PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al. v. SUMMUM

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460 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
PLEASANT GROVE CITY, UTAH, et al. v. SUMMUM
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the tenth circuit
No. 07–665. Argued November 12, 2008—Decided February 25, 2009
Pioneer Park (Park), a public park in petitioner Pleasant Grove City
(City), has at least 11 permanent, privately donated displays, including
a Ten Commandments monument. In rejecting the request of respond
ent Summum, a religious organization, to erect a monument containing
the Seven Aphorisms of Summum, the City explained that it limited
Park monuments to those either directly related to the City’s history or
donated by groups with longstanding community ties. After the City
put that policy and other criteria into writing, respondent renewed its
request, but did not describe the monument’s historical significance or
respondent’s connection to the community. The City rejected the re
quest, and respondent filed suit, claiming that the City and petitioner
officials had violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause by
accepting the Ten Commandments monument but rejecting respondent’s
proposed monument. The District Court denied respondent’s prelimi
nary injunction request, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. Noting that
it had previously found the Ten Commandments monument to be private
rather than government speech and that public parks have traditionally
been regarded as public forums, the court held that, because the exclu
sion of the monument was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny, the City
was required to erect it immediately.
Held: The placement of a permanent monument in a public park is a form
of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the
Free Speech Clause. Pp. 467–481.
(a) Because that Clause restricts government regulation of private
speech but not government speech, whether petitioners were engaging
in their own expressive conduct or providing a forum for private speech
determines which precedents govern here. Pp. 467–470.
(1) A government entity “is entitled to say what it wishes,” Rosen
berger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 833, and to
select the views that it wants to express, see, e. g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U. S. 173, 194. It may exercise this same freedom when it receives
private assistance for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled
message. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550,
562. This does not mean that there are no restraints on government
speech. For example, government speech must comport with the Es

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Syllabus
tablishment Clause. In addition, public officials’ involvement in advo
cacy may be limited by law, regulation, or practice; and a government
entity is ultimately “accountable to the electorate and the political proc
ess for its advocacy,” Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v.
Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 235. Pp. 467–469.
(2) In contrast, government entities are strictly limited in their
ability to regulate private speech in “traditional public fora.” Corne
lius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800.
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed, see Perry
Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45, but
content-based restrictions must satisfy strict scrutiny, i. e., they must
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, see
Cornelius, supra, at 800. Restrictions based on viewpoint are also pro
hibited. Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 463. Government restrictions
on speech in a “designated public forum” are subject to the same strict
scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum. Cornelius, supra,
at 800. And where government creates a forum that is limited to use
by certain groups or dedicated to the discussion of certain subjects,
Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 46, n. 7, it may impose reasonable and
viewpoint-neutral restrictions, see Good News Club v. Milford Central
School, 533 U. S. 98, 106–107. Pp. 469–470.
(b) Permanent monuments displayed on public property typically
represent government speech. Governments have long used monu
ments to speak to the public. Thus, a government-commissioned and
government-financed monument placed on public land constitutes gov
ernment speech. So, too, are privately financed and donated monu
ments that the government accepts for public display on government
land. While government entities regularly accept privately funded or
donated monuments, their general practice has been one of selective
receptivity. Because city parks play an important role in defining the
identity that a city projects to its residents and the outside world, cities
take care in accepting donated monuments, selecting those that por
tray what the government decisionmakers view as appropriate for the
place in question, based on esthetics, history, and local culture. The
accepted monuments are meant to convey and have the effect of con
veying a government message and thus constitute government speech.
Pp. 470–472.
(c) Here, the Park’s monuments clearly represent government speech.
Although many were donated in completed form by private entities,
the City has “effectively controlled” their messages by exercising “final
approval authority” over their selection. Johanns, supra, at 560–561.
The City has selected monuments that present the image that the City
wishes to project to Park visitors; it has taken ownership of most of the

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462 PLEASANT GROVE CITY v. SUMMUM
Syllabus
monuments in the Park, including the Ten Commandments monument;
and it has now expressly set out selection criteria. Pp. 472–473.
(d) Respondent’s legitimate concern that the government speech doc
trine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain viewpoints does
not mean that a government entity should be required to embrace pub
licly a privately donated monument’s “message” in order to escape Free
Speech Clause restrictions. A city engages in expressive conduct by
accepting and displaying a privately donated monument, but it does not
necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular donor sees
in the monument. A government’s message may be altered by the sub
sequent addition of other monuments in the same vicinity. It may also
change over time. Pp. 473–478.
(e) “[P]ublic forum principles . . . are out of place in the context of
this case.” United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U. S.
194, 205. The forum doctrine applies where a government property or
program is capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers
without defeating the essential function of the land or program, but
public parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent mon
uments. If governments must maintain viewpoint neutrality in select
ing donated monuments, they must either prepare for cluttered parks or
face pressure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments. Were
public parks considered traditional public forums for the purpose of
erecting privately donated monuments, most parks would have little
choice but to refuse all such donations. And if forum analysis would
lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, forum analysis is out of
place. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S.
753, distinguished. Pp. 478–480.
483 F. 3d 1044, reversed.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.,
joined. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg, J.,
joined, post, p. 481. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which
Thomas, J., joined, post, p. 482. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion,
post, p. 484. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
post, p. 485.
Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for petitioners. With
him on the briefs were Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, James
M. Henderson, Sr., Walter M. Weber, Thomas P. Monaghan,
Francis J. Manion, Edward L. White III, Geoffrey R. Sur
tees, John P. Tuskey, Laura B. Hernandez, Patricia A. Mil

