FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T. A.

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230 OCTOBER TERM, 2008
Syllabus
FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT v. T. A.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 08–305. Argued April 28, 2009—Decided June 22, 2009
After a private specialist diagnosed respondent with learning disabilities,
his parents unilaterally removed him from petitioner public school dis
trict (School District), enrolled him in a private academy, and requested
an administrative hearing on his eligibility for special-education services
under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20
U. S. C. § 1400 et seq. The School District found respondent ineligible
for such services and declined to offer him an individualized education
program (IEP). Concluding that the School District had failed to pro
vide respondent a “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) as re
quired by IDEA, § 1412(a)(1)(A), and that respondent’s private-school
placement was appropriate, the hearing officer ordered the School Dis
trict to reimburse his parents for his private-school tuition. The Dis
trict Court set aside the award, holding that the IDEA Amendments of
1997 (Amendments) categorically bar reimbursement unless a child has
“previously received special education or related services under the
[school’s] authority.” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Reversing, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that the Amendments did not diminish the authority of courts
to grant reimbursement as “appropriate” relief pursuant to § 1415(i)
(2)(C)(iii). See School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of
Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 370.
Held: IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private special-education serv
ices when a public school fails to provide a FAPE and the private-school
placement is appropriate, regardless of whether the child previously re
ceived special-education services through the public school. Pp. 237–248.
(a) This Court held in Burlington and Florence County School Dist.
Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7, that § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) authorizes courts to
reimburse parents for the cost of private-school tuition when a school
district fails to provide a child a FAPE and the private-school placement
is appropriate. That Burlington and Carter involved the deficiency of
a proposed IEP does not distinguish this case, nor does the fact that the
children in Burlington and Carter had previously received special
education services; the Court’s decision in those cases depended on
IDEA’s language and purpose rather than the particular facts involved.
Thus, the reasoning of Burlington and Carter applies unless the 1997
Amendments require a different result. Pp. 237–239.

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Syllabus
(b) The 1997 Amendments do not impose a categorical bar to reim
bursement. The Amendments made no change to the central purpose
of IDEA or the text of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). Because Congress is pre
sumed to be aware of, and to adopt, a judicial interpretation of a statute
when it reenacts that law without change, Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S.
575, 580, this Court will continue to read § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize
reimbursement absent a clear indication that Congress intended to re
peal the provision or abrogate Burlington and Carter. The School Dis
trict’s argument that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) limits reimbursement to chil
dren who have previously received public special-education services is
unpersuasive for several reasons: It is not supported by IDEA’s text, as
the 1997 Amendments do not expressly prohibit reimbursement in this
case, and the School District offers no evidence that Congress intended
to supersede Burlington and Carter; it is at odds with IDEA’s remedial
purpose of “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available
to them a [FAPE] that emphasizes special education . . . designed to
meet their unique needs,” § 1400(d)(1)(A); and it would produce a rule
bordering on the irrational by providing a remedy when a school offers
a child inadequate special-education services but leaving parents reme
diless when the school unreasonably denies access to such services alto
gether. Pp. 239–245.
(c) The School District’s argument that any conditions on accepting
IDEA funds must be stated unambiguously is clearly satisfied here, as
States have been on notice at least since Burlington that IDEA author
izes courts to order reimbursement. The School District’s claims that
respondent’s reading will impose a heavy financial burden on public
schools and encourage parents to enroll their children in private school
without first trying to cooperate with public-school authorities are also
unpersuasive in light of the restrictions on reimbursement awards iden
tified in Burlington and the fact that parents unilaterally change their
child’s placement at their own financial risk. See, e. g., Carter, 510 U. S.,
at 15. Pp. 246–247.
523 F. 3d 1078, affirmed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J.,
and Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Souter, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined, post,
p. 249.
Gary Feinerman argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the briefs were Richard Cohn-Lee, Andrea L. Hun
gerford, and Eamon P. Joyce.

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232 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
Opinion of the Court
Dav id B. Salmons argued the cause for respondent.
With him on the brief were Jason R. Scherr, Goutam Pat
naik, and Mary E. Broadhurst.
Eric D. Miller argued the cause for the United States as
amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief
were Solicitor General Kagan, Acting Assistant Attorney
General King, Deputy Solicitor General Katyal, Mark L.
Gross, Karl N. Gellert, and Philip H. Rosenfelt.*
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or
Act), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. § 1400 et seq., re
quires States receiving federal funding to make a “free ap
propriate public education” (FAPE) available to all children
with disabilities residing in the State, § 1412(a)(1)(A). We
have previously held that when a public school fails to pro
vide a FAPE and a child’s parents place the child in an appro
priate private school without the school district’s consent, a
court may require the district to reimburse the parents for
the cost of the private education. See School Comm. of
Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471 U. S. 359, 370
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the City of New
York by Michael A. Cardozo, Leonard J. Koerner, Michael Best, Edward
F. X. Hart, and Drake A. Colley; for the Council of the Great City Schools
by Julie Wright Halbert, Pamela A. Harris, and Shannon M. Pazur; for
the National Education Association by John M. West, Robert H. Chanin,
and Michael D. Simpson; for the National School Boards Association et al.
by Maree F. Sneed, John W. Borkowski, Audrey J. Anderson, Francisco
M. Negro´ n, Jr., and Naomi Gittins; for the New York State School Boards
Association by Jay Worona and Pilar Sokol; and for the U. S. Conference
of Mayors et al. by Richard Ruda and Donald B. Ayer.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for Autism Speaks
by Robert H. Pees and Gary S. Mayerson; for the Council of Parent Attor
neys and Advocates by Ankur J. Goel and Tamu K. Floyd; for the Disabil
ity Rights Legal Center et al. by Terri D. Keville and Deborah A. Dorf
man; and for the National Disability Rights Network et al. by Brian R.
Matsui, Seth M. Galanter, and Linda A. Arnsbarger.

