SOLIS, ROBERT v. the State of Texas

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NO. AP-77,109

ROBERT SOLIS, Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

ON DIRECT APPEAL FROM CAUSE NO. 164780601010
IN THE 230TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
HARRIS COUNTY

FINLEY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in
which RICHARDSON, NEWELL, KEEL, MCCLURE, and
PARKER, JJ., joined, and in which SCHENCK, P.J., joined
except for Part VII, and in which YEARY, J., joined
except for Part IV. WALKER, J., concurred.

OPINION

In October 2022, Appellant was tried for and convicted of capital murder

pursuant to Section 19.03(a)(1) of the Penal Code for committing the murder
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of Harris County Sheriff’s Deputy Sandeep Dhaliwal during a traffic stop. See

TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(1). On the basis of the jury’s answers to the

statutorily required special issues, Appellant was sentenced to death. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b), (e). Direct appeal to this Court is

automatic. Id., § 2(h). Appellant raises eight points of error. Finding no

reversible error, we affirm Appellant’s conviction and sentence of death.

I. Facts

a. Guilt Phase Evidence

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence and the

reasonable inferences from it showed the following. On September 27, 2019,

Dhaliwal was a certified peace officer employed by the Harris County Sheriff’s

Office (HCSO) as a patrol deputy. Shortly before noon, he was on duty, wearing

his HCSO uniform and monitoring an intersection in a residential area of

northeast Houston for traffic violations.

From his clearly marked patrol car, Dhaliwal observed a silver Nissan

Altima sedan fail to come to a complete stop at an intersection. Dhaliwal

activated his patrol car’s lights and siren, which automatically activated the

vehicle’s dashcam, and initiated a traffic stop. Following his training and

HCSO policy, Dhaliwal activated his bodycam before approaching the Nissan,
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and he touched the rear of the vehicle with his hand to leave his fingerprints

on the car.

Unbeknownst to Dhaliwal, Appellant was driving the Nissan, which he

had borrowed from his sister earlier that day. Appellant was a convicted felon

with an active warrant for his arrest due to a parole violation. Appellant was

also armed with his sister’s loaded semiautomatic handgun and two spare 10-

round ammunition magazines. As Appellant stopped the Nissan in response to

the lights and siren, he told his passenger and neighbor, Jennifer Saiz, about

his outstanding warrant. Appellant predicted that he was “going to jail[,]” and

he repeatedly expressed that he did not want that to happen.

During his interaction with Dhaliwal, Appellant claimed not to have any

identification with him, lied about his name and date of birth, and falsely

claimed to be in the military and to live in another state. Appellant also

claimed not to know his address, driver’s license number, or social security

number. Because Saiz knew Appellant was lying to Dhaliwal and she

suspected that Appellant was about to be arrested on the warrant, she asked

the deputy if she could leave. Dhaliwal allowed Saiz to do so, and she got out

of the car, began walking to her house, and called her boyfriend Larry Covey

to pick her up. Saiz testified that she was familiar with Dhaliwal, who

regularly patrolled the neighborhood. She agreed that while she was present
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during the traffic stop, Dhaliwal was “the same polite, kind and respectful man

he always was.”

After Saiz left, Dhaliwal radioed for a mobile fingerprint scanner to be

brought to his location, informed Appellant that he was detained until his

identity could be verified, and walked back to his patrol car. While Dhaliwal

was standing next to the patrol car, turned away from Appellant and writing

on his notepad, Appellant exited the Nissan holding his sister’s loaded

handgun. He brought the weapon to eye level, pointed it directly at Dhaliwal,

and then ran at Dhaliwal and shoved him against the patrol car. Although

Dhaliwal raised his arms in submission, Appellant shot the deputy in the head

at close range, inflicting a fatal injury. After shooting Dhaliwal, Appellant

rushed back to his sister’s car and drove away. At trial, Appellant’s sister

identified Appellant’s voice on Dhaliwal’s bodycam video and Appellant as the

person shown on a still photo from the video, holding her handgun and getting

back into the Nissan immediately after the shooting.

Within moments of killing Dhaliwal, Appellant began calling Saiz and

then Covey. Appellant separately told each of them that he had shot Dhaliwal,

and in an apparent effort to distance himself from his sister’s car, asked them

for a ride. Saiz and Covey both refused to help Appellant.
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Appellant subsequently drove the Nissan to a nearby shopping center,

parked the car in the parking lot, took the keys, and walked around the center

for a period of time. He ultimately dumped his sister’s handgun and the two

spare ammunition magazines in a trash can outside an ice cream shop that

was next to a children’s daycare center. The handgun was still loaded, with a

bullet in the chamber. 1 Appellant then entered the ice cream shop, hid his

sister’s car keys in a potted plant inside the business, and called her to tell her

where she could retrieve the keys.

Meanwhile, an intensive multi-agency manhunt was underway for

Dhaliwal’s shooter. Investigators searching for the Nissan quickly located it at

the shopping center where Appellant had left it, and they began cordoning off

the area, restricting entry and egress. Officers who later processed the Nissan

for evidence found Dhaliwal’s fingerprints on the rear of the vehicle.

