The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Rita Oteka

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 23-0167
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The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley,
Petitioner,

v.

Rita Oteka,
Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued February 20, 2025

JUSTICE DEVINE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Texas workers’ compensation system represents a carefully
crafted legislative compromise between the conflicting interests of
employees and employers. For personal injuries sustained in the course
and scope of employment, covered employees waive their right of action
to recover damages and instead are eligible for more certain and prompt
benefits without having to prove fault or negligence. 1 In exchange,

1 See TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 406.031(a), .034(a).
employers have limited liability and are entitled to an exclusive-remedy
defense against damages claims for work-related injuries. 2 The Division
of Workers’ Compensation administers the system and has exclusive
jurisdiction to determine compensation entitlement and to award any
benefits. 3
Here, an employee sued her employer to recover for a
nonwork-related injury. The employer raised the exclusive-remedy
defense, claiming the injury was, in fact, work-related. In this
interlocutory appeal, the issue is not who is right, but who decides: the
district court or the Division. We hold that the Division does not have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury was work-related
in a dispute arising outside of the compensability context when the
employee’s requested relief does not depend on entitlement to benefits.
Because the Legislature did not divest the district court of
subject-matter jurisdiction to decide the issue, we affirm.
I
Rita Oteka, a faculty member of The University of Texas Rio
Grande Valley, voluntarily attended a commencement ceremony to
support her former students. While she was walking to her car after the
event, a vehicle driven by a University police officer struck and injured
her.
The University, a self-insured employer for workers’
compensation purposes, reported the injury to its third-party claims

2 Id. §§ 406.031(a), 408.001.

3 Id. § 402.001(b); Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 804

(Tex. 2001).

2
administrator. 4 When asked, Oteka replied that she would use personal
insurance. In a subsequent letter to Oteka and the Division, the claims
administrator stated that benefits are being denied because (1) Oteka is
seeking treatment under her own insurance and not pursuing benefits;
(2) no supporting medical evidence was presented; and (3) based on its
investigation and available information, the injury did not arise out of
and in the course and scope of her employment. 5
Oteka never contested this denial nor filed a compensation claim
with the Division. She alleges that she did not file a claim with the
Division, timely or otherwise, 6 because the University’s claims
administrator confirmed what she already knew: that her injuries did
not occur in the course and scope of her employment.
More than a year later, Oteka sued the police officer for
negligence. The University, as the officer’s governmental employer,

4 The University is a higher-education institution under the
governance, management, and control of The University of Texas System’s
board of regents. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 79.02; see TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 503.001(3)
(defining “institution”), .022 (“An institution may self-insure as part of a
system insurance plan.”). Chapter 503, which governs workers’ compensation
coverage for employees of the System’s institutions, incorporates most
provisions of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. TEX. LAB. CODE
§ 503.002(a). If an employee’s injury results in absence from work for more
than one day, the employer must report the injury to the insurance carrier,
who must then report it to the Division. Id. § 409.005(a)–(e).
5 After receiving notice of an injury, an insurance carrier must notify

the Division and the employee if it refuses to pay benefits. Id. § 409.021(a)(2).
The stated grounds for refusal “constitute the only basis for the insurance
carrier’s defense on the issue of compensability in a subsequent proceeding,
unless the defense is based on newly discovered evidence that could not
reasonably have been discovered at an earlier date.” Id. § 409.022(b).
6 Id. § 409.003(1) (requiring a compensation claim to be filed with the

Division not later than one year after the date on which the injury occurred).

3
substituted in as the defendant per a Rule 11 agreement. 7 Among other
defenses, the University asserted that recovery of workers’
compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy for a covered employee,
like Oteka, when the injury is work-related. 8 Thus, for the first time,
the University placed in dispute whether Oteka’s injury occurred in the
course and scope of her employment and was thereby work-related. 9
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the
exclusive-remedy defense. Oteka claimed the injury was not