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(1985). The question presented in this case is whether the
IDEA Amendments of 1997 (Amendments), 111 Stat. 37,
categorically prohibit reimbursement for private-education
costs if a child has not “previously received special education
and related services under the authority of a public agency.”
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). We hold that the Amendments impose
no such categorical bar.
I
Respondent T. A. attended public schools in the Forest
Grove School District (School District or District) from the
time he was in kindergarten through the winter of his ju
nior year of high school. From kindergarten through eighth
grade, respondent’s teachers observed that he had trou
ble paying attention in class and completing his assign
ments. When respondent entered high school, his difficul
ties increased.
In December 2000, during respondent’s freshman year, his
mother contacted the school counselor to discuss respond
ent’s problems with his schoolwork. At the end of the school
year, respondent was evaluated by a school psychologist.
After interviewing him, examining his school records, and
administering cognitive ability tests, the psychologist con
cluded that respondent did not need further testing for any
learning disabilities or other health impairments, including
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The psy
chologist and two other school officials discussed the evalua
tion results with respondent’s mother in June 2001, and all
agreed that respondent did not qualify for special-education
services. Respondent’s parents did not seek review of that
decision, although the hearing examiner later found that the
School District’s evaluation was legally inadequate because
it failed to address all areas of suspected disability, includ
ing ADHD.
With extensive help from his family, respondent completed
his sophomore year at Forest Grove High School, but his
problems worsened during his junior year. In February

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2003, respondent’s parents discussed with the School District
the possibility of respondent completing high school through
a partnership program with the local community college.
They also sought private professional advice, and in March
2003 respondent was diagnosed with ADHD and a number
of disabilities related to learning and memory. Advised by
the private specialist that respondent would do best in a
structured, residential learning environment, respondent’s
parents enrolled him at a private academy that focuses on
educating children with special needs.
Four days after enrolling him in private school, respond
ent’s parents hired a lawyer to ascertain their rights and to
give the School District written notice of respondent’s pri
vate placement. A few weeks later, in April 2003, respond
ent’s parents requested an administrative due process hear
ing regarding respondent’s eligibility for special-education
services. In June 2003, the District engaged a school psy
chologist to assist in determining whether respondent had
a disability that significantly interfered with his educational
performance. Respondent’s parents cooperated with the
District during the evaluation process. In July 2003, a mul
tidisciplinary team met to discuss whether respondent satis
fied IDEA’s disability criteria and concluded that he did not
because his ADHD did not have a sufficiently significant ad
verse impact on his educational performance. Because the
School District maintained that respondent was not eligible
for special-education services and therefore declined to pro
vide an individualized education program (IEP),1 respond
ent’s parents left him enrolled at the private academy for his
senior year.
The administrative review process resumed in September
2003. After considering the parties’ evidence, including the
1 An IEP is an education plan tailored to a child’s unique needs that is
designed by the school district in consultation with the child’s parents
after the child is identified as eligible for special-education services. See
20 U. S. C. §§ 1412(a)(4), 1414(d).

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testimony of numerous experts, the hearing officer issued
a decision in January 2004 finding that respondent’s ADHD
adversely affected his educational performance and that the
School District failed to meet its obligations under IDEA in
not identifying respondent as a student eligible for special
education services. Because the District did not offer re
spondent a FAPE and his private-school placement was
appropriate under IDEA, the hearing officer ordered the
District to reimburse respondent’s parents for the cost of the
private-school tuition.2
The School District sought judicial review pursuant to
§ 1415(i)(2), arguing that the hearing officer erred in grant
ing reimbursement. The District Court accepted the hear
ing officer’s findings of fact but set aside the reimbursement
award after finding that the 1997 Amendments categor
ically bar reimbursement of private-school tuition for stu
dents who have not “previously received special education
and related services under the authority of a public agency.”
§ 612(a)(10)(C)(ii), 111 Stat. 63, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
The District Court further held that, “[e]ven assuming that
tuition reimbursement may be ordered in an extreme case
for a student not receiving special education services, under
general principles of equity where the need for special educa
tion was obvious to school authorities,” the facts of this case
do not support equitable relief. App. to Pet. for Cert. 53a.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded for further proceedings. The court first noted
that, prior to the 1997 Amendments, “IDEA was silent on
the subject of private school reimbursement, but courts had
granted such reimbursement as ‘appropriate’ relief under
principles of equity pursuant to 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(2)(C).”
523 F. 3d 1078, 1085 (2008) (citing Burlington, 471 U. S., at
2 Although it was respondent’s parents who initially sought reimburse
ment, when respondent reached the age of majority in 2003 his parents’
rights under IDEA transferred to him pursuant to Ore. Admin. Rule 581–
015–2325(1) (2008).

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370). It then held that the Amendments do not impose a
categorical bar to reimbursement when a parent unilaterally
places in private school a child who has not previously re
ceived special-education services through the public school.
Rather, such students “are eligible for reimbursement, to the
same extent as before the 1997 amendments, as ‘appropriate’
relief pursuant to § 1415(i)(2)(C).” 523 F. 3d, at 1087–1088.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the District Court’s
analysis of the equities as resting on two legal errors. First,
because it found that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) generally bars relief
in these circumstances, the District Court wrongly stated
that relief was appropriate only if the equities were suffici
ent to “ ‘override’ ” that statutory limitation. The District
Court also erred in asserting that reimbursement is limited
to “ ‘extreme’ ” cases. Id., at 1088 (emphasis deleted). The
Court of Appeals therefore remanded with instructions to
reexamine the equities, including the failure of respondent’s
parents to notify the School District before removing
respondent from public school. In dissent, Judge Rymer
stated her view that reimbursement is not available as an
equitable remedy in this case because respondent’s parents
did not request an IEP before removing him from public
school, and respondent’s right to a FAPE was therefore not
at issue.
Because the Courts of Appeals that have considered this
question have reached inconsistent results,3 we granted cer
tiorari to determine whether § 1412(a)(10)(C) establishes a
categorical bar to tuition reimbursement for students who
have not previously received special-education services
3 Compare Frank G. v. Board of Ed. of Hyde Park, 459 F. 3d 356, 376
(CA2 2006) (holding that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) does not bar reimbursement
for students who have not previously received public special-education
services), and M. M. v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 437 F. 3d
1085, 1099 (CA11 2006) (per curiam) (same), with Greenland School Dist.
v. Amy N., 358 F. 3d 150, 159–160 (CA1 2004) (finding reimbursement
barred in those circumstances).