Appellant, who had been lingering inside the ice cream shop for

approximately thirty minutes without purchasing anything, repeatedly asked

1 Investigators recovered the pistol and ammunition, and the State’s firearms expert

testified that the pistol fired the shot that killed Dhaliwal. In addition, various areas
of the pistol, including the trigger, were swabbed and tested for DNA. The State’s
DNA analyst testified that a mixture of DNA from two individuals was found on the
trigger, and that mixture was “approximately eight quadrillion times more likely to
have originated from [Appellant] and another individual than to have originated from
two other individuals.” The analyst further testified that the results of this analysis
“provide[d] very strong support for the proposition that [Appellant] was a contributor
to the DNA obtained from” the trigger.
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the owner about the heavy police presence forming outside. Appellant also

pretended to be a shop employee by moving tables to the business’s patio,

although the owner did not ask Appellant for assistance and did not want

Appellant’s help.

Eventually, Appellant approached one of the law enforcement officers

securing the perimeter at this secondary scene, asking the officer what was

happening and whether Appellant could leave. When the officer noticed that

Appellant matched the shooter’s description, he asked Appellant to identify

himself. The officer detained Appellant after he gave a false name. Once

detained, Appellant became argumentative and aggressive, refused to submit

to gunshot residue testing, and clenched his hands so that officers could not

fingerprint him using a mobile fingerprint scanner. Shortly thereafter,

Appellant was taken into custody, but not before blowing a kiss at one of the

arresting officers.

Appellant testified in his own defense and admitted that he shot and

killed Dhaliwal, but he contended that it was an accident. Appellant, who

disputed that he had actually committed a traffic violation, told the jury that

he decided to place Dhaliwal under a citizen’s arrest for falsely imprisoning

him. Appellant testified that he then accidently shot Dhaliwal in the head

when the deputy “jerked pretty quickly” while Appellant was trying to reach
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the deputy’s handcuffs. On cross-examination, Appellant admitted that

Dhaliwal was a peace officer acting in the line of duty at the time of the

shooting. Appellant further confirmed that Dhaliwal was “very polite” and

“very respectful” to him during the traffic stop but stated that he nonetheless

perceived “microaggressions” from the deputy that prompted him to attempt

the citizen’s arrest. The jury implicitly rejected Appellant’s accident defense by

finding him guilty of capital murder as alleged in the indictment.

b. Punishment Phase Evidence

At the punishment phase, the State introduced evidence of Appellant’s

juvenile and adult criminal record, as well as his prison disciplinary record and

unadjudicated bad acts. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s

answers to the punishment phase special issues, this evidence and the

reasonable inferences from it collectively showed as follows.

Appellant was forty-seven years old when he murdered Dhaliwal, an act

for which Appellant evidenced no remorse, and the capital offense was the

culmination of a lengthy history of escalating violence and antisocial behavior.

As a fourteen-year-old, Appellant sexually assaulted his mother’s romantic

partner Shauntel Lyons while she was recovering from a severe and painful

burn injury. Due to the injury itself and the effects of her pain medication,

Lyons was unable to fight Appellant off; he “[p]ut his penis in [her] and raped
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[her].” 2 As an older juvenile, Appellant was placed on deferred adjudication for

burglarizing a string of homes and stealing property that included handguns.

Around this same time, Appellant was arrested for unlawfully carrying a

weapon—a .380 semiautomatic pistol and two fully loaded magazines of

ammunition—and he later committed felony theft.

While Appellant was in his twenties, he statutorily raped and repeatedly

physically assaulted the mother of his three children, hog-tied his own mother,

set his sister’s room on fire, and fired a gun toward the foot of one of his sons.

In 2002, when Appellant was twenty-nine years old, he shot a man and then

engaged in an hours-long armed standoff with police in which he used his four-

year-old son as a human shield. Appellant was convicted of aggravated assault

and aggravated kidnapping as a result of this incident and sentenced to twenty

years in prison. Numerous correctional officers who encountered Appellant

during his imprisonment testified to his entitled, combative attitude and

disciplinary infractions. These infractions included creating disturbances,

possessing weapons and contraband, fighting, and assaulting a prison guard.

2 As we will discuss in further detail regarding point of error one, Appellant
represented himself at trial. At the end of cross-examining Lyons, Appellant
personally “conced[ed] to the State that the event” (i.e., his sexual assault of Lyons)
“happened.”
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Appellant’s misdeeds continued after his 2014 release from prison on

parole under a “Super Intense Specialized Program,” which required him to

wear a GPS tracker and adhere to various conditions. Appellant’s maternal

aunt and her husband provided him with a job, free corporate housing,

transportation to his required appointments, and other significant support.

Appellant did well until his GPS monitor was removed, when his attitude and

conduct changed for the worse. Appellant rewarded his aunt and uncle for their

support by stealing approximately $20,000 from his uncle’s company. When

his uncle confronted Appellant about the missing funds and terminated his

employment, Appellant—who bragged about having weapons—threatened,

“[I]f you ever try to take me down, I’ll take you down with me.”

