HRADEK, LINDSEY v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. PD-0083-23

THE STATE OF TEXAS

v.

LINDSEY HRADEK, Appellee

ON APPELLEE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM THE EIGHTH COURT OF APPEALS
EL PASO COUNTY

NEWELL, J. filed a concurring opinion in which WALKER, J.,
joined.

The proper standard for an appellate court to review a trial

court’s grant of a motion for new trial is an abuse of discretion

standard. The bare fact that a trial court may decide a matter

differently from an appellate court does not demonstrate an abuse of
Hradek Concurring — 2

discretion. 1 Appellate courts must view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the ruling, defer to the court’s credibility choices, and

assume that all reasonable fact findings in support of the ruling have

been made. 2 This abuse of discretion standard applies even when one

of the grounds raised in the motion for new trial is ineffective

assistance of counsel. 3

Reviewing courts must defer to the trial court’s role as fact-finder

due to its role as the judge of witness credibility, but they apply a de

novo review in those situations in which we can isolate a pure question

of law. 4 In Johnson v. State, we explained as much in the context of a

motion for new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel. 5

And, in that case, we noted that “while the ultimate question of

prejudice under Strickland is to be reviewed de novo, the trial court

should be afforded deference on any underlying historical fact

determinations.” 6

1
State v. Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing State v. Thomas,
428 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)).

2
Id.

3
See, e.g., Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d 689, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

4
Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

5
Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 239.

6
Id.
Hradek Concurring — 3

But the bottom line in Johnson was far more callipygian than the

court of appeals perceived. Indeed, we did not apply a categorically

de novo standard when evaluating prejudice. 7 We deferred to the trial

court’s credibility determinations regarding how the trial court could

have viewed the impact of the alleged deficient performance. 8 But we

also noted that there would not be a reasonable probability that the

outcome would change even if we assumed the trial court believed the

defendant’s version of events. 9

I do not read Johnson as suggesting that reviewing courts

categorically apply a strictly de novo standard or a purely deferential

one when evaluating prejudice as part of the trial court’s “ruling.”

Rather, I believe the proper standard is the one articulated by

Presiding Judge Keller in Kober v. State, which she relied upon when

she authored Johnson. 10 In Kober, we recognized that “the prejudice

prong of Strickland is a mixed question of law and fact, [and] that

7
Id.

8
Id. at 240. (“The trial court was not required to believe that the defendant would have
testified at trial as to the more exculpatory version of events given at the motion for new
trial hearing.”)

9
Id. (“And even if the trial court believed that the more exculpatory version of events given
by appellant at the motion for new trial hearing was in fact the version he would have given
at trial, there still would not be a reasonable probability that the outcome would change.”).

10
Kober v. State, 988 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
Hradek Concurring — 4

question often contains subsidiary questions of historical fact, some of

which may turn upon the credibility and demeanor of witnesses.” 11

Given this understanding, appellate courts must afford “almost total

deference” to the trial court’s determination of the historical facts and

to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on an evaluation of

credibility and demeanor, but purely legal questions can be reviewed

de novo. 12

In short, I do not believe the standard is an either-or proposition.

To the extent that the court of appeals suggested that the prejudice

prong of Strickland should always be reviewed de novo, it erred by

failing to defer to the trial court’s factual determinations.

By applying a de novo standard on the issue of prejudice, the

court of appeals appears to have evaluated both legal and factual

determinations by the trial court de novo. This ignored the more

nuanced aspect of the standard of review regarding the distinction

between factual findings and legal conclusions. Reviewing courts are

not expected to defer to a trial court’s ruling on a matter of law

because the trial court is in no better position to make that

11
Id. at 233.

12
Id.
Hradek Concurring — 5

determination than the reviewing court. 13 Failing to correct the court

of appeals’ analysis in this regard would likely have resulted in

confusion amongst both trial courts and reviewing courts given how

challenging it can be to differentiate between findings of fact and

conclusions of law. I join the Court’s opinion with the understanding

that reviewing courts are not required to defer to a trial court’s legal

determination on the issue of prejudice after viewing the historical

facts in the record in a light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.

Filed: December 11, 2024

Publish

13
Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (noting that the amount of
deference a reviewing court affords to a trial court’s ruling on a ‘mixed question of law and
fact’ is often determined by which judicial actor is in a better position to decide the issue)
(citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 (1985)).