City of Houston v. Adaeze Shavon Meka

Supreme Court of Texas
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No. 23-0438
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City of Houston,
Petitioner,

v.

Adaeze Shavon Meka,
Respondent

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On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
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PER CURIAM

This personal-injury lawsuit arises out of a motor-vehicle accident
involving a City of Houston employee. The City seeks dismissal and
argues that post-filing diligence in effecting service of process is a
jurisdictional requirement that, under Section 311.034 of the Texas
Government Code, may be challenged in a plea to the jurisdiction or
summary-judgment motion based on governmental immunity. The court
of appeals rejected the City’s contention. It concluded that timely service
of process does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction. ___ S.W.3d ___,
2023 WL 3063397, at *8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 25, 2023).
The court of appeals reached that conclusion by embracing and heavily
relying on an opinion from the Third Court of Appeals. See id. at *5-8
(citing and quoting Tanner v. Tex. State Univ., 644 S.W.3d 747 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2022)). This Court, however, subsequently reversed the
Third Court’s judgment. See Tex. State Univ. v. Tanner, 689 S.W.3d 292,
297 (Tex. 2024).
The relevant statutory term for limitations purposes in this case is
“bring suit.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a). As Tanner
explains, “bringing suit” involves both filing an original petition and
effecting service of process, so untimely service deprives a court of
jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the government. 689 S.W.3d at
296, 300. We clarified that diligence in effecting service is not an
independent “requirement.” Instead, diligence provides an opportunity
for a plaintiff who effects service after limitations has run to nonetheless
be deemed to have timely served the defendant. Service that would
otherwise be untimely, in other words, will relate back to a timely-filed
original petition if the plaintiff exercised diligence in attempting service
from the point that limitations expired until service was achieved. Id. at
298; see Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007).
The opinion below relied on propositions that we rejected in
Tanner. Because the court of appeals resolved the case in that way, it
had no occasion to consider the parties’ remaining arguments. The court
relied on what it regarded as the state of the law before our decision, the
benefit of which it did not have. We therefore grant the City’s petition for
review, vacate the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand to that court
for further proceedings in light of Tanner. See TEX. R. APP. P. 59.1, 60.2(f).

OPINION DELIVERED: August 30, 2024

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