In the interest of M.L.S. and T.L.S.Jr., children — Memorandum Opinion by Justice Trotter

Opinion filed October 22, 2026
In The
Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________
No. 11-26-00132-CV
__________
IN THE INTEREST OF M.L.S. AND T.L.S. JR., CHILDREN
On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11821-CX
M E M O R A N D U M 	O P I N I O N
This is an accelerated appeal from a final order in which the trial court
terminated the parental rights of the mother and the father of M.L.S. and T.L.S. Jr.
(the children).1 Only Mother has appealed. 	On appeal, Mother challenges the
sufficiency 	of 	the 	evidence 	to 	support 	the 	trial 	court’s 	(1) 	findings 	under
Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) 	and 	(E) 	of 	the 	Family 	Code, 	and 	(2) 	finding 	that
termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest. 	See T EX. FAM .
CODE A NN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2026). We affirm the trial
court’s order.
1To protect the identities of the children, we use pseudonyms or initials to refer to them. 	See
TEX. R. APP . P. 9.8(b).

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I. Termination Findings and Standards
To terminate one’s parental rights, the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (the Department) must “clear[] a high bar.” 	In re K.N., 741
S.W.3d 165, 178 (Tex. 2026); see also In re H.S., 741 S.W.3d 4, 8–9 (Tex. 2026).
This 	heightened 	standard 	requires 	that 	the 	Department 	present 	clear 	and
convincing evidence that (1) the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the best interest of the children. See
FAM . § 161.001(b). 	Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of
proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as
to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that: (1) Mother knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to
remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical or emotional
well-being of the children; (2) Mother engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the
children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or
emotional well-being of the children; and (3) termination of Mother’s parental rights
was in the children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). The trial
court further found that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the
children to Mother, however, a continuing danger existed in the home that prevented
the children’s return to her. 	See id. § 161.001(f), (g). 	Mother does not challenge
this finding.
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” 	In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)); see also H.S., 741 S.W.3d at 17. Cognizant of our
deference to the factfinder, we “look at all the evidence in the light most favorable
to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its

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finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.”
J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741 (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not
disregard ‘undisputed facts that do not support the finding.’” Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96
S.W.3d at 266). As such, when considering the credibility of the evidence, we may
not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304,
316 (Tex. 2021).
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
it. 	In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). 	We give due deference to the
finding, and determine whether, based on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations asserted
against the parent. 	In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89
S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2023, pet. denied).
II. Background and The Evidence Presented at Trial
On March 26, 2025, the Department filed the underlying suit to terminate the
mother’s and father’s parental rights to the children based on allegations that they
had endangered the children. 	The Department’s affidavit in support of removal
alleged, among other things, that Mother called the Abilene Police Department and
claimed that people were in her home. At the time, Mother was, and had been, under
the influence of methamphetamine. 	Mother was later found walking with the
children near a closed convenience store holding a baseball bat; the children were
shoeless and covered by a blanket that smelled of cat urine. The trial court granted
the Department temporary managing conservatorship of the children the same day.
The final hearing commenced on February 11, 2026, resumed March 4, and
concluded on April 29. 	Mother was not present during the February 11 setting

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because she had moved to California and claimed to be in the process of securing
housing for her and the children. 	The father had been convicted of aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon—he threatened to shoot and kill Mother with a
firearm—and was incarcerated but arrangements were made for him to attend the
final hearing in person.
Karlye Kramer is an investigator with the Department, and she was assigned
the original intake. According to the intake, Mother was experiencing an episode of
paranoia and believed that others were planting drugs in her home and manipulating
wires there. After Mother was arrested that day and during her confinement in the
Taylor County Jail, Kramer spoke with the children, who were at the home of their
maternal grandmother. M.L.S. told Kramer that she, T.LS. Jr., and Mother had been
sleeping in Mother’s car at night because Mother was “afraid” and they were “not
safe.” M.L.S. also told Kramer that she, T.L.S. Jr., and Mother had gone to a “male
friend’s” home and that Mother was given a baggie that contained a hard substance,
some of which Mother gave to a man who was in her car with them. 	Kramer
expressed concern that the children were exposed to illegal drugs.
After Mother was released from the Taylor County Jail, Kramer went to
Mother’s home to speak with her. 	When Kramer arrived, Mother was holding
several knives and using them to cut wires, which Kramer believed were electrical
wires, that were along the exterior perimeter of Mother’s home and that extended
inside the home. Mother told Kramer that the wires being cut did not exist the day
before her arrest and that she and the children had been sleeping in her car because
someone had broken into her home, urinated on her belongings, and planted drugs.
Kramer asked Mother who was attempting to harm her, and she said it was the
“Witches of the Western Covenant.” During their discussion, Mother was distracted
and acted erratically; she also admitted that she had been using methamphetamine
daily since January 2025. One of Mother’s cats then walked up to them and Mother

