Nejla Kassandra Keyfli Lane v. Commission for Lawyer Discipline

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 23-0956
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Nejla Kassandra Keyfli Lane,
Appellant,

v.

Commission for Lawyer Discipline,
Appellee

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Appeal from the Board of Disciplinary Appeals
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued December 4, 2024

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Chief Justice Blacklock, Justice Lehrmann, Justice Devine, Justice
Bland, Justice Young, and Justice Sullivan joined.

JUSTICE BOYD filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Busby
joined.

JUSTICE BUSBY filed a dissenting opinion.

Each attorney admitted to practice law in Texas is subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court and the Commission for Lawyer
Discipline (CLD), a committee of the State Bar. See TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 81.071. Disciplinary proceedings begin upon the CLD’s receipt of an
allegation of attorney misconduct. The Rules of Disciplinary Procedure
govern the process that unfolds, and one of them—Rule of Disciplinary
Procedure 17.06—is the subject of this case.
Rule 17.06(A) prohibits the imposition of discipline for
professional misconduct occurring more than four years before the
allegation of misconduct is received by the CLD. The issue here is
whether and how Rule 17.06(A) operates in “reciprocal” discipline cases,
in which a Texas attorney disciplined by another jurisdiction
self-reports the foreign jurisdiction’s judgment of discipline to Texas,
which, in turn, summarily imposes discipline mirroring that imposed by
the foreign jurisdiction.
The CLD urges that Rule 17.06(A) is inapplicable and suggests
that no statute or rule of limitations governs reciprocal discipline
proceedings. Under the CLD’s theory, it was therefore proper for Texas
to discipline Attorney Nejla Lane in 2023 for sending three intemperate
emails to an Illinois federal magistrate judge’s chambers in 2017. We
reject that reading of Rule 17.06(A) and hold that it applies to reciprocal
discipline cases and bars the CLD from imposing discipline in this case.
We accordingly reverse the judgment of suspension and dismiss the
case.
I. Background
Nejla Lane is an attorney who has practiced law for twenty years,
having been licensed in Illinois, Michigan, and her current home state
of Texas. In 2014, while representing the husband in a contentious
divorce proceeding in Illinois, Lane brought another suit in Illinois
federal court alleging that the wife violated federal wiretap law by

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downloading the husband’s emails. That case was assigned to
Magistrate Judge Sheila Finnegan. The litigation became heated and,
after the judge denied Lane’s request for additional time to conduct
discovery, Lane sent the first of three emails that ultimately would
result in her being disciplined by both the Northern District of Illinois
and the Supreme Court of Illinois.
Lane sent the first email in April 2017. After the judge denied
her motion for an extension of time to depose the wife, Lane emailed an
inbox for proposed orders, claiming Judge Finnegan was favoring
opposing counsel:
Today in court no matter what I said to you, you had
already made up your mind, and even questioned my
sincerity with regard to my preparation for upcoming
trial. . . .
[S]ince the beginning you never seem to doubt anything
[opposing counsel] says, as you appear to doubt me. Still,
I stated to you in open court that “I don’t want to be hated”
for doing my job, but it sure seems that way, as I never get
a break. [Opposing counsel] is the lucky guy who senses
same as he can just pick up the phone to call you knowing
he will get his way . . . .
Still, it’s not fair that my client (and I) is being treated
badly for suing his wife/ex wife, and everyone is protecting
[the wife] – why? . . . How am I to prove my case if I am
not given a fair chance to do my work, properly. I apologize
for this message, Judge Finnegan, but I am under a lot of
pressure, too, and it’s “I” who is being punished here
because it’s “I” who has to spend endless hours in the
office . . . .
Again, my sincere apology and I will adhere to your
instructions.

