Shafaii Investments, Ltd., Raj Shafaii, and Party and Reception Center, Inc. v. Melania Estela Rivera Bonilla and Margarita Angelino Trujillo

Opinion issued August 29, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-21-00731-CV
———————————
SHAFAII INVESTMENTS, LTD., RAJ SHAFAII, AND PARTY AND
RECEPTION CENTER, INC., Appellants
V.
MELANIA ESTELA RIVERA BONILLA AND MARGARITA ANGELINO
TRUJILLO, Appellees

On Appeal from the 113th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2018-07477

OPINION

Two individual townhouse owners brought this consolidated suit against the

seller for damages following flooding. Appellees Melania Estela Rivera Bonilla

(“Rivera”) and Margarita Angelino Trujillo (“Angelino”) sued appellants Shafaii
Investments, Ltd., Raj Shafaii, and Party and Reception Center, Inc.,1 (collectively,

“appellants”) asserting claims for breach of contract, fraud, negligent

misrepresentation, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act

(“DTPA”). Rivera and Angelino alleged that appellants agreed to obtain insurance

for their townhouses and charged them for insurance yet never procured insurance

coverage.

In addition, Rivera sued appellants to stop the wrongful foreclosure of her

townhouse.2 She later sued for violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act

(“TDCA”), alleging that appellants falsely threatened that she had committed a

crime, collected unlawful fees and interest, and attempted to foreclose on her

homestead without filing the requisite notice.

The jury found for Rivera and Angelino and assessed damages. The jury

awarded them both damages for repair costs, mental anguish damages, treble

damages under the DTPA, and attorney’s fees. The trial court also issued a

permanent injunction preventing appellants from further violating the Texas Debt

Collection Act in dealings with Rivera.

1
The parties stipulated that Party and Reception Center Inc. is the general partner of
Shafaii Investments.
2
Rivera also sued appellants’ attorney Robert Kouts, who is not a party to this appeal.
2
On appeal, appellants challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence supporting the jury’s award of repair damages, mental anguish damages,

and attorney’s fees. First, appellants argue that the evidence is insufficient to prove

repair damages were necessary and reasonable. As part of this issue, appellants assert

that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and that expert testimony was

required to support the award of damages. Next, appellants contend that mental

anguish damages and treble damages are precluded by the economic loss rule.

Appellants also argue that the record does not support the existence of mental

anguish or the amount of damages awarded. Finally, appellants argue that the

evidence is insufficient to support the award of attorney’s fees.

We affirm.

Background

A. Rivera’s Townhouse

At trial, Rivera testified that she purchased her townhouse from Shafaii

Investments in June 2014, with Shafaii Investments seller-financing the purchase.

Rivera executed loan documents, including a real estate lien note and a deed of trust.

When she bought her townhouse, Rivera did not have a credit history and earned

between $10,000, and $12,000 a year. Rivera testified that although the deed of trust

required her to obtain insurance, Raj Shafaii told her that she had to pay him directly

for insurance and that he would obtain insurance for any damage to the inside or

3
outside of her property. She testified that Shafaii charged her $75 per month for

insurance. When she asked if she could obtain insurance elsewhere, Shafaii told her

she was not permitted to do so. Rivera testified that Shafaii instructed her that she

would lose her home if she obtained insurance elsewhere.

Rivera testified that she paid monthly for insurance from 2014 until the

October 2015 flood. Though Rivera asked Shafaii multiple times to review the

insurance coverage paperwork, Shafaii never provided it to her. Instead, he told her

not to worry about it because no matter what happened, her house would be covered

by insurance. The jury viewed invoices and money order receipts demonstrating

Rivera’s payments for insurance.

In late October 2015, Rivera’s townhouse flooded with two to three feet of

water. The flooding damaged the first floor of the home, including the sheetrock,

lower kitchen cabinets, doors, and insulation. Rivera testified that Raj Shafaii told

her that the townhouse was insured and an inspector would assess the damage. She

testified that Shafaii later told her that he had been inside her townhouse with an

adjuster and that she would get “a lot of money from insurance.” Rivera never

received any money. After the flood, Shafaii told her that he would no longer accept

her monthly insurance payments and that she should obtain her own insurance.

