Angelita Marie Ruiz v. The State of Texas — Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-25-00180-CR
ANGELITA MARIE RUIZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 124th District Court
Gregg County, Texas
Trial Court No. 52,375-B
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
A Gregg County jury found Angelita Marie Ruiz guilty of murder, a first-degree felony,
and the trial court sentenced her to thirty years’ imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 19.02(b)(1), (c) (Supp.).
Ruiz raises six issues on appeal. In her first five points of error, Ruiz argues that the trial
court erred by (1) “permitting a general surgeon who had never performed an autopsy to testify
as an expert regarding bullet trajectory,” (2) “failing to instruct the jury on the issue of apparent
danger,” (3) “failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offenses of manslaughter and
criminally negligent homicide,” (4) “failing to instruct the jury on the issue of sudden passion at
the punishment phase,” and (5) “excusing a juror prior to punishment-phase deliberations.” In
her sixth and final point of error, Ruiz argues that “the court reporter’s failure to record bench
conferences deprived [her] of due process and due course of law.”
We find that (1) Ruiz’s substantial rights were not affected by the general and trauma
surgeon’s testimony, (2) Ruiz was not entitled to an instruction on apparent danger, (3) Ruiz
failed to preserve her complaints regarding the lesser-included offense instructions, (4) Ruiz was
not entitled to an instruction on sudden passion, (5) the trial court did not err in excusing the
juror, and (6) Ruiz waived her complaint regarding the unrecorded bench conferences.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Background
In the pre-dawn hours of April 29, 2020, Austin Goodall, an officer with the Longview
Police Department (LPD), responded to the scene of a shooting outside a residence that was later

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determined to be the home of Ruiz. Upon arrival, Goodall found Ruiz distraught and lying over
an unresponsive man who was prone in the roadway beside a still-running Dodge Durango.
Other LPD officers arrived shortly thereafter. The unresponsive man was later determined to be
Joshua Huffman, Ruiz’s estranged common-law husband. Ruiz voluntarily told Goodall at the
scene that she had shot Huffman. Later that day, during custodial questioning by Detective
Jason Kelley of the LPD, Ruiz explained that she had acted in self-defense after Huffman revved
the Durango’s engine and turned the vehicle’s wheels toward her. Kelley testified that Ruiz also
described a history of past abuse by Huffman and stated that Huffman had threatened Ruiz’s life
the night before the shooting.
Huffman died from a single gunshot wound behind his left ear, with the bullet trajectory
moving left to right and slightly forward and upward. A ballistic examination confirmed that
Ruiz’s gun was used to shoot Huffman.
II. Ruiz’s Substantial Rights Were Not Affected by the Surgeon’s Testimony
In her first point of error, Ruiz argues that the trial court improperly permitted a general
surgeon to testify as an expert regarding bullet trajectory.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion.
Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (citing Rodgers v. State, 205
S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). “An expert witness may offer an opinion if he is
qualified to do so by his knowledge, skill, experience, training or education and if scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence

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or determining a fact in issue.” Id. (citing TEX. R. EVID. 702). When admitting expert
testimony, the trial court must be satisfied that: “(1) [t]he witness qualifies as an expert by
reason of his knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education; (2) the subject matter of the
testimony is an appropriate one for expert testimony; and (3) admitting the expert testimony will
actually assist the fact-finder in deciding the case.” Id. (quoting Vela v. State, 209 S.W.3d 128,
131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
However, any error, other than constitutional error, “that does not affect” the appellant’s
“substantial rights must be disregarded.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Such harm has not occurred
“if the appellate court, after examining the record as [a] whole, has [a] fair assurance that the
error did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410,
417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b)).
B. Analysis
Assuming, without finding, that admitting the surgeon’s testimony was error, it did not
affect Ruiz’s substantial rights in light of other evidence entered at trial. See Maranda v. State,
253 S.W.3d 762, 769 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (citing Anderson
v. State, 717 S.W.2d 622, 628 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)) (“Improper admission of evidence does
not constitute reversible error if the same facts are proved by other, properly admitted
evidence.”). The autopsy report admitted into evidence described the bullet as entering the left
backside of Huffman’s head and traveling from left to right, upward, and back to the front. It
also provided measurements that located the entry wound and the bullet’s resting place within
Huffman’s head. A forensic pathologist also testified about the trajectory of the bullet,

