. 2d 252, 260 (2007), but it nonetheless af
firmed the intermediate appellate court on the belief that
this Court’s precedents, namely, Faretta, supra, and Godinez
v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389 (1993), required the State to allow
Edwards to represent himself. At Indiana’s request, we
agreed to consider whether the Constitution required the
trial court to allow Edwards to represent himself at trial.
II
Our examination of this Court’s precedents convinces us
that those precedents frame the question presented, but they
do not answer it. The two cases that set forth the Con

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stitution’s “mental competence” standard, Dusky v. United
States, 362 U. S. 402 (1960) (per curiam), and Drope v. Mis
souri, 420 U. S. 162 (1975), specify that the Constitution does
not permit trial of an individual who lacks “mental com
petency.” Dusky defines the competency standard as in
cluding both (1) “whether” the defendant has “a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him” and (2) whether the defendant “has sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding.” 362 U. S., at 402 (emphasis
added; internal quotation marks omitted). Drope repeats
that standard, stating that it “has long been accepted that a
person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the ca
pacity to understand the nature and object of the proceed
ings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in
preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial.” 420
U. S., at 171 (emphasis added). Neither case considered the
mental competency issue presented here, namely, the rela
tion of the mental competence standard to the right of
self-representation.
The Court’s foundational “self-representation” case, Fa
retta, held that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in
clude a “constitutional right to proceed without counsel
when” a criminal defendant “voluntarily and intelligently
elects to do so.” 422 U. S., at 807 (emphasis in original).
The Court implied that right from: (1) a “nearly universal
conviction,” made manifest in state law, that “forcing a law
yer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right
to defend himself if he truly wants to do so,” id., at 817–818;
(2) Sixth Amendment language granting rights to the “ac
cused”; (3) Sixth Amendment structure indicating that the
rights it sets forth, related to the “fair administration of
American justice,” are “persona[l]” to the accused, id., at
818–821; (4) the absence of historical examples of forced rep
resentation, id., at 821–832; and (5) “ ‘respect for the individ
ual,’ ” id., at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337,

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350–351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (a knowing and in
telligent waiver of counsel “must be honored out of ‘that re
spect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law’ ”)).
Faretta does not answer the question before us both be
cause it did not consider the problem of mental competency
(cf. 422 U. S., at 835 (Faretta was “literate, competent, and
understanding”)), and because Faretta itself and later cases
have made clear that the right of self-representation is not
absolute, see Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth
Appellate Dist., 528 U. S. 152, 163 (2000) (no right of self
representation on direct appeal in a criminal case); Mc-
Kaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 178–179 (1984) (appoint
ment of standby counsel over self-represented defendant’s
objection is permissible); Faretta, 422 U. S., at 835, n. 46
(no right “to abuse the dignity of the courtroom”); ibid. (no
right to avoid compliance with “relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law”); id., at 834, n. 46 (no right to “en
gag[e] in serious and obstructionist misconduct,” referring
to Illinois v. Allen, supra). The question here concerns a
mental-illness-related limitation on the scope of the self
representation right.
The sole case in which this Court considered mental com
petence and self-representation together, Godinez, supra,
presents a question closer to that at issue here. The case
focused upon a borderline-competent criminal defendant who
had asked a state trial court to permit him to represent him
self and to change his pleas from not guilty to guilty. The
state trial court had found that the defendant met Dusky’s
mental competence standard, that he “knowingly and intelli
gently” waived his right to assistance of counsel, and that he
“freely and voluntarily” chose to plead guilty. 509 U. S.,
at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted). And the state
trial court had consequently granted the defendant’s self
representation and change-of-plea requests. See id., at 392–
393. A federal appeals court, however, had vacated the de
fendant’s guilty pleas on the ground that the Constitution