Rivera obtained three initial verbal estimates for repairing her townhouse after

the 2015 flood. The estimates ranged from $30,000 to $75,000. She did not hire any

4
of the contractors because she thought their pricing was high and because she was

waiting for insurance money from appellants. In the meantime, Erasco Martinez told

her that he could make the repairs for $18,000 and gave her a written estimate. At

the time, Rivera sold tacos in the neighborhood, and she knew Martinez as a

customer who purchased tacos for his workers. Martinez showed Rivera

photographs of other properties he had worked on. She thought the work looked

professional, pretty, and clean, and she found his pricing fair. Rivera believed

$18,000 was reasonable because Martinez had to remove and replace all the damage

on the first floor. Rivera hired Martinez, and Martinez completed the work in six

months. In addition, Martinez fixed a leaking roof and painted the outside and first

floor of the townhouse. He also built a concrete patio in the front of the townhouse.

Rivera testified that she did not know how much of the $18,000 was for any specific

repair in her home and that she paid an additional $4,000 for extra work pursuant to

a verbal agreement with the contractor for a total of $22,000. Rivera testified that

she was not seeking to recover the additional $4,000 that she paid Martinez for the

extra repairs.

Rivera’s townhouse flooded again in 2017 during Hurricane Harvey. By this

time, Rivera had obtained her own homeowner’s insurance. The insurance estimate

stated that the replacement cost after the hurricane was $33,537.43 with an actual

cash value of $30,770.09 for repairs. Rivera received a check for $28,770.09 from

5
her insurance to repair her townhouse. Raj Shafaii asked Rivera to tell him when she

received the insurance check so he could use it to fix her townhouse. Rivera was

afraid that if she did so, Shafaii would keep the insurance money and not fix her

home. She believed that in 2015, Shafaii took the insurance payout yet refused to

repair her home, and she did not want that to happen again. The insurance check was

payable to Rivera with Shafaii Investments listed on the check under Rivera’s name.

Rivera cashed the check and used the proceeds to pay Martinez a second time to

repair her townhouse. She paid Martinez $29,000.

After Rivera refused to give the insurance check to Raj Shafaii, his attorney,

Robert Kouts, sent her a notice of default on her loan, accusing her of forging an

insurance check payable to Shafaii Investments. Shafaii authorized Kouts to set

Rivera’s townhouse for a February 2018 foreclosure sale. Shafaii accused Rivera of

“illegally” forging or cashing “an insurance check for funds due to [Shafaii

Investments].”

Rivera sued appellants to stop the February 2018 foreclosure sale. She

obtained a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale. Notwithstanding, Shafaii

authorized Kouts to issue a second notice of default and intent to foreclose that

accused Rivera of “illegally” forging or cashing an insurance check for funds due to

Shafaii Investments. Shafaii conceded at trial that Rivera had not forged his name,

as alleged. Kouts agreed that Rivera’s negotiation of the check was “technically

6
legal” and conceded that when he accused Rivera of illegally forging the check, he

had not seen the back of the check.

In March 2018, Kouts, on behalf of Shafaii Investments, issued two separate

notices of default and intent to foreclose, accusing Rivera of cashing the insurance

check illegally. The notices also claimed that Rivera lacked insurance and failed to

pay property taxes and homeowner’s association assessments. Kouts never filed

notices of acceleration of the note and sale of property as required in foreclosure

proceedings.

Rivera paid her property taxes and obtained insurance in April 2018. She

provided proof to appellants. Shafaii Investments refused to stop the May 2018

foreclosure sale, but Rivera obtained an injunction to stop the foreclosure.

Rivera testified that she was “irreparably” affected by her interactions with

Shafaii. She stated that she was “very afraid” Shafaii would press charges or call the

police after she received Kouts’s letter falsely accusing her of forging or illegally

cashing the insurance check. She said that her children cried because they saw her

sad, stressed, and worried. She testified that she lost sleep and became chronically

depressed and overwhelmed with anxiety. She testified she was “being treated for

anxiety and depression” and that “she was taking medication every week for treating

[her] anxiety and [] depression.” She stated that she had panic attacks and that she

was on a waitlist for further treatment for anxiety and depression.

7
Rivera testified that she is “very afraid” that Shafaii will “come after” her

because she filed suit against him. She testified that she worries Shafaii will retaliate

and hurt her children. The day after she gave a deposition in the case, she called an

ambulance because she was so stressed she could not breathe. Rivera testified that

she had not seen a psychologist because hiring a psychologist is very expensive. She

testified that taking her children to a psychologist would cost between $250 and $270

per child or about $800 for her family, and she did not have the money. She testified

that if she had the $4,500 she had deposited into the court’s registry as part of the

suit, she would be able to obtain psychological help for herself and for her children.

