Discipline of Swier

#29156-DG
2021 S.D. 11

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA

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IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINE OF

SCOTT R. SWIER

AS AN ATTORNEY AT LAW

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ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

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THOMAS H. FRIEBERG
ROBERT B. FRIEBERG of
State Bar of South Dakota
Beresford, South Dakota Attorneys for Disciplinary
Board.

JEFFERY G. HURD of
Bangs, McCullen, Butler, Foye & Simmons
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for respondent.

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CONSIDERED
JANUARY 22, 2021
OPINION FILED 02/17/21
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GILBERTSON, Retired Chief Justice

[¶1.] On February 19, 2020, this Court suspended Scott R. Swier from the

practice of law for a period of one year and imposed conditions that Swier had to

meet before seeking reinstatement. Matter of Discipline of Swier, 2020 S.D. 7, ¶ 85,

939 N.W.2d 855, 874. The Court amended its order of suspension on June 24, 2020.

The Court suspended Swier indefinitely after determining that he violated the

Court’s Order of Suspension “by practicing law while suspended and conducting

himself as a legal assistant without the approval of this court, SDCL 16-18-34.4.”

The matter was remanded to the State Bar’s Disciplinary Board to conduct a full

investigation of Swier and the Swier Law Firm to determine if Swier or members of

the Swier Law Firm committed additional violations of the Court’s Order of

Suspension.

[¶2.] The Board filed its report with the Court. The Board reported that

Swier’s conduct that triggered the Amended Order of Suspension did occur but was

an isolated event and that the attorney members of Swier Law Firm did not assist

or condone any violation of the Court’s order suspending Swier from the practice of

law. The Board recommended that the Court take “such action as it deems

appropriate.”

Facts

[¶3.] The facts leading to Swier’s initial suspension are set forth in Swier,

2020 S.D. 7, 939 N.W.2d 855. Shortly after this Court suspended Swier, a lawyer

from May, Adam, Gerdes, and Thompson, LLP, (May Adam) notified the

Disciplinary Board that Swier answered an email sent from a May Adam attorney

to Michael Henderson and Brooke Swier Schloss, Swier Law Firm attorneys. In the

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email, Swier informed the May Adam attorney that “[o]ur client has not yet given

us permission to waive FF & CL.”

[¶4.] As a result, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause why Swier

should not be held in contempt of its order suspending him, SDCL 16-19-82, and

why his apparent violation of SDCL 16-19-33(2) should not result in the extension

of his period of suspension or the revocation of his license to practice law. See SDCL

16-19-22. In response, Swier argued that the email was inconsequential; he merely

performed the clerical task of passing a message from Swier Law Firm attorneys to

a May Adam attorney. He claimed the email did not constitute the practice of law

or violate the Order of Suspension.

[¶5.] This Court concluded otherwise and filed an Amended Order of

Suspension and Order of Remand. This order provided, in part:

WHEREAS, respondent Swier violated this Court’s
Order of Suspension by practicing law while suspended
and conducting himself as a legal assistant without the
approval of this Court, SDCL 16-18-34.4(2), now,
therefore it is

ORDERED that respondent Swier’s fixed period of
suspension shall become indefinite until further Order of
this Court, SDCL 16-19-35(2).

*****

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is
remanded to the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar of
South Dakota to conduct a full investigation of respondent
Swier and the Swier Law Firm to determine if he or
members of the Swier Law Firm have committed
additional violations of this Court’s Order of Suspension.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Disciplinary
Board shall furnish a report of its findings to this Court.

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[¶6.] The Disciplinary Board investigated and filed its report and its

recommendation to the Court. The Disciplinary Board interviewed Swier Law Firm

attorneys and staff. It also subpoenaed, received, and reviewed Scott R. Swier’s

emails and Swier Law Firm’s billing records, and reviewed Swier Law Firm’s leases.

Brooke Swier Schloss, Swier’s law partner and sister, and Swier appeared before

the Disciplinary Board separately, and the Disciplinary Board examined them

under oath.

[¶7.] The effective date of Swier’s initial one-year suspension was March 20,

2020. After that date, Brooke Swier Schloss became the sole partner of Swier Law

Firm. Swier was rarely seen at Swier Law Firm locations. However, Swier

remained employed by the law firm to assist in marketing, updating website

articles, and writing blog posts for the firm’s website. He also cleaned the office and

did filing. His contact with the firm’s other attorneys was limited to updating them

on the status of matters and giving them background information to assist in their

representation of clients. He had no direct contact with Swier Law Firm’s clients.