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required the trial court to ask a further question, namely,
whether the defendant was competent to waive his constitu
tional right to counsel. See id., at 393–394. Competence to
make that latter decision, the appeals court said, required
the defendant to satisfy a higher mental competency stand
ard than the standard set forth in Dusky. See 509 U. S.,
at 393–394. Dusky’s more general standard sought only to
determine whether a defendant represented by counsel was
competent to stand trial, not whether he was competent to
waive his right to counsel. 509 U. S., at 394–395.
This Court, reversing the Court of Appeals, “reject[ed] the
notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the right
to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher
than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.” Id., at
398. The decision to plead guilty, we said, “is no more com
plicated than the sum total of decisions that a [represented]
defendant may be called upon to make during the course of
a trial.” Ibid. Hence “there is no reason to believe that
the decision to waive counsel requires an appreciably higher
level of mental functioning than the decision to waive other
constitutional rights.” Id., at 399. And even assuming that
self-representation might pose special trial-related difficul
ties, “the competence that is required of a defendant seeking
to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the
right, not the competence to represent himself.” Ibid. (em
phasis in original). For this reason, we concluded, “the de
fendant’s ‘technical legal knowledge’ is ‘not relevant’ to the
determination.” Id., at 400 (quoting Faretta, supra, at 836).
We concede that Godinez bears certain similarities with
the present case. Both involve mental competence and
self-representation. Both involve a defendant who wants to
represent himself. Both involve a mental condition that
falls in a gray area between Dusky’s minimal constitutional
requirement that measures a defendant’s ability to stand
trial and a somewhat higher standard that measures mental
fitness for another legal purpose.

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We nonetheless conclude that Godinez does not answer the
question before us now. In part that is because the Court
of Appeals’ higher standard at issue in Godinez differs in a
critical way from the higher standard at issue here. In
Godinez, the higher standard sought to measure the defend
ant’s ability to proceed on his own to enter a guilty plea; here
the higher standard seeks to measure the defendant’s ability
to conduct trial proceedings. To put the matter more spe
cifically, the Godinez defendant sought only to change his
pleas to guilty, he did not seek to conduct trial proceedings,
and his ability to conduct a defense at trial was expressly not
at issue. Thus we emphasized in Godinez that we needed
to consider only the defendant’s “competence to waive the
right.” 509 U. S., at 399 (emphasis in original). And we
further emphasized that we need not consider the defend
ant’s “technical legal knowledge” about how to proceed at
trial. Id., at 400 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
found our holding consistent with this Court’s earlier state
ment in Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105, 108 (1954), that
“[o]ne might not be insane in the sense of being incapable of
standing trial and yet lack the capacity to stand trial without
benefit of counsel.” See Godinez, supra, at 399–400, n. 10
(quoting Massey and noting that it dealt with “a question
that is quite different from the question presented” in Godi
nez). In this case, the very matters that we did not consider
in Godinez are directly before us.
For another thing, Godinez involved a State that sought
to permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself. Godi
nez’s constitutional holding is that a State may do so. But
that holding simply does not tell a State whether it may deny
a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself—the
matter at issue here. One might argue that Godinez’s grant
(to a State) of permission to allow a gray-area defendant
self-representation must implicitly include permission to
deny self-representation. Cf. 509 U. S., at 402 (“States are
free to adopt competency standards that are more elaborate

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than the Dusky formulation”). Yet one could more force
fully argue that Godinez simply did not consider whether the
Constitution requires self-representation by gray-area de
fendants even in circumstances where the State seeks to dis
allow it (the question here). The upshot is that, in our view,
the question before us is an open one.
III
We now turn to the question presented. We assume that
a criminal defendant has sufficient mental competence to
stand trial (i. e., the defendant meets Dusky’s standard) and
that the defendant insists on representing himself during
that trial. We ask whether the Constitution permits a State
to limit that defendant’s self-representation right by insist
ing upon representation by counsel at trial—on the ground
that the defendant lacks the mental capacity to conduct his
trial defense unless represented.
Several considerations taken together lead us to conclude
that the answer to this question is yes. First, the Court’s
precedent, while not answering the question, points slightly
in the direction of our affirmative answer. Godinez, as we
have just said, simply leaves the question open. But the
Court’s “mental competency” cases set forth a standard that
focuses directly upon a defendant’s “present ability to consult
with his lawyer,” Dusky, 362 U. S., at 402 (internal quotation
marks omitted); a “capacity . . . to consult with counsel,” and
an ability “to assist [counsel] in preparing his defense,”
Drope, 420 U. S., at 171. See ibid. (“It has long been ac
cepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he
lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to as
sist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial”
(emphasis added)). These standards assume representation
by counsel and emphasize the importance of counsel. They
thus suggest (though do not hold) that an instance in which
a defendant who would choose to forgo counsel at trial pre

