City of Rapid City v. Schaub

#28932-a-MES
2020 S.D. 50

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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CITY OF RAPID CITY, Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

RODNEY P. SCHAUB, Defendant and Appellant.

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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA

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THE HONORABLE JANE WIPF PFEIFLE
Judge

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KINSLEY P. GROOTE
Assistant City Attorney
Office of the City Attorney
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.

RODNEY P. SCHAUB
Rapid City, South Dakota Pro Se Defendant and
Appellant.

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CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
SEPTEMBER 30, 2019
OPINION FILED 09/02/20
#28932

SALTER, Justice

[¶1.] Rodney Schaub appeals the circuit court’s decision to affirm his

magistrate court conviction for operating an onsite wastewater system without a

permit. We affirm.

Background

[¶2.] Rodney Schaub owns real estate, including a home, that is located

northeast of Rapid City, within one mile of the municipal boundaries. Schaub’s

property is not connected to a municipal sewer system, and he instead relies upon

an onsite wastewater system. In 2006, Rapid City (the City) adopted an ordinance

requiring owners of onsite wastewater systems to obtain sewer permits. The

permits are renewable every six years after the owners have their systems pumped

empty and inspected by the City’s public works director or a designee. 1 Citing its

1. Rapid City Municipal Code (RCMC) 13.20.800-Sewerage System Permits
provides in relevant part that:
A. All owners of onsite wastewater systems are required to
obtain sewerage permits before being allowed to operate and
maintain such systems. Permit terms shall be as follows:
1. Individual onsite wastewater systems, small onsite
wastewater systems and mound systems -6 years:
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E. The city will send a permit renewal notice by mail to the
owner of record prior to the expiration date of each sewerage
permit. Upon notification of permit expiration, the owner of
the permitted disposal system shall have 30 calendar days to
schedule an observation of the system with a city approved
observer.
1. Prior to observation, the septic tank must be pumped.
2. The tank shall be observed prior to the tank filling
with liquid.
(continued . . .)
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extraterritorial jurisdiction, the City sought to apply the ordinance to landowners

within one mile of its exterior boundaries.

[¶3.] During 2016, the City sent Schaub three notices explaining the

requirement to have his system inspected and to ultimately obtain a permit. After

receiving no response, the City sent Schaub another letter by certified mail in April

2017. Schaub spoke in person with the City’s septic coordinator, who explained the

permit process and the appeals process. After an unsuccessful effort to obtain a

waiver exempting his wastewater system from the City’s ordinance, Schaub failed

to comply with an August 31, 2017 deadline to have his septic system inspected.

[¶4.] The City Attorney’s Office formally charged Schaub with maintaining

an onsite wastewater system without a permit in January 2018. Following a

magistrate court trial on September 25, 2018, Schaub was convicted for failure to

obtain a permit in violation of RCMC 13.20.800. The court fined Schaub $200 and

ordered him to pay $60 in court costs. 2

________________________
(. . . continued)
3. The Public Works Director or his or her designee may
extend a permit for up to 6 years if proof is provided
that the tank has been pumped and inspected by a city
approved observer or city personnel.
4. It is the owner’s responsibility to schedule said
pumping with a liquid waste hauler prior to the
expiration of the sewerage permit . . . .

2. The magistrate court imposed Schaub’s fine based upon two ordinances
related to RCMC 13.20.800. The first is RCMC 13.20.870 which provides, in
relevant part, that “[a]ny person who shall fail to comply with any of the
provisions of this chapter, or who shall counsel, aid, and/or abet any such
violation or failure to comply, shall be subject to the general penalty provision
as set forth in§ 1.12.010 of this code.” The provisions of RCMC 1.12.010, in
(continued . . .)
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[¶5.] Schaub appealed his conviction to the circuit court, arguing RCMC

13.20.800: (1) violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States Constitution

and the South Dakota Constitution; (2) is preempted by state administrative rules;

and (3) exceeds the City’s authority since he lives outside of the city limits. The

circuit court affirmed Schaub’s conviction, finding that the City’s sewerage permit

ordinance is not an ex post facto law. The court further determined that South

Dakota statutes allow a municipality to promulgate more stringent laws than state

administrative regulations, and the City has statutory authority to enforce its

sewerage permit requirement against Schaub.