He was paid a monthly salary that was based upon the annualized base salary he

received while practicing as an attorney. Swier owns the building housing Swier

Law Firm. The Disciplinary Board found the rent to be reasonable.

[¶8.] After the Court’s June 24, 2020 Amended Order of Suspension, Swier

has not been present at Swier Law Firm’s offices. He has not done any work or

received compensation for marketing or other services. He has not been present or

been in communication with members of the firm regarding the activities or

management of Swier Law Firm. He has been pursuing other business ventures,

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including a construction business in North Sioux City, South Dakota, and an ice

business in Avon, South Dakota.

[¶9.] According to the Disciplinary Board, the email chain that ultimately

triggered the Court’s Order to Show Cause and Amended Order of Suspension was

an isolated event. Swier claims he acted at the request of Brooke Swier Schloss who

wanted to respond quickly to an inquiry from opposing counsel but was unable to do

so personally. The Disciplinary Board did not uncover any on-going pattern of

violation. It also found that the attorneys of Swier Law Firm did not assist in, or

condone, any violation of the Court’s order suspending Swier from the practice of

law.

[¶10.] Based on its investigation and findings, the Disciplinary Board

recommended that the Court “take such action as it deems appropriate.”

Disciplinary Goals and Standard of Review

[¶11.] The South Dakota Supreme Court has the affirmative duty to “govern

terms of courts, admission to the bar, and discipline of members of the bar.” S.D.

Const. art. V, § 12. We take this obligation seriously because “[a] license to practice

law in this state is a privilege and a continuing proclamation by the Supreme Court

that a licensed attorney is an officer of the Court, is fit to be entrusted with legal

and judicial matters, and is able to aid in the administration of justice.” SDCL 16-

19-31. Each recipient privileged to receive a license to practice law has the duty to

conduct himself at all times, “both professionally and personally, in conformity with

the standards of conduct” imposed upon members of the bar as conditions for the

privilege to practice law. Id.

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[¶12.] It is essential to preserve trust in the legal profession. Petition of Pier,

1997 S.D. 23, ¶ 8, 561 N.W.2d 297, 299. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect clients’

property, freedom, and at times, lives, is formidable. Matter of Chamley, 349

N.W.2d 56, 58 (S.D. 1984). “Only by providing high quality lawyering can the

integrity of the legal profession remain inveterate and the confidence of the public

in the Bar remain strong.” Matter of Discipline of Wehde, 517 N.W.2d 132, 133

(S.D. 1994).

[¶13.] The attorney disciplinary process protects the public from further

fraudulent, unethical, or incompetent activities involving a lawyer. In re Discipline

of Reynolds, 2009 S.D. 9, ¶ 50, 762 N.W.2d 341, 352. It preserves the image and

integrity of attorneys, the bar association, and the legal profession. Id. It also

deters like conduct by other attorneys by putting the Bar on notice that such action

or inaction violates the Rules of Professional Conduct. See SDCL ch. 16-18 appx.

“Its purpose is not to punish the attorney.” Reynolds, 2009 S.D. 9, ¶ 50, 762 N.W.2d

at 352. “The real and vital issue to be determined is whether or not the accused,

from the whole evidence as submitted, is a fit and proper person to be permitted to

continue in the practice of law.” In re Discipline of Simpson, 467 N.W.2d 921, 922

(S.D. 1991).

[¶14.] As far as the discipline determination, this Court does not “defer to the

Disciplinary Board’s recommended sanction.” Swier, 2020 S.D. 7, ¶ 56, 939 N.W.2d

at 868. We make that determination de novo. The appropriate discipline for a

member of the “Bar rests firmly with the wisdom of this Court.” Id.

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Analysis

[¶15.] This Court has observed that “[h]e acts at his peril who treats a

communication from the [Disciplinary Board] with the indifference accorded an

unsolicited invitation to join a book club.” In re Rude, 88 S.D. 416, 423, 221 N.W.2d

43, 47 (1974). Likewise, an attorney who disobeys or violates a Supreme Court

order in a disciplinary proceeding acts at that attorney’s peril. Grounds for

discipline include “[d]isobedience to, or violation of an order of the court requiring

the attorney to act or refrain from acting in a particular manner[.]” SDCL 16-19-

33(2). We stress that the Rules of Professional Conduct are not cafeteria style rules;

an attorney is not free to pick and choose what rules to follow or disregard the rest

on a whim.