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sents a very different set of circumstances, which in our
view, calls for a different standard.
At the same time Faretta, the foundational self
representation case, rested its conclusion in part upon pre
existing state law set forth in cases all of which are con
sistent with, and at least two of which expressly adopt, a
competency limitation on the self-representation right. See
422 U. S., at 813, and n. 9 (citing 16 state-court decisions and
two secondary sources). See, e. g., Cappetta v. State, 204
So. 2d 913, 917–918 (Fla. App. 1967), rev’d on other grounds,
216 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1968), cited in Faretta, supra, at 813, n. 9
(assuring a “mentally competent” defendant the right “to
conduct his own defense” provided that “no unusual circum
stances exist” such as, e. g., “mental derangement” that
“would . . . depriv[e]” the defendant “of a fair trial if allowed
to conduct his own defense,” 204 So. 2d, at 917–918); id., at
918 (noting that “whether unusual circumstances are evident
is a matter resting in the sound discretion granted to the
trial judge”); Allen v. Commonwealth, 324 Mass. 558, 562–
563, 87 N. E. 2d 192, 195 (1949) (noting “the assignment of
counsel” was “necessary” where there was some “special cir
cumstance” such as when the criminal defendant was “men
tally defective”).
Second, the nature of the problem before us cautions
against the use of a single mental competency standard for
deciding both (1) whether a defendant who is represented by
counsel can proceed to trial and (2) whether a defendant who
goes to trial must be permitted to represent himself. Men
tal illness itself is not a unitary concept. It varies in degree.
It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual’s
functioning at different times in different ways. The his
tory of this case (set forth in Part I, supra) illustrates the
complexity of the problem. In certain instances an individ
ual may well be able to satisfy Dusky’s mental competence
standard, for he will be able to work with counsel at trial,
yet at the same time he may be unable to carry out the basic

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tasks needed to present his own defense without the help
of counsel. See, e. g., N. Poythress, R. Bonnie, J. Monahan,
R. Otto, & S. Hoge, Adjudicative Competence: The MacAr
thur Studies 103 (2002) (“Within each domain of adjudicative
competence (competence to assist counsel; decisional compe
tence) the data indicate that understanding, reasoning, and
appreciation [of the charges against a defendant] are separa
ble and somewhat independent aspects of functional legal
ability”). See also McKaskle, 465 U. S., at 174 (describing
trial tasks as including organization of defense, making mo
tions, arguing points of law, participating in voir dire, ques
tioning witnesses, and addressing the court and jury).
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) tells us
(without dispute) in its amicus brief filed in support of nei
ther party that “[d]isorganized thinking, deficits in sustain
ing attention and concentration, impaired expressive abili
ties, anxiety, and other common symptoms of severe mental
illnesses can impair the defendant’s ability to play the sig
nificantly expanded role required for self-representation
even if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.”
Brief for APA et al. as Amici Curiae 26. Motions and other
documents that the defendant prepared in this case (one of
which we include in the Appendix, infra) suggest to a layper
son the common sense of this general conclusion.
Third, in our view, a right of self-representation at trial
will not “affirm the dignity” of a defendant who lacks the
mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assist
ance of counsel. McKaskle, supra, at 176–177 (“Dignity”
and “autonomy” of individual underlie self-representation
right). To the contrary, given that defendant’s uncertain
mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his
self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove hu
miliating as ennobling. Moreover, insofar as a defendant’s
lack of capacity threatens an improper conviction or sen
tence, self-representation in that exceptional context under
cuts the most basic of the Constitution’s criminal law objec