Rivera said she was suing for mental anguish damages so that she would have money

to use for psychological treatment for herself and her children.

B. Angelino’s Townhouse

Angelino purchased her townhouse in January 2017 from Shafaii Investments,

which seller-financed the purchase. At the time, Angelino worked at a car wash, and

she earned $10,000 to $12,000 annually. Angelino paid three bills monthly to

appellants: (1) $881.60 toward the mortgage, (2) $135 in homeowner’s association

dues, and (3) $80 for insurance. Angelino testified that Raj Shafaii told her she had

to pay him directly for insurance and that he had secured insurance for the whole

property, covering all the townhouses. After Hurricane Harvey, Shafaii refused to

accept Angelino’s insurance payments.

8
Angelino’s townhouse flooded during Hurricane Harvey, taking on about four

feet of water. Angelino evacuated as floodwaters rose. She and her children spent

the night in a park before the Red Cross took them to a shelter. They stayed in the

shelter for weeks. She testified that when she returned home, her first-floor

belongings were destroyed, and the townhouse smelled awful.

Angelino testified that she believed appellants had insured her townhouse, and

that insurance would pay to repair the flood damage. Instead, Raj Shafaii told her

there was no insurance and threatened that if she did not fix the townhouse, he would

“throw” her in jail and she would have to pay for the townhouse “penny after penny”

anyway. Later, Angelino returned home to find Shafaii and other “well-dressed”

people in her townhouse taking pictures. Shafaii told her that the people were real

estate agents from an insurance company and that he was going to take care of the

damage. Another time, someone called Angelino to alert her that Shafaii was going

in her townhouse. Angelino came home and found Shafaii and other people taking

pictures. She testified that they took pictures of her television, her living room, and

her appliances. Angelino did not understand why or how Shafaii had a key to her

townhouse to allow the individuals inside to take pictures. She never received any

insurance money for the flood damage.

Regarding Angelino’s townhouse, Raj Shafaii testified that he did not provide

insurance for the townhouse and denied that he received money orders for insurance

9
from Angelino. The money orders with monthly insurance payments were admitted

into evidence. When confronted with his deposition testimony that he paid for

insurance and allowed Angelino and Rivera to pay him back, Shafaii responded that

in his deposition, he had been referring to another owner, Angelino’s sister.

Angelino used savings and a loan from family members to fix her townhouse.

She consulted three contractors who were in the community fixing other townhouses

and received verbal quotes from each ranging between $25,000 and $35,000. She

approached a fourth contractor, Ruben Castillo, because she saw him working on

other townhouses in the area and thought his work was good. Castillo initially quoted

Angelino $35,000 to complete the job, but when Angelino rejected the quote, he

lowered the price to $25,000, including materials, provided she hired him to start

right away. Angelino thought this amount was reasonable, especially because

Castillo would pay for the materials, and Castillo repaired Angelino’s home in two

months. The court admitted into evidence receipts showing Angelino’s payments to

Castillo.

Angelino testified that when she closed on her townhouse, she asked Shafaii

if she could first review the documents at home. He refused and told her that she had

to effectuate the closing at the specified time with his lawyer. Angelino testified that

she later learned Shafaii had recorded her at the closing without her permission. She

testified that she went to the restroom and “she does not know what [Shafaii] did

10
when [she] was in the restroom.” She does not “know if he recorded her when [she]

was in the restroom” and that is “something that’s been on [her] mind all this time.”

She testified that since she’s been involved in litigation with appellants and learned

that Raj Shafaii recorded her, failed to get insurance after she paid him for it, and

told her she would go to jail if she did not fix her townhouse, she has been so worried

that she cannot sleep or eat. She testified that dealing with appellants left her feeling

“very badly” and unwell, and she could not sleep or eat because she was under “so

much stress.” She believed she failed her children because they did not have a home.

She worried that Shafaii had installed cameras or microphones in her house,

especially because she knows he has a key. Angelino testified that her loan with

appellants continues until 2027, and she is afraid of having to deal with Shafaii for

six more years.