When he was terminated from his uncle’s company, Appellant was

already involved in a financially-exploitative relationship with Alyssa

Ascenscio, whose husband had recently died from cancer. Ascencio was left

with two young children—one of whom (Ascenscio’s daughter M.A.) had also

been diagnosed with cancer shortly before the husband’s death—and a

considerable sum of money in insurance proceeds. Appellant openly disparaged

Ascencio to his friends and relatives and stated that he had no romantic

feelings for her. However, Appellant pretended to Ascencio that he did have

such feelings, and he readily accepted her many expensive material gifts. After
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being terminated from his uncle’s company, Appellant moved in with Ascencio

and her children.

Appellant thereafter gained such psychological control over Ascencio

that he manipulated her into transferring significant amounts of money to him

under the pretense that he would use the funds to start a business. Appellant

instead spent these funds on online gambling, prostitutes, martial arts lessons,

and material items he desired. Appellant also manipulated Ascencio into

buying him firearms and large quantities of ammunition and transferring

valuable items of her personal property into his name.

In late 2016, Ascencio’s assets were largely gone as a result of Appellant’s

machinations, and she was depressed and anxious over her future and how she

would provide for her children. In December 2016, Appellant, impatient with

Ascensio’s emotional state, assaulted her. He struck her numerous times and

threatened her with a semiautomatic pistol. He repeatedly asked Ascencio if

she wanted to die and fired a bullet next to her head while forcing her to say

that she did want to die.

Some days later, after receiving support from her relatives and friends,

Ascensio filed a police report. In early January 2017, Ascensio also provided

Appellant’s parole officer with an affidavit detailing the December 2016

assault. Shortly afterward, a “blue warrant” for Appellant’s arrest issued, and
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he absconded from parole. 3 Then, in mid-January 2017, Appellant murdered

Ascencio in her home to prevent her from testifying at his parole revocation

hearing, and he staged her body to look like she had committed suicide. 4

M.A., who was in fifth grade at the time, witnessed Appellant’s terrifying

December assault on her mother and testified that he also pointed a gun at her

during the incident. In addition, M.A. found her mother’s body after the staged

suicide. M.A. further testified that Appellant sexually abused her while he was

living under her mother’s roof.

The State also presented evidence that Appellant orchestrated a drug

smuggling and distribution ring while in jail awaiting trial in this case. More

specifically, Appellant enlisted individuals inside and outside the jail to assist

him with obtaining and distributing “spiced paper” (paper infused with various

illicit drugs) to other jail inmates for profit. In at least one instance, as a lesson

and show of power, Appellant arranged for paper infused with toxic chemicals

instead of the desired drugs (a “Trojan Horse”) to be sent to an inmate-

3This is the same warrant Appellant was seeking to avoid when he murdered
Dhaliwal.
4 The State presented evidence showing Appellant’s motive and opportunity to kill

Ascensio, as well as evidence that he had previously expressed a willingness to do so.
The State additionally presented testimony from two different witnesses, who each
stated that Appellant admitted to them that he had been present in Ascencio’s home
and arguing with her at the time of her death. One of these witnesses also testified
that Appellant admitted to her that he had shot Ascensio.
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customer who owed him money.

The State additionally presented testimony from clinical and forensic

psychologist Dr. Christine Reed, who reviewed Appellant’s jail, prison,

medical, and mental health records as well as the evidence of the capital

offense. Because she did not personally interview Appellant, Reed testified that

she did not feel comfortable diagnosing him. However, Reed explained that she

was privy to Appellant’s prior diagnoses and that her review of his records

allowed her to refute or confirm them.

Reed discounted low intelligence as an explanation for Appellant’s

behavior; Appellant had an above-average IQ, and he had done well when he

took college courses in prison. Instead, Reed noted, Appellant was diagnosed

with Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), and his history amply supported

that diagnosis. Reed also testified that she would be very comfortable with

Appellant being diagnosed with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well, or

with narcissistic traits being added to his ASPD diagnosis. Reed testified that

both personality disorders are extremely resistant to treatment and that,

among other things, narcissists can lash out in violent ways when challenged.

Reed also assessed Appellant using the Hare Psychopathy Checklist

(PCL-R) based on her review of his records. Reed testified that Appellant

scored a 35 out of 40, and that a score above 30 indicated psychopathy. She
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explained that people whose PCL-R scores indicate psychopathy are at greater

risk for criminal behavior, including violent reoffending.

Appellant personally cross-examined the State’s punishment phase

witnesses, but he presented no witnesses of his own. After considering the

evidence presented at both phases of trial, the jury returned an affirmative

answer to the future dangerousness special issue and a negative answer to the

mitigation special issue.

II. Legal Sufficiency—Guilt Phase

In his third point of error, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of

the evidence to support his capital murder conviction. 5 Appellant appears to

assert that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his capital murder

conviction because five of the State’s guilt phase witnesses (Priscilla Garrison,

Tracy Lewallen, Hoang Nguyen, Michael Reddicks, and Elias Rivera)

“provided no direct evidence” of the offense “and no identification” of Appellant

as the perpetrator. Without acknowledging our holdings to the contrary,

Appellant conclusorily asserts that “circumstantial actions should not be

considered when judging the sufficiency of the evidence.” 6

5 We address Appellant’s points of error out of order because we generally first
address the issue that would afford Appellant the greatest relief. See TEX. R. APP. P.
43.3.
6 To the extent Appellant intends to raise any other arguments, those arguments are

inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
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a. Applicable Law

When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction, we consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict and determine whether any rational juror could have found the

essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592,

607–608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). The Jackson standard recognizes the trier of

fact’s role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence after

drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence. Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d

854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “We presume that the factfinder resolved any

conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution.”

Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608. “As a reviewing court, we may not reevaluate

the weight and credibility of the evidence in the record and thereby substitute

our own judgment for that of the factfinder.” Id. Therefore, on appellate review,

we determine whether the necessary inferences made by the trier of fact are

reasonable based on the cumulative force of all of the evidence. See id.

b. Analysis

Appellant’s challenge to the legal sufficiency of the guilt phase evidence

to support his conviction for capital murder lacks merit. We have repeatedly

held that “[c]ircumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
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establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be

sufficient to establish guilt.” See, e.g., Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2014); see also Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009) (“[T]he State may prove [a] defendant’s identity and criminal

culpability by either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all

reasonable inferences from that evidence.”). “[I]t is not necessary that every

fact and circumstance point directly and independently to the defendant’s

guilt; it is enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances.” Acosta, 429 S.W.3d

at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Further, Appellant ignores the fact that Dhaliwal’s dashcam and

bodycam videos, which were published to the jury, captured the traffic stop,

clear images of the driver involved, and almost all aspects of the fatal assault

on the deputy. 7 The jury could have reasonably determined from this evidence

alone that Appellant was the driver involved in the traffic stop and that he

intentionally and knowingly murdered Dhaliwal by shooting him in the head.

In addition, at trial, Appellant’s own sister viewed a still photo from the video

7 The video did not show Appellant actually shooting Dhaliwal because Dhaliwal’s

bodycam was front-facing, and Appellant pushed the deputy’s chest against the side
of the patrol car. However, the dashcam and bodycam footage captured Appellant’s
armed approach and retreat, between which the shot that killed Dhaliwal can be
heard on audio.
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and identified Appellant holding her firearm and getting back into her car

immediately after the fatal shot rang out. She also identified Appellant’s voice

on Dhaliwal’s bodycam video. Appellant also ignores the testimony that,

immediately after the offense, he separately told two different people (Saiz and

Covey) that he (Appellant) had just shot Dhaliwal. And, fatal to Appellant’s

sufficiency challenge, Appellant expressly admitted that he shot and killed

Dhaliwal, knowing that Dhaliwal was a peace officer who was then acting in

the line of duty.

In sum, the cumulative force of the evidence was more than sufficient for

the jury to reasonably find every element of the charged offense beyond a

reasonable doubt, including Appellant’s identity as the shooter. We overrule

Appellant’s third point of error.

III. Legal Sufficiency—Future Dangerousness

In his fourth point of error, Appellant challenges the legal sufficiency of

the evidence to support the jury’s affirmative answer to the punishment

phase’s “future dangerousness” special issue. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

37.071, § 2(b)(1). Instead of applying the Jackson standard to the facts of his

case, 8 Appellant focuses on the testimony of three punishment phase witnesses

8 To the extent Appellant is attempting to make a different argument, it is
inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
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(Lyons, Harry Hill, and M.A.) and in a conclusory fashion seems to complain

about either the admissibility of their testimony or the degree of credibility he

believes the jury should have afforded it. 9 After leveling these criticisms at

Lyons’s, Hill’s, and M.A.’s testimony, Appellant closes with the conclusory

statement, “When considered with evidence from the guilt phase about the

nature of this offense, a rational juror could not have found that the appellant

would commit future criminal acts of violence that would constitute a

continuing threat to society.” Appellant never explains how the complained-of

testimony implicates the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s

affirmative finding on the future dangerousness special issue.

a. Applicable Law

The future dangerousness special issue requires the jury to determine

9 As previously discussed, Lyons testified that Appellant sexually assaulted her when

he was about fourteen years old. The sum total of Appellant’s argument regarding
Lyons’s testimony is the statement, “This claim was unreported and allegedly
occurred many years before this trial.” Appellant fails to acknowledge that he
personally admitted in open court that “the event” happened. See supra n.2.
Appellant next conclusorily (and incorrectly) asserts that he had no opportunity to
cross-examine Hill. When Appellant was prosecuted in 2002 for aggravated assault
and aggravated kidnapping, Hill (the shooting victim) testified at the trial and was
cross-examined by Appellant’s counsel. Hill was deceased by the time of Appellant’s
capital murder trial, but his direct and cross-examination testimony from the 2002
trial was read into the record.
Appellant lastly complains of M.A.’s testimony that Appellant physically assaulted
her mother and sexually abused M.A. Appellant conclusorily calls M.A.’s testimony
“[t]he most egregious and unsupported/unreported allegation.” He fails to
acknowledge that M.A.’s testimony is evidence supporting the allegation.
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“whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts

of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(1). This special issue reflects an “essentially . . .

normative” inquiry that focuses on the individual defendant’s character for

violence, “not merely the quantity or quality of the institutional restraints”

imposed upon him. Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 268–69 (Tex. Crim. App.

2010). “That is, this special issue focuses upon the internal restraints of the

individual, not merely the external restraints of incarceration.” Id. at 269.