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tives, providing a fair trial. As Justice Brennan put it,
“[t]he Constitution would protect none of us if it prevented
the courts from acting to preserve the very processes that
the Constitution itself prescribes.” Allen, 397 U. S., at 350
(concurring opinion). See Martinez, 528 U. S., at 162 (“Even
at the trial level . . . the government’s interest in ensuring
the integrity and efficiency of the trial at times outweighs
the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer”). See
also Sell v. United States, 539 U. S. 166, 180 (2003) (“[T]he
Government has a concomitant, constitutionally essential
interest in assuring that the defendant’s trial is a fair one”).
Further, proceedings must not only be fair, they must “ap
pear fair to all who observe them.” Wheat v. United States,
486 U. S. 153, 160 (1988). An amicus brief reports one psy
chiatrist’s reaction to having observed a patient (a patient
who had satisfied Dusky) try to conduct his own defense:
“[H]ow in the world can our legal system allow an insane
man to defend himself?” Brief for State of Ohio et al. as
Amici Curiae 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). See
Massey, 348 U. S., at 108 (“No trial can be fair that leaves
the defense to a man who is insane, unaided by counsel, and
who by reason of his mental condition stands helpless and
alone before the court”). The application of Dusky’s basic
mental competence standard can help in part to avoid this
result. But given the different capacities needed to proceed
to trial without counsel, there is little reason to believe that
Dusky alone is sufficient. At the same time, the trial judge,
particularly one such as the trial judge in this case, who pre
sided over one of Edwards’ competency hearings and his two
trials, will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned
mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized cir
cumstances of a particular defendant.
We consequently conclude that the Constitution permits
judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s
mental capacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks
to conduct his own defense at trial is mentally competent to

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178 INDIANA v. EDWARDS
Opinion of the Court
do so. That is to say, the Constitution permits States to
insist upon representation by counsel for those competent
enough to stand trial under Dusky but who still suffer from
severe mental illness to the point where they are not compe
tent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.
IV
Indiana has also asked us to adopt, as a measure of a de
fendant’s ability to conduct a trial, a more specific standard
that would “deny a criminal defendant the right to represent
himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate co
herently with the court or a jury.” Brief for Petitioner 20
(emphasis deleted). We are sufficiently uncertain, however,
as to how that particular standard would work in practice to
refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard
here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it.
Indiana has also asked us to overrule Faretta. We decline
to do so. We recognize that judges have sometimes ex
pressed concern that Faretta, contrary to its intent, has led
to trials that are unfair. See Martinez, supra, at 164
(Breyer, J., concurring) (noting practical concerns of trial
judges). But recent empirical research suggests that such
instances are not common. See, e. g., Hashimoto, Defending
the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the
Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N. C. L. Rev. 423, 427, 447, 428
(2007) (noting that of the small number of defendants who
chose to proceed pro se—“roughly 0.3% to 0.5%” of the total,
state felony defendants in particular “appear to have
achieved higher felony acquittal rates than their represented
counterparts in that they were less likely to have been con
victed of felonies”). At the same time, instances in which
the trial’s fairness is in doubt may well be concentrated in
the 20 percent or so of self-representation cases where the
mental competence of the defendant is also at issue. See
id., at 428 (about 20 percent of federal pro se felony defend
ants ordered to undergo competency evaluations). If so, to

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179 Cite as: 554 U. S. 164 (2008)
Scalia, J., dissenting
day’s opinion, assuring trial judges the authority to deal ap
propriately with cases in the latter category, may well
alleviate those fair trial concerns.
For these reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court
of Indiana is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
APPENDIX
Excerpt from respondent’s filing entitled “ ‘Defendant’s
Version of the Instant Offense,’ ” which he had attached to
his presentence investigation report:
“ ‘The appointed motion of permissive intervention filed
therein the court superior on, 6–26–01 caused a stay of
action and apon it’s expiration or thereafter three years
the plan to establish a youth program to and for the
coordination of aspects of law enforcement to prevent
and reduce crime amoung young people in Indiana be
came a diplomatic act as under the Safe Streets Act of
1967, “A omnibuc considerate agent: I membered clients
within the public and others that at/production of the
courts actions showcased causes. The costs of the stay
(Trial Rule 60) has a derivative property that is: my
knowledged events as not unnexpended to contract the
membered clients is the commission of finding a facilitie
for this plan or project to become organization of admin
istrative recommendations conditioned by governors.’ ”
866 N. E. 2d, at 258, n. 4 (alterations omitted).
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
dissenting.
The Constitution guarantees a defendant who knowingly
and voluntarily waives the right to counsel the right to pro
ceed pro se at his trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806
(1975). A mentally ill defendant who knowingly and volun
tarily elects to proceed pro se instead of through counsel

