Champion Food Service, Inc. and Champion Food Service 2, Inc. v. Proalamo Foods, L.L.C. and Procoastal, L.L.C.

Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0297
══════════

Champion Food Service, Inc. and Champion Food Service 2, Inc.,
Petitioners,

v.

ProAlamo Foods, L.L.C. and ProCoastal, L.L.C.,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK, joined by Justice Sullivan,
concurring.

The jury awarded ProAlamo $46,396.58 in quantum meruit
damages and $0 in attorney’s fees. The district court changed the fee
award from $0 to $219,674, roughly five times the damages. A divided
court of appeals affirmed. I agree with the Court that $0 was the correct
fee award all along because ProAlamo’s quantum meruit claim fails as
a matter of law. Even if that were not the case, the jury’s award of no
fees seems reasonable to me given the mixed result at trial. The district
court’s large upward adjustment of the fee award was plainly improper,
as correctly observed by the dissenting justice in the court of appeals.
716 S.W.3d 881, 914–16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024) (Martinez, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
This case was a food fight in more ways than one, and it ended in
a messy verdict. The jury agreed to give ProAlamo some of what it asked
for, but not much. The jury’s quantum meruit findings supported
ProAlamo, while the breach of contract findings supported Champion.
In the end, ProAlamo lost its breach of contract claim, won considerably
less than it asked for on its quantum meruit claim, and was on the
receiving end of a jury finding that it breached the parties’ contract
(although no damages were awarded to Champion for that breach).
Asked about ProAlamo’s reasonable attorney’s fees, the jury
obviously did not think ProAlamo spent zero dollars on lawyers.
Instead, when asked by ProAlamo for a fee award dwarfing the amount
in controversy, a jury that had just found ProAlamo responsible for a
breach of contract thought $0 was the most reasonable response. Hardly
surprising. In a multi-claim case, the jury resolved some issues for the
plaintiff and some for the defendant, and then it declined to juice up the
partially successful plaintiff’s recovery by charging attorney’s fees to the
partially successful defendant. I struggle to see the problem—although
I acknowledge there is plenty of murky water under this bridge, much
of it this Court’s doing. See, e.g., Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip.
Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818–19 (Tex. 1997); Bocquet v. Herring, 972
S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998); Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare,
LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 483–506 (Tex. 2019). This opportunity having
passed, perhaps we will soon have another chance to confront the

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questions this case raised about the curious state of the law governing
attorney’s fee awards.
***
Departing from the American Rule, under which each side bears
its own fees, the Legislature has provided that “[a] person may recover
reasonable attorney’s fees” on claims such as ProAlamo’s quantum
meruit claim. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001(b) (emphasis
added). It seems to me that “may recover” is quite different from “shall
recover” or “is entitled to.” A party who may recover also may not.
This Court has perhaps said the opposite, however: “Statutes
providing that a party ‘may recover,’ ‘shall be awarded,’ or ‘is entitled to’
attorney fees are not discretionary.” Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20 (citation
modified) (contrasting statutes that say a prevailing party “may recover”
fees with statutes that say a court “may award” fees).
Setting aside my reservations about this precedent, even under a
“mandatory” fee-shifting statute there must be considerable discretion
for the factfinder to determine a reasonable fee award. If the plaintiff
clearly wins the case outright, then perhaps an award of no fees at all is
likely to be unsupportable if fee-shifting is truly mandatory. But this
case resulted in a mixed verdict. The jury question on fees did not
differentiate between the claims ProAlamo won and those it lost. It just
asked, “What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Plaintiffs’
attorneys in this case?” Was there no room at all for the jury to decide
that none of the fees were reasonable and necessary because all involved
would have been better off if the litigation never existed? Or to decide
that the necessity of the lawyer hours spent on the winning claims is

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cancelled out by the wastefulness of the hours spent on the losing
claims?
If a jury awards $0 in tort or contract damages, that is usually
the end of it, as “[i]t is scarcely necessary to say, that it is beyond our
power to reform the judgment by giving damages which the jury failed
to assess.” Ledbetter v. Burns, 42 Tex. 508, 512 (1875). But when a jury
awards $0 in attorney’s fees, often that is only the beginning, as it was
in this case, which I suspect was worth the time and expense of Supreme
Court litigation only because of the inflated fee award. 1
Why the law would encourage courts to be more skeptical of a $0
attorney’s fee award than of a $0 damages award is a mystery to me.
This odd state of affairs goes unaddressed today, but it should not go
unaddressed for much longer.
I respectfully concur and join the Court’s opinion.