In answering the future dangerousness special issue, the jury is entitled

to consider all of the evidence admitted at both the guilt and punishment

phases of trial. Devoe v. State, 354 S.W.3d 457, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The

jury may consider a variety of factors in reaching its answer. See Green v. State,

713 S.W.3d 865, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025). These factors include the

circumstances of the offense and the events surrounding it, including

forethought and deliberateness in its execution; the existence and severity of

past crimes; the defendant’s age and personal circumstances at the time of the

offense; psychiatric evidence; and character evidence. Id. The jury may

additionally consider escalating patterns of violence and disrespect for the law.

Id. In some instances, the circumstances of the offense and the events
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surrounding it may be sufficient in themselves to sustain an affirmative

answer to the future dangerousness special issue. Devoe, 354 S.W.3d at 462.

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s

affirmative answer to the future dangerousness special issue, we employ the

Jackson standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict. See Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We

determine whether, based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from it,

any rational trier of fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that

there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence

that would constitute a continuing threat to society. Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878.

b. Analysis

Appellant’s complaints about Lyons’s, Hill’s, and M.A.’s testimony are

misplaced in the context of a legal sufficiency analysis. In a legal sufficiency

analysis, “we consider all of evidence admitted, whether proper or improper.”

Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); cf. Smith v. State,

499 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (“Even evidence that is improperly

admitted is considered in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to

support a conviction[.]”). Further, we may not substitute our judgment for that

of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence.

Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756, 762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
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Having thoroughly reviewed the evidence presented at both phases of

Appellant’s trial, we find that it amply supported the jury’s affirmative answer

to the future dangerousness special issue. In addition to introducing evidence

of Appellant’s murder of Deputy Dhaliwal, the State introduced evidence that

Appellant had committed another murder—Ascenscio’s—to prevent her from

testifying at his parole revocation hearing. The parole revocation hearing had

been initiated due to a prior assault that Appellant had perpetrated on

Ascenscio by firing a gun next to her head. The State also introduced evidence

that Appellant staged Ascenscio’s body to look like Ascenscio had committed

suicide, showing a lack of remorse by Appellant. Moreover, the State

introduced additional evidence of Appellant’s past crimes, including prior

convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated kidnapping and juvenile

adjudications for a string of home burglaries. The State further introduced

evidence of Appellant’s prison records, from as recently as the months leading

up to this trial, most notably that he orchestrated a drug smuggling ring and

tried to poison another inmate who owed him money. Lastly, the State

introduced psychiatric testimony indicating that Appellant had psychopathic

traits. The evidence of Appellant’s future dangerousness was staggering.

Based on the evidence introduced at Appellant’s trial, a rational trier of

fact could have believed beyond a reasonable doubt that there was a probability
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that Appellant would commit future criminal acts of violence that would

constitute a continuing threat to society. Green, 713 S.W.3d at 878. We

overrule Appellant’s fourth point of error.

IV. Request to Withdraw Waiver of Counsel

In his first point of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused

its discretion by denying his request to withdraw his prior waiver of counsel.

Appellant appears to assert that the trial court’s decision violated both his

Sixth Amendment right to counsel as well as Code of Criminal Procedure

Article 1.051(h). We also understand Appellant to ask us to consider reviewing

“[Article] 1.051(h) case[s]” de novo rather than under an abuse-of-discretion

standard. 10

a. Factual Background

In his briefing, Appellant provides limited facts regarding the

circumstances in which he waived his right to counsel and later attempted to

withdraw that waiver. However, the record shows that, in the last few months

before trial in this case was scheduled to begin, Appellant repeatedly expressed

unhappiness with his appointed counsel. A consistent theme of Appellant’s

complaints regarding counsel, who had represented him for roughly three

10 To the extent Appellant intends to raise any other claim, it is inadequately briefed.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
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years at that point, was that they were violating his rights under “McCoy.”

Appellant claimed that counsel would not “discuss anything other than

mitigation” and refused to focus their efforts on achieving Appellant’s goal of

being found not guilty of capital murder (or, apparently, any lesser offense).

See McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018) (holding that “a defendant has

the right to insist that counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when

counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant

the best chance to avoid the death penalty”). 11 Appellant also asserted that

counsel were working in tandem with the district clerk and court coordinator

to prevent him from complaining to the trial court about counsel, so that

counsel could hide their alleged deficiencies and continue making money from

Appellant’s case.

Appellant repeatedly asked the trial court to remove counsel, raised the

possibility of representing himself when the trial court declined to appoint

different counsel, and asked the trial court for time to consider the option of

self-representation. Indeed, Appellant spent approximately two months

raising the prospect of self-representation with the trial court while

simultaneously refusing to commit to either proceeding with appointed counsel

11 We note that the record before us contains no indication that appointed counsel

intended to insist that Appellant plead guilty to the charged offense or that they
otherwise intended to concede his guilt at trial.
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or proceeding pro se. It was not until the last day of jury selection, when trial

was already underway, that Appellant affirmatively indicated that he wished

the trial court to remove his appointed attorneys and allow him to represent

himself.

The trial court then held a Faretta 12 hearing at which it admonished

Appellant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation,

informed him that it would not appoint stand-by counsel, and admonished him

that he would not be allowed to obstruct the orderly proceedings of the court

or interfere with the fair administration of justice. Appellant thereafter waived

his right to counsel. The trial court dismissed appointed counsel from the case,

and Appellant represented himself at trial from that point forward. 13

During the guilt phase, Appellant engaged in the following behavior. He

argued that the discovery material the State had previously provided to his

appointed attorneys was inadmissible because the State had not also provided

12 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818–19 (1975) (recognizing a Sixth Amendment

right to self-representation).
13 Appellant does not contend that he was improperly allowed to represent himself.

See Williams v. State, 252 S.W.3d 353, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (explaining
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the reciprocal right to self-
representation; once the right is clearly and unequivocally asserted, the trial court
must inform the defendant about the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation so that the record establishes that the waiver of counsel is
intelligently and voluntarily made); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 818–19. Further, the
record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellant voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently waived his right to counsel.
SOLIS — 24

it to Appellant personally. Although trial was underway, Appellant essentially

asserted that the discovery process should start over because he was

representing himself. He also alleged that the trial court’s staff were thwarting

him from filing legal documents. 14 Further, he complained that he did not have

access to prior counsel’s witness list, although the trial court noted that witness

lists were available in the clerk’s file.

Appellant also filed three motions for continuances, all of which were

denied. He filed the first motion for continuance immediately after the trial

court granted his request to proceed pro se. Although trial had already begun,

Appellant claimed to need additional time to prepare for his defense. On the

fourth day of the State’s case-in-chief, Appellant argued his second motion for

continuance, claiming that he was “nauseous” and “light-headed,” and that he

had vomited blood into a trash can. The prosecution vigorously disputed that

assertion, as did the bailiff, who stated that, at most, Appellant had spat some

saliva into a trash can. The trial court moreover made a record that it had not

seen vomiting of any kind in the courtroom. Appellant made his third motion

for continuance during his case-in-chief, claiming that he needed additional

14 However, Appellant’s own witness indicated that Appellant was still represented

by counsel when she attempted to file the documents on his behalf. See Jenkins v.
State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 n.47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“A defendant has no right to
hybrid representation, and, as a consequence, a trial court is free to disregard any
pro se motions presented by a defendant who is represented by counsel.”).
SOLIS — 25

time so that he could subpoena witnesses whom he had already cross-

examined. Given the circumstances, the prosecution expressed its belief that

Appellant’s request for time was actually intended to “drag out” the trial. The

trial court agreed, denying Appellant’s request and describing it as “a tactic for

delay.”

Although the record contradicted his assertion, Appellant also

repeatedly claimed that he could not prepare for his trial because he had no

access to pens. He also contended that his work product had disappeared while

he visited the jail infirmary. After the State rested its guilt phase case-in-chief,

Appellant orally moved the trial judge to recuse himself due to the judge’s

alleged failure to provide Appellant with the time and material necessary to

prepare a defense. 15

Then, at the end of the guilt phase charge conference and immediately

before closing arguments were set to begin, the trial court asked if Appellant

had any other objections to the charge beyond the ones he had already made.

This exchange ensued:

15 The trial court briefly acknowledged the oral motion and proceeded with trial.

Appellant’s oral motion required no action by the trial court because the oral request
did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a), which requires (among other
things) that a motion to recuse to be in writing. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18(a).
SOLIS — 26

[APPELLANT]: No, Your Honor. However, at this time I
would like to withdraw myself from my
case and request appointed counsel.

[PROSECUTOR]: I think this is just for delay at this point,
Judge.

THE COURT: Mr. Solis, we had a hearing. You’ve
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently
waived your right to counsel. I instructed
you at that time that you were not to use
that as an attempt to delay or disrupt this
court’s proceedings.

[APPELLANT]: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I believe at this point your request at the
time of closing is specifically to delay and
disrupt these proceedings. Your request is
denied at this time. I will reconsider if it
become[s] pertinent based upon the jury’s
verdict.

Appellant did not object to the trial court’s ruling or make any other response.

After the jury returned its verdict finding Appellant guilty of capital

murder, the trial court polled the jury and then excused it from the courtroom.

The trial court subsequently addressed Appellant.

THE COURT: At this time, Mr. Solis, I have considered
your request for the appointment of
counsel. I cannot appoint new counsel.
You have freely, voluntarily and
intelligently waived the effective
assistance of counsel in this case. The
Court has reached out to your former
counsel, who have spent three years in
preparing your defense. However, they
SOLIS — 27

believe, that based upon your dismissing
them, that they are now conflicted out and
they have declined to continue
representing you even in punishment. At
this point, because you have freely,
voluntarily and intelligently waived the
assistance of counsel, you must continue
to proceed pro se.

[APPELLANT]: Okay.

THE COURT: The Court will be in recess.

The punishment phase began later the same day. In the jury’s presence,

the State read a punishment enhancement paragraph from the indictment

which alleged that Appellant had previously been convicted of aggravated

assault with a deadly weapon. When the trial court asked Appellant for his

plea regarding the enhancement, he responded:

Not true, Your Honor. And also, Your Honor, at this time I would
like to object to your refusal of counsel to represent me in the
sentencing phase and forcing me to proceed and be present for
these proceedings when I asked to absent myself.