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under the authority of a public education agency. 555 U. S.
1130 (2009).4
II
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for a unanimous Court in Bur
lington provides the pertinent background for our analysis
of the question presented. In that case, respondent chal
lenged the appropriateness of the IEP developed for his child
by public-school officials. The child had previously received
special-education services through the public school. While
administrative review was pending, private specialists ad
vised respondent that the child would do best in a specialized
private educational setting, and respondent enrolled the
child in private school without the school district’s consent.
The hearing officer concluded that the IEP was not adequate
to meet the child’s educational needs and that the school dis
trict therefore failed to provide the child a FAPE. Finding
also that the private-school placement was appropriate under
IDEA, the hearing officer ordered the school district to re
imburse respondent for the cost of the private-school tuition.
We granted certiorari in Burlington to determine whether
IDEA authorizes reimbursement for the cost of private ed
ucation when a parent or guardian unilaterally enrolls a
child in private school because the public school has proposed
an inadequate IEP and thus failed to provide a FAPE. The
Act at that time made no express reference to the pos
sibility of reimbursement, but it authorized a court to
“grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.”
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).5 In determining the scope of the relief
4 We previously granted certiorari to address this question in Board of
Ed. of City School Dist. of New York v. Tom F., 552 U. S. 1 (2007), in which
we affirmed without opinion the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit by an equally divided vote.
5 At the time we decided Burlington, that provision was codified at
§ 1415(e)(2). The 1997 Amendments renumbered the provision but did not
alter its text. For ease of reference, we refer to the provision by its
current section number, § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).

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authorized, we noted that “the ordinary meaning of these
words confers broad discretion on the court” and that, absent
any indication to the contrary, what relief is “appropriate”
must be determined in light of the Act’s broad purpose
of providing children with disabilities a FAPE, including
through publicly funded private-school placements when nec
essary. 471 U. S., at 369. Accordingly, we held that the
provision’s grant of authority includes “the power to order
school authorities to reimburse parents for their expendi
tures on private special education for a child if the court
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than a
proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.” Ibid.
Our decision rested in part on the fact that administrative
and judicial review of a parent’s complaint often takes years.
We concluded that, having mandated that participating
States provide a FAPE for every student, Congress could
not have intended to require parents to either accept an inad
equate public-school education pending adjudication of their
claim or bear the cost of a private education if the court
ultimately determined that the private placement was
proper under the Act. Id., at 370. Eight years later, we
unanimously reaffirmed the availability of reimbursement in
Florence County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7
(1993) (holding that reimbursement may be appropriate even
when a child is placed in a private school that has not been
approved by the State).
The dispute giving rise to the present litigation differs
from those in Burlington and Carter in that it concerns not
the adequacy of a proposed IEP but the School District’s
failure to provide an IEP at all. And, unlike respondent,
the children in those cases had previously received public
special-education services. These differences are insignifi
cant, however, because our analysis in the earlier cases de
pended on the language and purpose of the Act and not the
particular facts involved. Moreover, when a child requires
special-education services, a school district’s failure to pro

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pose an IEP of any kind is at least as serious a violation of
its responsibilities under IDEA as a failure to provide an
adequate IEP. It is thus clear that the reasoning of Bur
lington and Carter applies equally to this case. The only
question is whether the 1997 Amendments require a differ
ent result.
III
Congress enacted IDEA in 1970 6 to ensure that all chil
dren with disabilities are provided “ ‘a free appropriate pub
lic education which emphasizes special education and related
services designed to meet their unique needs [and] to assure
that the rights of [such] children and their parents or guard
ians are protected.’ ” Burlington, 471 U. S., at 367 (quoting
20 U. S. C. § 1400(c) (1982 ed.), now codified as amended at
§§ 1400(d)(1)(A), (B)). After examining the States’ progress
under IDEA, Congress found in 1997 that substantial gains
had been made in the area of special education but that
more needed to be done to guarantee children with disabili
ties adequate access to appropriate services. See S. Rep.
No. 105–17, p. 5 (1997). The 1997 Amendments were in
tended “to place greater emphasis on improving student per
formance and ensuring that children with disabilities receive
a quality public education.” Id., at 3.
Consistent with that goal, the Amendments preserved the
Act’s purpose of providing a FAPE to all children with disa
bilities. And they did not change the text of the provision
we considered in Burlington, § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), which gives
courts broad authority to grant “appropriate” relief, includ
ing reimbursement for the cost of private special education
when a school district fails to provide a FAPE. “Congress
is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial in
terpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation
6 The legislation was enacted as the Education of the Handicapped Act,
Title VI of Pub. L. 91–230, 84 Stat. 175, and was renamed the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act in 1990, see § 901(a)(3), Pub. L. 101–476,
104 Stat. 1142.

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when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580 (1978). Accordingly, absent a clear
expression elsewhere in the Amendments of Congress’ intent
to repeal some portion of that provision or to abrogate
our decisions in Burlington and Carter, we will continue
to read § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize the relief respondent
seeks.
The School District and the dissent argue that one of the
provisions enacted by the Amendments, § 1412(a)(10)(C), ef
fects such a repeal. Section 1412(a)(10)(C) is entitled “Pay
ment for education of children enrolled in private schools
without consent of or referral by the public agency,” and it
sets forth a number of principles applicable to public reim
bursement for the costs of unilateral private-school place
ments. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) states that IDEA “does not
require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of
education . . . of a child with a disability at a private school
or facility if that agency made a free appropriate pub
lic education available to the child” and his parents never
theless elected to place him in a private school. Sec
tion 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) then provides that a “court or hearing
officer may require [a public] agency to reimburse the
parents for the cost of [private-school] enrollment if the
court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made
a free appropriate public education available” and the child
has “previously received special education and related
services under the authority of [the] agency.” Finally,
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) discusses circumstances under which the
“cost of reimbursement described in clause (ii) may be
reduced or denied,” as when a parent fails to give 10
days’ notice before removing a child from public school
or refuses to make a child available for evaluation, and
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iv) lists circumstances in which a parent’s
failure to give notice may or must be excused.7
7 The full text of § 1412(a)(10)(C) is set forth in the Appendix, infra,
at 248.