1 See also 716 S.W.3d at 888–914; Miller v. Debo Homes, LLC, No. 14-

15-00004-CV, 2016 WL 5399507, at *6–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
Sept. 27, 2016, no pet.); Glenn v. Pack, No. 02-09-00204-CV, 2011 WL 167254,
at *6–8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 13, 2011, no pet.); Recognition Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Am. Auto. Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 878, 890–91 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet.
denied) (op. on reh’g); Cont’l Dredging, Inc. v. De-Kaizered, Inc., 120 S.W.3d
380, 396–97 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied); Cale’s Clean Scene
Carwash v. Hubbard, 76 S.W.3d 784, 786–88 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2002, no pet.); Jackson L. Off., P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 23–24 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied); Satellite Earth Stations E., Inc. v. Davis, 756
S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1988, writ denied).

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James D. Blacklock
Chief Justice

OPINION FILED: June 19, 2026

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Supreme Court of Texas
══════════
No. 25-0297
══════════

Champion Food Service, Inc. and Champion Food Service 2, Inc.,
Petitioners,

v.

ProAlamo Foods, L.L.C. and ProCoastal, L.L.C.,
Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════
On Petition for Review from the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth District of Texas
═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued March 4, 2026

JUSTICE LEHRMANN delivered the opinion of the Court.

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK filed a concurring opinion, in which
Justice Sullivan joined.

Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy based on the principle of
unjust enrichment. The right to recover in quantum meruit does not
arise from a contract; rather, it arises by law under some circumstances
when the parties have neglected to form an express agreement.
Accordingly, recovery in quantum meruit is generally not available
when the parties have a valid contract.
In this case, a meat supplier sued a customer for breach of
contract and quantum meruit for failure to pay the full amount due on
several shipments of meat products. On the contract claim, the jury was
not asked whether agreements to pay for the meat products existed; it
was asked only whether the customer “fail[ed] to comply with” those
agreements. The jury answered no, but it also found that the supplier
was entitled to recover in quantum meruit and awarded damages on
that claim. The trial court rendered judgment on that portion of the
jury’s verdict. The court also awarded the supplier its requested
attorney’s fees, disregarding the jury’s finding that a reasonable fee for
the attorneys’ services was $0.
We hold that the supplier’s recovery in quantum meruit is barred
as a matter of law because the provision of meat was covered by express
agreements between the parties. In light of that holding, the supplier
has not prevailed on a claim for which attorney’s fees are recoverable,
and the trial court erred in awarding such fees. We reverse the court of
appeals’ judgment in part and render a take-nothing judgment.

I. Background

Respondents ProAlamo Foods, L.L.C. and ProCoastal, L.L.C.
(Sellers) are commercial meat suppliers. They deliver frozen, sealed
meat products to commercial distributors like petitioners Champion
Food Service, Inc. and Champion Food Service 2, Inc. (collectively,
Buyer). Buyer, in turn, supplies those products to restaurants and
grocery stores. From July to November 2018, Buyer purchased frozen
meat from Sellers. Buyer’s owner, Pasadena Ayala, placed the orders
by phone, and deliveries were accompanied by invoices.

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It is undisputed that Buyer failed to pay some of the invoices,
although the parties disagree on the reason. Buyer asserts that some of
the meat supplied by Sellers was spoiled and that it received complaints
from customers regarding the quality of the meat. 1 According to Ayala,
because the meat arrived frozen and sealed, it was also shipped to
customers that way. As a result, Ayala did not know any of the meat
was spoiled until customers complained. On the other hand, Sellers
maintain that Buyer fell behind on payments and created the
spoiled-meat justification months after accepting the shipments to avoid
its obligation to pay. According to Sellers, there is no proof that any
spoiled meat came from them.
Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract and, alternatively,
quantum meruit, alleging that Buyer owed and failed to pay $73,052.95
for the meat products Sellers supplied. 2 Buyer counterclaimed for
breach of contract based on Sellers’ alleged provision of spoiled meat, 3
seeking lost profits as damages.