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explaining that the bullet entered behind Huffman’s left ear and took the path described by the
autopsy report. Finally, the crime scene and autopsy photographs, which represented the
location and extent of the bullet wound, were also admitted at trial.
The surgeon’s challenged testimony conveyed the same information, and his use of a
demonstrative aid only illustrated the path described in the autopsy report without supplying a
materially different conclusion about the shooting. See Milton v. State, 572 S.W.3d 234, 240
(Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (explaining that demonstrative aids assist the jury in understanding other
evidence). Thus, the jury had independent evidence of the specific facts conveyed by the
challenged testimony. See Hawkins v. State, No. 06-08-00087-CR, 2009 WL 30255, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana Jan. 7, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(alternatively concluding that admission of an officer’s wound testimony was harmless because a
pathologist had provided very similar testimony).
Considering the cumulative nature of the challenged testimony in the context of the
record as a whole, we have fair assurance that any error in its admission “did not influence the
jury, or had but a slight effect.” Johnson, 967 S.W.2d at 417. Accordingly, we overrule Ruiz’s
first point of error.
III. Jury-Charge Error
In her second, third, and fourth points of error, Ruiz raises jury-charge errors.
A. Standard of Review
“We employ a two-step process in our review of alleged jury-charge error.” Murrieta v.
State, 578 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (citing Abdnor v. State, 871

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S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). “Initially, we determine whether error occurred and
then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal.” Id. (quoting
Wilson v. State, 391 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Abdnor, 871
S.W.2d at 731–32)).
“[T]he jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, but it is bound to receive the law from the
court and be governed thereby.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 36.13). “A trial court must submit a charge setting forth the ‘law applicable to the
case.’” Id. (quoting Lee v. State, 415 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. ref’d)
(quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14)).
As we further stated in Murrieta,
The purpose of the jury charge . . . is to inform the jury of the applicable law and
guide them in its application. It is not the function of the charge merely to avoid
misleading or confusing the jury: it is the function of the charge to lead and
prevent confusion.
Id. (quoting Lee, 415 S.W.3d at 917 (citation omitted) (quoting Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d
244, 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007))).
B. Ruiz Was Not Entitled to an Apparent-Danger Instruction
In her second point of error, Ruiz contends that the trial court committed reversible error
by failing to provide the jury with an instruction on the law of apparent danger. Specifically, she
challenges the definition of “reasonable belief” included in the self-defense charge.
The trial court’s instruction to the jury, in pertinent part, was as follows:
[If] you further find, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that [Ruiz] was justified
in using deadly force against Joshua Huffman because she was justified in using
force against Joshua Huffman in self-defense and when and to the degree the

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defendant reasonably believed the deadly force was immediately necessary, you
will find [Ruiz] not guilty.
. . . .
“Reasonable Belief” means a belief that would be held by an ordinary and
prudent man in the same circumstances as the actor.
Relying on Jones v. State, Ruiz argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that
she had the right to defend against an apparent danger as “viewed from her standpoint at the
time” of the offense. See Jones v. State, 544 S.W.2d 139, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). She
maintains that this then allowed the jury to evaluate the necessity of her actions from a
perspective too far removed from hers.
A defendant has a right to defend herself against apparent danger to the same extent as
actual danger. See Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Jones, 544
S.W.2d at 142. That right, however, does not invariably require a separate instruction expressly
addressing apparent danger. See Valentine v. State, 587 S.W.2d 399, 400–01 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1979).
In Jones, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court erred by refusing a
properly requested apparent-danger instruction because the charge required the jury to find that
the “deceased was [actually] using or attempting to use unlawful deadly force against” the
defendant. Jones, 544 S.W.2d at 142–43. In Valentine, however, the court clarified that a
separate apparent-danger instruction is unnecessary when the self-defense charge otherwise
adequately conveys that concept. Valentine, 587 S.W.2d at 400–01. There, the charge
authorized acquittal if the defendant “[r]easonably believed that (the deceased) was using or