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said that someone had shaved a Star of David into its fur; according to Kramer, the
cat was not shaved, and its fur was not disturbed.
Kramer was concerned for the children’s safety because of Mother’s erratic
behavior, paranoia, admitted drug use, and inability to comprehend events and her
surroundings; she attempted to discuss implementing a safety plan with Mother. But
Mother did not understand the purpose of a safety plan, and her erratic behavior
continued. 	The children were staying with their maternal grandmother. 	Kramer
asked Mother to leave the children there until she had time to discuss the
circumstances with her supervisor; as she was leaving, Mother stated, “I sound
paranoid, but the paranoia is real.” 	Mother then went to her mother’s home to
retrieve the children. 	The maternal grandmother called Kramer and stated that
Mother had been knocking on the door, but she did not open it. Law enforcement
arrived, and Kramer observed Mother’s car parked sideways in a parking spot, but
Mother could not be located at the apartment complex. 	The children were then
removed.
Emily 	Stewart 	was the children’s 	2INgage 	permanency 	case manager.
Stewart described the family plans of service that were created for Mother and the
father; the focus of Mother’s plan was to address her mental health issues and illegal
drug use. 	Early on, Mother appeared for hair follicle testing and a urinalysis, the
results of which were positive for amphetamine, cocaine, and methamphetamine.
Mother was then asked to drug test monthly; however, she stopped appearing for
scheduled testing because she claimed that she did not have sufficient time to make
it to and from the testing facility during her lunch break. Mother moved to California
in April 2025 and self-admitted into an inpatient rehab facility, but she did not
complete the program because she did not feel safe there and she claimed that people
were eavesdropping on her conversations and “looking at her through holes in the

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wall.” Mother later attempted outpatient mental health services but did not complete
them.
The Department offered Mother other services—counseling, substance abuse
treatment, visitation, psychological evaluations, and substance abuse assessments—
including making the necessary arrangements for Mother to receive services in
California via the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (ICPC).2 Mother
completed the psychological evaluations and attended most visitations (remotely by
Zoom); however, she routinely arrived late or left the visit early and did not complete
the substance abuse services.
Mother told Stewart that she was receiving services and mental health
treatment in California; however, Mother did not provide a signed release so that
Stewart could obtain her mental health records and verify, which she could not, that
Mother was under the care of a counselor or a psychiatrist or taking prescription
medications for her mental health issues. And although Mother claimed to be taking
Ativan, which is a controlled substance, her drug tests were negative for this
substance. This led Stewart to believe that Mother was not taking her medications.
Stewart testified that the children eventually began living with their maternal
aunt and uncle (Rachel and Avery), who were willing to adopt them if Mother’s
parental rights were terminated. According to Stewart, Rachel and Avery had a safe
and stable home and could provide for the children’s needs. 	Stewart testified that
Mother’s reunification with the children was not a valid option because: (1) she was
not taking her medications; (2) she had not cooperated with the ICPC process as
ordered by the trial court, and because of this a home study could not be performed
2The ICPC is a uniform law that has been adopted in all fifty states that governs the placement of
children across state lines. In re C.R.-A.A., 521 S.W.3d 893, 901 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.).
The ICPC ensures that children who are placed outside of their home state receive the same protection and
services that would be provided to them if they remained in their home state. See In re P.G., No. 11-26-
00074-CV, 2026 WL 2600985, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sep. 3, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (citing
FAM . §§ 162.101–.107.