1 Ayala testified that, at the time of trial, Buyer still had 102 boxes of

meat from Sellers that either Buyer’s customers had returned or Buyer was
unable to sell.
2 Based on the evidence, Buyer received twenty shipments of meat from

Sellers—the first on July 26, 2018, and the last on November 12, 2018—each
accompanied by a separate invoice. According to the breakdown of Buyer’s
payments that Sellers presented to the jury, Buyer ultimately paid some of the
invoices in full, made partial payments on others, and made a single $10,000
payment with respect to the final invoices, resulting in an overall shortage of
$73,052.95.
3Buyer brought additional counterclaims on which the trial court
granted Sellers a directed verdict. Those claims are not at issue on appeal.

3
At the ensuing jury trial, much of the evidence focused on how
much Buyer paid Sellers relative to the invoices accompanying the meat
shipments as well as whether, and how much of, the meat supplied to
Buyer was spoiled. Question No. 1 of the jury charge asked: “Did [Buyer]
fail to comply with the agreements to pay [Sellers] for the meat products
provided?” The jury answered no. Question No. 3, on quantum meruit,
asked: “Did [Sellers] perform compensable work for [Buyer] for which
they were not compensated?” 4 The jury answered yes. As to damages,
the jury found that the reasonable value of the meat products for which
Buyer did not pay was $46,396.58. 5 On attorney’s fees, the jury found
that a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Sellers’ attorneys was
$0. Finally, on Buyer’s counterclaim for breach of contract, the jury
found that Sellers “fail[ed] to comply with the agreement” but awarded
Buyer $0 in lost-profit damages.
Both parties filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV). Sellers argued the evidence conclusively established
that Buyer breached its agreements with them and that they were
entitled to recover $73,052.95 in damages and $219,674 in attorney’s

4 The charge instructed that Sellers “performed compensable work if

they furnished valuable materials—in the form of meat products—to [Buyer];
[Buyer] accepted, used, and benefited from the materials; and, under the
circumstances, [Buyer] was reasonably notified that [Sellers] expected to be
compensated for the materials.”
5 We are unable to discern from the record exactly how the jury arrived

at this number. At one point, Ayala testified that he estimated the dollar value
of the total amount of “bad” product to be approximately $30,000, significantly
less than Sellers claimed they were owed. Perhaps the jury’s finding reflects
an effort to assign a dollar value to a quantity of meat that Buyer neither paid
for nor asserted was spoiled.

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fees—the full amounts they had asked the jury to award. Buyer
contended that the quantum meruit question should not have been
submitted to the jury because the trial court decided as a matter of law
that a valid and enforceable agreement existed, and that it was entitled
to judgment awarding it $100,000 in lost-profit damages. The trial court
denied Buyer’s motion and granted Sellers’ motion in part. The court
rendered a final judgment in favor of Sellers on their quantum meruit
claim, awarding them $46,396.58 in actual damages—the amount found
by the jury—and $219,674 in attorney’s fees plus conditional appellate
fees.
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment in relevant part. 716
S.W.3d 881, 914 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024). The court of appeals
held that the trial court did not err in charging the jury on the quantum
meruit claim or in rendering judgment in favor of Sellers on that claim.
Id. at 896. On attorney’s fees, the court of appeals held that the trial
court did not err in awarding Sellers the full amount of fees sought
notwithstanding the jury’s finding that a reasonable fee was $0. 6 Id. at
904.
We granted Buyer’s petition for review.

II. Discussion
A. Quantum Meruit

“Quantum meruit is an equitable remedy that is ‘based upon the
promise implied by law to pay for beneficial services rendered and

6 The court of appeals reversed a separate order in which the trial court

awarded Sellers additional attorney’s fees for work related to the JNOV. 716
S.W.3d at 906. That portion of the court’s judgment is not before us.