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attempting to use unlawful deadly force against her and that she reasonably believed” that her
response was immediately necessary. Id. The charge also defined “reasonable belief” as “a
belief that would be held by an ordinary and prudent person in the same circumstances as the
defendant.” Id. at 401. The court concluded that these instructions adequately conveyed the
defendant’s right to act on “a reasonable apprehension of danger, whether it be actual or
apparent.” Id.
Here, the charge expressly directed the jury to consider whether Ruiz “reasonably
believed the deadly force was immediately necessary,” and provided a definition that required
the jury to assess that belief from the perspective of an ordinary and prudent person in Ruiz’s
circumstances. Accordingly, the charge properly instructed the jury on the concept of apparent
danger. See id.
Ruiz acknowledges that the charge defined “reasonable belief” in accordance with
Valentine but argues nonetheless that a “split” of authority renders Valentine less than
“unequivocal.” Ruiz cites Courtney v. State, 908 S.W.2d 48, 52–53 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d) and Torres v. State, 7 S.W.3d 712, 715 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d) in support of this contention. Ruiz further notes that Valentine is a
panel opinion.
However, neither Courtney nor Torres demonstrates uncertainty surrounding Valentine.
As the Dallas Court of Appeals explained, the charges in those cases conditioned self-defense on
an actual attack or attempted attack. Rider v. State, No. 05-20-00220-CR, 2022 WL 1769116, at
*3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 1, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

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(discussing Courtney, 908 S.W.2d at 52–53; Torres, 7 S.W.3d at 715). Moreover, several courts
have observed that Torres relied on Jones without addressing Valentine. See id.; Garrett v.
State, No. 08-19-00024-CR, 2020 WL 4381609, at *7 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 31, 2020, pet.
ref’d) (not designated for publication); Clark v. State, No. 04-02-00551-CR, 2004 WL 1835732,
at *6 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 18, 2004, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
Nor does Valentine’s status as a panel opinion undermine its application here. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has twice reaffirmed its holding in Valentine. See Walters v. State,
247 S.W.3d 204, 212 n.37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Semaire v. State, 612 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex.
Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980). Moreover, this Court has repeatedly applied Valentine in
rejecting challenges to apparent-danger instructions. See Lowe v. State, 211 S.W.3d 821, 825
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet. ref’d); Wilson v. State, 179 S.W.3d 240, 252 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2005, no pet.).
We therefore overrule Ruiz’s second point of error.
C. Ruiz Failed to Preserve Her Lesser-Included Offense Complaint
Ruiz next argues that the trial court committed reversible error in refusing to submit to
the jury her requested charges on the lesser-included offenses of manslaughter and criminally
negligent homicide. However, the record shows that Ruiz did not preserve error.
1. Error Preservation
Requests for lesser-included instructions implicate trial strategy and therefore are not
necessarily part of the law applicable to the case. Williams v. State, 662 S.W.3d 452, 461 (Tex.

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Crim. App. 2021). As such, a trial court has no independent duty to submit an instruction on a
lesser-included offense, and a defendant must preserve error to complain of such on appeal. Id.
at 455–56. To do so, “the defendant must point to evidence in the record that raises the lesser-
included offense.” Id. at 461. Thus, merely requesting the lesser offense, without identifying the
legal or factual basis for the request, ordinarily does not preserve error. Id. at 462–64.
An exception exists, however, where the evidence raising the lesser-included offense is
“manifest,” or obvious in the context to the trial court. Id. at 462–63. Even so, evidence found
on the face of the record is not necessarily manifest. See id. at 463 (finding that evidence cited
by the defendant on appeal was not manifest because it did not reflect any defensive theory
presented at trial).
Prior to the formal-charge hearing, Ruiz submitted a proposed jury charge with the lesser-
included offenses of manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. However, she did not
point out to the trial court what evidence raised it, either in the informal-charge conference at the
close of evidence for the State’s case or during the formal-charge conference. Thus, Ruiz
preserved her complaint only if the grounds for it would have been obvious to the trial court.
However, as in Williams, even if the record contained some evidence relevant to
manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide, such evidence was not manifest to the trial court.
Rather, Ruiz tried the case on a theory of self-defense, repeatedly testifying that she intentionally
shot Huffman, and her closing argument focused entirely on evidence supporting that theory.
Against that backdrop, any evidentiary basis for manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide
was not manifest to the trial court. See Williams, 662 S.W.3d at 464; Scott v. State, No. 05-25-