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to determine if Mother’s home environment in California was safe for the children
and whether she was still living with other men; (3) her April 2025 hair follicle test
was positive for illegal drugs; (4) although she tested negative for several months,
she did not drug test from the end of October 2025 until the week before the final
hearing commenced; and (5) she did not maintain contact with the Department
during the pendency of the termination proceeding.
Mother appeared in-person when the final hearing resumed on March 4. She
testified that the father physically abused her on one occasion and that this incident
occurred when the children were at school. While in California, she lived on and off
with different men, one of whom she met on Facebook, and she refused to provide
their full names and contact information to the Department. 	At the time, she was
working for a self-funded health insurance company. According to Mother, she did
not choose to stop attending counseling in California, but rather services ceased
because the assigned counselor withdrew. She claimed to be seeing a counselor and
a psychiatrist there and that medications were prescribed to address her mental health
issues.
Mother testified that she left Texas because she has a support system in
California and there was an extended waitlist to receive services in Texas. 	She
conceded that, while in Texas, she left the first rehab program early and later self-
admitted 	to 	an 	intensive 	outpatient 	program; 	however, 	she 	was 	still 	using
methamphetamine when admitted. Although she recalled hallucinating on occasion
(although she claimed that the hallucinations were never violent in nature), Mother
denied making the statements to Stewart about cutting wires around her home, the
condition of her cat, or claiming that someone had bugged her home or planted drugs
there. She also denied experiencing paranoia. Mother testified that she had made
efforts to obtain stable housing for the children and to address her drug and mental
health issues.

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Rachel testified that Mother made statements to the children and based on her
observations, acted in ways that suggested she was not mentally well. For example,
during a Zoom call with the children, Mother asked T.L.S. Jr. to not discuss her past
behavior at home that was “physically abusive.” T.L.S. Jr. had disclosed to Rachel
that Mother committed acts of physical abuse against the children and how she
would “hit him.” T.L.S. Jr. asked Mother about this, and she initially denied it and
said that “we don’t discuss that type of stuff with other people.” It concerned Rachel
that Mother would encourage the children not to mention to others the events that
were occurring in their home.
According to Rachel, she was attempting to address the children’s emotional
issues. At times, T.L.S. Jr. had no desire to speak with Mother during a Zoom call;
M.L.S. too, but not as much as T.L.S. Jr. Some of Mother’s text messages to Rachel
were concerning because it did not appear that Mother understood the seriousness
and the potential consequences of the termination proceeding. Rachel testified that
she has known Mother for ten years and expressed concern for the children’s safety
if they were returned to Mother. Mother also told Rachel of at least two instances
of domestic violence that occurred between her and the father. The father testified
that Mother had been violent toward him in the past, and he believed that the children
should remain with Rachel and Avery because they are “great people.”
Stacy Reynolds is a licensed marriage and family therapist, a licensed
chemical dependency counselor, a CASA advocate, and the guardian ad litem for
the children. She testified that it was in the children’s best interest to remain with
and be adopted by Rachel and Avery and that Mother’s parental rights should be
terminated. According to Reynolds, M.L.S. initially indicated her desire to move to
California but over time she became increasingly distant and short with Mother.
However, T.L.S. Jr. adamantly stated that he did not want to move to California.

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Initially, T.L.S. Jr. struggled with suicidal ideations, but progress was being
made to address this issue. He also suffered from depression, anxiety, and ADHD,
and his grades in school needed to improve. 	At first, M.L.S. was guarded, had
trouble with trusting others, and struggled with self-esteem and self-confidence.
However, M.L.S. had improved in these areas since she began living with Rachel
and Avery. Reynold’s concerns were that Mother’s behavioral issues, inconsistent
parenting, and inability to attend to the children’s mental health would cause the
children’s mental health to regress. 	But the children progressed and their mental
states improved while under Rachel’s and Avery’s care. 	Reynolds testified that
Rachel and Avery were willing to address the children’s mental health needs.
Although Reynolds made several attempts to contact Mother to discuss her concerns,
Mother never responded.
The Department also recommended terminating Mother’s parental rights and
asserted that it was in the children’s best interest to remain with Rachel and Avery
with the goal of adoption.
After the final hearing concluded, and before the proceedings adjourned, the
trial court stated: “the Court does not find that all of [Mother’s] testimony is
credible.” We note that the trial court, as the factfinder, may disregard portions of
Mother’s testimony that it found not to be credible. 	See In re M.A., No. 11-26-
00054-CV, 2026 WL 2339171, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 13, 2026, no pet.
h.) (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006)). 	The trial court
terminated Mother’s parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and
found 	termination 	to 	be 	in 	the 	best 	interest 	of 	the 	children. 	See 	FAM .
§ 161.0001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). This appeal followed.
III. Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) – Endangerment
In her first and second issues, Mother challenges the sufficiency of the trial
court’s findings that she endangered the children. 	See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).