C. The Jury’s Verdict

As to Rivera, the jury found that Shafaii Investments had agreed to insure or

obtain insurance for Rivera’s property, and Shafaii Investments breached the

agreement. It also found that Shafaii Investments and Raj Shafaii committed

common-law fraud and statutory fraud in dealing with Rivera and knowingly

violated the DTPA by engaging in unconscionable action and engaging in false,

misleading, or deceptive acts that caused Rivera damages. Further, the jury found

that Shafaii Investments, Raj Shafaii, and Robert Kouts engaged in unfair debt

11
collection in dealing with Rivera and knowingly violated the TDCA by using threats,

coercion, or attempts to coerce her and by using fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading

representations. The jury awarded Rivera $14,000 in cost of repair damages to

replace her property following the 2015 flood, $30,500 in mental anguish damages,

and $21,000 in treble damages for knowingly violating the DTPA and TDCA.

As to Angelino, the jury found that Shafaii Investments agreed to insure or

obtain insurance for her property and breached the agreement. It further found that

Shafaii Investments and Raj Shafaii made a negligent misrepresentation on which

Angelino justifiably relied, committed common-law fraud and statutory fraud in

dealing with Angelino, and knowingly violated the DTPA by engaging in

unconscionable action and engaging in false, misleading, or deceptive acts that

caused Angelino damages. The jury found that Shafaii Investments and Raj Shafaii

also knowingly violated the TDCA by using unfair or unconscionable means of

collecting debt. The jury awarded Angelino $20,000 in cost of repair damages from

the 2017 flood, $39,500 for mental anguish damages caused by Raj Shafaii and

Shafaii Investments, and $21,000 in treble damages for the DPTA violation.

The jury also awarded Rivera and Angelino attorney’s fees for trial and

conditional attorney’s fees for appellate proceedings. The trial court issued a

permanent injunction restraining appellants from foreclosing on Rivera’s property

for any default occurring before June 2, 2021, and from falsely accusing Rivera of

12
fraud or any other crime in connection with the 2017 insurance check for $28,770.09.

This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellants do not contest liability. Instead, they argue that the

evidence is insufficient to support the awards for repair damages, mental anguish,

and attorney’s fees. We address each in turn.

Standard of Review

When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an

adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, the party must

demonstrate that no evidence supports the finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v.

Peña, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). In determining whether the

evidence is legally sufficient to support the challenged finding, we review the

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168

S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex. 2005). We must credit favorable evidence if a reasonable

factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could

not. Id. Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the

challenged finding. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors,

Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998).

When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to a

finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, we may set aside the finding

only if, after considering all the evidence, it is so contrary to the overwhelming

13
weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d

175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam); Shepherd v. MWS Acquisitions, LLC, No. 01-22-

00293-CV, 2023 WL 2576451, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2023,

no pet.) (mem. op.). The amount of evidence necessary to affirm a judgment is far

less than the amount necessary to reverse. Harris Cnty v. Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359,

381 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). When conducting a factual

sufficiency review, a court of appeals must not merely substitute its judgment for

that of the factfinder. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 166 S.W.3d 757, 761

(Tex. 2003).

We apply these standards mindful that the jury is the sole judge of witness

credibility and the weight afforded witness testimony, and the jury may choose to

believe one witness and to disbelieve another. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819;

Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761.

Remedial Damages

Appellants contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the jury’s award of repair or remedial damages to Rivera and Angelino.

Specifically, appellants argue that the evidence was insufficient because neither

townhouse owner proved that the repairs were necessary and reasonable and because

the jury’s awards have no basis in the record. Appellants argue that expert testimony

is required to establish that repairs are necessary and reasonable, and that each

14
appellee’s lay testimony lacked foundation and was conclusory. Appellants also

argue that the court erred in admitting Angelino’s and Rivera’s testimony concerning

the estimates they obtained from contractors and the written construction agreements

for the repairs because the testimony and contracts are hearsay.

We hold that appellants did not preserve their complaint that the trial court

erroneously admitted testimony of estimates from contractors and that any error in

the admission of the written construction agreements was harmless. We further hold

that expert testimony was not required and that the evidence was legally and

factually sufficient to prove that the repairs were necessary and the costs reasonable.

A. Applicable Law

“A party seeking to recover remedial damages [such as costs of repair] must

prove that the damages sought are reasonable and necessary.” McGinty v. Hennen,

372 S.W.3d 625, 627 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Mustang Pipeline Co. v.

Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 200 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)). “The plaintiff

need not use magic words such as ‘reasonable’ or ‘necessary,’ but is only required

to present sufficient evidence to support a finding that . . . the costs were reasonable

and the repairs were necessary.” CCC Grp., Inc. v. S. Cent. Cement, Ltd., 450 S.W.3d

191, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.). “To establish that, the

plaintiff must show more than simply ‘the nature of the injuries, the character of and

need for the services rendered, and the amounts charged therefor.’” McGinty, 372

15
S.W.3d at 627 (quoting Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Gossett, 294 S.W.2d 377, 383

(1956)). In other words, the plaintiff needs more than a list of itemized costs—the

plaintiff needs to offer evidence of why these costs are reasonable. See id.