[¶6.] Schaub raises three issues on appeal that we restate as follows:

1. Whether the circuit court erred when it determined that
the City’s sewerage permit ordinance is not an ex post
facto law.

2. Whether the circuit court erred when it determined that
state administrative regulations set minimum standards
and the City was authorized to enact more stringent
sewerage ordinances.

3. Whether the circuit court erred when it determined that
the City could enforce sewerage ordinances upon
residents living within one mile of the City’s boundaries.

________________________
(. . . continued)
turn, authorize punishments for ordinance violations of “not less than $1 nor
more than $500 or 30 days in jail, or both.”

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Analysis

Ex Post Facto Claim

[¶7.] The United States Constitution and South Dakota Constitution both

prohibit the passage of an ex post facto law, 3 which is defined as “[a] statute that

criminalizes an action and simultaneously provides for punishment of those who

took the action before it had legally become a crime . . . .” Ex Post Facto Law,

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). We have previously held that “a statute . . .

is not rendered unconstitutional as an ex post facto law merely because it might

operate on a fact or status preexisting the effective date of the legislation, as long as

its punitive features apply only to acts committed after the statutory proscription

becomes effective.” State v. Smith, 2014 S.D. 15, ¶ 16, 844 N.W.2d 626, 630

(quoting State v. Arguello, 2002 S.D. 157, ¶ 14, 655 N.W.2d 451, 454). 4

[¶8.] Here, Schaub’s ex post facto argument is not supportable. 5 The record

3. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 12.

4. We review constitutional challenges de novo. Smith, 2014 S.D. 15, ¶ 15, 844
N.W.2d at 629.

5. The City argued to the circuit court, and does again in this appeal, that
Schaub failed to preserve his ex post facto claim by not pursuing it during his
magistrate court trial. The circuit court rejected the argument by relying
upon SDCL 23A-32-13, which states that a defendant can challenge “the
constitutionality of any statute” under which he was convicted “on appeal
regardless of whether it was first raised in any lower court.” In its brief to
this Court, the City claims the text of the statute limits its applicability only
to statutes—not municipal ordinances. We think it is unnecessary to
construe the text of SDCL 23A-32-13 because the record indicates that
Schaub sufficiently raised the issue to the magistrate court. Proceeding pro
se, Schaub specifically argued to the magistrate court that the law was “ex
post facto,” explaining that “what used to be legal” was now different under
the new ordinance that required “this permitting and pumping . . . .” Under
(continued . . .)
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establishes that Schaub’s failure to obtain a permit for his onsite wastewater

system occurred in 2018—well after the City enacted its onsite wastewater system

ordinance in 2006. 6 To be considered an ex post facto law, Schaub would need to

show that he was convicted for conduct committed before the ordinance was enacted

in 2006. 7 In other words, the fact that Schaub’s onsite wastewater system may

have existed prior to 2006 does not, itself, excuse him from the requirement to

comply with the ordinance.

[¶9.] Schaub’s reliance on Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Rapid

City to support his argument that RCMC 13.20.800 is an ex post facto law is

misplaced. 2007 S.D. 35, 731 N.W.2d 199. In Lamar, we held that a city council

acted within its authority when it allowed a sign company to complete a project

initiated under the provisions of the then-existing city sign ordinance. Id. ¶ 25, 731

N.W.2d at 205. The Lamar decision did not involve an ex post facto argument or

discussion.

[¶10.] Nevertheless, Schaub believes his position is buoyed by our generic

statement that “zoning laws may not be retroactively applied so as to deprive

property owners of prior vested rights by preventing a use that was lawful before

the enactment of zoning laws.” Id. His suggestion that the City is retroactively
________________________
(. . . continued)
the unique circumstances present here, we think this adequately raised the
argument.

6. The complaint charged Schaub with a violation of the onsite wastewater
disposal ordinance “on or about the 30th day of January, 2018 . . . .”

7. The ordinance was originally numbered 13.09.800 when it was enacted in
2006 and was renumbered as 13.20.800 in 2012.

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applying RCMC 13.20.800 and divesting him of a property right is unconvincing.