The trial court did not respond to Appellant’s statement. It instead

directed the State to proceed with its opening argument, which the State did.

The withdrawal issue was not raised again during Appellant’s trial.

b. Appellant’s Statutory Claim

We turn first to Appellant’s assertion that the trial court abused its

discretion under Article 1.051(h), which states:
SOLIS — 28

A defendant may withdraw a waiver of the right to counsel at any
time but is not entitled to repeat a proceeding previously held or
waived solely on the grounds of the subsequent appointment or
retention of counsel. If the defendant withdraws a waiver, the trial
court, in its discretion, may provide the appointed counsel 10 days
to prepare.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.051(h). We have recently held that the Article

1.051(h) right to withdraw a prior waiver of counsel is not absolute. See

Huggins v. State, 674 S.W.3d 538, 548–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (concluding

that the statutory language “at any time” does not mean “under any

circumstances” and that a defendant may not use his right to counsel to

manipulate the court).

We conclude that Appellant has failed to preserve this aspect of his first

point of error for appellate review. Appellant did not identify a legal basis for

his initial request or later objection, and we do not believe that a statutory

basis for it would have been obvious to the trial court or opposing counsel. See

Vasquez v. State, 483 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (explaining that

litigants need not employ specific words or technical considerations to avoid

forfeiting their complaints; however, a general or imprecise objection will not

preserve error for appeal unless the legal basis for the objection is obvious to

the court and to opposing counsel); see also Lankston v. State, 827 S.W.2d 907,

909 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[A]ll a party has to do to avoid the forfeiture of a

complaint on appeal is to let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks
SOLIS — 29

himself entitled to it, and to do so clearly enough for the judge to understand

him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about

it.”). Because Appellant failed to preserve his Article 1.051(h) allegation for

appellate review, his associated argument—concerning the proper standard of

review for such claims—is moot.

c. Appellant’s Sixth Amendment Claim

In his first point of error, Appellant claims he was denied effective

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.

i. Appellant’s claim is inadequately briefed

We preliminarily conclude that Appellant’s Sixth Amendment argument

is inadequately briefed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a

clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the record.”). Appellant sets forth some law

regarding a defendant’s waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and

the withdrawal of such a waiver. However, Appellant fails to apply the law he

provides to the limited facts of the case he sets forth. Appellant merely makes

conclusory statements about what the trial court did or did not review in

denying his request to withdraw his prior waiver of counsel, as well as

conclusory statements about the result to which Appellant believes he is

entitled. Moreover, in his briefing for this point of error, Appellant rambles
SOLIS — 30

from topic to topic and his arguments are often incoherent. Further, his

briefing features incomplete sentences and missing or inaccurate citations to

case law.

ii. Merits

Out of an abundance of caution, we nevertheless will review Appellant’s

Sixth Amendment contention. After such review, we conclude that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion.

“It is beyond dispute that ‘[t]he Sixth Amendment safeguards to an

accused who faces incarceration the right to counsel at all critical stages of the

criminal process.’” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 62 (2013) (quoting Iowa

v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2004)). “It is just as well settled, however, that a

defendant also has the right to ‘proceed without counsel when he voluntarily

and intelligently elects to do so.’” Id. (citing Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807). “To

resolve the tension that can exist between these two principles when a

defendant who elected to proceed pro se later demands an attorney, there is

broad consensus that, once waived, the right to counsel is no longer

unqualified.” United States v. Kerr, 752 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 2014) (collecting

cases).

That is, the exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “is subject

to the necessities of sound judicial administration. Trial courts have the duty,
SOLIS — 31

and discretion, to maintain the orderly flow and administration of judicial

proceedings, including the exercise of a defendant’s right to counsel.” Medley

v. State, 47 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, pet. ref’d) (internal

citation omitted); see also Marquez v. State, 921 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996) (“The control of the business of the court is vested in the sound

discretion of the trial judge.”). Although a waiver of the right to counsel may

generally be withdrawn, a “defendant does not have the right to repeatedly

alternate his position on the right to counsel and thereby delay trial or

otherwise obstruct the orderly administration of justice.” Medley, 47 S.W.3d at

23; see also Culverhouse v. State, 755 S.W.2d 856, 861 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988)

(“A defendant may not use his right to counsel to manipulate the court or to

delay his trial.”). Moreover, “[a] defendant does not have a constitutional right

to choreograph special appearances by counsel.” McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S.

168, 183 (1984).

Here, it was on the cusp of guilt-phase closing arguments that Appellant

attempted to withdraw his prior waiver of his right to counsel. Given the

timing of the request alone, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude

that Appellant’s request was made for the purpose of delay. Moreover,

Appellant’s behavior leading up his last-minute request to reclaim the right to

counsel provides additional support for the reasonableness of the trial court’s
SOLIS — 32

conclusion. Appellant fails to show that the trial court would have been

unreasonable to conclude that his request reflected the culmination of a

pattern of behavior designed to manipulate the court and delay his trial.