“[M]ere proof of amounts charged or paid does not raise an issue of

reasonableness and such amounts ordinarily cannot be recovered without evidence

showing the charges were reasonable.” Fort Worth Hotel Ltd. P’Ship v. Enserch

Corp., 977 S.W.2d 746, 762–63 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.) (concluding

hotel owner’s evidence failed to justify jury’s finding that hotel repair costs after

explosion were reasonable and repairs necessary). “[E]xpert testimony about

estimates for repairs, testimony of the person making the estimates or performing

the repairs, or approval of the repairs by a third party,” however “has been held

sufficient to support an award of damages based on the cost of repairs.” City of Alton

v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp., 402 S.W.3d 867, 876 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-

Edinburg 2013, pet. denied).

B. Admission of Evidence

We first consider appellants’ evidentiary arguments. Appellants argue that the

trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence because it was hearsay.

The admission and exclusion of evidence is committed to the trial court’s sound

discretion. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 132 (Tex. 2012). The test

for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any

16
guiding rules and principles. Id. Even if the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting certain evidence, reversal is appropriate only if the error was harmful, that

is, it probably resulted in an improper judgment. Id. (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1).

We first address Rivera’s and Angelino’s testimony concerning the estimates,

then we address the contracts. Appellants argue that the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting testimony from each homeowner as to verbal estimates each

received from various contractors because the verbal estimates are hearsay.

Angelino and Rivera contend that the objection was not preserved for our review.

We agree.

1. Rivera’s estimates

When Rivera was asked to describe how she selected a contractor, she

responded that she first called contractors to ask how much they would charge to

repair flood damages to her townhouse, noting there was damage to the walls,

cabinets, and living room. She testified, “[T]he first [contractor] told me that he was

going to charge me $75,000. Then the next one told me they were going to charge

me $35,000. Then somebody, somebody who worked at the property told me they

were going to charge me $30,000. Then I spoke to a gentleman called Ernesto

Martinez, who told me that he was going to . . .” At that point, appellants’ counsel

interjected to lodge a hearsay objection and moved to strike Rivera’s testimony as

17
to what people told her. The court sustained the objection but did not instruct the

jury to disregard the objectional evidence.

“To preserve error after inadmissible evidence is allowed before the jury, a

party must sequentially pursue an adverse ruling from the trial court by: (1) objecting

to the complained-of evidence, (2) moving the court to strike the evidence from the

record, (3) requesting the court to instruct the jury to disregard the evidence, and

(4) moving for a mistrial. Absent an adverse ruling from the trial court, nothing is

preserved for appellate review.” One Call Sys., Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power,

936 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied)

(emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1. While the

trial court sustained Shafaii’s objection, Shafaii did not request an instruction from

the court instructing the jury to disregard the evidence. The issue was thus not

preserved for our review. 3

2. Angelino’s estimates

Before Angelino testified, the lawyers approached the bench to discuss

evidentiary issues related to Angelino’s testimony. Appellants’ lawyer told the court

3
Rivera went on to testify that she received oral estimates from Ramirez, Rojas, and
an unnamed third contractor before agreeing to the price quoted by Martinez.
Appellants lodged hearsay objections to testimony concerning the estimates offered
individually by Ramirez and Rojas. Even assuming the admission of this testimony
was erroneous, it would be harmless because substantially similar testimony was
already in the record before the jury. Further, appellants did not object when Rivera
testified that the third unnamed contractor estimated $30,000 to replace the first
floor.
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that he understood Angelino would testify that (1) she obtained verbal bids from a

few contractors and a signed bid, (2) Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36 reflected payments she

made for repairs, and (3) she kept a copy of the payments as a record of regularly

conducted activity. Appellants’ counsel stated:

We object to foundation, that [Angelino is] not an expert, and [she] does
not have the qualifications to . . . state that these are reasonable and
necessary charges. And it’s also not a record of regularly conducted
activity such to qualify under the hearsay rule. And it’s hearsay within
hearsay. So we object for all those bases.

The court overruled the objection and Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36 was admitted.

