State v. Shangreaux, Jr.

#31143-a-RG
2026 S.D. 32

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

DAVID J. SHANGREAUX, JR., Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
HUGHES COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

THE HONORABLE CHRISTINA L. KLINGER
Judge

BEAU BLOUIN of
South Dakota Office of
Indigent Legal Services
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant and
appellant.

MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General

ERIN E. HANDKE
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff and
appellee.

ARGUED
APRIL 21, 2026
OPINION FILED 05/20/26
#31143

GUSINSKY, Justice

[¶1.] Following a 911 call from a neighbor, police arrived at David

Shangreaux, Jr., and Liv Guerue’s apartment in Pierre, South Dakota. Shangreaux

was present in the apartment when police arrived. Shortly after Shangreaux spoke

with police, officers entered the apartment to detain Shangreaux and discovered

E.M. deceased in the bathroom. E.M. had been stabbed several times. Shangreaux

was arrested and charged with E.M.’s murder. After a trial, a jury convicted

Shangreaux of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to life in prison.

Shangreaux appeals. We affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

[¶2.] Shangreaux and his girlfriend, Liv Guerue, lived together in an

apartment in Pierre, South Dakota. In November 2023, Guerue invited E.M.—a

teenage girl whom Guerue and Shangreaux met while she served the two as a

waitress at Perkins—to hang out at their apartment. E.M. agreed. Shangreaux

and Guerue picked E.M. up on November 30, 2023, around 5:00 p.m. and brought

her back to their apartment.

[¶3.] Shortly thereafter, E.M.’s two friends, Whitley Woehl and L.B., arrived

at the apartment to drink alcohol and play games together in the living room. L.B.

testified that Shangreaux was “wasted,” and that he became visibly frustrated when

E.M. was winning the card game they were playing. During the evening, Guerue

became sick and went to the nearby bathroom to vomit. L.B. followed to hold her

hair back. Woehl and L.B. testified at trial that while Guerue was throwing up,

Shangreaux got angry and pushed L.B. out of the bathroom, blocked the exit of the

-1-
#31143

apartment, and threatened the two while waving a knife around. L.B. and Woehl

left the apartment once Shangreaux stepped out of the way. Shangreaux and

Guerue’s neighbor, Christina Mack, testified that she saw L.B. and Woehl leave the

apartment between 8:15 and 8:30 p.m. Neither L.B. nor Woehl reported the

incident.

[¶4.] Once the two left, Guerue became sick again, and E.M. followed her

into the bathroom to hold her hair. Guerue testified at trial that while she was in

the bathroom with E.M., Shangreaux entered the bathroom and began arguing with

E.M. while Guerue stood between them. Guerue further testified that Shangreaux

shoved her toward the bathroom door, after which Guerue fled the apartment with

E.M.’s phone and ran to the nearby Taco Johns for help. Video surveillance footage

showed Guerue arriving at Taco Johns at 8:59 p.m. Guerue testified that she

attempted to call 911 from Taco Johns, but that she saw police arriving at the

apartment and abandoned her effort. Guerue received a ride from an employee’s

father to the Clubhouse Hotel & Suites where she worked.

[¶5.] Two 911 calls were made. At 8:48 p.m., Keenan Running Crane, E.M.’s

boyfriend, called 911 and identified himself as E.M.’s brother, requesting a wellness

check on E.M. at the apartment. Around 9:03 p.m., Christina Mack called 911 and

reported Shangreaux was outside yelling the word “babe” and banging on the

passenger window of an SUV. Mack reported Shangreaux appeared very

intoxicated, was wearing a baseball glove, and had an object in his hand.

[¶6.] Sergeant Jacob Harlow and Officer Gregory Jones with the Pierre

Police Department arrived on scene shortly thereafter. Sergeant Harlow went down

-2-
#31143

the stairs to Shangreaux and Guerue’s apartment while Officer Jones went up the

stairs to speak with Mack. Sergeant Harlow knocked on Shangreaux’s door, and

Shangreaux answered within 10 to 15 seconds. When he answered, Shangreaux

was sweating, breathing heavily, and had a knife blade sticking out from his left

pants pocket. This entire interaction was captured by Sergeant Harlow’s body

camera footage.