[¶16.] When disciplinary proceedings began, the Disciplinary Board

recommended that public censure was appropriate in Swier’s case. Swier, 2020 S.D.

7, ¶ 81, 939 N.W.2d at 873. This Court had “a low degree of confidence that the

solemnity of these disciplinary proceedings and the Board’s proposed sanction will,

themselves, effect the lasting change necessary to protect the public.” 1 Id. ¶ 83, 939

1. This Court’s concerns were based upon the fact that Swier did not have office
procedures and policies to identify conflicts of interest, failed to take
appropriate action to address apparent conflicts of interest, was unaware of
the responsibilities as a managing attorney, delegated decision-making and
supervisory authority to employees, and continued representation when he
knew conflicts existed. Swier, 2020 S.D. 7, ¶ 82, 939 N.W.2d at 873. “Of
grave concern” was Swier’s lack of full candor and credibility with the Board.
Id. ¶ 83, 939 N.W.2d at 873. At oral argument before this Court, Swier’s
argument was charitably characterized as an “infomercial”; Swier lacked
“sincerity and remorse and any attempt at either was pro forma.” Id. ¶ 79,
939 N.W.2d at 873.

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N.W.2d at 873. The Court suspended Swier for one year and outlined steps that

Swier must take before petitioning for reinstatement. 2 Id. ¶ 85, 939 N.W.2d at 874.

[¶17.] Three months after the effective date of Swier’s initial suspension for

the subsequent violation, the Court entered its order suspending him from

practicing law indefinitely, and suspending him until further order of the Court, for

practicing law under suspension and conducting himself as a legal assistant without

Court approval. We must now consider the appropriate discipline for a suspended

attorney who violates an Order of Suspension.

[¶18.] This is not the first time the Court has been confronted with this issue.

Admittedly, each case is factually unique, but the rules applied in each have general

application. In the case of In re Hosford (Hosford I), the Court appointed referee

found attorney Hosford guilty of unethical and improper conduct in the solicitation

of business. 60 S.D. 625, 245 N.W. 822-23 (1932). The referee also found Hosford

guilty of improper and unethical conduct involving moral turpitude and subornation

of perjury by “framing up” a defense in a criminal case. Id. at 823. The referee

recognized the gravity of Hosford’s transgressions, but recommended leniency due

to Hosford’s years of practice, which was the sole source of his income, his poor

2. These conditions included passing the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Examination, successfully completing a law office management course
approved by the Court, and reimbursing the State Bar of South Dakota and
the Unified Judicial System for expenses allowed under SDCL 16-19-70.2.
He was also required to submit an affidavit stating under oath that he had
reviewed the Oath of Attorney and the Rules of Professional Conduct; that he
recognized that his conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct by
which he is bound; that he will devote every effort in future practice to fully
abide by the Rules of Professional Conduct and Oath of Attorney; and, upon
reinstatement, he will maintain professional malpractice insurance along
with proof thereof. Swier, 2020 S.D. 7, ¶¶ 85-87, 939 N.W.2d at 874. Swier
has not acted to comply with the preconditions to reinstatement.
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health, and his seriously impaired eyesight. Id. The Court noted that, while the

deliberate subornation of perjury was ample to justify disbarment, it was inclined to

accept the view that the case could adequately be dealt with by something less than

disbarment. Id. The Court suspended Hosford from the practice of law for one year

with “both the hope and the opinion that he can and will thereafter conduct his

practice of his chosen profession in such manner that no proper exception can be

taken thereto.” Id.

[¶19.] In In re Hosford (Hosford II), the Tripp County Bar accused Hosford of

violating the order of suspension by indulging in the practice of law during the

period of suspension. 62 S.D. 374, 252 N.W. 843 (1934). Hosford kept his law office

open and fully equipped after suspension. Id. at 844. He went to the office daily,

employed a stenographer, left law office signage on the office window and doors, and

consulted with clients and prospective clients. Id. at 849. While Hosford did not

personally appear in court, the referee found that Hosford associated himself with

another attorney to continue the practice of law by resorting to the use of

subterfuge. Id. at 846. The referee recommended disbarment. Id.

[¶20.] The Court considered the record in Hosford’s original case and whether

Hosford willfully disobeyed or violated a court order requiring him to forbear an act

connected with or in the course of his profession. Id. at 846-47. It noted Hosford’s

“aggressive militant combativeness” in defending himself and his unwillingness and

inability to feel any contrition for his actions. Id. at 849. The Court ruled the

judgment of suspension failed to serve its intended purpose and disbarred Hosford

from the practice of law. Id. at 850. It observed:

He has undertaken in his argument before this court to palliate
the offense of subornation of perjury committed under

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circumstances that indicate it could have been inspired by the
most sordid motives only.