Moments later, Angelino testified without objection that she obtained three

bids to repair her townhouse following Hurricane Harvey. She stated:

The first person that I met told me that he would charge me $35,000.
The second person that I talked to, he told me that he could, that he
would be able to charge me $30,000. And the third person charged me
$25,000. And that’s the bid that I chose because loans for construction
and for homes are very expensive.

Angelino also explained what repair work these contractors’ estimates encompassed.

Appellants did not object to this testimony.

While the proffer appellants made before Angelino testified mentioned both

the estimates from other contractors and the contract for the eventual repairs

(Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36), appellants’ actual objections were that (1) Angelino’s

expected testimony about the necessity and reasonableness of the repairs would lack

foundation because she is not an expert; and (2) Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36 was hearsay

19
within hearsay and not a record of regularly conducted business. Appellants did not

object to other testimony as hearsay. The court overruled the stated objection and

admitted Plaintiff’s Exhibit 36. Appellants did not later obtain a ruling when

Angelino testified about the other estimates. Appellants also did not object when

Angelino testified about the amounts offered by various contractors, and thus,

appellants did not notify the trial court that they were objecting to that specific

testimony on hearsay grounds. We agree with Angelino that by failing to object in

the trial court during her testimony, appellants did not preserve this complaint for

our review. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). The testimony from Angelino about the range

of estimates she received was admitted into evidence, and the jury was entitled to

consider it for all purposes.

3. Contracts and receipts

Appellants also argue that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

repair contracts from the contractors Rivera and Angelino chose and the receipts for

payment to each contractor because they were hearsay.

Appellants assert that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the

contracts because they are handwritten statements, opining what repair work was

necessary, that were offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See TEX. R. EVID.

801(d). Appellants also argue that the payment receipts do not meet the business

records exception to hearsay because neither Rivera nor Angelino had a regular

20
practice of keeping receipts for home renovations after a flood. Rivera and Angelino

respond that the payment receipts are admissible to prove operative facts of what

Rivera and Angelino actually paid for repairs. They argue that the signed agreements

with their respective contractors are not hearsay—they are evidence of offer,

acceptance, and the terms of the contract. Rivera and Angelino contend that even if

the written contracts were hearsay, they were properly admitted under the business

record exception to hearsay because both women testified to their customary practice

of saving all receipts and documents related to expenses for their homes.

We need not resolve this issue because, even if the contracts and payment

receipts were improperly admitted, such error was harmless. Rivera and Angelino

testified about the scope of damages to their homes, the repair work the contractors

performed, and the amounts paid to the contractors. Even though the contracts

provided more specific itemizations of the work performed, given Rivera’s and

Angelino’s testimony regarding the repairs and payments, we cannot conclude that

admission of the documents probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.

See JLG Trucking, LLC v. Garza, 466 S.W.3d 157, 165 (Tex. 2015) (citing TEX. R.

APP. P. 44.1(a)).

C. Expert Testimony

Appellants next argue that the evidence supporting repair damages is

insufficient because the necessity of performing major flood-related repairs and the

21
reasonableness of such repairs are matters of specialized and technical nature

requiring expert testimony. We disagree.

Although expert testimony is one way to establish the reasonableness and

necessity of repairs, expert testimony is required only when an issue involves matters

beyond jurors’ common understanding. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d

572, 583 (Tex. 2006). Whether expert testimony is necessary to prove a matter or

theory is a question of law we review de novo. Id. The Texas Supreme Court has

held that the “subject of house repairs” is not “one for experts or skilled witnesses

alone.” McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986) (stating trier of

fact has discretion to evaluate opinion testimony on damages and upholding trier of

fact awarding less damages than indicated by evidence).4

4
See also Hands of Healing Residential Treatment Ctr., Inc. v. Havenar, No. 01-13-
01064-CV 2015 WL 4760211, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 13, 2015,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding tenant’s testimony regarding repairs, photographs of
repairs, and insurance adjuster’s testimony of extent of damage was enough lay
testimony to establish tenant breached lease by failing to make necessary repairs);
U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lynd Co., 399 S.W.3d 206, 217 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012,
pet. denied) (noting scope of property damage may constitute matter of “personal
observation and common sense” within scope of lay testimony). But see Pjectrovic
v. Home Depot, 411 S.W.3d 639, 649 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.)
(holding homeowner could not give lay opinion testimony concerning necessity and
reasonableness of whole house renovation); Wortham Bros., Inc. v. Haffner, 347
S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2011, no pet.) (holding necessity and
reasonableness of roof repair required expert testimony).