[¶7.] Sergeant Harlow asked who was banging on the SUV outside, and

Shangreaux replied his “wife” was, referring to Guerue. Sergeant Harlow then

asked to speak with her, and Shangreaux agreed to go get her. Shangreaux walked

back into the apartment while Sergeant Harlow stood at the door. Shangreaux

returned to the door without Guerue and told Sergeant Harlow that everyone was

trying to sleep, and that everything was okay. Sergeant Harlow asked Shangreaux

his name, and he replied, “Unless, you know, whenever I’m ready to go, I’ll tell you

my, my name.” Sergeant Harlow then asked where he was ready to go, and

Shangreaux pointed to the upstairs apartment where Christina Mack resided and

indicated the “people up here” were trying to kill him.

[¶8.] While gesturing, Sergeant Harlow noticed blood on Shangreaux’s arm

and asked him about it. Again, Shangreaux pointed to the upstairs apartment.

Sergeant Harlow then asked Shangreaux to return to get Guerue once more, and

Shangreaux walked back into the apartment. Footage from Sergeant Harlow’s body

camera shows Shangreaux walking back and forth between rooms, eventually

ending up in the bedroom with his hands on his head standing silently. After

-3-
#31143

observing this, Sergeant Harlow called Officer Jones away from Christina Mack’s

apartment to assist him with Shangreaux.

[¶9.] Shangreaux returned to the door without Guerue moments later, and

Sergeant Harlow detained him. Sergeant Harlow told Officer Jones to “check the

bathroom,” wherein Jones found E.M. deceased on the bathroom floor. Autopsy

results revealed E.M. was stabbed seven times in the back and neck area, and that

the only injury to the front side of her body was a small laceration on her cheek.

[¶10.] After Shangreaux was detained and E.M. was found, Special Agent

Trevor Swanson and other agents with the Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI)

arrived to assist with crime scene processing and began taking photographs.

Several pieces of evidence were recovered at this time. A five-and-a-half-inch

Cuisinart utility knife was located on the windowsill in the bathroom directly above

E.M.’s body. DCI identified several shoe tread prints on the bathroom floor, several

of which Agent Swanson opined were tactical boots consistent with police and first

responders. Agent Swanson opined that one other tread pattern was consistent

with the shoes Shangreaux was wearing that night. In the hallway outside the

bedroom, a three-and-a-half-inch Cuisinart knife was stuck in the wall. Lastly, DCI

recovered the black baseball glove and a Cuisinart knife sheath that Sergeant

Harlow removed from Shangreaux’s pockets when he detained him in the

apartment.

[¶11.] Police were then able to track Guerue’s whereabouts to the Clubhouse

hotel. When Sergeant Cole Martin arrived at the hotel, Guerue had no visible

injuries, no observable blood on her clothing, and her hotel room was tidy.

-4-
#31143

Shangreaux was transported to the Hughes County Jail on the night of November

30, 2023, where his blood sample was taken four hours after police responded to his

apartment. Results showed a blood alcohol level (BAC) of .141, and forensic chemist

Cody Geffre testified at trial that Shangreaux’s BAC was likely between .191 and

.241 at 8:40 p.m. that night.

[¶12.] Sergeant Martin and Detective David Estes interviewed Shangreaux

at the jail on December 1 and 2, 2023. During the December 1 interview,

Shangreaux first told investigators he did not know what happened the night E.M.

died and that he blacked out. Shangreaux asked several questions about whether

Guerue was okay and whether she was being charged with a crime. He then stated

that he recalled sitting on the floor with E.M. and Guerue that night, looking for

Guerue when Sergeant Harlow arrived, and getting blood on his hands while trying

to help E.M. off the floor.

[¶13.] Later during questioning, Shangreaux told detectives that “[m]e and

Liv both did it.” He claimed that E.M. and Guerue confronted each other in the

bathroom before Guerue grabbed a knife, stating Guerue “stabbed [E.M.] once or

whatever. Then I took that knife away [from] her, and then I pushed [E.M.]. And

[E.M.] went down. Hard.” Shangreaux told detectives that he threw the knife onto

the floor once he took it from Guerue’s hand. At this point, Shangreaux denied

stabbing E.M. at all. Later during questioning, however, Shangreaux admitted to

stabbing E.M. once in the back with the same knife he took away from Guerue.