Further, Appellant has not shown that the trial court abused its

discretion when it revisited the issue and declined to appoint counsel for the

punishment phase. At Appellant’s insistence, the trial court had already

dismissed appointed counsel from the case. The record shows that the trial

court nevertheless contacted these attorneys to ask whether they would be

willing to resume representing Appellant, but they were not, citing what they

viewed as a conflict of interest. Further, there was no standby counsel at the

ready. Appellant has not shown that, under these circumstances, the trial

court would have been unreasonable to determine that appointing new counsel

at this point during the trial would inevitably result in lengthy delay that

would obstruct the orderly administration of justice.

Having concluded that Appellant’s first point of error was either

inadequately briefed or that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we

overrule it.

V. Challenge for Cause

In his second point of error, Appellant alleges that “the trial court

reversibly erred and abused its discretion by improperly denying [his]
SOLIS — 33

challenge for cause.” Appellant’s allegation is inadequately briefed because he

fails to identify the challenge for cause that he believes the trial court

erroneously denied. See TEX R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

In addition, our review of the record reveals that the trial court did not

deny any of the defense’s challenges for cause. Thus, Appellant’s claim appears

to have no basis in fact and may be properly characterized as frivolous. Cf.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (superseded by statute)

(explaining that a complaint is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in

either fact or law).

Further, Appellant concedes (and the record confirms) that he did not

use all of his fifteen statutorily allotted peremptory challenges. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 35.15(a) (allotting the parties in capital cases fifteen

peremptory challenges each). Therefore, even if Appellant could show that the

trial court actually denied a defense challenge for cause, and that the trial

court abused its discretion by doing so, he would not be able to show that the

ruling harmed him. See Newbury v. State, 135 S.W.3d 22, 30–31 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004) (“[H]arm from the erroneous denial of a defense challenge for cause

focuses on whether a peremptory challenge was wrongfully taken from the

defendant.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also

Comeaux v. State, 445 S.W.3d 745, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (stating that to
SOLIS — 34

establish harm regarding the denial of a causal challenge, the appellant must

show, among other things, that he exhausted his peremptory challenges, and

the trial court denied his request for additional strikes). We overrule

Appellant’s second point of error.

VI. Extraneous Offense Evidence

In his fifth point of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court reversibly

erred and abused its discretion when it admitted extraneous offense evidence

during the punishment phase of his trial. Appellant invokes Rule of Evidence

403 and asserts that the trial court should not have admitted certain

punishment phase testimony given by Lyons, Deputy Daniel Turner, Janice

Peters, Brian Vaclavik, and M.A. because the testimony was unfairly

prejudicial. See TEX. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if

its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of

the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,

undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”). However,

Appellant did not preserve this claim for appellate review because at trial, he
SOLIS — 35

failed to lodge Rule 403 objections to the testimony at issue. 16 See TEX. R. APP.

P. 33.1(a)(1)(A).

Further, Appellant has inadequately briefed this point of error. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.1(i). After summarizing the allegedly objectionable testimony

given by these witnesses, Appellant conclusorily asserts that the testimony

was unfairly prejudicial because it “insinuated” that Appellant committed

certain bad acts (such as sexually assaulting Lyons, sexually abusing M.A.,

and murdering Ascencio) and suggested that money motivated him to kill

Ascencio. At no point does Appellant explain why this evidence was unfairly

prejudicial; he simply asserts that it was. See Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d

727, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (“Rule 403 does not require exclusion of

evidence simply because it creates prejudice; the prejudice must be ‘unfair.’”).

We overrule Appellant’s fifth point of error.

VII. Constitutional Challenges to Article 37.071

In his sixth, seventh, and eighth points of error, Appellant raises various

challenges to the constitutionality of Texas’s death penalty statutory scheme.

Specifically, Appellant argues that (1) his death sentence “is unconstitutional

16 The record shows that Appellant made a “prejudice” objection during Turner’s

testimony when the State sought to admit certain photos of Ascencio’s body. However,
this objection was to the admission of the photographs rather than Turner’s
testimony.
SOLIS — 36

because it was assigned based on [Texas’s] arbitrary system of administering

the death penalty” (point of error six); (2) his death sentence should be vacated

because Texas’s “statute governing capital trials expressly limits the evidence

that a jury may consider mitigating, in violation of” the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments (point of error seven); and (3) Texas’s “10-12” rule, see TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071, § 2(a)(1), violates the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendments because it prohibits a trial court from instructing the jury on the

consequences of any failure to agree on the punishment phase special issues

(point of error eight).

Appellant does not direct the Court to any motions he filed before or

during trial in which he challenged the constitutionality of Texas’s death

penalty statute on these or any other bases, nor are we aware of any.

Accordingly, Appellant has not preserved these three points of error for

purposes of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Reynolds v. State, 423 S.W.3d

377, 383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“‘As applied’ constitutional claims are subject

to the preservation requirement and therefore must be objected to at the trial

court in order to preserve error.”); Karenev v. State, 281 S.W.3d 428, 434 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009). (“[A] defendant may not raise for the first time on appeal a

facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.”).
SOLIS — 37

Further, Appellant fails to acknowledge that we have repeatedly rejected

such claims. See, e.g., Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 296–98. We are not persuaded by

Appellant’s arguments to revisit these issues. We overrule Appellant’s sixth

through eighth points of error.

VIII. Conclusion

Finding no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment and

sentence of death.

Delivered: October 30, 2025
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