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00601-CR, 2026 WL 2427752, at *6 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 18, 2026, no pet.) (mem op., not
designated for publication) (concluding that evidence supporting manslaughter was not manifest
where appellant “did not present a defensive theory of manslaughter during trial” but instead
pursued one “on identity”).
We therefore overrule Ruiz’s third point of error.
D. Ruiz Was Not Entitled to a Sudden-Passion Charge
In her fourth point of error, Ruiz argues that the trial court erred by not including a
sudden-passion charge in the punishment phase.
“Sudden passion” is “passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the
individual killed,” which arises at the time of murder. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(2)
(Supp.). “At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether
[s]he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate
cause.” Id. § 19.02(d) (Supp.). “If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a
preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree.” Id. “‘Adequate
cause’ means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror
in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.” Id.
§ 19.02(a)(1) (Supp.).
To be entitled to a jury instruction on the issue of sudden passion during
the punishment phase, the record must at least minimally support the following
inferences: (1) that [Ruiz] acted under the immediate influence of a passion such
as terror, anger, rage, or resentment; (2) that [her] sudden passion was induced
by some provocation by the deceased or another acting with [her], which
provocation would commonly produce such a passion in an individual of
ordinary temper; (3) that [s]he committed the murder prior to regaining [her]

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capacity for cool reflection; and (4) that a causal connection existed “between the
provocation, the passion, and the homicide.”
Walker v. State, 557 S.W.3d 678, 688 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. ref’d) (quoting
McKinney v. State, 179 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). If a defendant presents
evidence of sudden passion, she is entitled to an instruction on this mitigating circumstance even
if the evidence raising such an issue is contradicted, weak, or unbelievable. Trevino v. State, 100
S.W.3d 232, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam). The question “is whether there was any
evidence from which a rational jury could infer sudden passion.” Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4,
11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
As the provocations for her sudden passion, Ruiz cites past abuse at the hands of
Huffman and immediate fear for her life when he revved the vehicle’s engine at her. However,
passion that is “solely the result of former provocation” does not suffice. Hobson v. State, 644
S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04(b)).
Moreover, “[e]vidence of fear alone, or self-defense, is not sufficient to raise sudden passion.”
Walker, 557 S.W.3d at 688.
The facts in this case are similar to those in Walker. In Walker, Walker shot and killed
her husband after he entered their home, claiming she had done so out of self-defense. Id. at 681.
Moments before the shooting, the couple had gotten into a heated argument in their neighbor’s
yard, which resulted in Walker storming back to her and her husband’s home. Id. at 680. Once
inside, Walker sent over forty text messages to her husband within two hours, many of which
were laced with profanity. Id. Walker explained that she sent the messages to draw her husband
to the house. Id. at 682. When the husband asked to be let into the home, Walker responded,

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“[expletive] off u come in and I will put a bullet inn [sic] you.” Id. at 681 (alterations in
original). When the husband made no reply, Walker responded again that she was “setting
[expletive] on fire.” Id. (alteration in original). At that point, the husband attempted to enter the
home, which led to Walker retrieving a gun from her bedroom and shooting him. Id. During the
punishment phase, Walker testified of past abuse from her husband. Id. She further testified that
when she shot him, she was afraid of what he was going to do to her. Id. at 682. On appeal,
Walker argued that the trial court erred in not including an instruction on sudden passion. Id. at
687. This Court, however, found that Walker’s actions were deliberate and reflective, noting
specifically the text messages sent and the fact that Walker had armed herself in expectation of
her husband entering the house. Id. at 689.
Similarly, in this case, on the night of the shooting, Ruiz sent several inflammatory and
profanity-laced messages to Huffman, demonstrating intent to harm both him and his property.1
Moreover, Ruiz testified that after sending these messages, she called Huffman and asked him to
come to her residence. Finally, Ruiz testified that she armed herself with a gun before Huffman
arrived, indicating that she anticipated the event at issue. As in Walker, we find that Ruiz’s
conduct demonstrated a deliberate response to a perceived threat.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err when it failed to include a jury
instruction on the issue of sudden passion. We overrule Ruiz’s fourth point of error.
1After telling Huffman that she was about to use a baseball bat to damage his parked car that was in her yard, Ruiz
texted him stating, “I’ll be waiting for you with my [expletive] gun pointed straight to your [expletive] dick.”