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Judge Finnegan replied to all counsel explaining that she does not allow
attorneys to email her to argue motions or “share their feelings about
my past rulings” and that Lane’s email was “improper.”
Two months later, Judge Finnegan’s law clerk emailed all counsel
a copy of the judge’s order denying leave for Lane to depose an additional
witness. Lane responded with another email to the proposed order
mailbox, addressing her email to the clerk. In this email, Lane
complained Judge Finnegan had entered an “outrageous” order helping
the wife “escape punishment for wrongs she committed.” She also
asserted that the judge was “violating [her] client’s rights.” Three days
later, Lane sent a third email, again addressed to Judge Finnegan’s law
clerk and including the proposed order mailbox as a recipient. Lane
described the order as “fraudulent,” adding that it made her “sick to
[her] stomach.” In closing, Lane proclaimed: “What goes around comes
around, justice will be done at the end!”
Judge Finnegan then ordered Lane to “immediately cease all
email communications with the Court (via the proposed order box or
otherwise) and with all members of the Court’s staff.” Judge Finnegan’s
order described the emails as “highly inappropriate” and stated, “The
Court will take further action to address the failure to comply with the
Court’s directive [in April 2017] and the inappropriate content of
counsel’s two most recent emails in due course.”
After the lawsuit ended, Judge Finnegan reported Lane to the
Northern District of Illinois. In January 2018, the Northern District
suspended Lane from that court’s general bar for six months for
violating American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional

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Conduct 3.5(d), which forbids lawyers from “engag[ing] in conduct
intended to disrupt a tribunal,” and 8.4(d), which prohibits “conduct that
is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
In August 2019, the Supreme Court of Illinois’s Attorney
Registration and Disciplinary Commission filed a complaint against
Lane over the same emails, alleging that Lane violated Rules 3.5(d),
8.2(a), and 8.4(d) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Like their
ABA counterparts, these rules prohibit “conduct intended to disrupt a
tribunal” and “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.”1
While the Illinois complaint was pending, Lane self-reported the
federal suspension to the Texas State Bar. But the CLD’s Chief
Disciplinary Counsel, Seana Willing, informed Lane that, although a
proposed rule change was under consideration, the Disciplinary Rules

1 The text of the relevant Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct is as

follows:
Rule 3.5(d): “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal.”
Rule 8.2(a): “A lawyer shall not make a statement that the lawyer
knows to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity
concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory officer
or public legal officer . . . .”
Rule 8.4(d): “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
ILL. RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d), 8.2(a), 8.4(d).

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in effect at the time did not require reporting federal discipline.2 Texas
took no disciplinary action at the time.
The Illinois Supreme Court ultimately imposed a six-month
suspension, followed by six months of probation, in January 2023. As
required by Disciplinary Rule 8.03(f), Lane reported this suspension to
the Chief Disciplinary Counsel the following month, in February 2023.
One month later, the CLD filed a petition for reciprocal discipline with
the Board of Disciplinary Appeals (BODA), a body that imposes
reciprocal discipline and hears appeals in standard disciplinary matters.
Lane answered and asserted several defenses. She claimed that
the Illinois judgment was unsupported by evidence, that she had been
deprived of due process, and that imposing the same discipline in Texas
would be a “grave injustice.” See TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.
R. 9.04(A)–(C). She also alleged that imposing reciprocal discipline
would violate the U.S. Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause. Following
a hearing, a divided BODA rejected Lane’s defenses and issued a
Judgment of Partially Probated Suspension, suspending Lane from
practicing law in Texas for six months with a subsequent three-month
probation period.
BODA made three relevant conclusions of law regarding Rule of
Disciplinary Procedure 17.06(A). BODA first concluded that Lane

2 Lane emailed the State Bar in July 2020, shortly after the Texas Bar

Journal published a proposed rule change that would require self-reporting of
discipline by a federal court. Disciplinary Rule 8.03(f) was amended in 2021
and now requires attorneys to notify the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of
discipline by a federal court or federal agency as well as discipline by another
state. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.03(f).