7 See id. § 503.002(c) (noting that neither the Workers’ Compensation

Act nor Chapter 503 authorizes a cause of action or damages against an
institution or its employees “beyond the actions and damages authorized by
Chapter 101, Civil Practice and Remedies Code,” the Tort Claims Act); see also
TEX. R. CIV. P. 11 (governing litigation agreements). Chapter 101 waives a
governmental unit’s immunity for, among other things, personal injuries
arising from the operation of a motor vehicle that were proximately caused by
a governmental employee’s negligence, if “the employee would be personally
liable to the claimant according to Texas law.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 101.021(1), .025(a). The Tort Claims Act also requires dismissal of a suit
against an employee based on conduct within the general scope of employment
if the governmental unit is not timely substituted in as the defendant. Id.
§ 101.106(f).
8 TEX. LAB. CODE § 408.001(a); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 101.028 (providing that a governmental unit that has workers’ compensation
insurance “is entitled to the privileges and immunities granted by the workers’
compensation laws of this state to private individuals and corporations”).
9 See TEX. LAB. CODE § 401.011(10) (defining “compensable injury” as

one “that arises out of and in the course and scope of employment for which
compensation is payable under this subtitle”), (12) (defining “course and scope
of employment”). The parties treat “course and scope” as coextensive with the
phrase “work-related” in the exclusive-remedies provision, see id. § 408.001,
but whether that is so and to what extent is an open question, see Payne v.
Galen Hosp. Corp., 28 S.W.3d 15, 19 (Tex. 2000) (leaving open the question of
whether “course and scope of employment for compensation purposes” and
“‘work-related’ for exclusivity purposes” “are always and for all purposes
coextensive”).

4
work-related because she voluntarily attended the ceremony and had
already left when she was injured. The University, on the other hand,
argued that clinical-track faculty members, like Oteka, are expected to
attend at least one ceremony a year, which counts towards a
requirement to spend 10% of worktime in service, and that Oteka was
injured while in the parking lot of the leased convention center, an
access point for attending the ceremony.
Before the district court ruled on the motions, however, the
University’s claims administrator reversed course. Thirty-one months
after the incident and a year after the University first raised its
exclusive-remedy defense, the administrator sent a letter to Oteka
stating that her injury “has been accepted as compensable” and that
benefits would be paid. 10 The next day, the University filed a plea to the
jurisdiction, arguing that the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to
determine whether a covered employee sustained an injury while in the
course and scope of her employment. According to the University,
Oteka’s suit must be dismissed, regardless of whether her injury was
work-related, because she failed to file a compensation claim with the
Division for a ruling on the course-and-scope issue and thereby failed to

10 “An insurance carrier may reopen the issue of the compensability of

an injury if there is a finding of evidence that could not reasonably have been
discovered earlier.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 409.021(d). At oral argument, the
University’s counsel asserted that Oteka’s summary-judgment evidence meets
the standard for reopening the issue.

5
exhaust her administrative remedies. 11 The district court denied the
plea, and the University appealed. 12
The court of appeals affirmed. 13 Relying on its own precedent, the
court noted that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction “does not extend to
all cases that touch on workers’ compensation issues” and that trial
courts often decide whether the exclusive-remedy defense applies. 14
Acknowledging contrary authority from other courts of appeals, the
court nonetheless held that Oteka was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies because her personal-injury suit is “not based
on the ultimate question of whether she is eligible for workers’
compensation benefits.” 15
The University petitioned for review, citing a line of intermediate
appellate-court cases holding that the Division’s “exclusive jurisdiction
to determine compensability necessarily encompasses exclusive

11 Throughout the proceedings, the University has argued that Oteka’s

lawsuit must be dismissed with prejudice, but at oral argument, the University
agreed that a more appropriate remedy would be abatement of the proceedings
so that Oteka can “go through the administrative process.”
12 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8) (providing for an

interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction by a
governmental unit).
13 704 S.W.3d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2023).

14 Id. at 4-5 (quoting Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314,

320-21 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2018, pet. denied)).
15 Id. at 5-6 (discussing In re Hellas Constr., Inc., No. 03-21-00182-CV,

2022 WL 2975702, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2022, orig. proceeding
[mand. denied]); Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69, 71-72,
74 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.); and In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel
Co., 107 S.W.3d 832, 843 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig.
proceeding)).

6
jurisdiction to determine whether an injury or death occurred in the
course and scope of employment.” 16 In response, Oteka pointed to a
competing line of precedent that is consistent with the underlying court
of appeals’ opinion. 17 We granted the petition to resolve the split of
authority.
II
A
The Texas Constitution vests district courts with “exclusive,
appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and
remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original
jurisdiction may be conferred . . . on some other court, tribunal, or

16 Tyler Asphalt, 107 S.W.3d at 839; accord In re Tex. Mut. Ins. Co.,

No. 04-24-00386-CV, 2025 WL 610877, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26,
2025, orig. proceeding) (“[T]he Division has the exclusive jurisdiction to
determine if the worker was an employee injured in the course and scope of
employment, i.e. compensability, regardless of whether compensability is
asserted by the worker or the company.”); In re Prentis, 702 S.W.3d 762, 769
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, orig. proceeding) (concluding in a
negligence suit that “the Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine in the
first instance whether Sykes was in the course and scope of his employment
when the collision occurred”); Hellas Constr., 2022 WL 2975702, at *5 (“[W]e
conclude that [the Division] had exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
eligibility regardless of whether there was, in fact, a pending claim or merely
a potential claim.”); Berrelez, 562 S.W.3d at 74 (reaching the same conclusion
as Tyler Asphalt).
17 See Berry Contracting, 549 S.W.3d at 320 (concluding that the
Division did not have exclusive jurisdiction because the personal-injury suit
was not based on “the ultimate question” of the plaintiff’s eligibility for
workers’ compensation benefits); see also In re Recess Arcade Bar, LLC,
No. 03-24-00230-CV, 2024 WL 3048577, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 19,
2024, orig. proceeding) (following Berry Contracting); Medrano v. Kerry
Ingredients & Flavours, Inc., No. 02-20-00247-CV, 2021 WL 1323432, at *1-2
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 8, 2021, no pet.) (same).

7
administrative body.” 18 By contrast, administrative agencies, as
legislative creations, may exercise “only those powers expressly
conferred and necessary to accomplish [their] duties.” 19 An agency,
therefore, has no presumption of adjudicative jurisdiction, either
concurrent or exclusive. 20 A party resisting a district court’s jurisdiction
in favor of an agency’s must demonstrate that the Legislature divested
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction by vesting exclusive jurisdiction
with an agency. 21 We have described this burden as requiring a
“compelling showing”; otherwise, “we presume that remedies remain
intact and that the jurisdiction of a district court—our state’s sole court
of general jurisdiction—remains undisturbed.” 22
Whether an agency has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate an
issue is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. 23
To answer this question, we look to whether the Legislature has enacted

18 TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; see TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 24.007(a) (“The
district court has the jurisdiction provided by Article V, Section 8, of the Texas
Constitution.”), .008 (“The district court may hear and determine any cause
that is cognizable by courts of law or equity and may grant any relief that could
be granted by either courts of law or equity.”).
19 In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex.

2021) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Oncor Elec. Delivery Co. v. Chaparral Energy,
LLC, 546 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Tex. 2018)).
20 Pape Partners, Ltd. v. DRR Fam. Props. LP, 645 S.W.3d 267, 271-72

(Tex. 2022).
21 Id. at 272.

22 S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 436 (Tex. 2022).

23 CenterPoint Energy, 629 S.W.3d at 154; see Emps. Ret. Sys. of Tex. v.

Duenez, 288 S.W.3d 905, 910 (Tex. 2009) (“[E]xclusive jurisdiction must be
granted by the Legislature; an agency cannot grant exclusive jurisdiction to
itself.”).

8
either “an express grant of exclusive original jurisdiction to the agency
or a ‘pervasive regulatory scheme’ indicating that [it] intended ‘the
[administrative] process to be the exclusive means of remedying the
problem’ presented.” 24 As to the latter, all regulatory schemes have
limits, so the inquiry also requires a determination about whether the
disputed issue falls within the scope of the agency’s exclusive
jurisdiction. 25 If so, “the agency has the sole authority to make an initial
determination regarding that issue, and a trial court lacks jurisdiction
until a party has exhausted administrative remedies.” 26
To determine whether the Legislature granted the Division the
sole authority to initially decide the course-and-scope issue raised by the
University’s exclusive-remedy affirmative defense, we turn now to the
operative statute.
B
The Workers’ Compensation Act provides that an employee is
generally eligible for compensation benefits “without regard to fault or
negligence” if (1) “the employee is subject to” the Act at the time of injury
and (2) “the injury arises out of and in the course and scope of

24 Pape Partners, 645 S.W.3d at 272 (alterations in original) (quoting In

re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).
25 CenterPoint Energy, 629 S.W.3d at 156; see In re Oncor Elec. Delivery

Co., 630 S.W.3d 40, 48 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (“The Legislature’s
decision to regulate an issue is not coextensive with a wholesale disruption of
the adjudication of private disputes touching on that issue.”).
26 CenterPoint Energy, 629 S.W.3d at 154.

9
employment.” 27 The Department of Insurance oversees the workers’
compensation system, and the Division of Workers’ Compensation
administers and operates the system, regulates and administers the
business of workers’ compensation, and ensures that the Act and other
laws regarding workers’ compensation are executed. 28 To assist in the
Division’s administration, the Act establishes finely honed adjudication
procedures to resolve disputes about compensation benefits. 29 By
statute, these benefits are the exclusive remedy for work-related
injuries: “Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive
remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance
coverage . . . against the employer . . . [for] a work-related injury
sustained by the employee.” 30
Based on this regulatory scheme, we have held that the Division
has exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claimant’s entitlement to

27 TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 406.031(a) (“Liability for Compensation”), .032
(“Exceptions”). An employee may elect to waive coverage under the Act and
retain “all rights of action under common law” by providing timely notice to the
employer at the inception of employment or when the employer later obtains
coverage. Id. § 406.034(b). Employees of institutions in the University of
Texas System may waive their coverage rights in writing “before becoming an
employee.” Id. § 503.024. Oteka does not assert that she waived coverage.
28 Id. §§ 402.001, .00114(a).

29 See id. §§ 410.001–.308; Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d

430, 434, 437 (Tex. 2012) (describing the dispute-resolution process); see also
TEX. LAB. CODE § 402.021(a)(2), (b)(5) (listing among the basic goals and
legislative intent that “each injured employee shall have access to a fair and
accessible dispute resolution process” and the system shall “minimize the
likelihood of disputes and resolve them promptly and fairly when identified”).
30 TEX. LAB. CODE § 408.001(a).

10
benefits, subject to judicial review. 31 We have also concluded that when
an employee’s suit for damages is predicated on an entitlement to
benefits—for example, a suit for delay damages or bad-faith denial of
benefits—an employee may not “circumvent the [Division]’s exclusive
authority to decide that issue.” 32 But not all statutory and common-law
claims against an employer improperly circumvent the Division’s
exclusive jurisdiction. 33
In this case, no one disputes that the district court would have
jurisdiction over Oteka’s lawsuit if her injury is not work-related, as she
has pleaded. Nor are the personal-injury damages she seeks predicated
on an entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits. And when Oteka
filed suit, it was uncontested that her injury was outside the course and
scope of her employment. Indeed, the University’s claims administrator
had told her exactly that in its initial letter. No claim that Oteka’s
injury was work-related was raised for nearly three years, and it then
became an issue only in connection with the University’s
exclusive-remedy affirmative defense.

31 See Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 804 (Tex. 2001)

(holding that “only the [Division] can determine a claimant’s entitlement to
compensation benefits”); see also TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 410.255(a), .301 (providing
for judicial review).
32 Am. Motorists Ins., 63 S.W.3d at 804 (noting that a court cannot
“award damages for a denial in payment of compensation benefits without a
determination by the [Division] that such benefits were due”). The Act also
“provides the exclusive process and remedies for claims arising out of a
carrier’s investigation, handling, or settling of a claim for workers’
compensation benefits.” In re Accident Fund Gen. Ins. Co., 543 S.W.3d 750,
751 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d
920, 925-26 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding)).
33 See Accident Fund, 543 S.W.3d at 753.

11
The University acknowledges that the Legislature did not enact
express language granting the Division exclusive jurisdiction to
determine the exclusive-remedy defense and its subsidiary issues—e.g.,
course and scope, workers’ compensation insurance coverage, employee
and employer status, and injury. As to at least one of these issues, the
University concedes that the Act does not provide the Division with the
“exclusive jurisdiction to determine disputes concerning the existence or
breadth of an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage.” In
spite of this concession, the University argues that “the initial
determination of any ‘course and scope issue’ must rest within [the
Division]’s exclusive jurisdiction.” We disagree. Regardless of who
decides—the district court or the Division—the exclusive-remedy
provision will bar recovery of damages if the injury is work-related. And
in considering the Act, we see no indicia in its text or structure that the
Legislature intended the administrative process to be the exclusive
means for determining this defensive issue.
Significantly, the Act lacks a procedural mechanism for the
employee or employer to obtain a course-and-scope finding from the
Division without the employee first filing a compensation claim. “In
construing statutory language, we presume the Legislature chose the
statute’s language with care, purposefully choosing each word, while
purposefully omitting words not chosen.” 34 Chapter 410 establishes the
Division’s process for adjudicating disputes, which consists of a four-tier
system: (1) an informal benefit-review conference conducted by a

34 In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 158-59

(Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (internal quotation marks omitted).

12
Division employee, 35 (2) a contested-case hearing before the Division, 36
(3) an appeal to the Division’s appellate body, 37 and (4) judicial review. 38
To initiate the process, “the [D]ivision may direct the parties to a
disputed workers’ compensation claim to meet in a benefit review
conference to attempt to reach agreement on disputed issues involved in
the claim.” 39 But the Act does not authorize a conference without a
disputed workers’ compensation claim. And by and large, the other
dispute-adjudication steps are predicated on an initial benefit-review
conference. 40

35 TEX. LAB. CODE §§ 410.021–.034.

36 Id. §§ 410.151–.169; see id. §§ 410.101–.121 (alternatively providing

for arbitration).
37 Id. §§ 410.201–.209.

38 Id. §§ 410.251–.308 (drawing a distinction between judicial review of

workers’ compensation appeals concerning compensability and those involving
other issues). When an appeal is from a decision regarding compensability or
benefits eligibility, the judicial-review standard is modified de novo with a
right to a jury trial. Id. §§ 410.301, .304; Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241
S.W.3d 514, 516 (Tex. 2007) (stating that section 410.301 provides for modified
de novo judicial review). The factfinder may consider, but is not bound by, the
appeals panel’s decision. Morales, 241 S.W.3d at 516 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE
§ 410.304). For other issues, there is no right to a jury, and the agency’s
decision is reviewed under a substantial-evidence standard. TEX. LAB. CODE
§ 410.255(b); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2001.175(e).
39 TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.023(a) (emphases added).

40 See id. §§ 410.104 (“If issues remain unresolved after a benefit review

conference, the parties, by agreement, may elect to engage in arbitration[.]”),
.151(a) (“If arbitration is not elected . . . a party to a claim for which a benefit
review conference is held . . . is entitled to a contested case hearing.”), .202(a)
(providing for an appeal of the “decision of an administrative law judge”), .251
(authorizing a party aggrieved by a final decision of the appeals panel to seek
judicial review after exhausting administrative remedies); 28 TEX. ADMIN.

13
Under the Act, only an “employee or a person acting on the
employee’s behalf” may file a compensation claim. 41 A compensation
claim, as statutorily defined, is a claim (1) for the “payment of benefits”
(2) based on an injury (3) that “arises out of and in the course and scope
of employment” and (4) “for which compensation is payable under” the
Act. 42 Thus, “course and scope of employment” is a necessary component
of a compensation claim. But to obtain a negative course-and-scope
finding, the employee would be placed in the unnatural position of
having to file a claim with the Division for the “payment of benefits” she
neither seeks nor believes she is entitled to receive and, at the same

CODE § 142.5(a) (“Except as provided in this section, parties to a benefit
dispute are required to attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation at a benefit
review conference before proceeding to a contested case hearing or to
arbitration by mutual election.”). The Legislature also authorizes the
commissioner to “adopt guidelines relating to claims that do not require a
benefit review conference and may proceed directly to a contested case hearing
or arbitration.” TEX. LAB. CODE § 410.024(b); see 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 142.5(b) (authorizing parties to a benefit dispute to proceed directly to a
contested case hearing “if the [D]ivision determines that: (1) mediation would
not prove effective to resolve the dispute; (2) necessary evidence cannot be
obtained without subpoena; or (3) the situation of the parties or the nature of
the facts or law of the case is such that the overall policy of the Act would be
advanced by proceeding directly to a contested case hearing”).
41 TEX. LAB. CODE § 409.003. An employer may file a claim with the
Division as a “subclaimant” if it has “provided compensation . . . to or for an
employee or legal beneficiary” and “sought and been refused reimbursement
from the insurance carrier.” Id. § 409.009. An employer also has “the right to
contest the compensability of an injury if the insurance carrier accepts liability
for the payment of benefits.” Id. § 409.011(b)(4). Neither of these paths,
however, provides a route for a course-and-scope finding from the Division
without the employee seeking compensation benefits or having been provided
compensation.
42 See id. § 401.011(5), (10), (11).
“Benefit” refers to a medical, income,
death, or burial benefit based on a compensable injury. Id. § 401.011(5).

14
time, argue against that very claim. What is more, an employer who
has asserted the exclusive-remedy defense likely would not contest that
compensation claim. In other words, under the University’s theory, the
employee would have to succeed in defeating her own compensation
claim to exhaust her administrative remedies and pursue her lawsuit
for a nonwork-related injury. 43
We conclude that the Act does not manifest a legislative intent
that this unusual process should be the exclusive means for determining
the course-and-scope issue when an employer raises it by an affirmative
defense to an employee’s lawsuit. 44 In this context, we find the absence
of express language to the contrary and the lack of an independent path
for obtaining a course-and-scope finding to be determinative.
Consistent with this conclusion, we have on multiple occasions
addressed the merits of the exclusive-remedy defense and its subsidiary
issues without raising exclusive-jurisdiction concerns or requiring

43 See, e.g., Douglas v. Moody Gardens, Inc., No. 14-07-00016-CV, 2007

WL 4442617, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 20, 2007, no pet.)
(noting that although the employee failed to timely file a workers’
compensation claim, she “apparently urged” in the administrative proceedings
“the somewhat unusual position that her injury was not compensable, hoping
to prevent a subsequent bar” to a negligence suit against her employer).
44 Cf. In re Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 630 S.W.3d 40, 50, 52 (Tex. 2021)

(orig. proceeding) (“While the lack of a remedy alone is not dispositive of the
jurisdictional question, if the plaintiff’s allegations do not invoke an
administrative remedy or assert an administrative claim, the suit is less likely
to fall within the Commission’s ‘regulatory system.’ . . . Much as a federal
question presented as a defense does not create federal jurisdiction, Oncor’s
defense that its tariff might limit its liability does not create Commission
jurisdiction.”); Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 207-08 (Tex. 2002)
(holding that the lack of a procedural mechanism in the statutory scheme to
address a specific claim demonstrates that the Legislature did not intend for
the agency to have exclusive jurisdiction over the claim).

15
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 45 In Walls Regional Hospital v.
Bomar, for example, we reviewed a trial court’s summary judgment that
the Act’s exclusive-remedy provision barred the employee nurses’
negligence claims against their hospital employer for allowing a
physician with staff privileges to sexually harass them at work. 46 At
issue was whether the nurses’ injuries were not work-related because
they “arose out of an act of a third person intended to injure the
employee because of a personal reason and not directed at the employee
as an employee or because of the employment.” 47 In considering the
issue, we did not vacate the judgment and dismiss or abate the case for
the nurses to obtain an administrative course-and-scope finding.
Instead, we reached the defense’s merits, holding that “[b]ecause the
summary judgment record establishes that plaintiffs’ injuries occurred
in the course of their employment, the Act bars plaintiffs’ negligence
action against the Hospital.” 48
If a statutory scheme “is truly jurisdictionally exclusive, then
every Texas court (including this Court) would be duty-bound to dismiss
sua sponte” an action within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction because
“[c]ourts always have the duty to ensure that subject-matter

45 See, e.g., Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Stevenson, 622 S.W.3d 273, 276

(Tex. 2021) (employee status); City of Bellaire v. Johnson, 400 S.W.3d 922, 924
(Tex. 2013) (employee status); Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473,
475-77, 478-81 (Tex. 2005) (employer status and coverage); Walls Reg’l Hosp.
v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Tex. 1999) (course and scope); GTE Sw., Inc. v.
Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 611 (Tex. 1999) (injury).
46 9 S.W.3d at 806.

47 Id. at 806-07 (quoting TEX. LAB. CODE § 406.032(1)(C)).

48 Id. at 808.

16
jurisdiction—their own and that of the lower courts—is secure.” 49 Of
course, when neither the parties nor the court raises a jurisdictional
issue, an implicit conclusion that subject-matter jurisdiction exists to
reach the merits is not a precedential jurisdictional holding. 50 But as in
Walls Regional Hospital, it does provide persuasive support that in
exercising its independent obligation, the Court identified no
jurisdictional obstacles.
In sum, the Workers’ Compensation Act’s text and structure, the
presumption in favor of the district court’s jurisdiction, and our
precedent all point in the same direction: the Division does not have
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury occurred in the
course and scope of employment when (1) the employer raises the issue
as an affirmative defense outside the compensability context and (2) the
employee’s requested relief does not depend on any entitlement to