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IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Excusing a Juror Prior to Punishment-Phase
Deliberations
In her fifth point of error, Ruiz challenges the trial court’s excusal of a juror prior to
punishment-phase deliberations. Specifically, Ruiz challenges the finding that the juror was
disabled due to her responsibilities as the primary caregiver of her father.
A. Standard of Review
The Texas Constitution requires a jury in a felony-criminal trial to be composed of twelve
members. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13. “The trial court has discretion to determine whether a juror
has become disabled and to seat an alternate juror.” Scales v. State, 380 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2012) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29). In deciding to remove a
juror, “the trial court must make a finding, sufficiently supported by the record, that the juror was
disqualified or unable to perform the duties of a juror.” Id. at 784 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 33.011). We may not “substitute [our] own judgment for that of the trial court.”
Id. Instead, we are “to assess whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the trial court’s ruling, the ruling was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. “The ruling must be upheld
if it is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Id. Absent an abuse of discretion, no
reversible error will be found. Id.
B. Analysis
Ruiz first argues that the juror was not “disabled’ under Article 36.29 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29 (Supp.). However, several
courts, including this Court, have held that a juror may be disabled for purposes of Article 36.29
when a family emergency arising from the juror’s caregiving responsibilities prevents the juror

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from fully and fairly performing the duties of a juror. See Edwards v. State, 981 S.W.2d 359,
367 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1998, no pet.); Brown v. State, No. 10-07-00279-CR, 2010 WL
138331, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 13, 2010, pet. dism’d, untimely filed) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (upholding juror’s dismissal when juror needed to care for spouse).
Ruiz attempts to distinguish these cases on the grounds that they involved jurors responsible for
the care of a child or spouse, rather than a parent. However, neither Article 36.29 nor the cases
construing it limit a juror’s disability to caregiving responsibilities owed to a particular family
member. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29(c). Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether
any condition or circumstance “inhibits a juror from fully and fairly performing the functions of
a juror.” Reyes v. State, 30 S.W.3d 409, 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (quoting Griffin v. State,
486 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)).
Next, Ruiz states that the juror did not speak directly with the trial judge but instead
communicated with the bailiff about her father’s condition. However, a trial court is not required
to personally question a juror before finding the juror disabled. See Scales, 380 S.W.3d at 784
n.18. Rather, the trial court’s finding need only be sufficiently supported by the record. Id. at
784. Accordingly, courts have upheld disability findings based on information relayed to the
trial court by court personnel rather than by the juror personally. See Johnson v. State, 718
S.W.3d 563, 567-68 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, pet. ref’d) (upholding dismissal of
a juror where trial court relied on information from the bailiff in finding the juror disabled);
Brown, 2010 WL 138331, at *5–6 (upholding the trial court’s dismissal of a juror where the trial
court relied on the court coordinator’s testimony about the juror’s condition).

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We therefore overrule Ruiz’s fifth point of error.
V. Ruiz Failed to Preserve Her Complaint About Unrecorded-Bench Conferences
In her sixth and final point of error, Ruiz argues that the court reporter’s failure to record
bench conferences deprived her of meaningful appellate review and violated her rights to due
process and due course of law.
A defendant must object to the court reporter’s failure to record a bench conference to
preserve the complaint for appellate review. See Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 508–09 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2003); Morris v. State, No. 06-09-00147-CR, 2010 WL 1644739, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana Apr. 23, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). The record does
not reflect that Ruiz objected to the court reporter’s failure to record the bench conferences, nor
does Ruiz allege that she made such an objection.
Instead, Ruiz urges this Court to reconsider Valle in light of the constitutional interests
implicated. However, as an intermediate court, we must follow the binding precedent of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a); Peek v. State, No. 06-08-
00069-CR, 2008 WL 5090344, at *2 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 4, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (declining to “make an exception to well-established Texas
precedent” requiring an objection to a court reporter's failure to record trial proceedings to
preserve error).
Because Ruiz failed to preserve her complaint for appeal, we overrule her sixth point of
error.

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VI. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice
Date Submitted: August 28, 2026
Date Decided: October 20, 2026
Do Not Publish