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waived any limitations issue by failing to plead it in her written
response. Next, it concluded that Rule 17.06(A) would not apply to
reciprocal discipline cases even absent a waiver. Finally, BODA
reasoned that if Rule 17.06(A) applied to reciprocal discipline cases, it
would not bar discipline here because the four-year limitations clock
started when Lane was disciplined by the Supreme Court of Illinois in
2023, not when she emailed Judge Finnegan’s chambers in 2017.
Two BODA members disagreed with the judgment of suspension.
Member Jason Boatright concluded that Rule 17.06(A) barred BODA
from disciplining Lane because she sent the offending emails in 2017,
which was more than four years before the CLD learned of her Illinois
suspension in 2023. Another BODA member dissented without opinion.
Lane appealed to this Court. We granted her request for oral
argument, and BODA stayed the suspension judgment pending our
disposition.
II. Relevant Law
The Supreme Court of Texas has inherent power to administer
and regulate the practice of law in Texas. Webster v. Comm’n for Law.
Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 490 (Tex. 2024). The State Bar Act provides
a statutory framework within which the Court exercises this power. Id.
at 491 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 81.011(b)). Central to this framework
are the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, which this Court
promulgates to “define proper conduct for purposes of professional
discipline.” TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE ¶ 10.
To complement these rules, the Court also promulgates the Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure, which “establish the procedures to be used in

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the professional disciplinary and disability system for attorneys in the
State of Texas.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.02. In interpreting
these rules, we apply principles from the statutory-construction context,
considering the text as a whole and giving effect to all words and
provisions. In re Caballero, 272 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. 2008).
This case turns on the applicability and meaning of Rule of
Disciplinary Procedure 17.06(A), which prohibits discipline for
misconduct that occurred more than four years before the CLD’s Chief
Disciplinary Counsel receives notice. Before turning to its text,
however, some context regarding the overall disciplinary process proves
helpful.
Disciplinary proceedings typically begin when the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel receives a “Grievance,” i.e., a written allegation
that an attorney has committed misconduct. See TEX. RULES
DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06(R). In ordinary discipline cases, which are
governed by Part II of the Rules, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel
investigates the allegation and may classify it as warranting an
evidentiary hearing. Id. R. 2.10, 2.12. After a hearing and judgment,
either side may appeal that judgment to BODA. Id. R. 2.23.
In contrast, “compulsory discipline” and “reciprocal discipline”
cases are governed by different rules, which are in Parts VIII and IX of
the Rules, respectively. Both compulsory and reciprocal discipline cases
are summary proceedings insofar as they bypass the process in which a
Grievance is classified, investigated, and adjudicated in an evidentiary
hearing. Reciprocal discipline proceedings are initiated when the Chief

8
Disciplinary Counsel receives and files another jurisdiction’s
disciplinary judgment directly with BODA:
Upon receipt of information indicating that an attorney
licensed to practice law in Texas has been disciplined in
another jurisdiction, including by any federal court or
federal agency, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel shall
diligently seek to obtain a certified copy of the order or
judgment of discipline from the other jurisdiction, and file
it with [BODA] along with a petition requesting that the
attorney be disciplined in Texas.
Id. R. 9.01. In reciprocal discipline cases, BODA does not conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the allegations because, with few
exceptions, the Rules give preclusive effect to the foreign jurisdiction’s
judgment of discipline:
A certified copy of the [other jurisdiction’s] order or
judgment is prima facie evidence of the matters contained
therein, and a final adjudication in another jurisdiction
that an attorney licensed to practice law in Texas has
committed Professional Misconduct is conclusive . . . ,
subject to the defenses set forth in Rule 9.04 below.
Id.
Rule 9.04, which is located in Part IX of the Rules, identifies five
potential defenses that may be asserted in reciprocal discipline cases:
A. That the procedure followed in the other jurisdiction on
the disciplinary matter was so lacking in notice or
opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of
due process.
B. That there was such an infirmity of proof establishing
the misconduct in the other jurisdiction as to give rise
to the clear conviction that [BODA], consistent with its
duty, should not accept as final the conclusion on the
evidence reached in the other jurisdiction.