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Although only one statutory ground is necessary to support termination, appellate
courts must address a parent’s challenges to a trial court’s findings under subsections
(D) or (E), as they may have implications for the parent’s rights to other children.
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(M); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019)
(addressing due process and due course of law considerations with respect to
appellate review of grounds (D) and (E) and holding that an appellate court must
provide a detailed analysis if affirming the termination on either ground). Thus, if
we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial
court’s finding for either subsection (D) or (E), we need not address the trial court’s
finding as to the other subsection that the trial court found was violated. 	See FAM .
§ 161.001(b)(1); T EX. R. A PP. P. 47.1. 	And when the evidence pertaining to both
subsections (D) and (E) is interrelated, as it is here, we may conduct a consolidated
review of the trial court’s endangerment findings. See In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257,
263–64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied); In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105,
114 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); In re M.R.J.M., 280 S.W.3d
494, 503 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.).
The statutory endangerment grounds require clear and convincing proof that
the parent has: “(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child[ren] to remain
in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being
of the child[ren],” or “(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child[ren]
with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional
well-being of the child[ren].” 	F AM . § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E); In re S.M.R., 434
S.W.3d 576, 585 (Tex. 2014). 	“[E]ndangerment encompasses a larger array of
conduct that ‘expose[s a child] to loss or injury’ or ‘jeopardize[s]’ the child.” In re
R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v.
Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)). 	The term means “more than a threat of
metaphysical injury or potential ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment,”

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In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 803 (Tex. 2012), but “does not require actual harm,”
R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).
To terminate a parent’s rights for endangerment under subsections (D) or (E),
the “parent’s endangering conduct need not ‘be directed at the child[ren],’” nor must
“the child[ren] actually suffer[] injury.” 	R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277 (quoting Boyd,
727 S.W.2d at 533); In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024). “[T]ermination
under [subsection] (D) requires that the child[ren]’s environment is a source of
endangerment, and the parent’s conduct may create that dangerous environment.”
C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 310. “A parent’s drug use, violence, or other abuse may make
the child[ren]’s environment endangering to the child[ren].” In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d
120, 128 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, no pet.). “A parent acts ‘knowingly’ when the
parent is aware that the environment creates a potential danger to the child[ren] but
the parent disregards that risk.” 	Id. 	Because conditions or surroundings cannot
endanger children unless the children are exposed to it, the relevant time frame for
evaluating the application of subsection (D) is before the children’s removal. J.W.,
645 S.W.3d at 749.
Endangerment under subsection (E), in contrast, focuses on the parent’s
conduct, and whether the endangerment of the children’s well-being was the direct
result of the parent’s acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541,
550 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.) (Illegal drug use and its effect on a parent’s
life and ability to parent and care for children may show an endangering course of
conduct.). Termination under subsection (E) must be based on more than a single
act or omission; rather, a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by
the parent is required. Id.; In re D.T., 34 S.W.3d 625, 634 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2000, pet. denied). 	“A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of
conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child[ren]’s physical or emotional well-
being.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277. “[E]ndangerment under Subsection (E) . . . ‘does

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not require [that the parent’s conduct] directly harm the child[ren],’” In re N.L.S.,
715 S.W.3d 760, 764 (Tex. 2025) (quoting R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278), nor must the
children actually suffer an injury, J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345. Instead, what must be
shown is that the parent engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the
children’s well-being by exposing them to loss or injury. 	In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d
801, 811 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).
Clear and convincing evidence shows that Mother engaged in an endangering
course of conduct and knowingly allowed the children to remain in an endangering
environment. See J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573
(Tex. 2005). Mother’s use of illegal drugs, her mental instability, and their effects
on her ability to parent demonstrated an endangering course of conduct. See J.O.A.,
283 S.W.3d at 345; In re A.A.M., 464 S.W.3d 421, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (“Illegal drug use creates the possibility that the parent will be
impaired or imprisoned and thus incapable of parenting.”); see also J.S., 687 S.W.3d
at 551. “While illegal drug use alone may not be sufficient to show endangerment,
a pattern of [illegal] drug use accompanied by circumstances that indicate related
dangers to the child[ren] can establish a substantial risk of harm.” 	R.R.A., 687
S.W.3d at 278. 	“A reviewing court should not evaluate drug-use evidence in
isolation; rather, it should consider additional evidence that a factfinder could
reasonably credit that demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a risk to the parent’s
‘ability to parent.’” 	Id. (quoting J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345). 	Thus, under certain
circumstances, such as those that are present in this case, “any [illegal] drug activity
may render the parent incapable of parenting,” even if the illegal drug activity occurs
outside the children’s presence. 	J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551, 554; In re A.M., 495
S.W.3d 573, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (first quoting
Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 312 S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied; then citing Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533)).