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463 Cite as: 555 U. S. 460 (2009)
Counsel
lett, Vincent P. McCarthy, Ann-Louise Lohr, Kristina J.
Wenberg, Shannon D. Woodruff, and Erik M. Zimmerman.
Deputy Solicitor General Joseffer argued the cause for
the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. On the
brief were former Solicitor General Garre, Assistant Attor
ney General Katsas, Deputy Solicitor General Kneedler,
Toby J. Heytens, Robert M. Loeb, Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr., and
Randolph J. Myers.
Pamela Harris argued the cause for respondent. With
her on the brief were Walter Dellinger, Irving L. Gorn
stein, Shannon Pazur, Brian M. Barnard, and Martin S.
Lederman.*
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Common
wealth of Virginia et al. by Robert F. McDonnell, Attorney General of
Virginia, William E. Thro, State Solicitor General, Stephen R. McCul
lough, Deputy State Solicitor General, and William C. Mims, Chief Dep
uty Attorney General, by Roberto J. Sa´ nchez-Ramos, Secretary of Justice
of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States
as follows: Troy King of Alabama, John W. Suthers of Colorado, Bill Mc-
Collum of Florida, James D. Caldwell of Louisiana, Michael A. Cox of
Michigan, Kelly A. Ayotte of New Hampshire, Hardy Myers of Oregon,
Thomas W. Corbett, Jr., of Pennsylvania, Henry McMaster of South Caro
lina, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, Robert E. Cooper, Jr., of Tennes
see, Greg Abbott of Texas, and Mark L. Shurtleff of Utah; for the City of
New York by Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, Edward F. X.
Hart, and Jane L. Gordon; for the City of Casper, Wyoming, et al. by
Patrick T. Gillen, William C. Luben, Kathryn L. Walker, James L.
Charles, Charles Whitman, Robert West, and Patricia K. Kelly; for the
Alliance Defense Fund et al. by Benjamin W. Bull, Jordan W. Lorence,
Kevin H. Theriot, and William L. Saunders; for the American Catholic
Lawyers Association by Edward C. Lyons; for the American Humanist
Association et al. by Robert V. Ritter; for the American Jewish Committee
et al. by Ayesha N. Khan, Richard B. Katskee, Aram A. Schvey, Heather
L. Weaver, Jeffrey P. Sinensky, Kara H. Stein, Steven M. Freeman, Steven
C. Sheinberg, K. Hollyn Hollman, Kathryn Kolbert, and Judith E. Schaef
fer; for the American Legion et al. by Kelly J. Shackelford, Hiram S.
Sasser III, Daniel J. Murphy, Philip B. Onderdonk, Jr., and Lawrence M.
Maher; for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. by Kevin J. Has
son and Eric C. Rassbach; for Faith and Action et al. by Bernard P. Reese;
for the Foundation for Free Expression by Deborah J. Dewart and James

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464 PLEASANT GROVE CITY v. SUMMUM
Opinion of the Court
Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment entitles a private group to
insist that a municipality permit it to place a permanent
monument in a city park in which other donated monuments
were previously erected. The Court of Appeals held that
the municipality was required to accept the monument be
cause a public park is a traditional public forum. We con
clude, however, that although a park is a traditional public
forum for speeches and other transitory expressive acts, the
display of a permanent monument in a public park is not a
form of expression to which forum analysis applies. In
stead, the placement of a permanent monument in a public
park is best viewed as a form of government speech and is
therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech
Clause.
I
A
Pioneer Park (or Park) is a 2.5-acre public park located in
the Historic District of Pleasant Grove City (or City) in
Utah. The Park currently contains 15 permanent displays,
at least 11 of which were donated by private groups or indi-
L. Hirsen; for the Foundation for Moral Law et al. by Gregory M. Jones
and Benjamin D. Dupre´; for the International Municipal Lawyers Associa
tion by Mary Jean Dolan; for the James Madison Center for Free Speech
by James Bopp, Jr.; for the Jewish Social Policy Action Network et al. by
Theodore R. Mann, Seth Kreimer, and Jeffrey I. Pasek; for Liberty Coun
sel by Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Steve Crampton, and Mary E.
McAlister; and for the National Legal Foundation by Steven W. Fitschen
and Barry C. Hodge.
Marc D. Stern filed a brief for the American Jewish Congress as amicus
curiae urging affirmance.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Boy Scouts of America by
George A. Davidson, Carla A. Kerr, Savvas A. Foukas, Scott H. Christen
sen, and David K. Park; for the Center for Inquiry et al. by Barry Levens
tam and Ronald A. Lindsay; and for the Rutherford Institute by John W.
Whitehead and James J. Knicely.

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viduals. These include a historic granary, a wishing well,
the City’s first fire station, a September 11 monument, and
a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles in 1971.
Respondent Summum is a religious organization founded
in 1975 and headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah. On two
separate occasions in 2003, Summum’s president wrote a let
ter to the City’s mayor requesting permission to erect a
“stone monument,” which would contain “the Seven Apho
risms of SUMMUM” 1 and be similar in size and nature to
the Ten Commandments monument. App. 57, 59. The City
denied the requests and explained that its practice was to
limit monuments in the Park to those that “either (1) directly
relate to the history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated
by groups with long-standing ties to the Pleasant Grove
community. ” Id., at 61. The following year, the City
passed a resolution putting this policy into writing. The
resolution also mentioned other criteria, such as safety and
esthetics.
1 Respondent’s brief describes the church and the Seven Aphorisms as
follows:
“The Summum church incorporates elements of Gnostic Christianity,
teaching that spiritual knowledge is experiential and that through devo
tion comes revelation, which ‘modifies human perceptions, and transfigures
the individual.’ See The Teachings of Summum are the Teachings of
Gnostic Christianity, http://www.summum.us/philosophy/gnosticism.shtml
(visited Aug. 15, 2008).
“Central to Summum religious belief and practice are the Seven Princi
ples of Creation (the ‘Seven Aphorisms’). According to Summum doc
trine, the Seven Aphorisms were inscribed on the original tablets handed
down by God to Moses on Mount Sinai. . . . Because Moses believed that
the Israelites were not ready to receive the Aphorisms, he shared them
only with a select group of people. In the Summum Exodus account,
Moses then destroyed the original tablets, traveled back to Mount Sinai,
and returned with a second set of tablets containing the Ten Command
ments. See The Aphorisms of Summum and the Ten Commandments,
http://www.summum.us/philosophy/tencommandments.shtml (visited Aug.
15, 2008).” Brief for Respondent 1–2.