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180 INDIANA v. EDWARDS
Scalia, J., dissenting
receives a fair trial that comports with the Fourteenth
Amendment. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U. S. 389 (1993). The
Court today concludes that a State may nonetheless strip a
mentally ill defendant of the right to represent himself when
that would be fairer. In my view the Constitution does not
permit a State to substitute its own perception of fairness
for the defendant’s right to make his own case before the
jury—a specific right long understood as essential to a fair
trial.
I
Ahmad Edwards suffers from schizophrenia, an illness that
has manifested itself in different ways over time, depending
on how and whether Edwards was treated as well as on other
factors that appear harder to identify. In the years between
2000 and 2003—years in which Edwards was apparently not
treated with the antipsychotic medications and other drugs
that are commonly prescribed for his illness—Edwards was
repeatedly declared incompetent to stand trial. Even dur
ing this period, however, his mental state seems to have
fluctuated. For instance, one psychiatrist in March 2001 de
scribed Edwards in a competency report as “free of psycho
sis, depression, mania, and confusion,” “alert, oriented, [and]
appropriate,” apparently “able to think clearly” and appar
ently “psychiatrically normal.” App. 61a.
Edwards seems to have been treated with antipsychotic
medication for the first time in 2004. He was found compe
tent to stand trial the same year. The psychiatrist making
the recommendation described Edwards’ thought processes
as “coherent” and wrote that he “communicate[d] very well,”
that his speech was “easy to understand,” that he displayed
“good communications skills, cooperative attitude, average
intelligence, and good cognitive functioning,” that he could
“appraise the roles of the participants in the courtroom pro
ceedings,” and that he had the capacity to challenge prosecu
tion witnesses realistically and to testify relevantly. Id., at
232a–235a (report of Dr. Robert Sena).

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Over the course of what became two separate criminal
trials, Edwards sought to act as his own lawyer. He filed a
number of incoherent written pleadings with the judge on
which the Court places emphasis, but he also filed several
intelligible pleadings, such as a motion to dismiss counsel,
a motion to dismiss charges under the Indiana speedy trial
provision, and a motion seeking a trial transcript.
Edwards made arguments in the courtroom that were
more coherent than his written pleadings. In seeking to
represent himself at his first trial, Edwards complained in
detail that the attorney representing him had not spent ade
quate time preparing and was not sharing legal materials for
use in his defense. The trial judge concluded that Edwards
had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel
and proceeded to quiz Edwards about matters of state law.
Edwards correctly answered questions about the meaning of
voir dire and how it operated, and described the basic frame
work for admitting videotape evidence to trial, though he
was unable to answer other questions, including questions
about the topics covered by state evidentiary rules that the
judge identified only by number. He persisted in his re
quest to represent himself, but the judge denied the request
because Edwards acknowledged he would need a continu
ance. Represented by counsel, he was convicted of criminal
recklessness and theft, but the jury deadlocked on charges
of attempted murder and battery.
At his second trial, Edwards again asked the judge to be
allowed to proceed pro se. He explained that he and his
attorney disagreed about which defense to present to the
attempted murder charge. Edwards’ counsel favored lack of
intent to kill; Edwards, self-defense. As the defendant put
it: “My objection is me and my attorney actually had dis
cussed a defense, I think prosecution had mentioned that,
and we are in disagreement with it. He has a defense and
I have a defense that I would like to represent or present to
the Judge.” Id., at 523a.