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Mother told Kramer that she used methamphetamine daily for three months
before the children were removed. 	This caused Mother to experience episodes of
extreme paranoia, hallucinations, and other erratic behavior while she was the
children’s sole caregiver. Kramer observed examples of Mother’s erratic behavior
when she encountered her after the children had been removed. 	During this
encounter, Mother was outside her home holding several knives and cutting wires
that were attached to her home; she also took a pipe and attempted to break the
home’s 	siding. 	Mother 	claimed 	that 	others—the 	Witches 	of 	the 	Western
Covenant—were “out to get her,” were tampering with her home, planting illegal
drugs there, and manipulating wires. 	A parent’s actions prior to and after the
children’s removal may show an endangering course of conduct. 	See J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 550.
Mother and the children were sleeping in Mother’s car at night because
Mother was afraid and claimed that people were breaking into her home. 	M.L.S.
confirmed this and told Kramer that Mother had said they were sleeping in the car
because they were not safe in their home. 	M.L.S. also said that Mother took the
children with her to a “male friend’s” home where a drug deal was consummated.
According to Kramer, Mother’s inability to comprehend events or her surroundings
endangered the children.
Kramer testified that Mother neglected to adequately address her mental
health issues, and that she would not provide the necessary information to the
Department so that a home study could be completed to verify whether Mother’s
home was safe and appropriate services could be provided for her while she resided
in California. Further, according to Kramer, Mother minimized the seriousness of
her conduct, even though Kramer addressed this and Mother’s lack of accountability
with her. As we have said, a parent’s past behavior, minimization of her conduct,
illegal drug use, failure to submit to required drug screens, and failure to properly

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address and treat her mental health issues, permit the rational conclusion that
relinquishing the children to her care would pose a substantial risk of harm to the
children. In re A.H., No. 11-24-00075-CV, 2024 WL 3879987, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Aug. 21, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (exposing children to illegal drugs
contributes to an endangering environment). Such is the case here.
On this record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficiently clear and
convincing such that a reasonable factfinder could have formed a firm conviction or
belief that Mother disregarded her parental obligations to the degree that she
knowingly allowed the children to remain in an endangering environment and
knowingly engaged in conduct that endangered the physical or emotional well-being
of the children. F AM . § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s first and second issues.
IV. The Best Interest of the Children
In her third issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is
in the children’s best interest. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much
broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant
discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley v. Adams,
544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976)). Because the trial court, as the trier of fact in
this case, was the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility, we will not disturb its
determinations so long as they are not unreasonable. 	J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312;
J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. Giving the requisite deference that is due the trial court,
we conclude that, based on the evidence presented and the application of the Holley
factors, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination
of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d
at 371–72.

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With respect to the best interest of the children, no unique set of factors need
be proved. 	L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not
restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547. However,
courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 	Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72. These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the
children; (2) the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future;
(3) the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future; (4) the
parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to
assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the children; (6) the plans for
the children by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability
of the home or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may
indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse
for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id.
Because 	the 	best 	interest 	of 	the 	children 	is 	always 	the 	paramount
consideration, the best interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the children,
not the parent. 	J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)). To support a best-interest finding, the Department
is 	not 	required 	to 	prove 	the 	applicability 	of 	each 	Holley 	factor; 	in 	some
circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one factor will suffice. 	C.H., 89
S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no
pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for
termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence that termination is in
the children’s best interest. 	C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 547–48;
C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266; see also H.S., 741 S.W.3d at 23 (Although the heightened
standard of appellate review applies to both grounds for termination and the best