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knowingly accepted.’” Hill v. Shamoun & Norman, LLP, 544 S.W.3d
724, 732 (Tex. 2018) (quoting In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166
S.W.3d 732, 740 (Tex. 2005)). The purpose of quantum meruit “is to
prevent a party from being ‘unjustly enriched.’” Id. (quoting Truly v.
Austin, 74 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1988)). To recover in quantum meruit,
a party must prove the following elements: (1) valuable services were
rendered or materials furnished; (2) for the person sought to be charged;
(3) those services and materials were accepted, used, and enjoyed by the
person sought to be charged; and (4) the person sought to be charged
was reasonably notified that the plaintiff performing such services or
furnishing such materials was expecting to be paid by the person sought
to be charged. 7 Id. at 732–33. As a quasi-contractual theory, quantum
meruit “is not a contract at all but an obligation imposed by law to do
justice even though it is clear that no promise was ever made or
intended.” Fortune Prod. Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671, 684 (Tex.
2000) (quoting John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of
Contracts § 1–12 (3d ed. 1987)).
Generally, recovery in quantum meruit is barred when a valid
contract covers the services or materials furnished. Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d
at 740. In that circumstance, the injury is covered by the contract, so
there is no need to impose an independent legal obligation. Id.; see also
Woodward v. Sw. States, Inc., 384 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1964)
(“Recovery on an express contract and on quantum meruit are
inconsistent. Where there exists a valid express contract covering the

7 The instruction submitted to the jury on the quantum meruit claim

substantially tracked this language.

6
subject matter, there can be no implied contract.”). 8 “However, the
existence of an express contract does not preclude recovery in quantum
meruit for the reasonable value of work performed and accepted which
is not covered by an express contract.” Hill, 544 S.W.3d at 737
(emphasis added). Accordingly, a party may seek alternative relief
under both a contract theory and a quantum meruit theory. Kellogg,
166 S.W.3d at 740. Whether a contract covers the services or materials
provided is a legal question, which we review de novo. Hill, 544 S.W.3d
at 737. “When the evidence shows that no contract covers the service at
issue, then the question of whether a party may recover in quantum
meruit is for the trier of fact.” Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v.
Gulsby Eng’g, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 54, 70 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2011, no pet.).
Buyer argues that the transactions here were covered by valid,
express agreements between itself and Sellers. According to Buyer,
Sellers conceded that contracts existed and did not plead or argue in the
trial court that any of the meat products were provided outside the scope
of those contracts. Instead, Sellers alleged in their live pleading that
the parties “had valid agreements whereby [Sellers] provided products
and [Buyer] would pay according to the invoices submitted.” Thus,
Buyer concludes, Sellers cannot recover on a quantum meruit theory,

8 We have recognized exceptions to the express-contract bar, but none

are at issue here. See, e.g., Truly, 744 S.W.2d at 936 (explaining that “recovery
in quantum meruit is allowed when a plaintiff has partially performed an
express contract but, because of the defendant’s breach, the plaintiff is
prevented from completing the contract”).

7
and the trial court should have granted its JNOV motion and should not
have submitted the quantum meruit question to the jury.
In response, Sellers argue that even if agreements covered the
provision of some of the meat, Sellers may still recover in quantum
meruit for meat that was not covered by express agreements. In their
view, the record demonstrates only that the parties had oral
conversations and did not settle on specific terms. Moreover, when
Sellers made deliveries to Buyer, Ayala often changed the terms by
making handwritten notes on the invoices. Therefore, Sellers argue,
Buyer accepted goods outside of an express agreement and refused to
pay, so Sellers may recover in quantum meruit.
The denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
is reviewed as a legal-sufficiency challenge. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005). A JNOV is properly granted “only when
the law does not allow reasonable jurors to decide otherwise.” Id. Put
another way, a JNOV is proper when the evidence conclusively proves
that one party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law or “when the
record demonstrates that a theory of liability found by the jury is barred
as a matter of law.” Hou. Med. Testing Servs., Inc. v. Mintzer, 417
S.W.3d 691, 695 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.). In
conducting our review, we must view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors
could and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could
not. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827.
Here, the evidence and pleadings conclusively establish the
existence of express contracts that covered Sellers’ provision of meat to