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182 INDIANA v. EDWARDS
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The court again rejected Edwards’ request to proceed pro
se, and this time it did not have the justification that Ed
wards had sought a continuance. The court did not dispute
that Edwards knowingly and intelligently waived his right
to counsel, but stated it was “going to carve out a third ex
ception” to the right of self-representation, and—without ex
plaining precisely what abilities Edwards lacked—stated Ed
wards was “competent to stand trial but I’m not going to find
he’s competent to defend himself.” Id., at 527a. Edwards
sought—by a request through counsel and by raising an ob
jection in open court—to address the judge on the matter,
but the judge refused, stating that the issue had already
been decided. Edwards’ court-appointed attorney pursued
the defense the attorney judged best—lack of intent, not
self-defense—and Edwards was convicted of both attempted
murder and battery. The Supreme Court of Indiana held
that he was entitled to a new trial because he had been de
nied the right to represent himself. The State of Indiana
sought certiorari, which we granted. 552 U. S. 1074 (2007).
II
A
The Constitution guarantees to every criminal defendant
the “right to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily
and intelligently elects to do so.” Faretta, 422 U. S., at 807.
The right reflects “a nearly universal conviction, on the part
of our people as well as our courts, that forcing a lawyer
upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to his basic right
to defend himself if he truly wants to do so.” Id., at 817.
Faretta’s discussion of the history of the right, id., at 821–
833, includes the observation that “[i]n the long history of
British criminal jurisprudence, there was only one tribunal
that ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an un
willing defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal
was the Star Chamber,” id., at 821. Faretta described the
right to proceed pro se as a premise of the Sixth Amendment,

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which confers the tools for a defense on the “accused,” and
describes the role of the attorney as one of “assistance.”
The right of self-representation could also be seen as a part
of the traditional meaning of the Due Process Clause. See
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist.,
528 U. S. 152, 165 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
Whichever provision provides its source, it means that a
State simply may not force a lawyer upon a criminal defend
ant who wishes to conduct his own defense. Faretta, 422
U. S., at 807.
Exercising the right of self-representation requires waiv
ing the right to counsel. A defendant may represent himself
only when he “ ‘knowingly and intelligently’ ” waives the law
yer’s assistance that is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
Id., at 835. He must “be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation,” and the record must
“establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is
made with eyes open.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 279 (1942)). This limi
tation may be relevant to many mentally ill defendants, but
there is no dispute that Edwards was not one of them. Ed
wards was warned extensively of the risks of proceeding
pro se. The trial judge found that Edwards had “knowingly
and voluntarily” waived his right to counsel at his first trial,
App. 512a, and at his second trial the judge denied him the
right to represent himself only by “carv[ing] out” a new
“exception” to the right beyond the standard of knowing and
voluntary waiver, id., at 527a.
When a defendant appreciates the risks of forgoing counsel
and chooses to do so voluntarily, the Constitution protects
his ability to present his own defense even when that harms
his case. In fact waiving counsel “usually” does so. Mc-
Kaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U. S. 168, 177, n. 8 (1984); see also
Faretta, 422 U. S., at 834. We have nonetheless said that
the defendant’s “choice must be honored out of ‘that respect
for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.’ ” Ibid.

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What the Constitution requires is not that a State’s case be
subject to the most rigorous adversarial testing possible—
after all, it permits a defendant to eliminate all adversarial
testing by pleading guilty. What the Constitution requires
is that a defendant be given the right to challenge the State’s
case against him using the arguments he sees fit.
In Godinez, 509 U. S. 389, we held that the Due Process
Clause posed no barrier to permitting a defendant who suf
fered from mental illness both to waive his right to counsel
and to plead guilty, so long as he was competent to stand
trial and knowingly and voluntarily waived trial and the
counsel right. Id., at 391, 400. It was “never the rule at
common law” that a defendant could be competent to stand
trial and yet incompetent to either exercise or give up some
of the rights provided for his defense. Id., at 404 (Ken
nedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
We rejected the invitation to craft a higher competency
standard for waiving counsel than for standing trial. That
proposal, we said, was built on the “flawed premise” that a
defendant’s “competence to represent himself ” was the rele
vant measure: “[T]he competence that is required of a de
fendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the compe
tence to waive the right, not the competence to represent
himself.” Id., at 399. We grounded this on Faretta’s candid
acknowledgment that the Sixth Amendment protected the
defendant’s right to conduct a defense to his disadvantage.
509 U. S. at 399–400.
B
The Court is correct that this case presents a variation
on Godinez: It presents the question not whether another
constitutional requirement (in Godinez, the proposed higher
degree of competence required for a waiver) limits a defend
ant’s constitutional right to elect self-representation, but
whether a State’s view of fairness (or of other values) per
mits it to strip the defendant of this right. But that makes
the question before us an easier one. While one constitu

