BRADSHAW, CHARLES v. the State of Texas

In the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas
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No. PD-0577-23
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CHARLES BRADSHAW,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS

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On Appellant’s Petition for Discretionary Review
From the 10th Court of Appeals
McLennan County
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YEARY, J., filed a concurring opinion.

The Court today concedes that its statutory-construction analysis
is “oddly circular.” Majority Opinion at 9. But it has the advantage, the
Court says, id., of “harmoniz[ing] both statutes”—both Section 51.608 of
BRADSHAW – 2

the Texas Government Code, 1 and the “Transition and Effective Date”
provision of the 2019 amendment to Section 133.102 of the Texas Local
Government Code. 2 Id. at 10; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 51.608; TEX. LOC. GOV’T
CODE §133.102. But, as I understand the Court’s opinion, it achieves this
harmonization by essentially reading the “Transition and Effective
Date” provision of the 2019 amendment into oblivion. 3

1 Passed in 2013, Section 51.608 reads:

Notwithstanding any other law that establishes the amount of a
court cost collected by the clerk of a district, county, or statutory
county court from a defendant in a criminal proceeding based on
the law in effect on the date the offense was committed, the
amount of a court cost imposed on the defendant in a criminal
proceeding must be the amount established under the law in
effect on the date the defendant is convicted of the offense.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 51.608.

2 Section 1.03 of the 2019 amendment to Section 133.102 of the Local

Government Code raised the court cost imposed for cases involving felony
convictions from $133 to $185. See Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 1352, § 1.03, p.
3982, eff. Jan. 1, 2020 (amending Section 133.102(a)(1) of the Local
Government Code to raise the court cost for felony convictions from $133 to
$185). Section 5.01 of the 2019 amendment is the “Transition and Effective
Date” provision. It reads:

Except as otherwise provided by this Act, the changes in law
made by this Act apply to a cost, fee, or fine on conviction for an
offense committed on or after the effective date of this Act. An
offense committed before the effective date of this Act is
governed by the law in effect on the date the offense was
committed, and the former law is continued in effect for that
purpose.

Acts 2019, 86th Leg., ch. 1352, § 5.01, p. 4035, eff. Jan. 1, 2020.

3 The Court insists it is harmonizing the two provisions by recognizing

that there is, it claims, a “small group of defendants who are subject to the old
BRADSHAW – 3

The Court argues that, absent its harmonizing efforts, we would
be consigning Section 51.608 to the legislative scrap heap, and that
would be “absurd.” Majority Opinion at 10. But I do not understand how
this constitutes “harmonizing” the two provisions. Nor do I understand
how wholly sacrificing one of the two provisions is any less “absurd” than
wholly sacrificing the other.
If the two provisions are really so incompatible that one of them
simply has to go, that must mean that they are truly “irreconcilable.”
And if they are indeed that “irreconcilable,” the Code Construction Act
tells us how to resolve the conflict: Section 311.025(a) of the Texas
Government Code provides that “if statutes enacted at the same or
different sessions of the legislature are irreconcilable, the statute latest
in date of enactment prevails.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.025(a). This
means that, if one of these two provisions must be wholly sacrificed for
the sake of achieving textual harmony, then arguably it should be

law[.]” Majority Opinion at 10. That is, there is a “subset” of defendants who
both committed their offenses and were convicted before the effective date of
the 2019 amendment to Section 133.102. See Majority Opinion at 9 (“It appears
that the 2020 ‘Transition and Effective Date’ applies only to the subset of cases
in which a defendant commits an offense and is convicted before 1/1/2020.”).
But that is not a “subset of defendants” who would, by any understanding, ever
be subject to the 2019 amendment—at all—since all relevant events would
have taken place before the effective date of that amendment. Indeed, there is
no subset of cases involving felony and misdemeanor court costs that, as far as
I can tell, will not be wholly controlled by Section 51.608 of the Government
Code, according to the Court’s analysis. Ultimately, for any defendant whose
conviction occurs either before or after the effective date of the 2019
amendment, Section 51.608 will still govern. In other words, under the Court’s
apparent reasoning, the Legislature essentially did a useless thing when it
added Section 5.01’s “Transition and Effective Date” provision, purporting to
make the date of commission the operative event regarding court costs, to its
2019 amendment to Section 133.102 of the Local Government Code.
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Section 51.608, which was enacted in 2013, rather than the later-in-time
“Transition and Effective Date” provision of the 2019 amendment to
Section 133.102.
Ultimately, however, I do not believe the two provisions are as
irredeemably incompatible as the Court seems to think. It is true that
both Section 51.608, and Section 5.01 of the 2019 amendment to Section
133.102 (the “Transition and Effective Date” provision), specifically
target criminal court costs. But, while Section 51.608 is limited in its
application to criminal court costs, the “Transition and Effective Date”
provision also applies to fees and fines. And, more importantly, Section
133.102 includes court costs for “a nonjailable misdemeanor offense,
including a criminal violation of a municipal ordinance,” 4 while Section
51.608 is limited to court costs “collected by the clerk of a district,
county, or statutory county court”—which handle felonies and more
serious misdemeanors. Thus, the “Transition and Effective Date”
provision to the 2019 amendment to Section 133.102 has some
additional application that is not negated by Section 51.608. To that
extent, at least, the two statutes may be read in pari materia to give
tangible application to both.
But the bottom line in this case remains the same. This case
involves a court cost imposed in a district court. By operation of Section
51.608 of the Government Code, the date of conviction rather than the
date of commission is controlling. Because Appellant was convicted after

4 See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 133.102(a)(3) (imposing a $62 (previously

$40) court cost “on conviction of a nonjailable misdemeanor offense, including
a criminal violation of a municipal ordinance, other than a conviction of an
offense relating to a pedestrian or the parking of a motor vehicle”).
BRADSHAW – 5

the effective date of the amendment to Section 133.102(a)(1), which
raised the court cost from $133 to $185, the court of appeals did not err
to affirm the trial court’s assessment of the higher court cost, as the
Court decides today.
I therefore respectfully concur.

FILED: December 18, 2024
PUBLISH