22
No bright-line rule requires that expert testimony must support every award

of remedial damages for home repairs.5 In relation to causation evidence in insurance

coverage cases, for example, the Texas Supreme Court has considered lay testimony

sufficient to support a finding of a causal relationship between a natural disaster and

property damage.6 In this case, where there was no dispute as to causation, the jury

could ascertain from lay testimony, as a matter of personal observation and common

sense, that a flood created the need for the home repairs. Similarly, there is nothing

in the record to indicate that the cost associated with repairing the flood-damaged

5
See Stevens v. Avent, No. 07-20-00265-CV 2022 WL 393576 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
Feb. 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (declining to establish a “bright-line rule that
expert testimony is required to support award of remedial damages” and concluding
that non-expert testimony and exhibits were sufficient to support award that home
repair costs were necessary and reasonable); Seasha Pools, Inc. v. Hardister, 391
S.W.3d 635, 641 n.8 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (concluding expert
testimony not required to establish cost to repair plaintiff’s pool because “[t]here is
nothing in the record to indicate that the cost associated with replastering a pool is
so technical or complex that it required expert testimony”); accord Pools Unlimited,
Inc. v. Houchens, No. 03-21-00046-CV, 2022 WL 16824340, at *9 (Tex. App.—
Austin Nov. 9, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding reasonableness of pool repairs
not so specialized or technical to require expert testimony).
6
See Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 866 S.W.2d 597, 598, 600–01 (Tex. 1993)
(lay testimony from property owner and neighbors that brick veneer and outside
staircase of home were undamaged before but visibly damaged after windstorm,
along with engineer’s opinion that windstorm caused damage, supported jury’s
finding that property damage was caused in part by wind and therefore covered by
insurance); U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morgan, 399 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. 1966)
(lay testimony that warehouse was destroyed by wind before rising water was
sufficient to support jury finding that property was damaged by wind, a covered
event, rather than high water, an excluded event, under insurance policy).

23
townhouses was so technical or complex as to require expert testimony.7 Under the

facts of this case, expert testimony was not required to establish necessity and

reasonableness of remedial damages.

D. Lay Testimony

Although lay testimony could establish reasonableness and necessity, we now

evaluate whether it did. We turn to whether the lay testimony offered at trial was

sufficient for the factfinder to conclude that remedial damages were necessary and

reasonable.

1. Necessity of Repairs

As to the necessity of repairs, Rivera testified that her townhouse took on two

or three feet of water during the 2015 flood. She stated that the damage required

installation of new sheetrock, replacing the front door and interior doors and lower

kitchen cabinets, as well as replacing the undamaged upper kitchen cabinets so that

her upper and lower cabinets would match.

Appellants did not dispute the necessity of the repairs. Shafaii testified that

Rivera “probably got flooded” in 2015 and that if her house took on a foot of water,

Rivera would need to repair it. He admitted that if the townhouse took on a foot of

7
Compare U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 399 S.W.3d at 217 (stating whether hail fell on specific
day at particular location and caused damage is not matter solely within scope of
expert’s knowledge), with Wortham Bros., Inc., 347 S.W.3d at 361 (necessity and
reasonableness of roof repairs required expert testimony).
24
water, sheetrock, insulation, bottom cabinets, and baseboards would need to be

replaced. The jury viewed photographs of Rivera’s townhouse showing the damage

after the 2015 flood.

As to Angelino, appellants likewise admitted the necessity of repairs. Shafaii

testified that everyone “including Angelino and [Rivera]” flooded during the

hurricane. Angelino testified that four feet of water, up to her shoulders, came into

the house. She left with her children to sleep in a park for a few days, then went to a

shelter for three weeks while waiting for the waters to recede. When she returned to

her townhouse, all her furniture and belongings on the first floor were damaged. The

jury viewed photographs of flooding in the complex showing water rising almost a

first-story high, people in kayaks in the parking lot, and individuals wading through

waist-to-shoulder-deep water.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude

that more than a scintilla of evidence existed to support the jury’s findings that

repairs to each townhouse were necessary. Appellants presented no conflicting

evidence, and this finding was not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the

evidence to be unjust and wrong. The evidence was legally and factually sufficient

to support the jury’s finding that the repairs to each townhouse were necessary.

