Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion: KP-0500

September 15, 2025

The Honorable Eric Burnett
Board President
Nueces River Authority
539 South Hwy 83
Uvalde, Texas 78801

Opinion No. KP-0500

Re: Interpretation of the recusal standard under Texas Government Code § 572.058(a)
(RQ-0575-KP)

Dear Mr. Burnett:

You ask whether a Nueces River Authority board member should recuse themselves from
“[b]oard discussions and votes involving the City of Corpus Christi . . . or the Port of Corpus
Christi” as a result of the board member’s “close familial relationship” with a senior-level
employee of the City whose position carries “a special interest in water development projects.” 1
Specifically, you state that the board member’s “brother-in-law is an executive of Corpus Christi
Water, the arm of the City responsible for water supply and service.” Request Letter at 2. You
express concern over this relationship because the Authority seeks to “construct and operate a
state-of-the-art seawater desalination plant in the Corpus Christi area” that will “generate a new
water supply and ensure present and future water security for the region.” Id. at 1. According to
your request letter, the Port and the City are “two entities in Corpus Christi . . . with whom [the
Authority] could engage” to effectuate this project. Id. In fact, the Authority is already doing so:
You explain the Authority “is in active negotiations with the Port to reach a formal agreement
whereby the Port would lease property and license the necessary regulatory permits” for the
project. Id. Further, you state that the City and the Port have “common and sometimes competing
interests.” Id. at 2. Despite these potential conflicting interests, the board member took part in the

1
Letter and Attachments from Hon. Eric Burnett, Nueces River Auth. Bd. President, to
Hon. Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen. at 1–2 (Jan. 17, 2025), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/
request-files/request/2025/RQ0575KP.pdf (“Request Letter” and “Attachments,” respectively).
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Authority’s discussions and votes involving negotiations with the Port. 2 Id. As such, you seek
guidance on whether Government Code subsection 572.058(a) mandates recusal. Id. at 1−3.

Chapter 572 of the Government Code generally and section 572.058 specifically
govern state officer conflicts of interest.

Chapter 572 of the Government Code contains mandatory standards of conduct for state
officers and employees. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 572.001−.069. These statutes aim “to strengthen
the faith and confidence . . . in state government,” id. § 572.001(b), and “serve not only as a guide
for official conduct of those persons but also as a basis for discipline of those who refuse to abide
by [their] terms,” id. § 572.001(c). Indeed, the Legislature’s stated policy explains “that a state
officer or state employee may not have a direct or indirect interest, including financial and other
interests, . . . that is in substantial conflict with the proper discharge of the officer’s or employee’s
duties in the public interest.” Id. § 572.001(a). To that end, the provision you reference requires
public, memorialized disclosure by “[a]n elected or appointed officer[] . . . who is a member of a
board or commission having policy direction over a state agency” if that individual “has a personal
or private interest in a measure, proposal, or decision pending before the board or commission.”
Id. § 572.058(a). The officer with the personal or private interest may not “vote or otherwise
participate in the decision.” Id. And “[a]n individual who violates this section is subject to removal
from office.” Id. § 572.058(b). Your inquiry therefore requires us to address (1) whether the board
member you reference is subject to this provision, and (2) if so, whether that individual has a
“personal or private interest” that requires recusal from the vote and decision process. See id.
§ 572.058(a). We address each question in turn.

Section 572.058 applies to the Authority’s board members.

We review the text as written, and begin with subsection 572.058(a)’s application to the
board member in question. See Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 720 (Tex. 2024)
(“When the statutory language is unambiguous, we must apply the statute as written.” (citation
omitted)). As seen from the text, subsection 572.058(a) applies to an “elected or appointed officer,
. . . who is a member of a board or commission having policy direction over a state agency.” TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 572.058(a).

Board members are not elected so we start with the meaning of “appointed officer.” See
TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8511.0201(a) (providing that the board is “appointed by the governor
with the advice and consent of the senate”). An “appointed officer” includes “an officer of a state
agency who is appointed for a term of office specified by the Texas Constitution or a statute of
this state, excluding an appointee to a vacated elective office.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 572.002(1)(C).
The board members are appointed for “staggered terms of six years.” TEX. SPEC. DIST.