8
Buyer. Indeed, that was Sellers’ emphatic position throughout the trial.
At the charge conference, Buyer objected to the liability questions for
both breach of contract and quantum meruit based on the lack of a
predicate question asking whether the parties had an agreement. In
response, counsel for Sellers told the trial court, “[T]here is no question
here that there is an agreement. . . . There’s ample evidence that there’s
an agreement. It’s not something that’s in question.” The trial court
submitted both questions without a predicate question regarding the
existence or terms of any agreement. In doing so, the trial court, at
Sellers’ urging, submitted a jury question that assumed the existence of
“agreements to pay [Sellers] for the meat products provided” and asked
only whether Buyer “fail[ed] to comply with th[os]e agreements.” 9
Similarly, counsel for Sellers asserted in closing argument that an
agreement undisputedly covered the transactions. In discussing the
breach-of-contract question in the jury charge, counsel stated, “[I]t’s not
in dispute that the answer is yes. There was an agreement between
[Sellers] and [Buyer], we would sell him meat products, he would pay
for them. He didn’t pay for them.”
The trial evidence supported that position. Sellers introduced the
invoices with handwritten changes as evidence of the agreements they
claimed were breached. Sellers’ general manager of distribution
testified by deposition that Ayala would call her and discuss pricing,

9 The trial court did predicate the quantum meruit question on a “no”

answer to the question of whether Buyer failed to comply with the agreements.
But quantum meruit is not an alternative theory to recover from a party who
did not breach a contract; rather, it is an equitable remedy when no contract
existed at all. Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 740.

9
date of delivery, and quantity of meat products for the orders. Based on
those conversations, Sellers would deliver meat to Buyer with invoices.
Those oral agreements with written invoices qualify as contracts. See
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 2.204 (“A contract for sale of goods may be
made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract.”). 10
Sellers claim the handwritten changes to some of the invoices
constitute evidence that a portion of the meat was delivered outside the
scope of any agreement. We disagree. First, Sellers’ own witnesses
explained some of the changes. For example, Sellers’ operations
warehouse manager testified that some of the changes were credits
given when an invoice did not accurately reflect the amount of meat
delivered in a particular shipment:
Q: All right. So with regard to this product, which is
Champion 039, . . . do you know whether [Sellers] gave
[Buyer] any credit with respect to this invoice involving
outside skirt, fajita meat?
A: Yeah, I’m sure we did. I mean, I don’t have that
information in front of me, but I’m sure we did.
Q: Do you know how much?
A: If they didn’t receive the skirts, it would have been a
credit of $1400.63.
Similarly, Sellers’ general manager approved a discount on
invoice #13623:
Q: [T]hese are the same invoices that are Champion 14, but
there are some differences; aren’t there?

10 Neither party has alleged or argued that the agreements are
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.

10
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you identify just some of those differences.
A: Sure. When you look at [invoice] ProAlamo 195, that
one indicates there that -- you have, “okay, MC,” which I
believe to be [Sellers’ general manager] meaning that she
approved that price.
Specifically, on that invoice, Sellers’ general manager approved a
discount totaling $1625.66. On another invoice, the same notation
indicated an approved discount of $465.
Ayala testified that he revised other invoices to reflect credits for
the portion of meat that turned out to be spoiled. Sellers, of course,
disputed that they authorized such credits or that Buyer was entitled to
them. While that testimony may reflect a disagreement about how
much was owed and whether Buyer breached by refusing to pay, it does
not indicate the absence of an agreement in the first instance. Nor does
it indicate that Sellers delivered meat to Buyer outside the scope of any
orders Buyer placed. Instead, Sellers argued at trial that the invoices,
some with the handwritten changes, constituted the very agreements
that Buyer breached.
Imagine a customer calling a bakery and ordering a birthday cake
for $75. The bakery makes the cake, delivers it to the customer, and
presents an invoice for $75. However, the customer, dissatisfied with
the cake, crosses out the price and writes in $50. The bakery sues the
customer for the remaining $25. It would make no sense for the bakery
to pursue a quantum meruit claim on the theory that no contract existed
because the customer “changed” the terms of the agreement on delivery.
The customer simply did not hold up their end of the bargain, and the