[¶11.] The City is not applying the ordinance retroactively, as we have

indicated. Beyond that, Schaub has not established that he has a vested property

right in operating his onsite wastewater system free of the City’s inspection and

permit requirements—the only obligations imposed by RCMC 13.20.800 that are at

issue here. Indeed, these basic requirements contemplate that Schaub can continue

to operate his existing system.

Preemption Claim

[¶12.] “The interpretation of an ordinance presents a question of law

reviewable de novo.” Parris v. City of Rapid City, 2013 S.D. 51, ¶ 10, 834 N.W.2d

850, 854 (quoting Atkinson v. City of Pierre, 2005 S.D. 114, ¶ 10, 706 N.W.2d 791,

795). “Administrative regulations are subject to the same rules of construction as

are statutes.” Krsnak v. S.D. Dep’t of Env’t & Natural Res., 2012 S.D. 89, ¶ 16, 824

N.W.2d 429, 436 (quoting Westmed Rehab, Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 2004 S.D. 104,

¶ 8, 687 N.W.2d 516, 518).

[¶13.] Generally, “municipal corporations possess only those powers given to

them by the Legislature[,]” 8 and it is possible for the Legislature to preempt a city’s

regulatory efforts, either expressly or impliedly. Law v. City of Sioux Falls, 2011

S.D. 63, ¶ 9, 804 N.W.2d 428, 432.

8. See Ericksen v. City of Sioux Falls, 70 S.D. 40, 53, 14 N.W.2d 89, 95 (1944)
(“A municipal corporation is a creature of the Constitution and statutes of the
state. It possesses only such powers, great or small, as these laws give to it . .
. .”).

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Express preemption occurs when there is a specific legislative
enactment reflecting the Legislature’s intent to preempt any
local regulation. Implied preemption, on the other hand, exists
when the legislative scheme “is sufficiently comprehensive to
make reasonable the inference that” the Legislature “left no
room for supplementary” local regulation.

Id. ¶ 10, 804 N.W.2d at 432 (citation omitted).

[¶14.] As is relevant to our discussion here, Chapter 74:53:01 of South

Dakota’s administrative rules (ARSD) contains regulations promulgated by the

Department of Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) concerning

“Individual and Small on-Site Wastewater Systems.” 9 Among other things, ARSD

Chapter 74:53:01 establishes specifications and requirements for onsite wastewater

treatment systems, including septic tank systems. See ARSD 74:53:01:23

(prescribing “minimum design and construction requirements for septic tanks”).

However, these specifications and requirements may not apply to systems that

existed prior to February 28, 1975, by virtue of ARSD 74:53:01:04. This provision

provides in part that these existing systems “are not subject to this chapter unless

the systems are changed, the systems cause the groundwater to become polluted, or

the systems are allowing wastewater to surface.” The parties differ markedly in

their views about the applicability of this administrative provision to this case.

[¶15.] Schaub claims ARSD 74:53:01:04 effectively “grandfather[s]” his onsite

wastewater system into compliance and argues further that this regulation has a

preemptive effect that categorically prohibits local regulation of his system by

9. Under SDCL 34A-2-20, the Legislature directed the DENR’s Water
Management Board to “establish minimum requirements for the treatment of
wastes.” See SDCL 1-40-15 (creating “a Water Management Board within
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources”).

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municipalities. 10 The City, for its part, contends that the regulations contained in

ARSD Chapter 74:53:01 merely prescribe minimum standards, leaving

municipalities free to prescribe “more stringent” standards. We are not convinced

that either argument guides our consideration of this issue.

[¶16.] Initially, Schaub has not established that his system fits within the

date restriction of ARSD 74:53:01:04. Like the circuit court, we see no evidence in

the record to indicate that Schaub’s septic system was “existing prior to February

28, 1975[,]” and his preemption claim fails on this basis alone. However, even if the

state of the record were otherwise and reflected evidence that Schaub’s system

existed before the regulation’s cutoff date, his preemption argument is not

persuasive.