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Looking primarily to clauses (i) and (ii), the School District
argues that Congress intended § 1412(a)(10)(C) to provide the
exclusive source of authority for courts to order reimburse
ment when parents unilaterally enroll a child in private
school. According to the District, clause (i) provides a safe
harbor for school districts that provide a FAPE by foreclos
ing reimbursement in those circumstances. Clause (ii) then
sets forth the circumstance in which reimbursement is ap
propriate—namely, when a school district fails to provide
a FAPE to a child who has previously received special
education services through the public school. The District
contends that because § 1412(a)(10)(C) only discusses reim
bursement for children who have previously received
special-education services through the public school, IDEA
only authorizes reimbursement in that circumstance. The
dissent agrees.
For several reasons, we find this argument unpersuasive.
First, the School District’s reading of the Act is not sup
ported by its text and context, as the 1997 Amendments do
not expressly prohibit reimbursement under the circum
stances of this case, and the District offers no evidence that
Congress intended to supersede our decisions in Burlington
and Carter. Clause (i)’s safe harbor explicitly bars reim
bursement only when a school district makes a FAPE avail
able by correctly identifying a child as having a disability
and proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child’s needs.
The clause says nothing about the availability of reimburse
ment when a school district fails to provide a FAPE. In
deed, its statement that reimbursement is not authorized
when a school district provides a FAPE could be read to
indicate that reimbursement is authorized when a school dis
trict does not fulfill that obligation.
Clause (ii) likewise does not support the District’s position.
Because that clause is phrased permissively, stating only that
courts “may require” reimbursement in those circumstances,
it does not foreclose reimbursement awards in other circum

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stances. Together with clauses (iii) and (iv), clause (ii) is
best read as elaborating on the general rule that courts may
order reimbursement when a school district fails to provide
a FAPE by listing factors that may affect a reimbursement
award in the common situation in which a school district has
provided a child with some special-education services and
the child’s parents believe those services are inadequate.
Referring as they do to students who have previously re
ceived special-education services through a public school,
clauses (ii) through (iv) are premised on a history of coopera
tion and together encourage school districts and parents to
continue to cooperate in developing and implementing an ap
propriate IEP before resorting to a unilateral private place
ment.8 The clauses of § 1412(a)(10)(C) are thus best read as
elucidative rather than exhaustive. Cf. United States v. At
lantic Research Corp., 551 U. S. 128, 137 (2007) (noting that
statutory language may “perfor[m] a significant function sim
ply by clarifying” a provision’s meaning).9
8 The dissent asserts that, under this reading of the Act, “Congress has
called for reducing reimbursement only for the most deserving . . . but
provided no mechanism to reduce reimbursement to the least deserving.”
Post, at 254 (opinion of Souter, J.). In addition to making unsubstanti
ated generalizations about the desert of parents whose children have been
denied public special-education services, the dissent grossly mischaracter
izes our view of § 1412(a)(10)(C). The fact that clause (iii) permits a court
to reduce a reimbursement award when a parent whose child has pre
viously received special-education services fails to give the school ade
quate notice of an intended private placement does not mean that it
prohibits courts from similarly reducing the amount of reimbursement
when a parent whose child has not previously received services fails to
give such notice. Like clause (ii), clause (iii) provides guidance regarding
the appropriateness of relief in a common factual scenario, and its instruc
tions should not be understood to preclude courts and hearing officers
from considering similar factors in other scenarios.
9 In arguing that § 1412(a)(10)(C) is the exclusive source of authority for
granting reimbursement awards to parents who unilaterally place a child

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This reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C) is necessary to avoid the
conclusion that Congress abrogated sub silentio our deci
sions in Burlington and Carter. In those cases, we con
strued § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize reimbursement when
a school district fails to provide a FAPE and a child’s
private-school placement is appropriate, without regard to
the child’s prior receipt of services.10 It would take more
than Congress’ failure to comment on the category of cases
in which a child has not previously received special-education
services for us to conclude that the Amendments sub
stantially superseded our decisions and in large part re
pealed § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii). See Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S.
254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“[A]bsent a clearly ex
pressed congressional intention, repeals by implication are
not favored” (internal quotation marks and citation omit
in private school, the dissent neglects to explain that provision’s failure
to limit the type of private-school placements for which parents may be
reimbursed. School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass.,
471 U. S. 359 (1985), held that courts may grant reimbursement under
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) only when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and
the private-school placement is appropriate. See id., at 369; see Florence
County School Dist. Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7, 12–13 (1993). The latter
requirement is essential to ensuring that reimbursement awards are
granted only when such relief furthers the purposes of the Act. See Bur
lington, 471 U. S., at 369. That § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not codify that re
quirement further indicates that Congress did not intend that provision to
supplant § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) as the sole authority on reimbursement awards
but rather meant to augment the latter provision and our decisions
construing it.
10 As discussed above, although the children in Burlington and Carter
had previously received special-education services in public school, our
decisions in no way depended on their prior receipt of services. Those
holdings rested instead on the breadth of the authority conferred by
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), the interest in providing relief consistent with the Act’s
purpose, and the injustice that a contrary reading would produce, see Bur
lington, 471 U. S., at 369–370; see also Carter, 510 U. S., at 12–14—consid
erations that were not altered by the 1997 Amendments.

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244 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
Opinion of the Court
ted)).11 We accordingly adopt the reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C)
that is consistent with those decisions.12
The School District’s reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C) is also at
odds with the general remedial purpose underlying IDEA
and the 1997 Amendments. The express purpose of the Act
is to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available
to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs,” § 1400(d)(1)(A)—a factor we took into account
in construing the scope of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), see Burlington,
471 U. S., at 369. Without the remedy respondent seeks, a
“child’s right to a free appropriate education . . . would be
11 For the same reason, we reject the District’s argument that because
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) authorizes “a court or a hearing officer” to award reim
bursement for private-school tuition, whereas § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) only pro
vides a general grant of remedial authority to “court[s],” the latter section
cannot be read to authorize hearing officers to award reimbursement.
That argument ignores our decision in Burlington, 471 U. S., at 363, 370,
which interpreted § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to authorize hearing officers as well
as courts to award reimbursement notwithstanding the provision’s silence
with regard to hearing officers. When Congress amended IDEA without
altering the text of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), it implicitly adopted that construc
tion of the statute. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 580–581 (1978).
12 Looking to the Amendments’ legislative history for support, the
School District cites two House and Senate Reports that essentially re
state the text of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), H. R. Rep. No. 105–95, pp. 92–93
(1997); S. Rep. No. 105–17, p. 13 (1997), and a floor statement by Repre
sentative Mike Castle, 143 Cong. Rec. 8013 (1997) (stating that the “bill
makes it harder for parents to unilaterally place a child in elite private
schools at public taxpayer expense, lowering costs to local school dis
tricts”). Those ambiguous references do not undermine the meaning that
we discern from the statute’s language and context.
Notably, the agency charged with implementing IDEA has adopted re
spondent’s reading of the statute. In commentary to regulations imple
menting the 1997 Amendments, the Department of Education stated that
“hearing officers and courts retain their authority, recognized in Burling
ton . . . to award ‘appropriate’ relief if a public agency has failed to provide
FAPE, including reimbursement . . . in instances in which the child has
not yet received special education and related services.” 64 Fed. Reg.
12602 (1999); see 71 Fed. Reg. 46599 (2006).