[¶14.] On December 2, investigators again returned to question Shangreaux.

When asked about the knife he had in his pocket when he first answered the door

-5-
#31143

for police, Shangreaux told investigators that this was the same knife he had taken

away from Guerue after she stabbed E.M. Investigators asked if this was the same

five-and-a-half-inch knife found on the windowsill in the bathroom, and Shangreaux

stated he did not know and only remembered bits of the night. When asked how

many times E.M. was stabbed, Shangreaux admitted that Guerue may have

stabbed her three times and that Shangreaux stabbed her twice—marking the third

change in Shangreaux’s story regarding who stabbed E.M. and how many times she

was stabbed.

[¶15.] Forensic evidence revealed five latent prints on the five-and-a-half-

inch knife found on the windowsill. Three of the five were deemed to be of value for

consideration, and all three were identified as Shangreaux’s prints. Both the five-

and-a-half-inch knife and the three-inch knife found in the wall were tested for

DNA. Both tested positive for the presence of blood, and E.M.’s DNA was a major

contributor to the mixture of DNA on both knives. Shangreaux’s tank top, pants,

soles of his shoes, and the baseball glove found in his bedroom were all tested and

identified as stained with E.M.’s DNA.

[¶16.] Shangreaux was indicted on December 12, 2023, on Count 1, murder in

the first degree, Count 2, murder in the second degree, and Count 3, aggravated

assault. Shangreaux was deemed incompetent to stand trial in April 2024, but was

restored to competency three months later in July 2024.

-6-
#31143

Jury Selection

[¶17.] During jury selection of the April 2025 trial, each side exercised 20

peremptory strikes. The State used one peremptory strike to remove Juror 78, P.D.,

a Native American. P.D. answered five questions during voir dire:

Defense: So I’m curious if you’ve ever read our names or read
about cases of ours. Only because if there’s a concern and it’s
something that you would want us to know or that you may hold
against us or in favor of us, we’d like to know that too. Anyone
ever stumble across our names? Okay. We’ll start right over
here. [P.D.]

P.D.: Yep.

Defense: Have you read about cases we’ve had or on the news?

P.D.: [Defense counsel].

Defense: [Defense counsel]?

P.D.: Quite a bit.

Defense: Wonderful. Anything about that that gives you
concern in sitting as a potential juror today?

P.D.: Nope.

Defense: Willing to give his side of things or anything he says
more credence than anybody else?

P.D.: Nope.

[¶18.] In response to a later question, P.D. recounted the following:

Defense: [A]nything you think I should know? Anything you’ve
held close to your chest until now and I just didn’t ask the right
question? Yes.

P.D.: So for me, I was a victim of a serious crime.

[. . .]

Defense: And I won’t force you to go into it.

-7-
#31143

P.D.: Oh, you can Google it.

Defense: Well, I might do that but . . . [i]s there something
about that experience that gives you some pause in participating
as a juror in a criminal case?

P.D.: No.

Defense: Given that life experience of yours, would it be
difficult for you to presume my client innocent from the outset?

[. . .]

P.D.: Oh, no, I could presume him innocent.

Defense: And you will do so if you are chosen as a juror?

P.D.: Yes.

[¶19.] The next question P.D. replied to was when the State asked: “Anybody

had a run in with the law, essentially, that you want to talk about?”

P.D.: Yep. So about 20 years ago, I had one of the—sustained
for [sic] complaint against the Rapid City Police Department.
Just one night walking home, just pulled over, handcuffed, and
they started harassing me.

State: You said it was about 20 years ago?

P.D.: Yep.

State: You heard the names of the law enforcement officers that
might testify in this case. Was it any of them?

P.D.: It was definitely not any of them.

State: It wasn’t me or [co-counsel]; right?

P.D.: No.

State: 20 years ago, I was 10.

P.D.: No comment.

-8-
#31143

State: Anything about that situation that you’re going to hold
against the State based on what comes out as evidence in this
case?