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tional requirement must yield to another in case of conflict,
nothing permits a State, because of its view of what is fair,
to deny a constitutional protection. Although “the purpose
of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure
a fair trial,” it “does not follow that the rights can be disre
garded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.” United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 145 (2006). Thus,
although the Confrontation Clause aims to produce fairness
by ensuring the reliability of testimony, States may not pro
vide for unconfronted testimony to be used at trial so long
as it is reliable. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36, 61
(2004). We have rejected an approach to individual liberties
that “ ‘abstracts from the right to its purposes, and then
eliminates the right.’ ” Gonzalez-Lopez, supra, at 145 (quot
ing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U. S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
Until today, the right of self-representation has been ac
corded the same respect as other constitutional guarantees.
The only circumstance in which we have permitted the State
to deprive a defendant of this trial right is the one under
which we have allowed the State to deny other such rights:
when it is necessary to enable the trial to proceed in an or
derly fashion. That overriding necessity, we have said,
justifies forfeiture of even the Sixth Amendment right to be
present at trial—if, after being threatened with removal,
a defendant “insists on conducting himself in a manner
so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that
his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom.”
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 343 (1970). A pro se de
fendant may not “abuse the dignity of the courtroom,” nor
may he fail to “comply with relevant rules of procedural
and substantive law,” and a court may “terminate” the
self-representation of a defendant who “deliberately en
gages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” Faretta,
supra, at 834–835, n. 46. This ground for terminating self
representation is unavailable here, however, because Ed

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wards was not even allowed to begin to represent himself,
and because he was respectful and compliant and did not
provide a basis to conclude a trial could not have gone for
ward had he been allowed to press his own claims.
Beyond this circumstance, we have never constrained the
ability of a defendant to retain “actual control over the case
he chooses to present to the jury”—what we have termed
“the core of the Faretta right.” Wiggins, 465 U. S., at 178.
Thus, while Faretta recognized that the right of self
representation does not bar the court from appointing
standby counsel, we explained in Wiggins that “[t]he pro se
defendant must be allowed to control the organization and
content of his own defense, to make motions, to argue points
of law, to participate in voir dire, to question witnesses, and
to address the court and the jury at appropriate points in the
trial.” 465 U. S., at 174. Furthermore, because “multiple
voices ‘for the defense’ ” could “confuse the message the de
fendant wishes to convey,” id., at 177, a standby attorney’s
participation would be barred when it would “destroy the
jury’s perception that the defendant is representing himself,”
id., at 178.
As I have explained, I would not adopt an approach to the
right of self-representation that we have squarely rejected
for other rights—allowing courts to disregard the right when
doing so serves the purposes for which the right was in
tended. But if I were to adopt such an approach, I would
remain in dissent, because I believe the Court’s assessment
of the purposes of the right of self-representation is inaccu
rate to boot. While there is little doubt that preserving in
dividual “ ‘dignity’ ” (to which the Court refers), ante, at 176,
is paramount among those purposes, there is equally little
doubt that the loss of “dignity” the right is designed to pre
vent is not the defendant’s making a fool of himself by pre
senting an amateurish or even incoherent defense. Rather,
the dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being
master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the State—the

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dignity of individual choice. Faretta explained that the
Sixth Amendment’s counsel clause should not be invoked to
impair “ ‘the exercise of [the defendant’s] free choice’ ” to dis
pense with the right, 422 U. S., at 815 (quoting Adams, 317
U. S., at 280); for “whatever else may be said of those who
wrote the Bill of Rights, surely there can be no doubt that
they understood the inestimable worth of free choice,” 422
U. S., at 833–834. Nine years later, when we wrote in Wig
gins that the self-representation right served the “dignity
and autonomy of the accused,” 465 U. S., at 177, we explained
in no uncertain terms that this meant according every de
fendant the right to his say in court. In particular, we said
that individual dignity and autonomy barred standby counsel
from participating in a manner that would “destroy the jury’s
perception that the defendant is representing himself,” and
meant that “the pro se defendant is entitled to preserve
actual control over the case he chooses to present to the
jury.” Id., at 178. In sum, if the Court is to honor the
particular conception of “dignity” that underlies the self
representation right, it should respect the autonomy of the
individual by honoring his choices knowingly and voluntar
ily made.
A further purpose that the Court finds is advanced by
denial of the right of self-representation is the purpose of
ensuring that trials “appear fair to all who observe them.”
Ante, at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted). To my
knowledge we have never denied a defendant a right simply
on the ground that it would make his trial appear less “fair”
to outside observers, and I would not inaugurate that princi
ple here. But were I to do so, I would not apply it to deny
a defendant the right to represent himself when he know
ingly and voluntarily waives counsel. When Edwards stood
to say that “I have a defense that I would like to represent
or present to the Judge,” App. 523a, it seems to me the epit
ome of both actual and apparent unfairness for the judge to
say, I have heard “your desire to proceed by yourself and