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Opinion of the Court
less than complete.” Id., at 370. The District’s position
similarly conflicts with IDEA’s “child find” requirement, pur
suant to which States are obligated to “identif[y], locat[e],
and evaluat[e]” “[a]ll children with disabilities residing in the
State” to ensure that they receive needed special-education
services. § 1412(a)(3)(A); see § 1412(a)(10)(A)(ii). A read
ing of the Act that left parents without an adequate remedy
when a school district unreasonably failed to identify a child
with disabilities would not comport with Congress’ acknowl
edgment of the paramount importance of properly identify
ing each child eligible for services.
Indeed, by immunizing a school district’s refusal to find a
child eligible for special-education services no matter how
compelling the child’s need, the School District’s interpreta
tion of § 1412(a)(10)(C) would produce a rule bordering on
the irrational. It would be particularly strange for the Act
to provide a remedy, as all agree it does, when a school dis
trict offers a child inadequate special-education services but
to leave parents without relief in the more egregious situa
tion in which the school district unreasonably denies a child
access to such services altogether. That IDEA affords par
ents substantial procedural safeguards, including the right
to challenge a school district’s eligibility determination and
obtain prospective relief, see post, at 258–259, is no answer.
We roundly rejected that argument in Burlington, observing
that the “review process is ponderous” and therefore inade
quate to ensure that a school’s failure to provide a FAPE is
remedied with the speed necessary to avoid detriment to the
child’s education. 471 U. S., at 370. Like Burlington, see
ibid., this case vividly demonstrates the problem of delay, as
respondent’s parents first sought a due process hearing in
April 2003, and the District Court issued its decision in May
2005—almost a year after respondent graduated from high
school. The dissent all but ignores these shortcomings of
IDEA’s procedural safeguards.

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246 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
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IV
The School District advances two additional arguments for
reading the Act to foreclose reimbursement in this case.
First, the District contends that because IDEA was an ex
ercise of Congress’ authority under the Spending Clause,
U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, any conditions attached to
a State’s acceptance of funds must be stated unambigu
ously. See Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halder
man, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981). Applying that principle, we held
in Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548
U. S. 291, 304 (2006), that IDEA’s fee-shifting provision,
§ 1415(i)(3)(B), does not authorize courts to award expert
services fees to prevailing parents in IDEA actions because
the Act does not put States on notice of the possibility of
such awards. But Arlington is readily distinguishable from
this case. In accepting IDEA funding, States expressly
agree to provide a FAPE to all children with disabilities.
See § 1412(a)(1)(A). An order awarding reimbursement of
private-education costs when a school district fails to provide
a FAPE merely requires the district “to belatedly pay ex
penses that it should have paid all along.” Burlington, 471
U. S., at 370–371. And States have in any event been on
notice at least since our decision in Burlington that IDEA
authorizes courts to order reimbursement of the costs of pri
vate special-education services in appropriate circumstances.
Pennhurst’s notice requirement is thus clearly satisfied.
Finally, the District urges that respondent’s reading of the
Act will impose a substantial financial burden on public
school districts and encourage parents to immediately enroll
their children in private school without first endeavoring to
cooperate with the school district. The dissent echoes this
concern. See post, at 258. For several reasons, those fears
are unfounded. Parents “are entitled to reimbursement
only if a federal court concludes both that the public place
ment violated IDEA and the private school placement was
proper under the Act.” Carter, 510 U. S., at 15. And even

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247 Cite as: 557 U. S. 230 (2009)
Opinion of the Court
then courts retain discretion to reduce the amount of a reim
bursement award if the equities so warrant—for instance, if
the parents failed to give the school district adequate notice
of their intent to enroll the child in private school. In con
sidering the equities, courts should generally presume that
public-school officials are properly performing their obliga
tions under IDEA. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49,
62–63 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring). As a result of these
criteria and the fact that parents who “ ‘unilaterally change
their child’s placement during the pendency of review pro
ceedings, without the consent of state or local school officials,
do so at their own financial risk,’ ” Carter, 510 U. S., at 15
(quoting Burlington, 471 U. S., at 373–374), the incidence of
private-school placement at public expense is quite small, see
Brief for National Disability Rights Network et al. as Amici
Curiae 13–14.
V
The IDEA Amendments of 1997 did not modify the text of
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and we do not read § 1412(a)(10)(C) to alter
that provision’s meaning. Consistent with our decisions in
Burlington and Carter, we conclude that IDEA authorizes
reimbursement for the cost of private special-education serv
ices when a school district fails to provide a FAPE and
the private-school placement is appropriate, regardless of
whether the child previously received special education or
related services through the public school.
When a court or hearing officer concludes that a school
district failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement
was suitable, it must consider all relevant factors, includ
ing the notice provided by the parents and the school dis
trict’s opportunities for evaluating the child, in determining
whether reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the
child’s private education is warranted. As the Court of Ap
peals noted, the District Court did not properly consider the
equities in this case and will need to undertake that analysis
on remand. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Ap

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248 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
Appendix to opinion of the Court
peals is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further pro
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
APPENDIX
Title 20 U. S. C. § 1412(a)(10)(C) provides:
“(C) Payment for education of children enrolled in private
schools without consent of or referral by the public agency
“(i) In general
“Subject to subparagraph (A), this subchapter does not
require a local educational agency to pay for the cost of
education, including special education and related services,
of a child with a disability at a private school or facility
if that agency made a free appropriate public education
available to the child and the parents elected to place the
child in such private school or facility.
“(ii) Reimbursement for private school placement
“If the parents of a child with a disability, who pre
viously received special education and related services
under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child in
a private elementary school or secondary school without
the consent of or referral by the public agency, a court or
a hearing officer may require the agency to reimburse the
parents for the cost of that enrollment if the court or hear
ing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appro
priate public education available to the child in a timely
manner prior to that enrollment.
“(iii) Limitation on reimbursement
“The cost of reimbursement described in clause (ii) may
be reduced or denied—
“(I) if—
“(aa) at the most recent IEP meeting that the par
ents attended prior to removal of the child from the
public school, the parents did not inform the IEP
Team that they were rejecting the placement pro
posed by the public agency to provide a free appro