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In May 2005, respondent’s president again wrote to the
mayor asking to erect a monument, but the letter did not
describe the monument, its historical significance, or Sum
mum’s connection to the community. The city council re
jected this request.
B
In 2005, respondent filed this action against the City
and various local officials (petitioners), asserting, among
other claims, that petitioners had violated the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment by accepting the Ten Com
mandments monument but rejecting the proposed Seven
Aphorisms monument. Respondent sought a prelimi
nary injunction directing the City to permit Summum to
erect its monument in Pioneer Park. After the District
Court denied Summum’s preliminary injunction request,
No. 2:05CV00638, 2006 WL 3421838 (D Utah, Nov. 22, 2006),
respondent appealed, pressing solely its free speech claim.
A panel of the Tenth Circuit reversed. 483 F. 3d 1044
(2007). The panel noted that it had previously found the Ten
Commandments monument to be private rather than govern
ment speech. See Summum v. Ogden, 297 F. 3d 995 (2002).
Noting that public parks have traditionally been regarded as
public forums, the panel held that the City could not reject
the Seven Aphorisms monument unless it had a compelling
justification that could not be served by more narrowly tai
lored means. See 483 F. 3d, at 1054. The panel then con
cluded that the exclusion of respondent’s monument was un
likely to survive this strict scrutiny, and the panel therefore
held that the City was required to erect Summum’s monu
ment immediately.
The Tenth Circuit denied the City’s petition for rehearing
en banc by an equally divided vote. 499 F. 3d 1170 (2007).
Judge Lucero dissented, arguing that the Park was not a
traditional public forum for the purpose of displaying monu
ments. Id., at 1171. Judge McConnell also dissented, con

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tending that the monuments in the Park constitute govern
ment speech. Id., at 1174.
We granted certiorari, 552 U. S. 1294 (2008), and now
reverse.
II
No prior decision of this Court has addressed the applica
tion of the Free Speech Clause to a government entity’s ac
ceptance of privately donated, permanent monuments for in
stallation in a public park, and the parties disagree sharply
about the line of precedents that governs this situation.
Petitioners contend that the pertinent cases are those con
cerning government speech. Respondent, on the other
hand, agrees with the Court of Appeals panel that the appli
cable cases are those that analyze private speech in a public
forum. The parties’ fundamental disagreement thus centers
on the nature of petitioners’ conduct when they permitted
privately donated monuments to be erected in Pioneer Park.
Were petitioners engaging in their own expressive conduct?
Or were they providing a forum for private speech?
A
If petitioners were engaging in their own expressive con
duct, then the Free Speech Clause has no application. The
Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of pri
vate speech; it does not regulate government speech. See
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 553
(2005) (“[T]he Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from
First Amendment scrutiny”); Columbia Broadcasting Sys
tem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U. S. 94,
139, n. 7 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Government is not
restrained by the First Amendment from controlling its own
expression”). A government entity has the right to “speak
for itself.” Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v.
Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 229 (2000). “[I]t is entitled to say
what it wishes,” Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ.

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of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 833 (1995), and to select the views that
it wants to express, see Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 194
(1991); National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U. S.
569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (“It is
the very business of government to favor and disfavor points
of view”).
Indeed, it is not easy to imagine how government could
function if it lacked this freedom. “If every citizen were to
have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express
a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great
concern to the public would be limited to those in the private
sector, and the process of government as we know it radi
cally transformed.” Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U. S. 1,
12–13 (1990). See also Johanns, 544 U. S., at 574 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (“To govern, government has to say some
thing, and a First Amendment heckler’s veto of any forced
contribution to raising the government’s voice in the ‘mar
ketplace of ideas’ would be out of the question” (footnote
omitted)).
A government entity may exercise this same freedom to
express its views when it receives assistance from private
sources for the purpose of delivering a government
controlled message. See id., at 562 (opinion of the Court)
(where the government controls the message, “it is not pre
cluded from relying on the government-speech doctrine
merely because it solicits assistance from nongovernmental
sources”); Rosenberger, supra, at 833 (a government entity
may “regulate the content of what is or is not expressed . . .
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message”).
This does not mean that there are no restraints on govern
ment speech. For example, government speech must com
port with the Establishment Clause. The involvement of
public officials in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation,
or practice. And of course, a government entity is ulti
mately “accountable to the electorate and the political proc
ess for its advocacy.” Southworth, 529 U. S., at 235. “If the