2
You relay that information from the August 29, 2024 closed executive session was “unlawfully shared”
resulting in “more than one local news entity report[ing] on information concerning the desalination plant project and
negotiations with the Port.” Request Letter at 2. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 552.101, .131, .352. However,
the questions of who shared this information and whether that action was unlawful go beyond the scope of your inquiry
and involve questions of fact beyond the scope of this opinion. See Request Letter at 1; Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-
0240 (2019) at 1 (stating that “[t]he attorney general opinion process does not resolve disputed fact questions”). We
therefore offer no comment on either issue.
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CODE § 8511.0202. Moreover, chapter 572 defines “appointed officer of a major state agency” as
“a member of[] . . . the board of directors of a river authority created under the Texas Constitution
or a statute of this state.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 572.003(a), (c)(34); see also id. § 572.002(12)
(defining “state officer” as “an appointed officer of a major state agency”). The Authority is “a
conservation and reclamation district under Section 59, Article XVI, Texas Constitution,” TEX.
SPEC. DIST. CODE § 8511.0102(a)(1), and was created under Special District Local Laws chapter
8511, id. §§ 8511.0101−.0710. Thus, the Authority’s board members are “appointed officers”
under subsection 572.058(a).

Next, we consider whether the Authority’s board has “policy direction over a state agency.”
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 572.058(a). As already discussed, the Authority qualifies as a “major state
agency.” Id. § 572.003(a), (c)(34). “Policy direction,” however, is not defined so we look to the
common and ordinary meaning. See Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v.
Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017) (relying on dictionary definitions to determine
the “common, ordinary meaning” where a statutory term is not defined). “Policy” means “a definite
course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to
guide and determine present and future decisions” and “a high-level overall plan embracing the
general goals and acceptable procedures esp[ecially] of a governmental body.” MERRIAM-
WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 901 (10th ed. 1993). “Direction” means “guidance or
supervision of an action or conduct . . . management.” Id. at 328. Thus, the board member must
have authority to guide, supervise, or manage the high-level plans of the Authority, including
discretion to choose a course or method of action to guide and determine present and future
Authority decisions.

The Authority’s board may “make and determine plans necessary to accomplish the
purposes for which the authority is created” as well as “perform all actions useful and helpful in
carrying out [those] plans . . . and accomplishing the authority’s purposes.” TEX. SPEC. DIST.
CODE § 8511.0325. The board also has authority to, inter alia, “adopt and implement a program
of water conservation,” id. § 8511.0305; award contracts, id. § 8511.0321; “provide for any
expenditures it considers essential or useful in the authority’s maintenance, operation, and
administration,” id. § 8511.0301(c); and “adopt necessary bylaws for the conduct of the authority’s
business,” id. § 8511.0205. The board therefore has policy direction over the Authority. See also
id. § 8511.0213 (recognizing that the board has “policymaking responsibilities”).

A personal or private interest can exist where a public official may be influenced by
a familial relationship.

We next consider what constitutes a personal or private interest. A board member cannot
“vote or otherwise participate” in a decision involving “a measure, proposal, or decision pending
before the board” for which they have “a personal or private interest.” TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 572.058(a). The Government Code explains that the term “personal or private interest” carries
“the same meaning as is given to it under Article III, Section 22, of the Texas Constitution,
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governing the conduct of members of the legislature.” 3 Id. § 572.058(f); see also TEX. CONST.
art. III, § 22 (“A member who has a personal or private interest in any measure or bill, proposed,
or pending before the Legislature, shall disclose the fact to the House, of which he is a member,
and shall not vote thereon.”). When interpreting the Texas Constitution, “we rely heavily on its
literal text and must give effect to its plain language.” Stringer v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 23 S.W.3d
353, 355 (Tex. 2000). We also “strive to give constitutional provisions the effect their makers and
adopters intended.” Id.