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C. That the imposition by [BODA] of discipline identical,
to the extent practicable, with that imposed by the other
jurisdiction would result in grave injustice.
D. That the misconduct established in the other
jurisdiction warrants substantially different discipline
in this state.
E. That the misconduct for which the attorney was
disciplined in the other jurisdiction does not constitute
Professional Misconduct in this state.
Id. R. 9.04. These defenses must be pleaded, id.; notably, none
resembles a rule or statute of limitations.
Compulsory discipline proceedings, like reciprocal discipline
cases, are initiated by the Chief Disciplinary Counsel directly with
BODA. But, unlike reciprocal discipline, compulsory discipline is based
on an attorney’s conviction of or order of deferred adjudication for an
“Intentional Crime.” Id. R. 8.01, 8.03. That conviction or order is
“conclusive evidence of the attorney’s guilt.” Id. R. 8.02. In compulsory
discipline cases, BODA is tasked only with determining whether the
conviction (or order of probation) involves the same person, whether it
involves an Intentional Crime, and the appropriate discipline. Id.
R. 8.04.
Rule 17.06 appears in Part XVII of the Rules, under the heading
“Miscellaneous Provisions.” Rule 17.06(A) sets out a general rule
prohibiting discipline for misconduct that occurred more than four years
before the Chief Disciplinary Counsel receives a Grievance. Its other
subsections describe instances in which the general four-year
limitations period does not apply. Because the exceptions to

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Rule 17.06(A) inform its meaning and scope, we quote Rule 17.06 in its
entirety:
17.06. Limitations, Rules and Exceptions:
A. General Rule: No attorney may be disciplined for
Professional Misconduct that occurred more than four
years before the date on which a Grievance alleging the
Professional Misconduct is received by the Chief
Disciplinary Counsel.
B. Exception: Compulsory Discipline: The general rule
does not apply to a Disciplinary Action seeking
compulsory discipline under Part VIII.
C. Exception: Alleged Violation of the Disclosure Rule: A
prosecutor may be disciplined for a violation of
Rule 3.09(d), Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct, that occurred in a prosecution that resulted
in the wrongful imprisonment of a person if the
Grievance alleging the violation is received by the
Chief Disciplinary Counsel within four years after the
date on which the Wrongfully Imprisoned Person was
released from a Penal Institution.
D. Effect of Fraud or Concealment: Where fraud or
concealment is involved, the time periods stated in this
rule do not begin to run until the Complainant
discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the Professional Misconduct.
Id. R. 17.06. As its text—and its placement in Part XVII, Miscellaneous
Provisions—shows, Rule 17.06(A) is generally applicable in all
disciplinary proceedings, save for three express exceptions. The first of
these is subsection (B), which categorically exempts compulsory
discipline cases from Rule 17.06(A)’s application. Id. R. 17.06(B).
Compulsory discipline cases, like reciprocal discipline cases, do not
undergo either the investigation process or a hearing by a court or

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evidentiary panel. See id. R. 8.01, 8.04. But, unlike reciprocal discipline
cases, compulsory discipline cases arise only if an attorney commits
misconduct so grave that it results in a criminal conviction of or
probation for an “Intentional Crime” as that term is defined by the
Rules.3 Id. R. 8.01, 8.03. Excepting criminal misconduct from
Rule 17.06(A) is consistent with provisions of the Penal Code that make
limitations inapplicable to certain serious crimes. See TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. art. 12.01(1) (excepting crimes such as murder and child sexual
abuse from a statute of limitations). But neither text nor logic suggests
that reciprocal discipline cases are similarly beyond Rule 17.06(A)’s
reach merely because they, like compulsory discipline cases, are
summary in nature.
The other two exceptions are not categorical. Rather, they
describe two circumstances that justify excepting a disciplinary
proceeding from the general rule that the four-year limitations clock
begins ticking when the underlying misconduct occurs. Rule 17.06(C)
governs prosecutorial misconduct that results in wrongful
imprisonment and provides that the four-year clock begins only upon
the prisoner’s release. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 17.06(C).
Likewise, Rule 17.06(D) delays the start of the four-year time period
when an attorney hinders discovery of misconduct through fraud or