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citizenry objects, newly elected officials later could espouse
some different or contrary position.” Ibid.
B
While government speech is not restricted by the Free
Speech Clause, the government does not have a free hand
to regulate private speech on government property. This
Court long ago recognized that members of the public retain
strong free speech rights when they venture into public
streets and parks, “which ‘have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.’ ” Perry
Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45
(1983) (quoting Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organi
zation, 307 U. S. 496, 515 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.)). In
order to preserve this freedom, government entities are
strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech in
such “traditional public fora.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800 (1985). Rea
sonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed, see
Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 45, but any restriction based on
the content of the speech must satisfy strict scrutiny, that is,
the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a compel
ling government interest, see Cornelius, supra, at 800, and
restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited, see Carey v.
Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 463 (1980).
With the concept of the traditional public forum as a start
ing point, this Court has recognized that members of the
public have free speech rights on other types of government
property and in certain other government programs that
share essential attributes of a traditional public forum. We
have held that a government entity may create “a designated
public forum” if government property that has not tradition
ally been regarded as a public forum is intentionally opened
up for that purpose. See Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 802. Gov

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ernment restrictions on speech in a designated public forum
are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a
traditional public forum. Id., at 800.
The Court has also held that a government entity may
create a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or
dedicated solely to the discussion of certain subjects. Perry
Ed. Assn., supra, at 46, n. 7. In such a forum, a government
entity may impose restrictions on speech that are reasonable
and viewpoint neutral. See Good News Club v. Milford
Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 106–107 (2001).
III
There may be situations in which it is difficult to tell
whether a government entity is speaking on its own behalf
or is providing a forum for private speech, but this case does
not present such a situation. Permanent monuments dis
played on public property typically represent government
speech.
Governments have long used monuments to speak to the
public. Since ancient times, kings, emperors, and other rul
ers have erected statues of themselves to remind their
subjects of their authority and power. Triumphal arches,
columns, and other monuments have been built to commemo
rate military victories and sacrifices and other events of civic
importance. A monument, by definition, is a structure that
is designed as a means of expression. When a government
entity arranges for the construction of a monument, it does
so because it wishes to convey some thought or instill some
feeling in those who see the structure. Neither the Court
of Appeals nor respondent disputes the obvious proposition
that a monument that is commissioned and financed by a
government body for placement on public land constitutes
government speech.
Just as government-commissioned and government
financed monuments speak for the government, so do pri
vately financed and donated monuments that the govern

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ment accepts and displays to the public on government land.
It certainly is not common for property owners to open up
their property for the installation of permanent monuments
that convey a message with which they do not wish to be
associated. And because property owners typically do not
permit the construction of such monuments on their land,
persons who observe donated monuments routinely—and
reasonably—interpret them as conveying some message on
the property owner’s behalf. In this context, there is little
chance that observers will fail to appreciate the identity of
the speaker. This is true whether the monument is located
on private property or on public property, such as national,
state, or city park land.
We think it is fair to say that throughout our Nation’s his
tory, the general government practice with respect to do
nated monuments has been one of selective receptivity. A
great many of the monuments that adorn the Nation’s public
parks were financed with private funds or donated by pri
vate parties. Sites managed by the National Park Service
contain thousands of privately designed or funded commemo
rative objects, including the Statue of Liberty, the Marine
Corps War Memorial (the Iwo Jima monument), and the
Vietnam Veterans Memorial. States and cities likewise
have received thousands of donated monuments. See, e. g.,
App. to Brief for International Municipal Lawyers Associa
tion as Amicus Curiae 15a–29a (hereinafter IMLA Brief)
(listing examples); Brief for American Legion et al. as Amici
Curiae 7, and n. 2 (same). By accepting monuments that
are privately funded or donated, government entities save
tax dollars and are able to acquire monuments that they
could not have afforded to fund on their own.
But while government entities regularly accept privately
funded or donated monuments, they have exercised selec
tivity. An example discussed by the city of New York as
amicus curiae is illustrative. In the wake of the contro
versy generated in 1876 when the city rejected the donor’s

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proposed placement of a donated monument to honor Daniel
Webster, the city adopted rules governing the acceptance of
artwork for permanent placement in city parks, requiring,
among other things, that “any proposed gift of art had to be
viewed either in its finished condition or as a model before
acceptance.” Brief for City of New York as Amicus Curiae
4–5 (hereinafter NYC Brief). Across the country, “munici
palities generally exercise editorial control over donated
monuments through prior submission requirements, de
sign input, requested modifications, written criteria, and
legislative approvals of specific content proposals.” IMLA
Brief 21.
Public parks are often closely identified in the public mind
with the government unit that owns the land. City parks—
ranging from those in small towns, like Pioneer Park in
Pleasant Grove City, to those in major metropolises, like
Central Park in New York City—commonly play an impor
tant role in defining the identity that a city projects to its
own residents and to the outside world. Accordingly, cities
and other jurisdictions take some care in accepting donated
monuments. Government decisionmakers select the monu
ments that portray what they view as appropriate for the
place in question, taking into account such content-based fac
tors as esthetics, history, and local culture. The monuments
that are accepted, therefore, are meant to convey and have
the effect of conveying a government message, and they thus
constitute government speech.
IV
A
In this case, it is clear that the monuments in Pleasant
Grove’s Pioneer Park represent government speech. Al
though many of the monuments were not designed or built
by the City and were donated in completed form by private
entities, the City decided to accept those donations and to
display them in the Park. Respondent does not claim that