P.D.: No.

[¶20.] The State exercised its fourth peremptory strike to strike P.D. The

defense noted the strike and submitted a Batson challenge. The defense did so

immediately following the strike and did not wait until both sides exercised all their

strikes: “Your honor, the State’s fourth strike is [P.D.], who I believe is a Native

American, and so we would submit a [Batson challenge] as to the State’s fourth

strike of [P.D].”

[¶21.] The court noted the objection by responding “[a]ll right,” and the State

immediately offered its “non-race related reason” for striking P.D., stating:

[P.D.] said during jury selection that he at least knows of
[defense counsel]. And we looked at his history, his criminal
history prior to coming here today. He has a criminal history
and he talked a little bit about that today as well. That is the
State’s reasoning for striking that juror.

[¶22.] The defense replied, admitting that P.D. “said that he was mistreated

by law enforcement,” but disputing that P.D. ever discussed his criminal history.

The court replied that it, too, did not recall P.D. discussing a criminal history. In

response, the State attempted to clarify: “Judge, what [defense counsel] referred to

was what I was referring to. I guess I had just presumed that that related to his

criminal history, but that statement is what I was referring to.”

[¶23.] The court recalled that P.D. “referred to police officers jumping out as

he was walking down the road and simply handcuffing him for no reason. I think

he said he was one of the first excessive force [sic]. Is that what it was?”

-9-
#31143

State: I had a hard time understanding that particular
statement, Judge.

Defense: Right. He did mention that he had made a complaint
against law enforcement, three sustained complaints against
Rapid City Police Department is what [defense counsel]
remembers.

Court: And that was based on, I think then he followed it up
with that he was handcuffed out of nowhere as he walked down
the road. That’s the [c]ourt’s recollection. I don’t recall any
criminal history.

State: Correct. Not as far as convictions go, but the general
statements he made are the reasons the State is striking him.
. . . [H]e has a known criminal history when we looked him up.
And the statements he made about his criminal history, which
would include his statements about unfair treatment by law
enforcement, are the State’s concerns.

[¶24.] The defense then stated that they were relying on P.D.’s response to

the juror questionnaire, where P.D. had indicated he was convicted of a crime other

than a traffic violation. In its final address to the court, the State explained that its

strike was “because of those concerns as it relates to law enforcement.”

[¶25.] The court noted that this answer “was not explored with [P.D.] in the

courtroom” and that “[n]obody followed up with him in the room, and now we’re

striking what appears to be one of two Native Americans when we have a Native

American defendant who’s entitled to have a jury of his peers.” Despite being

“certainly concerned,” the court allowed the strike to stand and found that

“[c]onviction of a crime, the possibility—the interactions with law enforcement is an

adequate reason that I’m going to allow at this time.” In explaining its decision, the

court reasoned:

I’m going to circle back down to the [Batson] challenge. I’m not
sure that I made my reasoning of the third analysis clear. The

-10-
#31143

third being that if a race-neutral explanation was tendered,
which it was, then a determination whether the opponent of the
strike has proven purposeful and raceful [sic] discrimination. In
looking at that, consider[ing] the State’s offered reason, and we
can’t just accept any offered reason, the [c]ourt does make a
finding that the State’s offered reason was not merely a pretext,
that they did provide a valid reason. There wasn’t a pretext for
racial discrimination in making that strike.

Trial

[¶26.] Shangreaux testified in his own defense at trial. He first testified that

he remembered everyone playing cards in the living room and an altercation

between him and L.B., but that he blacked out once Woehl and L.B. left the

apartment. The next thing he remembered was sitting with E.M. on the bathroom

floor while Guerue threw up. Shangreaux testified that he and Guerue were

arguing, and E.M. was attempting to calm them down. He then recalled lying in

the bedroom while E.M. sat next to him before three people entered the room.

Shangreaux remembered hearing a woman’s voice before blacking out again, and

that when he regained consciousness, someone was standing above him and

pushing on his shoulders while an individual in a beaked hat did something to his

right hand.