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249 Cite as: 557 U. S. 230 (2009)
Souter, J., dissenting
priate public education to their child, including stating
their concerns and their intent to enroll their child in
a private school at public expense; or
“(bb) 10 business days (including any holidays that
occur on a business day) prior to the removal of the
child from the public school, the parents did not give
written notice to the public agency of the information
described in item (aa);
“(II) if, prior to the parents’ removal of the child from
the public school, the public agency informed the par
ents, through the notice requirements described in sec
tion 1415(b)(3) of this title, of its intent to evaluate the
child (including a statement of the purpose of the eval
uation that was appropriate and reasonable), but the
parents did not make the child available for such eval
uation; or
“(III) upon a judicial finding of unreasonableness with
respect to actions taken by the parents.”
Justice Souter, with whom Justice Scalia and Jus
tice Thomas join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of
Mass., 471 U. S. 359 (1985), held that the Education of the
Handicapped Act, 84 Stat. 175, now known as the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA or Act), 20 U. S. C.
§ 1400 et seq., authorized a district court to order reimburse
ment of private school tuition and expenses to parents who
took their disabled child from public school because the
school’s special education services did not meet the child’s
needs. We said that, for want of any specific limitation,
this remedy was within the general authorization for courts
to award “such relief as [they] determin[e] is appropriate.”
§ 1415(e)(2) (1982 ed.) (now codified at § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006
ed.)). In 1997, however, Congress amended the IDEA with
a number of provisions explicitly addressing the issue of

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250 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
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“[p]ayment for education of children enrolled in private
schools without consent of or referral by the public agency.”
§ 1412(a)(10)(C). These amendments generally prohibit re
imbursement if the school district made a “free appropriate
public education” (FAPE) available, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i), and if
they are to have any effect, there is no exception except by
agreement, § 1412(a)(10)(B), or for a student who previously
received special education services that were inadequate,
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
The majority says otherwise and holds that § 1412(a)
(10)(C)(ii) places no limit on reimbursements for private
tuition. The Court does not find the provision clear enough
to affect the rule in Burlington, and it does not believe
Congress meant to limit public reimbursement for unilater
ally incurred private school tuition. But there is no author
ity for a heightened standard before Congress can alter
a prior judicial interpretation of a statute, and the assess
ment of congressional policy aims falls short of trumping
what seems to me to be the clear limitation imposed by
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
I
In Burlington, parents of a child with a learning disability
tried for over eight years to work out a satisfactory individu
alized education plan (IEP) for their son. 471 U. S., at 361–
362. They eventually gave up and sent the boy to a private
school for disabled children, id., at 362, and we took the ensu
ing case to decide whether the Education of the Handicapped
Act authorized courts to order reimbursement for private
special education “if the court ultimately determines that
such placement, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under
the Act,” id., at 369. After noting various sections that
“emphasiz[e] the participation of the parents in developing
the child’s [public] educational program,” id., at 368, we in
ferred that the Act authorized reimbursement by providing
that a district court shall “ ‘grant such relief as [it] deter
mines is appropriate,’ ” id., at 369 (quoting what is now

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251 Cite as: 557 U. S. 230 (2009)
Souter, J., dissenting
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii); alteration in original). We emphasized
that the Act did not speak specifically to the issue of reim
bursement, and held that “[a]bsent other reference,” reim
bursement for private tuition and expenses would be an
“ ‘appropriate’ ” remedy in light of the purposes of the Act.
Id., at 369–370. In short, we read the general provision for
ordering equitable remedies in § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) as authoriz
ing a reimbursement order, in large part because Congress
had not spoken more specifically to the issue.
But Congress did speak explicitly when it amended the
IDEA in 1997. It first said that whenever the State or a
local educational agency refers a student to private special
education, the bill is a public expense. See 20 U. S. C.
§ 1412(a)(10)(B). It then included several clauses addressing
“[p]ayment for education of children enrolled in private
schools without consent of or referral by the public agency.”
§ 1412(a)(10)(C). The first contrasts with the provision cov
ering an agency referral:
“(i) In general
“ . . . this subchapter does not require a local educational
agency to pay for the cost of education . . . of a child
with a disability at a private school or facility if that
agency made a free appropriate public education avail
able to the child and the parents elected to place the
child in such private school or facility.” § 1412(a)(10)(C).
The second clause covers the case in which the school author
ity failed to make a FAPE available in its schools. It does
not, however, provide simply that the authority must pay in
this case, no matter what. Instead it provides this:
“(ii) Reimbursement for private school placement
“If the parents of a child with a disability, who pre
viously received special education and related services
under the authority of a public agency, enroll the child
in a private elementary school or secondary school with
out the consent of or referral by the public agency,

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252 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
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a court or a hearing officer may require the agency to
reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment
if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had
not made a free appropriate public education available
to the child in a timely manner prior to that enroll
ment.” Ibid.
Two additional clauses spell out in some detail various facts
upon which the reimbursement described in clause (ii) may
be “reduced or denied.” See §§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) and (iv).
As a purely semantic matter, these provisions are ambigu
ous in their silence about the case with no previous special
education services and no FAPE available. As the majority
suggests, ante, at 241–242, clause (i) could theoretically be
understood to imply that reimbursement may be ordered
whenever a school district fails to provide a FAPE, and
clause (ii) could be read as merely taking care to mention one
of a variety of circumstances in which such reimbursement
is permitted. But this is overstretching. When permissive
language covers a special case, the natural sense of it is taken
to prohibit what it fails to authorize. When a mother tells
a boy that he may go out and play after his homework is
done, he knows what she means.
So does anyone who reads the authorization of a reim
bursement order in the case of “a child with a disability, who
previously received special education and related services
under the authority of a public agency.” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).1
If the mother did not mean that the homework had to be
done, why did she mention it at all, and if Congress did not
1 Likewise, no one is unsure whether this Court’s Rule 18.6, which
states, “Within 30 days after the case is placed on this Court’s docket, the
appellee may file a motion to dismiss, . . . ” allows for a motion to dismiss
after 30 days. See also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 431–432
(1996) (listing numerous examples of permissive statements, such as then
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(d)’s statement that a subpoena
“may be served” by a person “who is not less than 18 years of age,” that
plainly carry a restrictive meaning).