49 S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 449 (Tex. 2022); see City of Houston v.

Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex. 2013) (noting in a workers’ compensation
case raising an exclusive-jurisdiction issue that “all courts bear the affirmative
obligation ‘to ascertain that subject matter jurisdiction exists regardless of
whether the parties have questioned it’” (quoting In re United Servs. Auto.
Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 306 (Tex. 2010))).
50 See Rattray v. City of Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 869 (Tex. 2023)

(“The statement that courts have the authority and indeed the duty to resolve
any jurisdictional doubts that arise before proceeding to the merits does not
mean that we expect courts to become Inspector Javert, hunting for defects
that the parties do not see or raise. Courts are empowered to note potential
jurisdictional defects sua sponte, but the adversary process remains the
touchstone of litigation even in this context.”); Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d
334, 339-40 (Tex. 2006) (noting that when a court reaches the merits of a case,
it has implicitly concluded that it has subject-matter jurisdiction and is
denying jurisdictional challenges).

17
benefits. To the extent our courts of appeals have concluded otherwise,
we disapprove of the holdings in those opinions. 51
C
“The exclusive-remedy provision is essential to the Act’s
continued success,” 52 and our opinion today by no means diminishes that
provision’s importance. As we have noted, “[i]f employers are required
to provide not only workers’ compensation but also to defend and pay for
accidental injuries, their ability to spread the risk through reasonable
insurance premiums is threatened, and the balance of advantage and
detriment [between employers and employees] would be significantly
disturbed.” 53 We are mindful, as both the University and amicus curiae
caution, that some may improperly view our jurisdictional holding as a
path to circumvent the statutory scheme and take a shot at a greater
tort recovery before seeking benefits. 54 In such a scenario, litigation

51 See In re Tex. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 04-24-00386-CV, 2025 WL 610877, at

*4, *7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26, 2025, orig. proceeding); In re Prentis,
702 S.W.3d 762, 769-74 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, orig. proceeding);
In re Hellas Constr., Inc., No. 03-21-00182-CV, 2022 WL 2975702, at *4-5 (Tex.
App.—Austin July 28, 2022, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); Berrelez v.
Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69, 74-75 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2018, no pet.); In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d 832, 839-40, 843
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding).
52 Mo-Vac Serv. Co. v. Escobedo, 603 S.W.3d 119, 125 (Tex. 2020).

53 Id. (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Reed Tool Co.

v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1985)).
54 Amicus Curiae Texas Mutual Insurance Company argues that
exclusive jurisdiction must lie with the Division because, otherwise, injured
workers would be encouraged “to simply bypass entirely the [Division’s]
dispute resolution process, and instead to have issues such as course and scope
decided in the first instance by a civil jury.”

18
costs may be increased contrary to the Act’s purposes by allowing both
judicial and administrative proceedings, even if a tort recovery is
eventually barred for a work-related injury. 55 Nevertheless, legislative
and judicial safeguards are in place to maintain the Act’s balance of
advantage and detriment.
First, the Act requires an employee to file a compensation claim
within a year after the injury occurred. 56 If the employee fails to do so,
the employer and its insurance carrier are relieved of liability under the
Act unless the claim is uncontested or “good cause exists for failure to
file a claim in a timely manner.” 57 The test for good cause, which “must
continue to the date the claim is actually filed,” 58 is “whether the
claimant prosecuted his claim with that degree of diligence that an
ordinarily prudent person would have exercised under the same or
similar circumstances.” 59 Thus, the mere desire to have a bite at a larger
tort recovery before seeking benefits would be insufficient to establish

55 See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 440, 451 (Tex.

2012) (noting that the Act’s administrative proceedings are designed to, among
other things, “reduce the number and cost of judicial trials [and] speed up the
time for the entire dispute resolution process” while recognizing that
“increase[ed] litigation expense” “builds additional costs into the system,”
potentially “distort[ing] the balances struck in the Act and frustrat[ing] the
Legislature’s intent to have disputes resolved quickly and objectively”).
56 See TEX. LAB. CODE § 409.003.

57 Id. § 409.004(1), (2).

58 Lee v. Hous. Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1975).

59 Id. (quoting Hawkins v. Safety Cas. Co., 207 S.W.2d 370, 384 (Tex.

1948)).

19
good cause. 60 And given the Act’s compressed timeline for filing a claim,
it is unlikely an employee would be able to complete a lawsuit, with any
ensuing appeals, before pursuing benefits. So to preserve both possible
recovery options when course and scope of employment is in doubt, an
employee would need to file a compensation claim with the Division
before the one-year deadline, even if she also pursues a lawsuit.
Otherwise, the employee may end up recovering nothing if the injury is
determined to be work-related.
Second, when parallel proceedings are pending in both the court
and the Division, prudential grounds may support (or even require)
abatement of the employee’s lawsuit. 61 The Division, in exercising its

60 On the other hand, an employer’s statement to an employee that the

injury occurred outside the course and scope of her employment may be a
relevant good-cause consideration. See id. at 297 (“Reliance on statements of
employers or their agents may constitute good cause for a delayed filing [of a
compensation claim].”).
61 See Dolenz v. Cont’l Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575

(Tex. 1981) (“A court, in exercise of its sound discretion, may abate an action
for reasons of comity, convenience and orderly procedure, and in exercise of
that discretion may look to the practical results to be obtained, dictated by a
consideration of the inherent interrelation of the subject matter of the two
suits[.]” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); cf. Kallinen v. City
of Houston, 462 S.W.3d 25, 28-29 (Tex. 2015) (“A court may decide, exercising
sound discretion, to abate proceedings to await the Attorney General’s ruling
[on whether the Public Information Act excepted withheld information from
disclosure]. . . . If the court determines that under the circumstances of a
particular case a decision from the Attorney General before adjudication of the
merits of disclosure would be beneficial and any delay would not impinge on a
requestor’s right to information, abatement would be within the court’s
discretion.”). Even when pending parallel administrative proceedings have not
yet been undertaken, a referral to an administrative agency and abatement
may be necessary to allow the agency to consider certain issues within its core
area of authority. See, e.g., In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 226 S.W.3d 400, 402-03, 405
(Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting mandamus relief

20
exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claimant’s entitlement to benefits,
will decide the subsidiary course-and-scope issue in a relatively efficient
administrative proceeding. 62 That proceeding also may eliminate the
need to litigate an employer’s fault or negligence if it is determined that
the injury is work-related and the employee is entitled to compensation
benefits. As a result, allowing both proceedings to simultaneously
proceed would inject needless uncertainty and confusion due to the
potential for conflicting rulings, unfairly burden the parties with the
complexity and expense of dual-track litigation, and waste judicial and
administrative-agency resources. 63

directing the trial court to refer certain issues to the administrative agency
and to abate the case while the agency reviewed the referred issues). The
University, however, sought only dismissal up until oral argument, not
abatement. See supra note 11. Accordingly, we have no opportunity here to
further address whether or to what extent a disputed course-and-scope issue
that has been raised by an employer’s exclusive-remedy defense could be
referred to the Division.
62 See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 440, 451 (Tex.

2012) (noting that the current Workers’ Compensation Act is designed to
“speed up the time for the entire dispute resolution process” and “have disputes
resolved quickly and objectively” while providing “meaningful proceedings at
the administrative agency level”).
63 See Mantas v. Fifth Ct. of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1996)

(orig. proceeding) (“It makes no sense for the court of appeals to expend its
resources, and require the parties to expend theirs, on an appeal which may be
moot. Certainly, a ruling on the merits of the appeal before judgment is
rendered in the enforcement suit would inject needless uncertainty and
confusion into the issues surrounding the settlement.”); In re Luby’s Cafeterias,
Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig.
proceeding) (holding that “the reasoning in Mantas is equally applicable here”
to abate a personal-injury lawsuit while a workers’ compensation claim is
pending); cf., e.g., In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 629 S.W.3d 866, 876
(Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (noting that in the underinsured-motorist
context, “[i]nsurers have a substantial right not to undergo the expense of

21
That said, no parallel proceeding before the Division is pending
in this case. And the sole issue raised in the University’s plea to the
jurisdiction and in its petition is whether the Division has exclusive
jurisdiction over the course-and-scope issue. We therefore need not, and
do not, consider whether nonjurisdictional prudential grounds would
support abatement in this case.
III

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Division’s exclusive
jurisdiction does not extend to determining whether an injury was
work-related when that issue was raised by the employer’s
exclusive-remedy defense and the employee’s lawsuit does not hinge on
entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits. We affirm the court of
appeals’ judgment.

John P. Devine
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 13, 2025

litigating and conducting discovery on issues that ultimately may be
unnecessary because of the result of the underlying tort case” (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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