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I’ve denied your request, so your attorney will speak for you
from now on,” id., at 530a.
III
It may be that the Court permits a State to deprive men
tally ill defendants of a historic component of a fair trial
because it is suspicious of the constitutional footing of the
right of self-representation itself. The right is not explicitly
set forth in the text of the Sixth Amendment, and some
Members of this Court have expressed skepticism about
Faretta’s holding. See Martinez, 528 U. S., at 156–158 (ques
tioning relevance of historical evidence underlying Faretta’s
holding); 528 U. S., at 164 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting
“judges closer to the firing line have sometimes expressed
dismay about the practical consequences” of the right of
self-representation).
While the Sixth Amendment makes no mention of the
right to forgo counsel, it provides the defendant, and not his
lawyer, the right to call witnesses in his defense and to con
front witnesses against him, and counsel is permitted to as
sist in “his defence” (emphasis added). Our trial system,
however, allows the attorney representing a defendant “full
authority to manage the conduct of the trial”—an authority
without which “[t]he adversary process could not function
effectively.” Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U. S. 400, 418 (1988); see
also Florida v. Nixon, 543 U. S. 175, 187 (2004). We have
held that “the client must accept the consequences of the
lawyer’s decision to forgo cross-examination, to decide not to
put certain witnesses on the stand, or to decide not to dis
close the identity of certain witnesses in advance of trial.”
Taylor, supra, at 418. Thus, in order for the defendant’s
right to call his own witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses,
and to put on a defense to be anything more than “a tenuous
and unacceptable legal fiction,” a defendant must have con
sented to the representation of counsel. Faretta, 422 U. S.,
at 821. Otherwise, “the defense presented is not the de

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fense guaranteed him by the Constitution, for, in a very real
sense, it is not his defense.” Ibid.
The facts of this case illustrate this point with the utmost
clarity. Edwards wished to take a self-defense case to the
jury. His counsel preferred a defense that focused on lack
of intent. Having been denied the right to conduct his own
defense, Edwards was convicted without having had the op
portunity to present to the jury the grounds he believed sup
ported his innocence. I do not doubt that he likely would
have been convicted anyway. But to hold that a defendant
may be deprived of the right to make legal arguments for
acquittal simply because a state-selected agent has made dif
ferent arguments on his behalf is, as Justice Frankfurter
wrote in Adams, supra, at 280, to “imprison a man in his
privileges and call it the Constitution.” In singling out
mentally ill defendants for this treatment, the Court’s opin
ion does not even have the questionable virtue of being polit
ically correct. At a time when all society is trying to main
stream the mentally impaired, the Court permits them to be
deprived of a basic constitutional right—for their own good.
Today’s holding is extraordinarily vague. The Court does
not accept Indiana’s position that self-representation can be
denied “ ‘where the defendant cannot communicate coher
ently with the court or a jury,’ ” ante, at 178. It does not
even hold that Edwards was properly denied his right to
represent himself. It holds only that lack of mental compe
tence can under some circumstances form a basis for denying
the right to proceed pro se, ante, at 167. We will presum
ably give some meaning to this holding in the future, but the
indeterminacy makes a bad holding worse. Once the right
of self-representation for the mentally ill is a sometime
thing, trial judges will have every incentive to make their
lives easier—to avoid the painful necessity of deciphering
occasional pleadings of the sort contained in the Appendix to
today’s opinion—by appointing knowledgeable and literate
counsel.

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Because I think a defendant who is competent to stand
trial, and who is capable of knowing and voluntary waiver of
assistance of counsel, has a constitutional right to conduct
his own defense, I respectfully dissent.