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mean to restrict reimbursement authority by reference to
previous receipt of services, why did it even raise the sub
ject? “[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that
[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or super
fluous, void or insignificant . . . .” Corley v. United States,
556 U. S. 303, 314 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
But not on the Court’s reading, under which clause (ii)
does nothing but describe a particular subset of cases
subject to remedial authority already given to courts by
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) and recognized in Burlington: a court may
order reimbursement for a child who previously received
special education related services, but it may do this for any
other child, too.2 But this is just not plausible, the notion
that Congress added a new provision to the IDEA entitled
“Reimbursement for private school placement” that had no
effect whatsoever on reimbursement for private school place
ment. I would read clause (i) as written on the assumption
that the school authorities can be expected to honor their
obligations and as stating the general rule that unilateral
placement cannot be reimbursed. See § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i)
(“In general . . . ”). And I would read clause (ii) as imposing
a receipt of prior services limit on any exceptions to that
general rule when school officials fall short of providing a
2 The majority says that “clause (ii) is best read as elaborating on the
general rule that courts may order reimbursement when a school district
fails to provide a FAPE by listing factors that may affect a reimbursement
award in the common situation in which a school district has provided a
child with some special-education services and the child’s parents believe
those services are inadequate.” Ante, at 242. But this is just another
way of reading the provision off the books. On the majority’s reading,
clause (ii) states only that a court may award reimbursement when
(1) there is a previous receipt of special education services and (2) a failure
to provide a FAPE. Such a description of the most common subset of a
category already described may be called elaboration, but it still has no
effect on the statutory scheme.

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254 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
Souter, J., dissenting
FAPE. See § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (“Reimbursement for private
school placement . . . ”).
This reading can claim the virtue of avoiding a further
anomaly. Section 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), which limits otherwise
available reimbursement, is expressly directed to “[t]he cost
of reimbursement described in clause (ii).” This makes per
fect sense under my reading. Since clause (ii) is now the
exclusive source of authority to order reimbursement, it is
natural to refer to it in the clause setting out the conditions
for reducing or even denying reimbursement otherwise au
thorized. Yet, as T. A. and the Government concede, Brief
for Respondent 22; Brief for United States as Amicus Cu
riae 4, 17, under the majority’s reading, Congress has called
for reducing reimbursement only for the most deserving
(parents described in clause (ii) who consult with the school
district and give public special education services a try be
fore demanding payment for private education), but provided
no mechanism to reduce reimbursement to the least deserv
ing (parents who have not given public placement a chance).
The Court responds to this point by doubling down. Ac
cording to the majority, the criteria listed in clause (iii) can
justify a reduction not only of “reimbursement described in
clause (ii),” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii), but can also do so for a reim
bursement order authorized elsewhere as well, ante, at 242,
n. 8. That is, the majority avoids ascribing perverse mo
tives to Congress by concluding that in both clause (ii) and
clause (iii), Congress meant to add nothing to the statutory
scheme. This simply leads back to the question of why Con
gress in § 1412(a)(10)(C) would have been so concerned with
cases in which children had not previously received special
education services when, on the majority’s reading, the prior
receipt of services has no relevance whatsoever to the sub
ject of that provision.
Because any other interpretation would render clause (ii)
pointless and clause (iii) either pointless or perverse,
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) must be read to allow reimbursement only

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255 Cite as: 557 U. S. 230 (2009)
Souter, J., dissenting
for “parents of a child with a disability, who previously re
ceived special education and related services under the au
thority of a public agency.”
II
Neither the majority’s clear statement rule nor its pol
icy considerations prevail over the better view of the 1997
amendments.
A
The majority says that, because of our previous interpre
tation of the Act as authorizing reimbursement for unilat
eral private placement, Congress was obliged to speak with
added clarity to alter the statute as so understood. Ante,
at 239–244. The majority refers to two distinct principles
for support: first, statutes are to be read with a presumption
against implied repeals, e. g., ante, at 243–244 (citing Branch
v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plurality opinion)), and
second, congressional reenactment of statutory text without
change is deemed to ratify a prior judicial interpretation of
it, e. g., ante, at 239–240 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S.
575, 580 (1978)). I think neither principle is up to the task.
Section 1412(a)(10)(C) in no way repealed the provision we
considered in Burlington.3 The relief that “is appropriate”
under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) depends on the substantive provi
sions of the IDEA as surely as if the provision authorized
equitable relief “consistent with the provisions of this stat
ute.” 4 When we applied § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) in Burlington,
3 The presumption against implied repeals would not justify reading the
later provision as useless even if it applied since, when two provisions are
irreconcilable, the presumption against implied repeals gives way to the
later enactment. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U. S. 254, 273 (2003) (plural
ity opinion).
4 No one, for example, would suggest that a court could grant reimburse
ment under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) to parents of a nondisabled child, but this is
obvious only because we assume § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) is to be read in light of
the substantive provisions of the statute.

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256 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
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we expressly referred to those provisions and concluded
that, in the absence of a specific rule, “appropriate” relief
included the reimbursement sought. By introducing new
restrictions on reimbursement, the 1997 amendments pro
duce a different conclusion about what relief is “appro
priate.” But § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) remains in effect, just as it
would remain in effect if Congress had explicitly amended
the IDEA to prohibit reimbursement absent prior receipt
of services.
As for the rule that reenactment incorporates prior inter
pretation, the Court’s reliance on it to preserve Burlington’s
reading of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) faces two hurdles. First, so far
as I can tell, this maxim has never been used to impose a
clear statement rule. If Congress does not suggest other
wise, reenacted statutory language retains its old meaning;
but when a new enactment includes language undermining
the prior reading, there is no presumption favoring the old,
and the only course open is simply to read the revised statute
as a whole. This is so because there is no reason to distin
guish between amendments that occur in a single clause (as
if Congress had placed all the changes in § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii)),
and those that take the form of a separate section (here,
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)). If Congress had added a caveat within
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), or in an immediately neighboring pro
vision, I assume the majority would not approach it with
skepticism on the ground that it purported to modify a prior
judicial interpretation.
Second, nothing in my reading of § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) is in
consistent with the holdings of Burlington and the other
prior decision on the subject, Florence County School Dist.
Four v. Carter, 510 U. S. 7 (1993). Our opinion in Burling
ton was expressly premised on there being no “other refer
ence” that would govern reimbursement for private tuition,
471 U. S., at 369, and this all but invited Congress to provide
one. Congress’s provision of such a reference in 1997 is, to

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257 Cite as: 557 U. S. 230 (2009)
Souter, J., dissenting
say the very least, no reason for skepticism that Congress
wished to alter the law on reimbursement. The 1997 legis
lation, read my way, would not, however, alter the result in
either Burlington or Carter. In each case, the school dis
trict had agreed that the child was disabled, the parents had
cooperated with the district and tried out an IEP, and the
only question was whether parents who later resorted to a
private school could be reimbursed “ ‘if the court ultimately
determines that such placement, rather than a proposed IEP,
is proper under the Act.’ ” Carter, supra, at 12 (quoting
Burlington, supra, at 369). In ordering reimbursement, the
Court in both Burlington and Carter emphasized that the
parents took part in devising an IEP, 471 U. S., at 368; 510
U. S., at 12, and expressed concern for parents who had
sought an IEP before placing their child in private school,
but received one that was inadequate, 471 U. S., at 370;
510 U. S., at 12. The result in each case would have been
the same under my reading of the amended Act, both sets
of parents being “parents of a child with a disability, who
previously received special education and related services
under the authority of a public agency.” § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii).
It is therefore too much to suggest that my reading of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) would “abrogat[e] sub silentio our deci
sions in Burlington and Carter,” ante, at 243.
The majority argues that the policy concerns vindicated in
Burlington and Carter justify reading those cases to author
ize a reimbursement authority going beyond their facts,
ante, at 238–239, and would hold reimbursement possible
even for parents who, like those here, unilaterally resort to
a private school without first establishing at the administra
tive or appellate level that the child is disabled, or engaging
in a collaborative process with the school officials. But how
broadly one should read Burlington and Carter is beside the
point, Congress having explicitly addressed the subject with
statutory language that precludes the Court’s result today.

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258 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
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B
The Court also rejects the natural sense of § 1412(a)(10)(C)
as an interpretation that would be “at odds with the general
remedial purpose underlying IDEA and the 1997 Amend
ments.” Ante, at 244. The majority thinks my reading
would place the school authorities in total control of parents’
eligibility for reimbursement: just refuse any request for
special education or services in the public school, and the
prior service condition for eligibility under clause (ii) can
never be satisfied. Thus, as the majority puts it, it would
“borde[r] on the irrational” to “immuniz[e] a school district’s
refusal to find a child eligible for special-education services
no matter how compelling the child’s need.” Ante, at 245.
I agree that any such scheme would be pretty absurd, but
there is no absurdity here. The majority’s suggestion over
looks the terms of the IDEA process, the substantial pro
cedures protecting a child’s substantive rights under the
IDEA, and the significant costs of its rule.
To start with the costs, special education can be immensely
expensive, amounting to tens of billions of dollars annually
and as much as 20% of public schools’ general operating
budgets. See Brief for Council of the Great City Schools as
Amicus Curiae 22–23. The more private placement there
is, the higher the special education bill, a fact that lends ur
gency to the IDEA’s mandate of a collaborative process in
which an IEP is “developed jointly by a school official quali
fied in special education, the child’s teacher, the parents or
guardian, and, where appropriate, the child.” Burlington,
supra, at 368.
The Act’s repeated emphasis on the need for cooperative
joint action by school and parent does not, however, leave
the school in control if officials should wish to block effective
(and expensive) action for the child’s benefit, for if the collab
orative approach breaks down, the IDEA provides for quick
review in a “due process hearing” of the parents’ claim that
more services are needed to provide a FAPE than the school

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259 Cite as: 557 U. S. 230 (2009)
Souter, J., dissenting
is willing to give. See § 1415(c)(2) (district must respond to
due process hearing complaint within 10 days and hearing
officer must assess facial validity of complaint within 5 days);
§ 1415(e) (mediation is available, provided it does not delay
due process hearing); § 1415(f)(1)(B) (district must convene a
meeting with parents within 15 days to attempt to resolve
complaint); 34 CFR §§ 300.510(b)(1)–(2) (2008) (if complaint
is not resolved, a hearing must be held within 30 days of
complaint and a decision must be issued within 75 days of
complaint). Parents who remain dissatisfied after these
first two levels of process may have a right of appeal to the
state educational agency and in any case may bring a court
action in federal district court. See 20 U. S. C. § 1415(i)(2).
This scheme of administrative and judicial review is the an
swer to the Court’s claim that reading the prior services
condition as restrictive, not illustrative, immunizes a school
district’s intransigence, giving it an effective veto on reim
bursement for private placement.5
That said, the Court of course has a fair point that the
prior services condition qualifies the remedial objective of
the statute, and pursuing appeals to get a satisfactory IEP
with special services worth accepting could be discouraging.
The child who needs help does not stop needing it, or stop
growing, while schools and parents argue back and forth.
5 The majority argues that we already rejected this process as inade
quate in School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Ed. of Mass., 471
U. S. 359 (1985). Ante, at 245. That was before the enactment of
§ 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The question in Burlington was whether the reim
bursement there was an “appropriate” remedy under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).
See 471 U. S., at 370. With no statement to the contrary from Congress,
the Court expressed concern over the possible length of the IDEA review
process and surmised that Congress would have intended for reimburse
ment to be authorized. Ibid. But Congress provided a statement to the
contrary in 1997; the only reading that gives effect to § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii)
is that reimbursement is not permitted absent prior placement, and the
only question for the Court now is whether Congress could have meant
what it said.

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260 FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DIST. v. T. A.
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But we have to decide this case on the premise that most
such arguments will be carried on in good faith, and even on
the assumption that disagreements about the adequacy of
IEPs will impose some burdens on the Act’s intended bene
ficiaries, there is still a persuasive reason for Congress to
have written the statute to mandate just what my interpre
tation requires. Given the burden of private school place
ment, it makes good sense to require parents to try to devise
a satisfactory alternative within the public schools, by taking
part in the collaborative process of developing an IEP that
is the “modus operandi” of the IDEA. Burlington, 471
U. S., at 368. And if some time, and some educational oppor
tunity, is lost in consequence, this only shows what we have
realized before, that no policy is ever pursued to the ulti
mate, single-minded limit, and that “[t]he IDEA obviously
does not seek to promote [its] goals at the expense of all
considerations, including fiscal considerations,” Arlington
Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. 291,
303 (2006).6
6 See 143 Cong. Rec. 8013 (1997) (statement of Rep. Castle) (“This law
. . . has had unintended and costly consequences. . . . It has resulted in
school districts unnecessarily paying expensive private school tuition for
children. It has resulted in cases where lawyers have gamed the system
to the detriment of schools and children.” “This bill makes it harder for
parents to unilaterally place a child in elite private schools at public tax
payer expense, lowering costs to local school districts”).