[¶27.] Shangreaux further recalled seeing someone standing in the bathroom

with a cut on her cheek. After this, he exited the apartment and began banging on

the SUV windows outside the apartment because he believed Guerue was inside the

vehicle. He then returned to the bathroom where he saw the person standing at the

sink fall face-down onto the bathroom floor. Shangreaux testified that he attempted

to help the person up, but that he did not remember answering the door or talking

-11-
#31143

to Sergeant Harlow. Shangreaux had no memory of having the Cuisinart knife in

his pocket.

[¶28.] When confronted with the conflicting stories he presented to

investigators, Shangreaux testified that he told investigators both he and Guerue

“did it” in an attempt to get investigators to look into Guerue and her potential

involvement. Shangreaux denied stabbing E.M. and denied witnessing the

stabbing.

Closing arguments

[¶29.] During closing arguments, the State made the following statements:

We heard the defendant himself say he doesn’t think he was
involved, Kennan Running Crane was involved. Whether you
believe him or not is up to you. We know he probably lied on the
stand.

[¶30.] Later in the rebuttal, the State said:

Self-serving lies on the stand don’t create reasonable doubt. We
know what happened. We know from the evidence the
defendant stabbed [E.M.] seven times, probably some while she
was standing, and probably some with that knife while she was
laying on the floor because we know that cast off pattern on that
toilet. We know the intent with which he did it. We know he
intended to cause her death. We know that the result is a guilty
verdict on first-degree murder.

[¶31.] The jury found Shangreaux guilty on Count 2, murder in the second

degree. The jury acquitted Shangreaux of murder in the first degree and

aggravated assault. The circuit court sentenced Shangreaux to life in prison.

Shangreaux appeals, raising two issues for our consideration: (1) whether the

circuit court clearly erred in sustaining the State’s peremptory strike of a Native

American member of the jury pool, and (2) whether the State’s comments during

-12-
#31143

closing argument constituted improper vouching and denied Shangreaux his due

process right to a fair trial.

Analysis

1. Whether the circuit court clearly erred in sustaining
the State’s peremptory strike of a Native American
member of the jury pool.

[¶32.] Shangreaux first argues the State’s use of a peremptory strike on P.D.

was “substantially motivated by discriminatory intent” rather than race-neutral

justifications. Despite the State’s race-neutral justifications for the strike,

Shangreaux alleges that the record and “multiple indicators of pretext . . .

[establish] that the peremptory strike was not genuinely race-neutral but was

instead substantially motivated by discriminatory intent.” To support this theory,

Shangreaux points to the State’s “shifting explanations” and “limited and

superficial questioning” of P.D. during voir dire.

[¶33.] “A challenge to the State’s use of peremptory challenges is reviewed for

clear error, for the finding of intentional discrimination is a factual determination.”

State v. Owen, 2007 S.D. 21, ¶ 11, 729 N.W.2d 356, 362 (citing State v. Martin, 2004

S.D. 82, ¶¶ 13, 16, 683 N.W.2d 399, 403, 405).

[¶34.] The State violates a defendant’s right to equal protection when it

eliminates potential jurors on the basis of race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86

(1986). When challenging the State’s use of a peremptory strike under Batson:

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an
inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, once the defendant
has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State
to explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, [i]f

-13-
#31143

a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then
decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved
purposeful racial discrimination.

State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12, 843 N.W.2d 364, 368 (alterations in original)

(quoting State v. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16, 829 N.W.2d 458, 465–66).

[¶35.] The State contends, for the first time on appeal, that the defense failed

to make a prima facie showing to satisfy the first step under the Batson framework.

When attempting to make a prima facie case, “‘[t]he defendant must point to more

than the bare fact of the removal of certain venirepersons and the absence of an

obvious valid reason for the removal’ before the prosecution is required to offer a

race-neutral reason for the strike.” United States v. Young, 129 F.4th 459, 466 (8th

Cir. 2025) (quoting United States v. Young-Bey, 893 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir. 1990)).

This includes “identify[ing] facts and circumstances that support the inference of

discrimination[.]” Id. (citation omitted). In Young, the Eighth Circuit held the

following language to be insufficient to establish a prima facie case: “Our position is

that these are three strikes from the [G]overnment that are Native American

people, and we’re making a Batson challenge.” Id. at 466–67 (alteration in original).