16
interest analysis, evidence that supports a finding under subsection (b)(1) “may also
be, and indeed often is, relevant to best interest under [s]ubsection (b)(2).”). Thus,
the absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates
that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety
and well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548.
In this regard, the factfinder may measure and compare a parent’s future
conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of the parent-
child relationship is in the children’s best interest. 	J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re
Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re
D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). 	The factfinder
may infer that a parent’s past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of
the children may recur in the future if the children are returned to the possession of
the parent. 	J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. 	Moreover, the
factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the children’s physical and
emotional needs an inability or unwillingness to meet the children’s physical and
emotional needs in the future. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118.
Here, several Holley factors are in play. We will address those that are in turn.
A. 	The Desires of the Children
Stewart testified that, at first, the children were excited to speak with Mother
during their Zoom visitations with her. M.L.S. initially indicated her desire to move
to California but as time passed, she became increasingly distant and short with
Mother. However, T.L.S. Jr. was adamant that he did not want to move to California.
B. 	The Emotional and Physical Needs of the Children Now and in the Future
The children are emotionally vulnerable. The evidence shows that T.L.S. Jr.
struggled with suicidal ideations. 	He also suffered from depression, anxiety, and

17
ADHD, and his grades in school needed improvement. 	M.L.S. was guarded, had
trouble 	trusting 	others, 	and 	struggled 	with 	self-esteem 	and 	self-confidence.
Reynold’s concerns were that Mother’s behavioral issues, the inconsistencies in her
parenting, and her inability to attend to the children’s mental health would cause the
children’s 	mental 	health 	to 	regress. 	However, 	the 	children’s 	mental 	state
significantly improved once they began living with Rachel and Avery. According
to Reynolds, Rachel and Avery were capable and willing to address the children’s
mental health and other needs.
C. 	The Emotional and Physical Danger to the Children
As we have said, the factfinder may measure and compare a parent’s future
conduct by his or her past conduct in determining whether termination of the parent-
child relationship is in the children’s best interest. 	J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548.
Persistent illegal drug use by a parent poses infinite potential dangers to the children.
In re S.B., No. 11-24-00267-CV, 2025 WL 920044, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Mar. 27, 2025, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Further, it is well-established that a parent’s
continuing pattern of drug use can support a best-interest finding because of the
“attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the children.”
See In re G.H., No. 11-26-00012-CV, 2026 WL 1992098, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Eastland July 10, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 279–
81). Moreover, a parent’s decision to engage in illegal drug use during the pendency
of a termination suit, when the parent is at risk of losing her children, is indeed
contrary to the children’s best interest. 	See J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551; A.M., 495
S.W.3d at 580; see also G.H., 2026 WL 1992098, at *5.
Mother told Kramer that she used methamphetamine daily for three months
before the children were removed, causing her to experience erratic behavior,
hallucinations, and paranoia while she was the children’s sole caregiver. 	Kramer
observed examples of Mother’s behavior when she encountered her after Mother

18
was released from jail. 	During this encounter, Mother was outside her home with
several knives cutting wires that were attached to her home; she also took a pipe and
attempted to break her home’s siding. Mother claimed that others—the Witches of
the Western Covenant—were “out to get her,” urinating on her belongings, planting
illegal drugs there, and manipulating wires.
Mother and the children were sleeping in Mother’s car at night because
Mother was afraid and claimed that people were breaking into her home. 	M.L.S.
confirmed this and told Kramer that Mother had said they were sleeping in Mother’s
car because their home was not safe. M.L.S. also said that Mother took the children
to a home where it appeared that a drug deal was consummated. 	Kramer testified
that Mother’s inability to comprehend events or her surroundings endangered the
children. 	Mother also failed to adequately address her mental health issues and
would not provide the necessary information to the Department so that appropriate
services could be provided for her while she resided in California. 	According to
Kramer, Mother minimized her conduct, even though Kramer addressed Mother’s
lack of accountability with her. A.H., 2024 WL 3879987, at *9.
It is unclear whether the children were present when Mother and the father
engaged in domestic violence. Regardless of who was the victim, Mother testified
that the children were in school at the time, when, evidently, they were not. Thus,
the trial court could consider, and apparently did, Mother’s untruthfulness when she
testified. 	In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023,
pet. denied).
Further, the trial court could assess Mother’s credibility in conjunction with
her unwillingness to disclose background or personal information of the people with
whom she lived with in California so that background checks could be performed to
ensure the safety of Mother’s home environment. 	Mother agreed 	with the
importance of providing this information, and its purpose and necessity, but she