Section 22 does not define “personal or private interest,” and courts have not construed this
provision. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. GA-0351 (2005) at 4. Section 22’s interpretative
commentary nonetheless provides insight, clarifying that conflict of interests were “regulated by
the House of Commons by a rule which forbids a member to vote on a matter in which he has a
direct pecuniary interest, immediate and personal, and not merely of a general or remote
description.” TEX. CONST. art. III, § 22 interp. commentary (West 2007). The commentary also
discusses the Jeffersonian principles behind conflict-of-interest rules—namely that “private
interests” strictly compelled recusal not only by “the laws of decency” but also by virtue of “the
social compact, which denies to any man to be a judge in his own cause.” 4 Id. (citing II, THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 368 (Library ed. 1903)); accord THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James
Madison) (G. Wills ed., 1982) (“No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”).

Prior guidance from this office also proves instructive. One opinion concerned a member
of the Board of Public Accountancy whose sister was “an officer in a trade association in the
profession of public accountancy.” Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-88-103 (1988) at 1. 5 The opinion in part
considered whether the member had “a personal or private interest” in board activities “assuming
that her sister was an officer of the trade association at that time” the member was on the board.
Id. at 1−2 (reviewing prior version of section 572.058). Relying on the mere “possibility for a
conflict of interest” as well as “the appearance of a conflict” in board activities affecting the “board
member’s sister or the organization in which the sister is an officer,” the opinion concluded it was
“imperative for the Board to review all of the matters” where the board member cast a vote. Id. at
2 (emphases added). The opinion explained that this action was further supported by Texas’s
public policy “requir[ing] that . . . an official” refrain from voting “in a matter concerning an issue
in which the official has a direct, personal interest.” Id. Should “such an examination reveal[] that
the . . . member cast a deciding vote” in a matter affecting the board member’s sister or the sister’s
organization, then the board’s action was, “at the least, . . . voidable.” Id.

3
Subsection (f) also states that an individual does not have a “personal or private interest . . . if the individual
is engaged in a profession, trade, or occupation and the individual’s interest is the same as all others similarly engaged
in the profession, trade, or occupation.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 572.058(f). You do not ask about this provision so we
do not address it here.
See generally THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE: FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE
4

OF THE UNITED STATES § XVII (Wilbur Samuel Howell, 2d ed. 1812) (officially titled “Order in Debate”),
https://constitution.org/1-History/Founders/tj/tj-mpp.htm.
5
A previous opinion concluded the board member was ineligible to serve on the board under the nepotism
statute in effect at the time of the opinion. See Tex. Att’y Gen. LO–88–68 (1988) at 4.
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Another opinion considered conflicts of interests where a county commissioners court
member and county auditor were married. Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-93-8 (1993) at 1. 6 The county
auditor kept “accounts for county officers” and had “general oversight” over the county officers’
financial records. Id. In turn, the commissioners court “examine[d] county financial records” and
“corrected errors therein.” Id. Different entities appointed those officers: the Legislature and the
county’s district judge. Id. The auditor was subject to removal by the district judge, even though
the auditor “d[id] not work under the direction of the district judge,” to “maintain the auditor’s
independence from the commissioners court.” Id. Despite the independent nature of each office,
however, the opinion found “the emotional bond between husband and wife” significant in the
consideration of conflicts of interests even where there was no “financial aspects that would
amount to a question of self-dealing.” Id. at 6. Such a bond “could make it impossible” for the
parties to “exercise appropriate independence of judgment” required by their official functions. Id.
And the opinion concluded there were “serious ethical ramifications” because the “appearance of
a conflict of interest” alone can “undermine the public’s confidence in its elected and appointed
officials.” Id.; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0045 (2015) at 3 (concluding that a public
official should abstain from voting where a matter might concern the public official’s wife).

For comparison, another opinion addressed a conflict-of-interest question where Texas
Southern University’s Board of Regents awarded two contracts to a project management services
company whose president was the board chairman’s brother-in-law. Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-88-44
(1988) at 1. There, the chairman disclosed that his brother-in-law was the president of the
corporation and “abstained from voting on each of the contracts.” Id. at 2. The opinion therefore
concluded under the facts described that “no action of either the board or its chairman violated”
the predecessor to section 572.058. Id.

A personal or private interest exists where a board member engages in board
activities that may be influenced by a familial relationship.