[¶36.] Here, the language used by the defense in an attempt to make a prima

facie case is remarkably similar. The defense stated: “the State’s fourth strike is

[P.D.], who I believe is Native American, and so we would submit a Batson

challenge as to the State’s fourth strike of [P.D.]” The defense did not identify facts

nor circumstances that supported an inference of discrimination aside from P.D.’s

-14-
#31143

race. This language, without more, is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination under the Batson framework.1

[¶37.] Despite the defendant’s failure to establish a prima facie case,

however, the State failed to raise this argument to the circuit court, and instead

immediately offered its race-neutral justifications for the strike. Because this issue

was not presented to the circuit court, the State has waived this issue on appeal.2

See State v. Stanley, 2017 S.D. 32, ¶ 26, 896 N.W.2d 669, 678 (“This Court will not

address arguments that are raised for the first time on appeal.” (citation omitted)).

[¶38.] In the second step of the Batson framework, once the defense has

established a prima facie case of discrimination, the State must “explain adequately

the racial exclusion by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the

strikes.” Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12, 843 N.W.2d at 368 (citation omitted). “The

State’s reasons for a peremptory strike [at this stage of the inquiry] need not be

1. It is unclear from the record how many prospective jurors were Native
American. But it is undisputed that the challenge was made after the first
known Native American was struck instead of waiting until the end of the
jury selection process.

2. In Young, the Eighth Circuit addressed a similar issue and noted the defense
“did not satisfy its initial burden to show a prima face case of discrimination”
under the first step of Batson. Young, 129 F.4th at 466. The court
nevertheless declined to affirm the conviction on these grounds, noting the
failure was “arguably moot” because “the district court ruled on the objection
after the race-neutral explanation was given[.]” Id. at 467. The court used
the phrase “arguably” because its explanation rested on the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in Hernandez v. New York, wherein a plurality of
the Court stated “‘the preliminary issue of whether the [objecting party] had
made a prima facie showing becomes moot’ once a race-neutral explanation
has been proffered and the district court has ruled on said objection.” Young,
129 F.4th at 467 n.4 (quoting Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359
(1991) (plurality opinion)).
-15-
#31143

‘persuasive or even plausible.’” State v. Martin, 2004 S.D. 82, ¶ 14, 683 N.W.2d 399,

403 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). Rather, “the issue is the

facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation,” and “[u]nless a discriminatory intent

is inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed [race]

neutral.” Id. (citation omitted). Shangreaux admits that the State “ultimately

offered two reasons for the peremptory strike that courts have generally recognized

as race-neutral” and that the circuit court “appropriately moved onto step three of

the analysis.”

[¶39.] Once a race-neutral justification has been provided, the third step of

the Batson framework requires the court to determine whether the defense has

proven purposeful racial discrimination. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 18, 829 N.W.2d at

466. The court is tasked with deciding “if the reason offered for the strike was

‘merely a pretext designed to mask the improper consideration of race to exclude’ a

juror.” Id. ¶ 19 (citation omitted). There are no “‘magic words’ the trial court must

use in order to fulfill a Batson analysis.” Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 16, 843 N.W.2d

at 369 (quoting State v. Ryan, 2008 S.D. 94, ¶ 13, 757 N.W.2d 155, 159). “For

example, ‘a trial court implicitly conducts [the required] analysis when it accepts or

rejects the State’s explanations for use of its peremptory challenges.’” Id. (alteration

in original) (citation omitted).

[¶40.] Once Shangreaux challenged the State’s strike of P.D. under Batson,

the State immediately provided its justification, stating it was striking P.D. because

he knew of defense counsel and he had a criminal history. After a discussion

between the court and counsel, the State clarified it was striking P.D. because of his

-16-
#31143

interactions with law enforcement, including the negative experience he revealed

during voir dire and his prior criminal history he revealed on his juror

questionnaire.

[¶41.] The court ultimately accepted the State’s reasoning for striking P.D. as

race-neutral—P.D.’s criminal history and previous negative interactions with law

enforcement. Such justifications have previously been recognized as race-neutral

justifications. See United States v. Allen, 644 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2011)

(accepting the State’s justification based upon a juror’s “expression of past

dissatisfaction with law enforcement” as race-neutral despite juror’s

acknowledgement that she could remain fair and impartial in the case); United

States v. Booker, 576 F.3d 506, 511 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding “past dissatisfaction

with law enforcement officers, which could indicate potential bias against the

prosecution, is a legitimate race neutral reason for striking prospective jurors”);

United States v. Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2005) (same).

[¶42.] We “give great deference to the [circuit] court’s finding that the State

exercised a race-neutral strike.” State v. Roach, 2012 S.D. 91, ¶ 34, 825 N.W.2d

258, 267 (citation omitted). On the record before us, we are not left with a “definite

and firm conviction” that a mistake has been made. Martin, 2004 S.D. 82, ¶ 16, 683

N.W.2d 399, 405. The circuit court did not clearly err in upholding the State’s

peremptory strike of P.D.

-17-
#31143

2. Whether the State’s comments during closing
argument constituted improper vouching and
denied Shangreaux his due process right to a fair
trial.

[¶43.] Shangreaux additionally argues that several remarks the State made

during closing arguments constituted improper “vouching” and rose to the level of

prosecutorial misconduct. He claims the State, through these comments, violated

Shangreaux’s right to a fair trial. The State’s at-issue statements provided:

We heard the defendant himself say he doesn’t think he was
involved, Keenan Running Crane was involved. Whether you
believe him or not is up to you. We know he probably lied on the
stand. . . . We know what happened. We know from the
evidence the defendant stabbed [E.M.] seven times, probably
some while she was standing, and probably some with that knife
while she was laying on the floor because we know that cast off
pattern on the toilet. We know the intent with which he did it.
We know he intended to cause her death. We know that the
result is a guilty verdict on first-degree murder.

[¶44.] Prosecutorial misconduct claims are generally reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. State v. Hankins, 2022 S.D. 67, ¶ 31, 982 N.W.2d 21, 32–33. But “[a]

party must generally object at trial in order to provide the circuit court with an

opportunity to correct the alleged error” and preserve the issue for appeal. State v.

Hayes, 2014 S.D. 72, ¶ 24, 855 N.W.2d 668, 675 (citing State v. Beck, 2010 S.D. 52,

¶ 10, 785 N.W.2d 288, 292). “[I]f an issue of prosecutorial misconduct is not

properly preserved for appeal, this Court will analyze the claim under plain error.”

Id. (citation omitted).

[¶45.] “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed

although they were not brought to the attention of a court.” SDCL 23A-44-15 (Rule

52(b)). Not every error constitutes plain error, so “the plain error analysis ‘must be

-18-
#31143

applied cautiously and only in exceptional circumstances.’” Hayes, 2014 S.D. 72,

¶ 25, 855 N.W.2d at 675 (citation omitted). “Plain error requires a showing of an

‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and only then may this

Court exercise its discretion to notice the error if (4) it seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting State v. Buchhold, 2007 S.D. 15, ¶ 22, 727 N.W.2d 816, 822).

“With plain error analysis, the defendant bears the burden of showing the error was

prejudicial.” Id. (quoting Beck, 2010 S.D. 52, ¶ 10, 785 N.W.2d at 293). Error is

prejudicial when there exists “a reasonable probability, that, but for [the error], the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Carter, 2023 S.D. 67,

¶ 26, 1 N.W.3d 674, 686 (alteration in original) (quoting Owens v. Russell, 2007 S.D.

3, ¶ 9, 726 N.W.2d 610, 615).

[¶46.] “Prosecutorial misconduct implies a dishonest act or an attempt to

persuade the jury by use of deception or by reprehensible methods.” Hankins, 2022

S.D. 67, ¶ 32, 982 N.W.2d at 33 (citation omitted). “This Court will find that

prosecutorial misconduct has occurred if (1) there has been misconduct, and (2) the

misconduct prejudiced the party as to deny the party a fair trial.” Id. (citation

omitted). “If both prongs for prosecutorial misconduct are satisfied, this Court will

reverse the conviction.” Id. (citation omitted).