11
law provides a cause of action to resolve that dispute—breach of
contract. But the bakery may not recover under an implied-contract
theory because the parties had an express agreement covering the
provision of the cake.
The same is true here: The notations Buyer made on the invoices
do not negate the existing agreements. At trial, Sellers did not argue or
offer evidence that they delivered meat not reflected on the invoices,
which were presented as evidence of the “agreements to pay [Sellers] for
the meat products provided.” Instead, the parties disagreed about the
reason Buyer did not pay the full amount reflected on the invoices.
Buyer alleged that Sellers had delivered spoiled meat, while Sellers
alleged that Buyer simply got behind on payments and had no evidence
to support its spoiled-meat theory. That dispute over an alleged failure
to pay the full, agreed-upon amount sounds in breach of contract but not
quantum meruit because there was a valid, enforceable agreement. See
Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 740.
We emphasize that when the existence or scope of a contract is in
dispute, the jury should be asked whether a contract exists. Ordinarily,
when that issue arises in the context of a quantum meruit claim, the
burden is on the party seeking to avoid liability to ensure that the
question is in the charge—and to preserve error if it is not—because the
existence of a contract is an affirmative defense to quantum meruit. See
Fortune Prod. Co., 52 S.W.3d at 685 (“When the existence of or the terms
of a contract are in doubt, and there is a claim for unjust enrichment, it
is incumbent on the party disputing that claim to secure findings from
the trial court that an express contract exists that covers the subject

12
matter of the dispute.”). But when a party asserts both a contract claim
and a quantum meruit claim, the charge assumes the existence of a
contract, and the evidence conclusively supports that assumption,
recovery in quantum meruit is not available for claims covered by the
contract.
In short, the parties had agreements for Sellers to supply a
certain amount of meat products to Buyer for a certain price. Moreover,
nothing in the record indicates that any products were provided outside
the scope of those agreements. Therefore, Sellers were barred from
recovering in quantum meruit. See Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 740.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred in denying Buyer’s JNOV
motion with respect to the quantum meruit claim. 11

B. Attorney’s Fees

In its second issue, Buyer argues that the trial court erred in
awarding Sellers attorney’s fees in contravention of the jury’s finding
that a reasonable fee for Sellers’ attorneys’ services was $0. Buyer
argues that the reasonableness of the fees was a fact question for the
jury to decide and the trial court should not have disturbed that decision.
Sellers’ entitlement to attorney’s fees is premised on Civil
Practice and Remedies Code Section 38.001, which provides in relevant
part that “[a] person may recover reasonable attorney’s fees . . . in

11 Buyer also argues that the trial court committed charge error by
refusing to submit a predicate question regarding the existence or scope of a
contract. Sellers respond that Buyer failed to preserve this issue because it
did not submit such a predicate question. See Fortune Prod. Co., 52 S.W.3d at
685. In light of our holding that the trial court should have granted Buyer’s
JNOV motion, we need not reach the charge-error issue.

13
addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is
for . . . furnished material.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 38.001(b)(3).
To recover fees, “a party must (1) prevail on a cause of action for which
attorney’s fees are recoverable, and (2) recover damages.” 12 Green Int’l,
Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 390 (Tex. 1997). Because we hold that
Sellers cannot recover under quantum meruit as a matter of law, they
may not recover attorney’s fees. We therefore need not address Buyer’s
argument that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury’s $0 fee
award. 13

III. Conclusion

Sellers cannot recover in quantum meruit because the provision
of meat products was covered by agreements between the parties. And
because their quantum meruit claim is barred, Sellers also may not

12 We have held that while a trial court has discretion to determine the

amount of attorney’s fees to be awarded, it lacks discretion to deny fees when
they are proper under Section 38.001 and evidence thereof is presented.
Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 154 (Tex. 2015); Smith v. Patrick W.Y.
Tam Tr., 296 S.W.3d 545, 547 (Tex. 2009).
13 Our conclusion that we need not address this issue should not be read

as approval of the court of appeals’ analysis of it. Assuming the jury’s finding
of $0 in reasonable attorney’s fees is unsupported by legally sufficient evidence
and therefore improper, we are troubled by the trial court’s rendition of
judgment as a matter of law for the full amount of requested fees. See Smith,
296 S.W.3d at 548–49 (holding that, where the jury awarded the plaintiff
approximately one-third of the contract damages sought and no attorney’s fees,
the court of appeals correctly determined that no evidence supported the jury’s
refusal to award any fees but erred in awarding the full amount requested as
a matter of law given the amount involved and results obtained); see also Wang
v. Whittenburg, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1355074, at *6 (Tex. May 15, 2026)
(remanding for the factfinder to reconsider attorney’s fees after the results
obtained changed on appeal).

14
recover attorney’s fees. We reverse the portion of the court of appeals’
judgment affirming the trial court’s judgment with respect to quantum
meruit and attorney’s fees, and we render a take-nothing judgment for
Buyer.

Debra H. Lehrmann
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 19, 2026

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