19
never provided it to the Department despite Stewart’s numerous requests for it.
Because Mother did not comply with the ICPC process as ordered by the trial court,
the Department could not facilitate a home study to determine if Mother’s home in
California was safe for the children or whether she was still living with other men or
alone, as she claimed.
Mother also told Stewart that she was receiving services and mental health
treatment in California; however, Mother would not provide a signed release so that
Stewart could obtain Mother’s mental health records and verify that Mother was
under the care of a psychiatrist, counselor, or taking prescription medications for her
mental health issues. As a result, Stewart could not confirm that Mother was in fact
under the care of a psychiatrist or counselor or taking her prescribed medications.
In this regard, a parent’s failure to demonstrate that they addressed the Department’s
concerns supports a trial court’s best-interest finding. In re E.T., No. 11-25-00318-
CV, 2026 WL 1171545, at *7 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2026, pet. denied)
(mem. op.); see Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72; E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 769.
Finally, Mother was violent with and would hit T.L.S. Jr. and encouraged the
children not to discuss prior incidents of physical abuse that had occurred in their
home before their removal. 	The father said that Mother was violent toward him.
There was also domestic violence between Mother and one of the men that she lived
with in California.
D. 	Available Programs/Mother’s Acts and Omissions
Mother self-admitted to an inpatient rehab facility in April 2025, but she did
not complete the treatment regimen. 	She also failed to complete a subsequent
outpatient program. 	She twice discontinued attending counseling because she did
not approve of the provider. She did not provide proof of her participation in other
counseling services, despite the Department’s requests, and would not sign a release
for information so that the Department could confirm that she was receiving

20
psychiatric treatment and/or counseling in California. 	She missed several of her
visitation sessions with the children and when she did attend, she would frequently
arrive late or leave early. During one visitation session, Mother told M.L.S. not to
discuss the death of a classmate that M.L.S. was grieving over because their time
together was limited.
Mother failed to maintain contact with the Department and would not respond
to Reynold’s attempts to contact her. Mother also failed to submit to drug testing on
several occasions when requested and did not test at all from late October 2025 until
the week before the final hearing commenced. A failure to appear for drug testing
permits the inference that the parent used illegal drugs during the pendency of the
termination proceeding and would thus test positive. See R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281;
see also In re A.R.D., 694 S.W.3d 829, 840 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024,
pet. denied) (“A fact finder reasonably can infer that a parent’s failure to submit to
court-ordered drug tests indicates the parent is avoiding testing because they were
using illegal drugs.”). Considering Mother’s history of drug abuse and positive drug
test at the beginning of the case, this inference may support the trial court’s best-
interest finding.
Further, as has been discussed, despite repeated requests from the Department,
Mother did not provide the necessary information to invoke the ICPC process which
would have allowed her to take advantage of services in Texas and California. And
because of her refusal to participate in the ICPC process, which the trial court
admonished her to do so, it could not be shown that the housing that Mother claimed
to have had secured in California was a safe environment for the children. Mother’s
evasiveness, failure to provide documentary or other proof, and lack of cooperation
prevented the Department from addressing its concerns and evaluating her claims.
See In re R.H., No. 11-25-00317-CV, 2026 WL 1025555, at *7 (Tex. App.—

21
Eastland Apr. 16, 2026, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 	This conduct supports the trial
court’s best-interest finding.
E. 	Plans for the Children
The children gradually improved since their removal from Mother’s care and
placement with Rachel and Avery, who hoped to adopt them if Mother’s parental
rights were terminated. Stewart testified that Rachel’s and Avery’s home was safe
and stable, they were able and provided for the children, and, unlike Mother, they
attended to the children’s emotional, medical, and educational needs. According to
Stewart, since living with Rachel and Avery, the children were able “to be kids”
rather than focusing on helping Mother deal with her emotional issues and paranoia.
Stewart believed that the best outcome for the children was for them “[t]o stay with
Rachel and Avery, and they move forward with adoption.” 	Moreover, Rachel
testified that she had known Mother for ten years and that returning the children to
her would not be tantamount to a safe environment.
The clear and convincing evidence that Mother endangered the children
establishes that terminating her parental rights is in the children’s best interest.
Given the risk of Mother’s unknown housing situation, the possibility of an extended
or permanent absence from the children, and her pattern of illegal drug use, the
evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest finding. In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595,
607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied). Here, Mother’s pattern of
drug 	use 	and 	instability 	pose 	infinite 	potential 	dangers 	to 	the 	children 	and
“implicates most of the Holley factors.” 	See id. at 607, 609. Not only did Mother
engage in persistent illegal drug use and permit the children to be in the presence of
others who use illegal drugs, at least one act of domestic violence between her and
the father involved a firearm. 	See In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 905, 908 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“Physical violence in the home leads to an unstable
and unpredictable environment for children.”). Therefore, the trial court could have