[¶47.] “[N]o hard and fast rules exist which state with certainty when

prosecutorial misconduct reaches a level of prejudicial error which demands

reversal of the conviction and a new trial; each case must be decided on its own

facts.” Id. ¶ 33 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). But prosecutorial

-19-
#31143

misconduct “is prejudicial when it ‘so infect[s] the trial with unfairness as to make

the resulting convictions a denial of due process.’” Id. (alteration in original)

(quoting State v. Smith, 1999 S.D. 83, ¶ 52, 599 N.W.2d 344, 355). “‘A criminal

conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis of a prosecutor’s comments

standing alone,’ but, if the prosecutor’s conduct affects the fairness of the trial when

viewed in context of the entire proceeding, reversal can be warranted.” Id. (citation

omitted).

[¶48.] “[P]rejudice can result from the prosecution placing the prestige of the

government behind the witness and implying that the prosecutor knows what the

truth is and thereby assures its revelation.” State v. Nelson, 2022 S.D. 12, ¶ 38, 970

N.W.2d 814, 826 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Westerfield, 1997 S.D. 100,

¶ 12, 567 N.W.2d 863, 867). “If a prosecutor conveys this message explicitly or

implicitly, they are improperly vouching.” Id. “Improper vouching invites the jury

to rely on the government’s assessment that the witness is testifying truthfully.”

State v. Manning, 2023 S.D. 7, ¶ 38, 985 N.W.2d 743, 755 (citation modified). “It is

well established that it is within ‘the exclusive province of the jury to determine the

credibility of a witness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 45, 951

N.W.2d 792, 806). But not all comments relating to the credibility of a witness

constitute improper vouching, as “the State is permitted to make fair comments on

the credibility of witnesses during final argument.” Id. ¶ 42, 985 N.W.2d at 756

(quoting Jenner v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 422, 428 (S.D. 1994)).

[¶49.] Here, Shangreaux takes issue with various statements made by the

State, most of which start with the phrase “we know.” Shangreaux asserts that, in

-20-
#31143

using this phrase, the State offered statements “more akin to governmental

assurances regarding [Shangreaux’s] credibility, intent and guilt, than a fair

marshalling of the evidence.” To support this claim, Shangreaux cites a Ninth

Circuit case where the defense made a similar prosecutorial misconduct claim after

the prosecution used “we know” statements during closing arguments. United

States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1191 (9th Cir. 2005). The court in Younger

recognized that the use of “we know” statements during closing arguments “readily

blurs the line between improper vouching and legitimate summary” and stated it

does “not condone” the use of such statements. Id. But the court concluded the

prosecution “used the phrase ‘we know’ to marshal evidence actually admitted at

trial and reasonable inferences from that evidence, not to vouch for witness veracity

or suggest that evidence not produced would support a witness’s statements.” Id.

(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Moreover, “we know” statements could be

construed as a reference to the collective audience that witnessed a trial and not as

a commentary on a witness’s credibility.

[¶50.] Thus, the use of a “we know” statement must be viewed in context.

Throughout trial, the State introduced evidence that Shangreaux’s story shifted

several times between the time he first spoke to officers in his apartment to when

he testified at trial. Significant forensic and DNA evidence, including Shangreaux’s

fingerprints on the knife used to kill E.M. and E.M.’s blood on his clothing,

suggested he was present and an active participant in the death of E.M. He

admitted to investigators during police questioning that he participated in E.M.’s

death, but then later testified that he did not stab E.M. nor witness the stabbing.

-21-
#31143

During trial, the State repeatedly casted doubt on Shangreaux’s credibility by

highlighting the inconsistencies in his recollection of events and theory of defense.

[¶51.] Contrary to Shangreaux’s claim, the State’s remarks during closing

arguments were fairly related to the evidence presented at trial and did not suggest

the State “had some superior knowledge or criterion, not available to the jury, to

establish the witness was testifying truthfully.” Lodermeier v. Class, 1996 S.D. 134,

¶ 17, 555 N.W.2d 618, 624. The State’s remarks did not constitute impermissible

vouching. We affirm.

[¶52.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and SALTER, DEVANEY, and MYREN,

Justices, concur.

-22-