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the City ever opened up the Park for the placement of what
ever permanent monuments might be offered by private do
nors. Rather, the City has “effectively controlled” the mes
sages sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising “final
approval authority” over their selection. Johanns, 544
U. S., at 560–561. The City has selected those monuments
that it wants to display for the purpose of presenting the
image of the City that it wishes to project to all who frequent
the Park; it has taken ownership of most of the monuments
in the Park, including the Ten Commandments monument
that is the focus of respondent’s concern; and the City has
now expressly set forth the criteria it will use in making
future selections.
B
Respondent voices the legitimate concern that the govern
ment speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favor
ing certain private speakers over others based on viewpoint.
Respondent’s suggested solution is to require a government
entity accepting a privately donated monument to go
through a formal process of adopting a resolution publicly
embracing “the message” that the monument conveys. See
Brief for Respondent 33–34, 57.
We see no reason for imposing a requirement of this sort.
The parks of this country contain thousands of donated mon
uments that government entities have used for their own
expressive purposes, usually without producing the sort of
formal documentation that respondent now says is required
to escape Free Speech Clause restrictions. Requiring all of
these jurisdictions to go back and proclaim formally that
they adopt all of these monuments as their own expressive
vehicles would be a pointless exercise that the Constitution
does not mandate.
In this case, for example, although respondent argues that
Pleasant Grove City has not adequately “controll[ed] the
message,” id., at 31, of the Ten Commandments monument,
the City took ownership of that monument and put it on per

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manent display in a park that it owns and manages and that
is linked to the City’s identity. All rights previously pos
sessed by the monument’s donor have been relinquished.
The City’s actions provided a more dramatic form of adoption
than the sort of formal endorsement that respondent would
demand, unmistakably signifying to all Park visitors that the
City intends the monument to speak on its behalf. And the
City has made no effort to abridge the traditional free speech
rights—the right to speak, distribute leaflets, etc.—that may
be exercised by respondent and others in Pioneer Park.
What respondent demands, however, is that the City
“adopt” or “embrace” “the message” that it associates with
the monument. Id., at 33–34, 57. Respondent seems to
think that a monument can convey only one “message”—
which is, presumably, the message intended by the donor—
and that, if a government entity that accepts a monument
for placement on its property does not formally embrace that
message, then the government has not engaged in expres
sive conduct.
This argument fundamentally misunderstands the way
monuments convey meaning. The meaning conveyed by a
monument is generally not a simple one like “ ‘Beef. It’s
What’s for Dinner.’ ” Johanns, supra, at 554. Even when
a monument features the written word, the monument may
be intended to be interpreted, and may in fact be interpreted
by different observers, in a variety of ways. Monuments
called to our attention by the briefing in this case illustrate
this phenomenon.
What, for example, is “the message” of the Greco-Roman
mosaic of the word “Imagine” that was donated to New York
City’s Central Park in memory of John Lennon? See NYC
Brief 18; App. to id., at A5. Some observers may “imagine”
the musical contributions that John Lennon would have
made if he had not been killed. Others may think of the
lyrics of the Lennon song that obviously inspired the mosaic

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and may “imagine” a world without religion, countries, pos
sessions, greed, or hunger.2
Or, to take another example, what is “the message” of
the “large bronze statue displaying the word ‘peace’ in
many world languages” that is displayed in Fayetteville,
Arkansas? 3
These text-based monuments are almost certain to evoke
different thoughts and sentiments in the minds of different
observers, and the effect of monuments that do not contain
text is likely to be even more variable. Consider, for exam
2 The lyrics are as follows:
“Imagine there’s no heaven
It’s easy if you try
No hell below us
Above us only sky
Imagine all the people
Living for today . . .
“Imagine there’s no countries
It isn’t hard to do
Nothing to kill or die for
And no religion too
Imagine all the people
Living life in peace . . .
“You may say I’m a dreamer
But I’m not the only one
I hope someday you’ll join us
And the world will be as one
“Imagine no possessions
I wonder if you can
No need for greed or hunger
A brotherhood of man
Imagine all the people
Sharing all the world . . .
“You may say I’m a dreamer
But I’m not the only one
I hope someday you’ll join us
And the world will live as one.” J. Lennon, Imagine, on Imagine (Apple
Records 1971).
3 See IMLA Brief 6–7.

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ple, the statue of Pancho Villa that was given to the city of
Tucson, Arizona, in 1981 by the Government of Mexico with,
according to a Tucson publication, “a wry sense of irony.” 4
Does this statue commemorate a “revolutionary leader who
advocated for agrarian reform and the poor” or “a violent
bandit”? IMLA Brief 13.
Contrary to respondent’s apparent belief, it frequently is
not possible to identify a single “message” that is conveyed
by an object or structure, and consequently, the thoughts or
sentiments expressed by a government entity that accepts
and displays such an object may be quite different from those
of either its creator or its donor.5 By accepting a privately
donated monument and placing it on city property, a city
engages in expressive conduct, but the intended and per
ceived significance of that conduct may not coincide with the
thinking of the monument’s donor or creator. Indeed, when
a privately donated memorial is funded by many small dona
tions, the donors themselves may differ in their interpreta
tion of the monument’s significance.6 By accepting such a
monument, a government entity does not necessarily endorse
4 The Presidio Trail: A Historical Walking Tour of Downtown Tucson, on
line at http://www.visittucson.org/includes/media/docs/DowntownTour.pdf
(as visited Feb. 24, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).
5 Museum collections illustrate this phenomenon. Museums display
works of art that express many different sentiments, and the significance
of a donated work of art to its creator or donor may differ markedly from
a museum’s reasons for accepting and displaying the work. For example,
a painting of a religious scene may have been commissioned and painted
to express religious thoughts and feelings. Even if the painting is do
nated to the museum by a patron who shares those thoughts and feelings,
it does not follow that the museum, by displaying the painting, intends to
convey or is perceived as conveying the same “message.”
6 For example, the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund is a private organi
zation that obtained funding from over 650,000 donors for the construction
of the memorial itself. These donors expressed a wide range of personal
sentiments in contributing money for the memorial. See, e. g., J.
Scruggs & J. Swerdlow, To Heal a Nation: The Vietnam Veterans Memorial
23–28, 159 (1985).