22
rationally inferred that relinquishing the children to Mother’s care would subject the
children to a life of uncertainty, unnecessary risks, and instability, which is contrary
to their best interest. 	See In re E.M., No. 11-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL 1240792, at
*10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In re R.W., 129
S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).
Substantial evidence was also presented concerning Mother’s mental health
issues and her failure to properly address them. 	“While mental incompetence or
mental illness alone are not grounds for termination of the parent-child relationship,
‘[w]hen a parent’s mental state allows the parent to engage in conduct that endangers
the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren], that conduct has bearing’” on
the trial court’s decision to terminate a person’s parental rights. 	In re E.G., 643
S.W.3d 236, 253–54 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, no pet.) (quoting In re P.W., 579
S.W.3d 713, 727 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.)).
Because of the child-centered focus of the best-interest inquiry, we may not
discount the children’s improvement since removal, and their bond with Rachel and
Avery, who have provided a safe, stable home environment for the children and hope
to adopt them. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 746–47; In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (stating that evidence showing
that a child had bonded with the foster family supported the trial court’s best-interest
finding). Importantly, Rachel and Avery have focused on the children’s needs and
assured that they attended their medical and therapy appointments, which were vital
to their continued improvement, and she testified that they will continue to do so.
We also do not ignore M.L.S.’s equivocal desire, which may no longer exist,
to return to Mother; however, this is only one factor that we consider in the overall
best interest analysis. 	See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372; cf. In re F.M.E.A.F., 572
S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“A child’s
love for a parent cannot be ignored as a reflection of the parent’s ability to provide

23
for the child’s emotional needs.”). Although a child’s desires or wishes for residing
with a parent is an important consideration in determining the best interest of the
child, “it cannot override or outweigh evidence of danger to the child.” F.M.E.A.F.,
572 S.W.3d at 732; see G.H., 2026 WL 1992098, at *7 (although it was undisputed
that the young child had a bond with his parents, the parents nevertheless failed to
demonstrate their willingness or ability to provide the child with a safe, stable, drug-
free environment). 	Such desires, although not binding on the trial court, are only
one 	factor, 	among 	others, 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	considers 	in 	its 	best 	interest
determination. See Hart v. Kozik, 242 S.W.3d 102, 109 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007,
no pet.) (citing In re Marriage of Stockett, 570 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1978, no writ)).
Here, Mother’s remote and questionable desire to eventually support the
children is not enough to alleviate the trial court’s and the Department’s concerns
for the children’s safety and well-being. Thus, any recent, temporary improvement
by Mother is not enough to avoid the termination of her parental rights. 	See In re
N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 479 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015, no pet.); see also G.H., 2026
WL 1992098, at *6 (“[E]vidence of improved conduct, especially of short duration,
does not conclusively negate the probative value of a [parent’s] long history of drug
use and irresponsible choices.” (quoting J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 346)). Stability and
permanence are paramount in raising children. 	G.H., 2026 WL 1992098, at *7
(citing In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024,
pet. denied)). 	However, this is difficult to achieve when the children’s parent—
Mother—has moved and effectively abandoned them and has no plans to return to
Texas where the children reside.
When we consider the evidence of Mother’s substance abuse, mental health
issues and erratic behavior, the emotional and physical needs of the children now
and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the

24
future, Mother’s lack of parental abilities, instability, and refusal to address the
issues raised by the Department and the trial court, the future plans for the children,
Mother’s uncertain living situation, and Mother’s actions and inactions, we conclude
that such evidence supports the trial court’s firm belief or conviction that the
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 372.
Accordingly, we overrule Mother’s third issue.
V. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.
W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE
October 22, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.