Taking the above examples together, it is evident that a personal or private interest can
originate from a familial relationship that has the potential to influence the public official in the
exercise of their duties and responsibilities. With this principle in mind, we now turn to the facts
at hand. 7

The Authority exists in part to address “the conservation and development of the natural
resources inside the Nueces River Basin.” Request Letter at 1; see also TEX. SPEC. DIST.
CODE § 8511.0102(b) (“The authority’s creation is essential to accomplish the purposes of Section
59, Article XVI, Texas Constitution.”). See generally TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE §§ 8511.0101−.0710.
To this end, the Authority is participating in negotiations with the Port to “construct and operate a
state-of-the-art seawater desalination plant in the Corpus Christi area.” Request Letter at 1. This
plant will effectuate the Authority’s purpose—“generat[ing] a new water supply and ensur[ing]

6
This opinion considered the application of Local Government Code chapter 171. Tex. Att’y Gen. LO-93-8
(1993) at 6. Although concluding that chapter did not apply, the opinion acknowledged the “emotional bond of loyalty
inherent in the marital relationship itself.” Id.
7
See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. KP-0143 (2017) at 2 (“[W]hen responding to opinion requests, we provide
advice concerning the legal issues presented and assume the facts as presented to us are true.”).
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present and future water security for the region.” Id. The board member in question has a brother-
in-law who is an executive at Corpus Christi Water, a City entity, and similar to the Authority, the
entity is “responsible for [the City’s] water supply and service.” Id. at 2. Also like the Authority,
Corpus Christi Water has “a special interest in water development projects” in the Corpus Christi
area. Id.

It is consequential that Corpus Christi Water and the Authority seek water development
projects in the Corpus Christi area to improve water supply and security. Id. This family member’s
employer-based “special interest in water development projects” is only magnified by your
coordinate representation that the Port, with whom the Authority is negotiating, and the City have
“common and sometimes competing interests.” Id. Familial relationships combined with
competing interests can create conflicting loyalties, influencing one’s judgment. See supra pp.
4−5. Given that the longstanding “public policy of this state [is] to construe the prohibition against
a conflict of interest broadly enough both to include the indirect use of official influence to further
one’s private . . . interest and to include the mere possibility that such influence might be used,”
Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JM-296 (1985) at 6, we conclude that the board member you reference
possesses a personal or private interest under subsection 572.058(a).

Moreover, although not required under subsection 572.058(a), the appearance of
impropriety independently counsels in favor of recusal. Our “[g]overnment [is] founded in opinion
and confidence.” THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE COMPLETE ANAS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 90 (Franklin
B. Sawvel, 1st ed. 1903). A board member occupies a position of public trust with official
responsibilities whereby the officer takes an oath to “faithfully execute the duties of the office.”
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 1(a). “[P]ublic confidence in . . . elected . . . officials . . . is enhanced by
the public’s knowledge that these . . . officials are not engaged in conflicts of interest.” Tex. Att’y
Gen. OR2016-11121 (2016) at 2. Of no small significance, “even the appearance of a conflict of
interest can undermine the public’s confidence in its elected and appointed officials.” Tex. Att’y
Gen. LO-93-8 (1993) at 6. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE § 572.001(b); In re Ligon, 408 S.W.3d
888, 893 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“[T]he responsibilities
carried out in the name of the state must be conducted in a manner that ‘foster[] rather than
discourage[] public confidence in our government’ . . . .” (quoting People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E.2d
705, 708 (N.Y. 1980))).

Relying on the facts as presented, we conclude the board member has a personal or private
interest and, as required under subsection 572.058(a), should publicly disclose the conflict of
interest to the board and abstain from voting on or otherwise participating in decisions concerning
the plans and negotiations you raise.
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S U M M A R Y

Under Government Code section 572.058, an elected or
appointed official must recuse themselves from a vote or decision in
which they have a personal or private interest originating from a
familial relationship that has the potential to influence the public
official in the exercise of their duties and responsibilities. Thus, a
Nueces River Authority board member whose brother-in-law is an
executive staff member of the water supply entity for the City of
Corpus Christi should recuse themselves from a vote and otherwise
refrain from participating in a decision about Authority business
regarding water supply activities that have common or competing
interests with the City of Corpus Christi.

Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff

D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JOSHUA C. FIVESON
Chair, Opinion Committee

AMY L. K. WILLS
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee