Lewis, Damon Earl

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS
NOS.
WR-57,648-13
WR-57,648-14
WR-57,648-15
WR-57,648-16

EX PARTE DAMON EARL LEWIS, Applicant

ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NOS. 0216853, 0216854, 0216855, AND 0216856
IN THE 8TH DISTRICT COURT
HOPKINS COUNTY

Per curiam. FINLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion joined by SCHENCK,
P.J.; YEARY, J., dissented.
OPINION

A jury convicted Applicant in 2002 of four offenses of aggravated sexual

assault of a child and two offenses of indecency with a child by contact. The State

alleged abuse of two victims: his stepdaughter, C.C., and her friend, M.N. At trial,

both girls testified, and the State presented SANE Kim Basinger’s testimony
LEWIS - 2

regarding C.C.’s medical examination. There was no such medical examination of

M.N. The jury convicted Applicant on charges involving C.C. but acquitted on

those involving M.N.

Applicant presents Basinger’s recantation and newly available photographs

of C.C.’s 2001 SANE examination. Basinger now acknowledges that medical

consensus has evolved, and her trial testimony was incorrect. Dr. Joyce Adams, a

board-certified pediatrician, confirms that under current guidelines, the SANE

examination findings would be classified as non-specific or normal.

Article 11.073 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for relief when

relevant scientific evidence contradicts scientific evidence presented at trial, was

not previously ascertainable through reasonable diligence, would be admissible at

trial, and by a preponderance of the evidence would have changed the verdict. See

Ex parte Robbins, 478 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

This Court has made an independent review of the record. Basinger’s

recantation and the photographs constitute newly available evidence not previously

ascertainable, and the evidence is admissible. The jury’s verdict pattern of

convicting on charges supported by medical evidence while acquitting on charges

lacking medical corroboration suggests that the jury strongly depended on SANE
LEWIS - 3

Basinger’s now-recanted testimony.

The trial court entered findings agreed upon by both Applicant and the State

and recommends that this Court grant Applicant a new trial. We agree with the

trial court that Applicant has shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, he would

not have been convicted without SANE Basinger’s trial testimony. Relief is

granted.

The judgments in cause numbers 0216853, 0216854, 0216855, and 0216856

in the 8th District Court of Hopkins County are set aside, and Applicant is

remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Hopkins County to answer the charges as

set out in the informations. The trial court shall issue any necessary bench warrant

within ten days from the date of this Court’s mandate.

Copies of this opinion shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice–Correctional Institutions Division and the Board of Pardons and Paroles.

Delivered: February 12, 2026
Do not publish

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
OF TEXAS

NOS.
WR-57,648-13
WR-57,648-14
WR-57,648-15
WR-57,648-16

EX PARTE DAMON EARL LEWIS, Applicant

ON APPLICATIONS FOR WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS
CAUSE NOS. 0216853, 0216854, 0216855, AND 0216856
IN THE 8TH DISTRICT COURT
HOPKINS COUNTY

Finley, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which
Schenck, P.J., joined.

DISSENTING OPINION

Applicant was convicted in 2002 of four counts of aggravated sexual assault

of a child and two counts of indecency with a child by contact for sexually

assaulting his stepdaughter C.C. Before the Court is Applicant’s -13 thru -16
LEWIS DISSENT— 2

habeas applications—Applicant’s second subsequent habeas applications. In each

habeas application, Applicant raises three grounds for relief. Applicant’s first

ground for relief is a due process claim that alleges that the State knowingly or

unknowingly used false testimony at Applicant’s trial. Applicant’s second ground

for relief is an Article 11.073 claim premised on SANE Nurse Kim Basinger’s

change of expert opinion since her testimony at Applicant’s trial. And Applicant’s

third ground for relief is an alternative Article 11.073 claim that relies on general

advances in medical research that he argues undermine the scientific validity of

hymenal examination testimony, independent of SANE Basinger’s change of

opinion.

The parties jointly submitted agreed findings of fact and conclusions of law,

which the habeas court adopted. The findings of fact and conclusions of law are

limited to Applicant’s second ground for relief and recommend that this Court

grant relief. In filing their agreed findings of fact and conclusions of law, the parties

agreed that it was appropriate to defer further development and litigation of

Applicant’s first and third grounds for relief. Based on this agreement, the habeas

court found that further development of Applicant’s first and third grounds for

relief was unnecessary and abated those grounds for relief. The habeas court asks
LEWIS DISSENT— 3

this Court to remand for full development of grounds one and three if this Court

does not grant relief on Applicant’s second ground.

This Court has repeteadly disfavored piecemeal litigation. In Ex parte

Roark, we explained that “without full presentment and examination of all issues

in this application, we only invite piecemeal litigation, which is an inappropriate

use of the Great Writ. Generally, all of an applicant’s claims should be

fully developed and ready to be resolved when the record is transmitted to this

Court.” 662 S.W.3d 469, 469–70 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). We have previously

remanded similar attempts by habeas courts to engage in piecemeal litigation. See,

e.g., Ex parte Huffman, No. WR-96,031-01, 2025 WL 1177479, at *1 (Tex. Crim.

App. Apr. 23, 2025); Ex parte Sherrill, No. WR-79,186-03, 2025 WL 1177960, at

*1 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2025); Ex parte Lucio, No. WR-72,702-05, 2024 WL

3051367, at *2 (Tex. Crim. App. June 19, 2024); Ex parte Hopper, No. WR-94,327-

01, 2024 WL 1296740, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 27, 2024).

We should do the same here. Because the Court does not, and instead bucks

its normal practice in a “remand for some but not for all” manner, I respectfully

dissent.
LEWIS DISSENT— 4

Filed: February 12, 2026
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