3 “Intentional Crime” includes (1) any “Serious Crime” committed with

knowledge or intent and (2) “any crime involving misapplication of money or
other property held as a fiduciary.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06(V).
“Serious Crime” means “barratry; any felony involving moral turpitude; any
misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent or reckless
misappropriation of money or other property; or any attempt, conspiracy, or
solicitation of another to commit any of the foregoing crimes.” Id. R. 1.06(GG).

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concealment. Id. R. 17.06(D). Taken together, the three exceptions set
forth in Rule 17.06(B)–(D) demonstrate that the Rules’ drafters
deliberately exempted an entire category of cases—compulsory
discipline cases—from Rule 17.06(A)’s reach, but intentionally refrained
from excepting reciprocal discipline cases. See Bexar Appraisal Dist. v.
Johnson, 691 S.W.3d 844, 854 n.9 (Tex. 2024) (“Just as we give meaning
to text where it exists, we must too give meaning to its absence.”). They
also show that the default rule is to start the four-year clock upon the
occurrence of the misconduct—otherwise, there would be no need for
subsections (C) and (D) to except two scenarios for different treatment,
i.e., delayed accrual.
III. Analysis
We begin by addressing the CLD’s argument that Lane waived
Rule 17.06(A)’s application by failing to plead it in response to the
petition. BODA concluded that pleading was required because the Rules
of Civil Procedure require a party to plead a statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense in responsive pleadings, TEX. R. CIV. P. 94,4 and
BODA’s internal procedures require application of the Rules of Civil
Procedure “[e]xcept as varied by these rules and to the extent
applicable,” BODA INTERNAL PROCEDURAL RULES R. 1.03. We disagree.
Like Rule of Civil Procedure 94, Rule of Disciplinary
Procedure 9.04 enumerates certain defenses that must be pleaded in
response to a petition seeking reciprocal discipline. But Rule 9.04 is

4 “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively . . . statute of limitations . . . and any other matter constituting
an avoidance or affirmative defense.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 94.

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silent about the need to plead Rule 17.06(A). BODA’s reliance on Rule
of Civil Procedure 94 is therefore misplaced as the Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure establish their own pleading requirements for reciprocal
discipline cases and thus “var[y]” the requirements for a responsive
pleading.
We recognize that Rule 17.06(A) at least resembles a statute of
limitations, which typically must be affirmatively pleaded to avoid
waiver. But the rationale that supports finding limitations to be waived
if not raised in a trial court does not apply here. In typical litigation,
judicial efficiency forbids a party from presenting issues on appeal that
were not properly presented to and ruled upon by a lower court. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). But this is not a typical appeal—the CLD filed
its petition for reciprocal discipline directly with BODA, meaning that
BODA was not acting as a court of appeals. Because Rule 9.04, which
expressly governs this proceeding, does not require limitations to be
pleaded, we are reluctant to find waiver based on the failure to plead.
This is particularly true where, as here, BODA plainly was aware of
Rule 17.06(A)’s potential application, as evidenced by the discussion of
that rule in both the judgment of suspension and Member Boatright’s
reasoned writing supporting Rule 17.06(A)’s application.5

5 We agree with our dissenting colleague that Rule 9.04 enumerates the

defenses that must be both pleaded and proved to avoid reciprocal discipline.
Post at 1–2 (Boyd, J., dissenting). But in contrast to the Rules of Civil
Procedure, which expressly classify a statute of limitations as an affirmative
defense, TEX. R. CIV. P. 94, we see no indication in the text of the Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure that Rule 17.06(A) is such a defense. This omission
suggests that Rule 17.06(A) independently constrains BODA from imposing
reciprocal discipline regardless of whether the rule has been pleaded.