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the specific meaning that any particular donor sees in the
monument.
The message that a government entity conveys by allow
ing a monument to remain on its property may also be al
tered by the subsequent addition of other monuments in the
same vicinity. For example, following controversy over the
original design of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, a compro
mise was reached that called for the nearby addition of a
flagstaff and bronze Three Soldiers statue, which many be
lieved changed the overall effect of the memorial. See, e. g.,
J. Mayo, War Memorials as Political Landscape: The Ameri
can Experience and Beyond 202–203, 205 (1988); K. Hass,
Carried to the Wall: American Memory and the Vietnam Vet
erans Memorial 15–18 (1998).
The “message” conveyed by a monument may change over
time. A study of war memorials found that “people reinter
pret” the meaning of these memorials as “historical interpre
tations” and “the society around them changes.” Mayo,
supra, at 8–9.
A striking example of how the interpretation of a monu
ment can evolve is provided by one of the most famous and
beloved public monuments in the United States, the Statue
of Liberty. The statue was given to this country by the
Third French Republic to express republican solidarity and
friendship between the two countries. See J. Res. 6, 44th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1877), 19 Stat. 410 (accepting the statue as
an “expressive and felicitous memorial of the sympathy of
the citizens of our sister Republic”). At the inaugural cere
mony, President Cleveland saw the statue as an emblem of
international friendship and the widespread influence of
American ideals. See Inauguration of the Statue of Liberty
Enlightening the World 30 (1887). Only later did the statue
come to be viewed as a beacon welcoming immigrants to a
land of freedom. See Public Papers of the Presidents, Ron
ald Reagan, Vol. 2, July 3, 1986, pp. 918–919 (1989), Remarks
at the Opening Ceremonies of the Statue of Liberty Centen

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nial Celebration in New York, New York; J. Higham, The
Transformation of the Statue of Liberty, in Send These To
Me 74–80 (rev. ed. 1984).
C
Respondent and the Court of Appeals analogize the instal
lation of permanent monuments in a public park to the deliv
ery of speeches and the holding of marches and demonstra
tions, and they thus invoke the rule that a public park is a
traditional public forum for these activities. But “public
forum principles . . . are out of place in the context of this
case.” United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539
U. S. 194, 205 (2003) (plurality opinion). The forum doctrine
has been applied in situations in which government-owned
property or a government program was capable of accommo
dating a large number of public speakers without defeating
the essential function of the land or the program. For exam
ple, a park can accommodate many speakers and, over time,
many parades and demonstrations. The Combined Federal
Campaign permits hundreds of groups to solicit donations
from federal employees. See Cornelius, 473 U. S., at 804–
805. A public university’s student activity fund can provide
money for many campus activities. See Rosenberger, 515
U. S., at 825. A public university’s buildings may offer
meeting space for hundreds of student groups. See Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 274–275 (1981). A school system’s
internal mail facilities can support the transmission of many
messages to and from teachers and school administrators.
See Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U. S., at 39, 46–47. See also Ar
kansas Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U. S. 666, 680–
681 (1998) (noting that allowing any candidate to participate
in a televised political debate would be burdensome on
“logistical grounds” and “would result in less speech, not
more”).
By contrast, public parks can accommodate only a limited
number of permanent monuments. Public parks have been
used, “ ‘time out of mind, . . . for purposes of assembly, com

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municating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions,’ ” Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 45 (quoting Hague,
307 U. S., at 515 (opinion of Roberts, J.)), but “one would be
hard pressed to find a ‘long tradition’ of allowing people to
permanently occupy public space with any manner of monu
ments,” 499 F. 3d, at 1173 (Lucero, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc).
Speakers, no matter how long-winded, eventually come to
the end of their remarks; persons distributing leaflets and
carrying signs at some point tire and go home; monuments,
however, endure. They monopolize the use of the land on
which they stand and interfere permanently with other uses
of public space. A public park, over the years, can provide
a soapbox for a very large number of orators—often, for all
who want to speak—but it is hard to imagine how a public
park could be opened up for the installation of permanent
monuments by every person or group wishing to engage in
that form of expression.
Respondent contends that this issue “can be dealt with
through content-neutral time, place and manner restrictions,
including the option of a ban on all unattended displays.”
Brief for Respondent 14. On this view, when France pre
sented the Statue of Liberty to the United States in 1884,
this country had the option of either (1) declining France’s
offer or (2) accepting the gift, but providing a comparable
location in the harbor of New York for other statues of a
similar size and nature (e. g., a Statue of Autocracy, if one
had been offered by, say, the German Empire or Imperial
Russia).
While respondent and some of its amici deride the fears
expressed about the consequences of the Court of Appeals
holding in this case, those concerns are well founded. If
government entities must maintain viewpoint neutrality in
their selection of donated monuments, they must either
“brace themselves for an influx of clutter” or face the pres
sure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments.

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Opinion of the Court
See 499 F. 3d, at 1175 (McConnell, J., dissenting from denial
of rehearing en banc). Every jurisdiction that has accepted
a donated war memorial may be asked to provide equal
treatment for a donated monument questioning the cause for
which the veterans fought. New York City, having accepted
a donated statue of one heroic dog (Balto, the sled dog who
brought medicine to Nome, Alaska, during a diphtheria epi
demic) 7 may be pressed to accept monuments for other dogs
who are claimed to be equally worthy of commemoration.
The obvious truth of the matter is that if public parks were
considered to be traditional public forums for the purpose of
erecting privately donated monuments, most parks would
have little choice but to refuse all such donations. And
where the application of forum analysis would lead almost
inexorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum
analysis is out of place.
Respondent compares the present case to Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753 (1995),
but that case involved a very different situation—a request
by a private group, the Ku Klux Klan, to erect a cross for a
period of 16 days on public property that had been opened
up for similar temporary displays, including a Christmas tree
and a menorah. See id., at 758. Although some public
parks can accommodate and may be made generally available
for temporary private displays, the same is rarely true for
permanent monuments.
To be sure, there are limited circumstances in which the
forum doctrine might properly be applied to a permanent
monument—for example, if a town created a monument on
which all of its residents (or all those meeting some other
criterion) could place the name of a person to be honored or
some other private message. But as a general matter,
forum analysis simply does not apply to the installation of
permanent monuments on public property.
7 See NYC Brief 2; App. to Brief for American Catholic Lawyers Associ
ation as Amicus Curiae 1a–10.