[¶17.] The text of ARSD 74:53:01:04 generally exempts certain existing onsite

wastewater systems from the technical specifications and requirements of ARSD

Chapter 74:53:01, but none of those standards are at issue in this municipal

prosecution for violating RCMC 13.20.800. The City’s complaint charged Schaub

with violating RCMC 13.20.800 by failing to “obtain[ ] a sewerage permit[,]” and the

magistrate court found Schaub guilty of failing to secure the permit. Even if ARSD

74:53:01:04’s exemption for existing wastewater systems were preemptive, and we

do not hold that it is, the exemption from the requirements of ARSD Chapter

74:53:01 does not implicate the City’s inspection and permitting process, which may

10. The City argues Schaub has not raised a preemption argument on appeal, but
we read his pro se appellate brief differently. In it, Schaub unmistakably
invokes ARSD 74:53:01:04 as the preeminent and exclusive authority
governing regulatory efforts for certain existing onsite wastewater treatment
systems.

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well require no changes to Schaub’s existing septic system. Indeed, we are not

confronted here with an effort by the City to impose different standards than those

required under ARSD Chapter 74:53:01 because RCMC 13.20.800 does not contain

standards—just the requirements to obtain a permit and have the system

inspected. 11

[¶18.] For this reason, we believe it is unnecessary to consider the City’s

argument that ARSD Chapter 74:53:01 states only minimal requirements, which by

extension leaves municipalities free to adopt more stringent requirements. The

circuit court adopted this view and cited as support SDCL 6-12-5, which expressly

allows municipal “standards and requirements which are higher or more stringent

than those imposed by state law . . . .” However, as Schaub notes, this statute is

contained within SDCL Chapter 6-12, which deals with local governments

organized under home rule charters. See S.D. Const. art. IX, § 2 (authorizing “[a]ny

county or city or combinations thereof” to adopt a home rule charter which “may

exercise any legislative power or perform any function not denied by its charter, the

Constitution or the general laws of the state.”). Though the City endorses the

court’s “more stringent than state law” rationale on appeal, it does not rely upon

11. Schaub’s suggestion that ARSD 74:53:01:04 applies broadly and allows him
to operate his onsite wastewater system free of any effort to inspect it is
unsound. The regulation does not categorically exempt pre-February 28,
1975 onsite wastewater systems from regulation. Instead, they are exempt
“unless the systems are changed, the systems cause the groundwater to
become polluted, or the systems are allowing wastewater to surface.”
(Emphasis added.) At a minimum, Schaub’s system would be subject to an
inspection by the DENR to determine if any of these exceptions applied and
required compliance with the standards of ARSD Chapter 74:53:01. See
ARSD 74:53:01:42 (authorizing DENR secretary or an authorized
representative to inspect an onsite wastewater system “at any time”).

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SDCL 6-12-5. 12 Regardless, we need not decide whether SDCL 6-12-5 reflects a

universal or narrow rule for municipal governments based on its form of

government. We have already determined that RCMC 13.20.800 does not, itself,

require standards for onsite wastewater systems and therefore does not conflict

with state administrative regulations. 13

The City’s Extraterritorial Authority

[¶19.] The Legislature has given municipalities the express authority to

protect their water supplies “within one mile of the limits of the municipality.”

SDCL 9-32-8; see also Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 75, 99 S.

Ct. 383, 392, 58 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1978) (upholding city’s enforcement of its police

power beyond city limits against due process and equal protection claims). Utilizing

this authority, the City enacted RCMC 13.20.800 to help ensure a safe and reliable

water supply for its citizens. 14 It is undisputed that Schaub lives within the one-

mile perimeter of the City. We therefore find no merit in Schaub’s argument that

the City lacks authority to enforce RCMC 13.20.800 beyond its municipal

boundaries.

12. The record does not indicate that the City operates under a home rule
charter.

13. Without any apparent reference to chartered status, the Legislature has
given municipalities the power to “adopt ordinances for the purposes of
protecting public groundwater supplies from pollution.” SDCL 9-12-17.

14. In addition, SDCL 9-29-1 provides municipalities with broad police power
authority within one mile of the city limits. We upheld this authority in State
v. Hirsch, 309 N.W.2d 832 (S.D. 1981), when a city police officer arrested a
driver for driving under the influence within one mile of the city limits.

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Conclusion

[¶20.] The City’s ordinance as applied to Schaub is not an ex post facto law

because it punishes Schaub for conduct occurring after the ordinance was enacted.

Furthermore, the City’s effort to enforce RCMC 13.20.800 was authorized under the

facts presented here. We affirm.

[¶21.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KERN, JENSEN, and DEVANEY,

Justices, concur.

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