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Although we conclude there was no waiver, we do not hold that
Rule 17.06(A) implicates subject matter jurisdiction such that a final
disciplinary judgment could be rendered void for imposing discipline
outside Rule 17.06(A)’s four-year window. Rule 17.05 identifies various
“mandatory” time periods in the Rules, which do not include
Rule 17.06(A), and then states that “[a]ll other time periods herein
provided are directory only and the failure to comply with them does not
result in the invalidation of an act or event by reason of the
noncompliance with those time limits.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P.
R. 17.05 (emphasis added). Accordingly, a disciplinary judgment is not
void merely because the proceeding ran afoul of the four-year limitation
in Rule 17.06(A).
Having concluded that Lane did not waive Rule 17.06(A)’s
application, we address Lane’s contention that Rule 17.06(A) bars the
CLD’s proceeding against her. The CLD argues, and BODA agreed, that
Rule 17.06(A) does not apply because the rule requires discipline to be
imposed within four years of a “Grievance” and a reciprocal discipline
case involves no “Grievance.” We disagree with this cramped reading of
the defined term.
A “Grievance” is “a written statement, from whatever source,
apparently intended to allege Professional Misconduct by a lawyer . . . ,
received by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel.” Id. R. 1.06(R).
In standard discipline cases, the CLD begins the disciplinary process by
determining whether a Grievance constitutes a “Complaint.” Id. R. 2.10.
The CLD then investigates the Complaint to determine if there is just
cause for discipline. Id. R. 2.10, 2.12. If the CLD moves forward, the

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Complaint may be heard either in a district court or before an appointed
evidentiary panel. Id. R. 2.15; see also id. R. 2.17 (describing the
procedure for an evidentiary panel hearing). Decisions by the panel are
appealed to BODA, id. R. 2.23, and then to this Court, id. R. 2.27, 7.11.
Here, the CLD argues that Lane’s 2023 email informing the CLD
and its Chief Disciplinary Counsel about her Illinois suspension and
attaching a copy of the Illinois Supreme Court’s judgment was not a
Grievance because it was not subject to the classification and
investigation process employed in the usual disciplinary proceeding. We
disagree and conclude that Lane’s 2023 email falls within the scope of
Rule 1.06(R)’s definition of a Grievance. The email and the attached
judgment are of course “written statements.” It is inconsequential that
Lane self-reported the misconduct, as a Grievance can derive “from
whatever source.” And the email and attachments plainly include and
incorporate the allegations of Lane’s misconduct that led to her
suspension in Illinois. In short, there is no requirement that a written
statement be classified and investigated under the rules governing
typical disciplinary proceedings in order to constitute a Grievance.
The fact that Rule 17.06(B) expressly excepts compulsory
discipline from the general limitations rule supports this conclusion.
Compulsory discipline, like reciprocal discipline, does not begin with
classification and investigation of a Grievance. Thus, under the CLD’s
logic, Rule 17.06(A) would not apply to compulsory discipline cases
either. Yet Rule 17.06(B) expressly excepts compulsory discipline from
Rule 17.06(A)’s application, indicating that rule would apply but for the
exception. Rule 17.06(A) applies to reciprocal discipline cases, but,

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unlike compulsory discipline cases, reciprocal discipline cases are not
excepted. We therefore reject the CLD’s argument that Rule 17.06(A) is
inapplicable for lack of a “Grievance.”6
The definition of “Professional Misconduct” also accords with our
conclusion that reciprocal discipline against Lane is time-barred. The
CLD argues that even if Rule 17.06(A) applies to reciprocal discipline
cases generally, it would not preclude the proceedings against Lane
because her Professional Misconduct occurred within four years of
BODA’s judgment of suspension. BODA concluded that, in the context
of reciprocal discipline, “Professional Misconduct” refers not to the
underlying conduct that resulted in discipline—here, Lane’s sending the
three emails in 2017—but rather to the Illinois Supreme Court’s entry
of the judgment of discipline in 2023. In BODA’s view, Professional
Misconduct “does not occur until the lawyer is disciplined in another
jurisdiction for misconduct that occurred there” (emphasis added). The
CLD echoes this reasoning and argues that Lane’s Professional
Misconduct occurred in January 2023, when the Illinois Supreme Court