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481 Cite as: 555 U. S. 460 (2009)
Stevens, J., concurring
V
In sum, we hold that the City’s decision to accept certain
privately donated monuments while rejecting respondent’s
is best viewed as a form of government speech. As a result,
the City’s decision is not subject to the Free Speech Clause,
and the Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise. We
therefore reverse.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins,
concurring.
This case involves a property owner’s rejection of an offer
to place a permanent display on its land. While I join the
Court’s persuasive opinion, I think the reasons justifying the
city’s refusal would have been equally valid if its acceptance
of the monument, instead of being characterized as “govern
ment speech,” had merely been deemed an implicit endorse
ment of the donor’s message. See Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, 801–802 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
To date, our decisions relying on the recently minted gov
ernment speech doctrine to uphold government action have
been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit. See, e. g., Gar
cetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410 (2006); Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550 (2005); Rust v. Sullivan, 500
U. S. 173 (1991). The Court’s opinion in this case signals
no expansion of that doctrine. And by joining the Court’s
opinion, I do not mean to indicate agreement with our earlier
decisions. Unlike other decisions relying on the govern
ment speech doctrine, our decision in this case excuses no
retaliation for, or coercion of, private speech. Cf. Garcetti,
547 U. S., at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting); Rust, 500 U. S., at
212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Nor is it likely, given the
near certainty that observers will associate permanent dis
plays with the governmental property owner, that the gov

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482 PLEASANT GROVE CITY v. SUMMUM
Scalia, J., concurring
ernment will be able to avoid political accountability for the
views that it endorses or expresses through this means.
Cf. Johanns, 544 U. S., at 571–572 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Finally, recognizing permanent displays on public property
as government speech will not give the government free li
cense to communicate offensive or partisan messages. For
even if the Free Speech Clause neither restricts nor protects
government speech, government speakers are bound by the
Constitution’s other proscriptions, including those supplied
by the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses. To
gether with the checks imposed by our democratic processes,
these constitutional safeguards ensure that the effect of to
day’s decision will be limited.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins,
concurring.
As framed and argued by the parties, this case presents a
question under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amend
ment. I agree with the Court’s analysis of that question and
join its opinion in full. But it is also obvious that from the
start, the case has been litigated in the shadow of the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause: the city wary of associ
ating itself too closely with the Ten Commandments monu
ment displayed in the park, lest that be deemed a breach in
the so-called “wall of separation between church and State,”
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1879); respond
ent exploiting that hesitation to argue that the monument is
not government speech because the city has not sufficiently
“adopted” its message. Respondent menacingly observed
that while the city could have formally adopted the monu
ment as its own, that “might of course raise Establishment
Clause issues.” Brief for Respondent 34, n. 11.
The city ought not fear that today’s victory has propelled
it from the Free Speech Clause frying pan into the Establish
ment Clause fire. Contrary to respondent’s intimations,

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Scalia, J., concurring
there are very good reasons to be confident that the park
displays do not violate any part of the First Amendment.
In Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U. S. 677 (2005), this Court
upheld against Establishment Clause challenge a virtually
identical Ten Commandments monument, donated by the
very same organization (the Fraternal Order of Eagles),
which was displayed on the grounds surrounding the Texas
State Capitol. Nothing in that decision suggested that the
outcome turned on a finding that the monument was only
“private” speech. To the contrary, all the Justices agreed
that government speech was at issue, but the Establishment
Clause argument was nonetheless rejected. For the plural
ity, that was because the Ten Commandments “have an unde
niable historical meaning” in addition to their “religious sig
nificance,” id., at 690 (opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.). Justice
Breyer, concurring in the judgment, agreed that the monu
ment conveyed a permissible secular message, as evidenced
by its location in a park that contained multiple monuments
and historical markers; by the fact that it had been donated
by the Eagles “as part of that organization’s efforts to com
bat juvenile delinquency”; and by the length of time (40
years) for which the monument had gone unchallenged. Id.,
at 701–703. See also id., at 739–740 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Even accepting the narrowest reading of the narrowest
opinion necessary to the judgment in Van Orden, there is
little basis to distinguish the monument in this case: Pioneer
Park includes “15 permanent displays,” ante, at 464 (opinion
of the Court); it was donated by the Eagles as part of its
national effort to combat juvenile delinquency, Brief for Re
spondent 3; and it was erected in 1971, ibid., which means it
is approaching its (momentous!) 40th anniversary.
The city can safely exhale. Its residents and visitors can
now return to enjoying Pioneer Park’s wishing well, its his
toric granary—and, yes, even its Ten Commandments monu
ment—without fear that they are complicit in an establish
ment of religion.