The whole record reeks with an unhealthy miasma of blunted
ethical sense in the matter of attitude, questionable methods,
manner of practice, and lack of wholesome professional idealism.

There is an underlying and pervading motif and entity in the
record made by the accused, and in the record of these
proceedings, that constrains us to the conclusion that accused
suffers so great a poverty of ethical concept as to make
incomprehensible to him the high standards of conduct,
integrity, honor, unselfish willingness to serve, and professional
probity that should characterize a lawyer. We are without
indication of his present ability to understand the necessity for
those standards.

Id. at 389, 252 N.W. at 849-50. The Court denied Hosford’s application for

reinstatement. In re Hosford (Hosford III), 64 S.D. 161, 265 N.W. 598 (1936).

[¶21.] Unfortunately, the pattern has continued, albeit in different contexts.

Attorney Reynolds failed to promptly attend to client needs resulting in a default

judgment being taken against a client for failure to promptly file an answer.

Reynolds, 2009 S.D. 9, ¶ 39, 762 N.W.2d at 349. Another client repeatedly asked

Reynolds to draft and file a complaint. Id. ¶ 17-19, 762 N.W.2d at 344. Reynolds

procrastinated, and the client never made it to court because of the running of the

statute of limitations despite his repeated pleas to Reynolds. Id. ¶ 20, 762 N.W.2d

at 344. While the Disciplinary Board recommended disbarment, the Court

suspended Reynolds for three years with the hope that “a lengthy suspension will

allow a once very competent attorney time to identify to himself his professional

flaws and attempt to cure them.” Id. ¶ 65, 762 N.W.2d at 356. It was not to be.

The Court learned that Reynolds misrepresented his suspended status in South

Dakota to a bar admissions authority in another state. Reynolds consented to

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disbarment, SDCL 16-19-65, and for the protection of the public, this Court

disbarred Reynolds in South Dakota.

[¶22.] In a 3-2 decision, Ogilvie was conditionally admitted to the practice of

law despite various character flaws. In re Ogilvie (Ogilvie I), 2001 S.D. 29, ¶ 3, 623

N.W.2d 55, 56. Notwithstanding his prior plea to this Court that he would no

longer engage in such misconduct, the “[p]roblems on which he earlier received the

benefit of the doubt have re-emerged.” In re Ogilvie (Ogilvie II), 2005 S.D. 65, ¶ 14,

698 N.W.2d 78, 82. The Court revoked his conditional license to practice law. Id. ¶

15, 698 N.W.2d at 82.

[¶23.] In the case before us, Swier’s ethical lapses, while serious and

disturbing, are not as egregious as those in Hosford I, Hosford II, Reynolds, or

Ogilvie II. Swier admitted to the allegations in the initial proceeding. Swier, 2020

S.D. 7, ¶ 1, 939 N.W.2d at 857. In this proceeding, he admitted to participating in

the email thread, but attempted to justify it as inconsequential and clerical. Like

Hosford, Swier has been loath to accept responsibility for his actions and has done

so “only through capitulation.” Id. ¶ 83, 939 N.W.2d at 873. Unlike Hosford,

Reynolds, and Ogilvie, Swier’s violation of the Order of Suspension was an isolated

incident and not a seamless continuation of the practice of law.

Appropriate Discipline

[¶24.] Given the fact that Swier is suspended from the practice of law, a

pattern of multiple violations would have led to his disbarment in order to protect

the public. Based on this single violation, which nevertheless was an intentional

one, we extend Swier’s suspension from the practice of law for an additional 60 days

following the end of his one-year suspension on March 20, 2021, require Swier to

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reimburse the State Bar of South Dakota and the Unified Judicial System the

$8,373.73 in costs and expenses for the initial suspension and $8,915.58 in costs and

expenses for the current proceeding, and require Swier to meet the conditions the

Court imposed in Swier, 2020 S.D. 7, ¶¶ 85-87, 939 N.W.2d at 874, (restated in this

decision at n.2), before petitioning for reinstatement.

[¶25.] JENSEN, Chief Justice, and SALTER and MYREN, Justices, and

MEANS, Circuit Court Judge, concur.

[¶26.] MEANS, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for KERN, Justice, disqualified.

[¶27.] GILBERTSON, Retired Chief Justice, sitting for DEVANEY, Justice,

disqualified.

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