6 BODA and the CLD cite to another BODA decision in which an
attorney sought to dismiss a reciprocal discipline petition as time-barred under
Rule 17.06(A). Bd. of Disciplinary Appeals, In re Bruno, Cause No. 65864, 2021
WL 5543655 (Nov. 2, 2021). Because this Court affirmed BODA’s judgment of
suspension, Bruno v. Comm’n for Law. Discipline, No. 21-0964 (Tex. Sept. 2,
2022), the CLD argues that we should follow BODA’s conclusion in that case
that Rule 17.06(A) did not apply. This Court’s decision to affirm a BODA
judgment without a written opinion, however, does not reflect the Court’s
agreement with the legal conclusions or reasoning reflected in BODA’s
judgment. See TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 7.11 (“The Court may affirm a
decision on [BODA] by order without written opinion.”). In this sense,
affirmance of a BODA judgment resembles the Court’s denial of a petition for
review.

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suspended her. Lane responds that her Professional Misconduct for
purposes of Rule 17.06(A) occurred when she sent the emails in 2017
that ultimately led to her discipline in Illinois. We agree with Lane.
The Rules first define “Professional Misconduct” as “[a]cts or
omissions by an attorney, individually or in concert with another person
or persons, that violate one or more of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct.” TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 1.06(CC)(1). This
definition encompasses the conduct for which the CLD initiates
standard disciplinary proceedings. In cases of reciprocal discipline, the
Rules provide another definition of “Professional Misconduct”:
“[a]ttorney conduct that occurs in another jurisdiction, including before
any federal court or federal agency, and results in the disciplining of an
attorney in that other jurisdiction, if the conduct is Professional
Misconduct under the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.” Id.
R. 1.06(CC)(2).7 The CLD and our dissenting colleague emphasize one
phrase in this second definition to insist that Professional Misconduct
in reciprocal discipline cases does not occur until it “results in the
disciplining of an attorney in that other jurisdiction.” We reject this
strained reading of the text. The requirement that there be resulting
discipline in another jurisdiction is merely a limitation on the scope of

7 Rule 1.06(CC)(2) was amended in 2021 (with similar changes made to

Rule 9.01 and Disciplinary Rule 8.03(f)) to add the current phrase “including
before any federal court or federal agency.” Sup. Ct. of Tex., Final Approval
and Adoption of Amendments to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure, Misc. Docket
No. 21-0961 (May 25, 2021). The rule previously limited “Professional
Misconduct” to “[a]ttorney conduct that occurs in another state or in the
District of Columbia.” Id.

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conduct to which the rules governing reciprocal discipline apply. In
other words, Rule 1.06(CC)(2) circumscribes the type of conduct that is
actionable in Texas, but it does not alter Rule 17.06(A)’s focus, which is
on when the misconduct occurred. We do not ignore Rule 1.06(CC)(2)’s
distinct requirement that misconduct in another jurisdiction be
accompanied by discipline before reciprocal discipline may be imposed—
indeed, we wholeheartedly agree. But we disagree that this is relevant
in interpreting the meaning of Rule 17.06(A).
Subsections (C) and (D) of Rule 17.06, which expressly delay the
start of the four-year window so that it begins upon an event other than
the occurrence of the attorney conduct itself, also support this reading.
See id. R. 17.06(C) (the four-year period begins on the prisoner’s release,
not at the time of prosecutorial misconduct), (D) (the four-year period
does not begin until the discovery of misconduct that was concealed).8
Had the Rules’ drafters intended for reciprocal discipline cases to accrue
upon a foreign jurisdiction’s entry of a judgment of discipline,
Rule 17.06(C) and (D) prove that they would have said so expressly.
Other textual clues buttress our conclusion. In the context of
compulsory discipline, the Rules separately define “Professional
Misconduct” to include “[c]onviction of an Intentional Crime, or being
placed on probation for an Intentional Crime with or without an
adjudication of guilt.” Id. R. 1.06(CC)(8) (emphasis added). Rather than
refer to the conduct that results in a conviction, Rule 1.06(CC)(8)

8 We note that there is no hint of fraud or concealment here, as Lane

twice self-reported her discipline in other jurisdictions to the CLD, first in 2020
and again in 2023.