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Breyer, J., concurring
Justice Breyer, concurring.
I agree with the Court and join its opinion. I do so, how
ever, on the understanding that the “government speech”
doctrine is a rule of thumb, not a rigid category. Were
Pleasant Grove City (City) to discriminate in the selection of
permanent monuments on grounds unrelated to the display’s
theme, say, solely on political grounds, its action might well
violate the First Amendment.
In my view, courts must apply categories such as “govern
ment speech,” “public forums,” “limited public forums,” and
“nonpublic forums” with an eye toward their purposes—lest
we turn “free speech” doctrine into a jurisprudence of labels.
Cf. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U. S. 720, 740–743 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Consequently, we must sometimes
look beyond an initial categorization. And, in doing so, it
helps to ask whether a government action burdens speech
disproportionately in light of the action’s tendency to further
a legitimate government objective. See, e. g., Ysursa v. Po
catello Ed. Assn., ante, at 365–368 (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 404 (2000) (Breyer, J.,
concurring).
Were we to do so here, we would find—for reasons that
the Court sets forth—that the City’s action, while preventing
Summum from erecting its monument, does not dispropor
tionately restrict Summum’s freedom of expression. The
City has not closed off its parks to speech; no one claims
that the City prevents Summum’s members from engaging
in speech in a form more transient than a permanent monu
ment. Rather, the City has simply reserved some space in
the park for projects designed to further other than free
speech goals. And that is perfectly proper. After all,
parks do not serve speech-related interests alone. To the
contrary, cities use park space to further a variety of recre
ational, historical, educational, esthetic, and other civic inter
ests. To reserve to the City the power to pick and choose

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Souter, J., concurring in judgment
among proposed monuments according to criteria reasonably
related to one or more of these legitimate ends restricts
Summum’s expression, but, given the impracticality of alter
natives and viewed in light of the City’s legitimate needs, the
restriction is not disproportionate. Analyzed either way, as
“government speech” or as a proportionate restriction on
Summum’s expression, the City’s action here is lawful.
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that the Ten Commandments mon
ument is government speech, that is, an expression of a
government’s position on the moral and religious issues
raised by the subject of the monument. See Board of Re
gents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217,
235 (2000) (noting government speech may “promote [gov
ernment’s] own policies or . . . advance a particular idea”).
And although the government should lose when the charac
ter of the speech is at issue and its governmental nature has
not been made clear, see Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 577 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting), I
also agree with the Court that the city need not satisfy the
particular formality urged by Summum as a condition of rec
ognizing that the expression here falls within the public cate
gory. I have qualms, however, about accepting the position
that public monuments are government speech categorically.
See ante, at 470–471 (“Just as government-commissioned and
government-financed monuments speak for the government,
so do privately financed and donated monuments that the
government accepts and displays to the public on govern
ment land”).
Because the government speech doctrine, as Justice Ste
vens notes, ante, at 481 (concurring opinion), is “recently
minted,” it would do well for us to go slow in setting its
bounds, which will affect existing doctrine in ways not yet
explored. Even though, for example, Establishment Clause
issues have been neither raised nor briefed before us, there

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Souter, J., concurring in judgment
is no doubt that this case and its government speech claim
has been litigated by the parties with one eye on the Estab
lishment Clause, see ante, at 482 (Scalia, J., concurring).
The interaction between the “government speech doctrine”
and Establishment Clause principles has not, however,
begun to be worked out.
The case shows that it may not be easy to work out.
After today’s decision, whenever a government maintains a
monument it will presumably be understood to be engaging
in government speech. If the monument has some religious
character, the specter of violating the Establishment Clause
will behoove it to take care to avoid the appearance of a
flatout establishment of religion, in the sense of the govern
ment’s adoption of the tenets expressed or symbolized. In
such an instance, there will be safety in numbers, and it will
be in the interest of a careful government to accept other
monuments to stand nearby, to dilute the appearance of
adopting whatever particular religious position the single ex
ample alone might stand for. As mementoes and testimoni
als pile up, however, the chatter may well make it less intu
itively obvious that the government is speaking in its own
right simply by maintaining the monuments.
If a case like that occurred, as suspicion grew that some
of the permanent displays were not government speech at
all (or at least had an equally private character associated
with private donors), a further Establishment Clause prohi
bition would surface, the bar against preferring some reli
gious speakers over others. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U. S. 38, 113 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The Clause
was also designed to stop the Federal Government from as
serting a preference for one religious denomination or sect
over others”). But the government could well argue, as a
development of government speech doctrine, that when it
expresses its own views, it is free of the Establishment
Clause’s stricture against discriminating among religious

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sects or groups. Under this view of the relationship be
tween the two doctrines, it would be easy for a government
to favor some private religious speakers over others by its
choice of monuments to accept.
Whether that view turns out to be sound is more than I
can say at this point. It is simply unclear how the relatively
new category of government speech will relate to the more
traditional categories of Establishment Clause analysis, and
this case is not an occasion to speculate. It is an occasion,
however, to try to keep the inevitable issues open, and as
simple as they can be. One way to do that is to recognize
that there are circumstances in which government main
tenance of monuments does not look like government speech
at all. Sectarian identifications on markers in Arlington
Cemetery come to mind. And to recognize that is to forgo
any categorical rule at this point.
To avoid relying on a per se rule to say when speech is
governmental, the best approach that occurs to me is to ask
whether a reasonable and fully informed observer would un
derstand the expression to be government speech, as distinct
from private speech the government chooses to oblige by
allowing the monument to be placed on public land. This
reasonable observer test for governmental character is of a
piece with the one for spotting forbidden governmental en
dorsement of religion in the Establishment Clause cases.
See, e. g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U. S. 573, 630, 635–
636 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment). The adoption of it would thus serve coherence
within Establishment Clause law, and it would make sense
of our common understanding that some monuments on pub
lic land display religious symbolism that clearly does not ex
press a government’s chosen views.
Application of this observer test provides the reason I find
the monument here to be government expression.