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deliberately defines Professional Misconduct as the later-occurring
conviction itself. The Rules could have similarly defined Professional
Misconduct in the reciprocal discipline context—by expressly pointing
to the later-occurring order or disciplinary judgment of another
jurisdiction. Instead, the definition of Professional Misconduct in the
reciprocal discipline context refers to the conduct that results in a
judgment of discipline.
Here, Lane’s conduct that resulted in discipline by Illinois is
readily identifiable: it was sending three discrete emails to a federal
magistrate judge and her clerk on three distinct occasions in 2017. This
is the conduct that resulted in the discipline imposed by Illinois in 2023,
i.e., the Professional Misconduct referred to in Rule 17.06(A). Because
that misconduct occurred more than four years before the CLD’s Chief
Disciplinary Counsel received the Illinois Supreme Court’s judgment of
suspension in 2023, Rule 17.06(A) forbade the CLD from filing a
complaint against Lane with BODA at that time.9
Our dissenting colleague argues that, under our interpretation,
Lane’s judgment of suspension would be timely under Rule 17.06(A)
because she first reported her misconduct and the resulting Illinois
federal suspension in 2020. Post at 7 (Busby, J., dissenting). But while
Lane’s 2020 report constituted a “Grievance,” it is not the operative
Grievance for purposes of Rule 17.06(A). This is because the CLD chose

9 We need not and do not address whether the CLD had authority to file

a complaint with BODA based on Lane’s self-reporting in July 2020 of her
suspension by the Illinois federal court before the 2021 amendment to Rule of
Disciplinary Procedure 9.01 expressly authorized reciprocal discipline based
on discipline imposed by a federal court or federal agency.

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to take no action upon receiving the report of Lane’s federal suspension.
The CLD decided to discipline Lane only after a second—much later—
report of the same underlying misconduct, which makes the second
report the operative “Grievance” under Rule 17.06(A). The rule neither
states nor implies that the limitations period begins on receipt of a
Grievance upon which the CLD takes no action. To read Rule 17.06(A)
this way would lead to the absurd result that the CLD could impose
discipline based on a Grievance received decades after the underlying
misconduct so long as some other report about that same conduct was
received within four years of the misconduct. See Carreras v.
Marroquin, 339 S.W.3d 68, 73 (Tex. 2011) (“We . . . interpret statutes to
avoid an absurd result.”); Caballero, 272 S.W.3d at 599 (applying
statutory-construction principles when interpreting the Rules of
Disciplinary Procedure).
Ultimately, under the CLD’s interpretation of the Rules, no
limitations period would govern reciprocal discipline cases, and the CLD
would be authorized to file a complaint based on stale—even
decades-old—misconduct whenever it sees fit. The CLD assures us it
would be judicious in exercising its authority to bring cases in
perpetuity. While that may be true, the text of Rule 17.06 along with
the definitions of “Grievance” and “Professional Misconduct” compel us
to reject the CLD’s argument.
IV. Conclusion
Lane was twice suspended for sending admittedly improper
emails to an Illinois federal judge and her staff. The CLD sought to
discipline Lane for a third time in 2023 for the same three emails she

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sent nearly six years earlier. We hold that Texas Rule of Disciplinary
Procedure 17.06(A) applies and bars the CLD from proceeding on the
basis of Lane’s 2023 report of her discipline by the Supreme Court of
Illinois. We therefore reverse BODA’s Judgment of Partially Probated
Suspension and dismiss the disciplinary proceedings against Lane.

Rebeca A. Huddle
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 6, 2025

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