25
2. Reasonableness of Repair Costs

We next turn to whether the evidence was sufficient to support the

reasonableness of the costs to repair each townhouse. The jury was asked to

determine the “reasonable and necessary cost to repair or replace [Rivera]’s real

property following the 2015 flood” and the “reasonable and necessary cost to repair

or replace Angelino’s real property following the 2017 flood.” Under our standard

of review, if the record contains more than a scintilla of evidence showing that

remedial damages of $14,000 to Rivera and $20,000 to Angelino were reasonable

amounts, then the evidence is legally sufficient to support a determination that those

amounts are reasonable. If that determination is not so contrary to the weight of the

evidence as to be unjust, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the awards.

Appellants assert that each townhouse owner testified as to what she paid for

repairs and that mere cost of repairs is insufficient to establish reasonableness.

Evidence of amounts charged or paid, by itself, is not legally sufficient evidence to

prove reasonableness; instead, separate evidence must be offered to show the

reasonableness of expenses or costs. See Mustang Pipeline, 134 S.W.3d at 200–01

(holding expert who estimated cost to build new pipeline did not establish

reasonableness of charges); Gossett, 294 S.W.2d at 382–83. But the Supreme Court

has concluded that in some cases, the process of determining repair costs “will reveal

26
factors that were considered to ensure reasonableness of the ultimate price.”

McGinty, 372 S.W.3d at 627.

We examine whether each townhouse owner considered such additional

“factors” to ensure the reasonableness of the ultimate price paid. Id. at 628. In

McGinty and Mustang Pipeline, each expert testified to a single estimated number

for the cost of repairs. See McGinty, 372 S.W.3d at 629; see also Mustang Pipeline,

134 S.W.3d at 201. Here, Rivera and Angelino did more than offer proof of just the

cost of repairs they incurred; they each testified to the multiple estimates they

received from various contractors, the process by which they selected a contractor,

and how they determined that the contractor’s pricing, and thus, the cost of repairs

under the circumstances, was reasonable.

Rivera testified that she first obtained estimates from three separate

contractors ranging between $30,000 and $75,000 to repair her flood-damaged

townhouse. She specifically asked each contractor how much he would charge to

repair the damage caused to her house by the flood. She did not hire any of the

contractors who provided those estimates because she thought their pricing was too

high. Rivera ultimately hired Erasco Martinez—the fourth contractor to whom she

spoke. Martinez is a customer at Rivera’s taco stand who did repair and construction

work on other townhouses in Rivera’s neighborhood. Martinez showed Rivera

photographs of properties he had repaired, and he quoted her $18,000 to repair her

27
townhouse—an amount much lower than the other quotes she received. Rivera

believed his price was fair and reasonable for the scope of the work. She needed her

home repaired promptly for the safety of her children, so she paid Martinez $18,000.

Angelino similarly testified that she received quotes from three separate

contractors to repair her townhouse following Hurricane Harvey. The quotes ranged

between $25,000 and $35,000, and Angelino explained the scope of repair work

covered by the quotes. Each of the three contractors who provided the quote had

repaired other townhouses in the community. Angelino thought the quotes were

high, but she also knew demand was high after the hurricane. She ultimately talked

to Ruben Castillo, who had done work in the community. Angelino saw his work in

a neighboring townhouse and thought it was good. She hired him and agreed to pay

him $25,000 for the work, including materials. Angelino testified that she needed

her townhouse repaired promptly so that her children had shelter, and Castillo told

her he could start right away. She thought what Castillo charged was fair and

reasonable under the circumstances.

Appellants focus on the fact that each homeowner testified that she did not

know much about construction or how to fix houses. Specifically, when asked if she

knew the individual line-item cost of any aspect of the repairs to her townhouse,

Rivera responded that she relied on her contractor because she is not a contractor

and does not fix houses. Similarly, Angelino testified that she “does not know about

28
construction” when asked if the prices charged by Castillo were fair. She then

clarified that considering what the other contractors were charging, and the fact that

Castillo was covering the cost of materials, she thought the price he charged was

reasonable. Appellants argue that because each homeowner testified that she was

unfamiliar with construction pricing, the evidence is insufficient to support that the

repair costs were reasonable. In Gerhart, our court held that a plaintiff’s testimony,

including reliance on multiple estimates for each repair job, was sufficient to award

reasonable repair costs. Great Am. Homebuilders Inc. v. Gerhart, 708 S.W.2d 8, 12

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (holding sufficient evidence

that repair costs were reasonable when plaintiff-appellee testified that she obtained

multiple estimates for each of three repair jobs and used same plumber that

appellants used to install hot water heater); see also Demiraj v. Martinez, No. 01-

23-00493-CV, 2025 WL 626430, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 27,

2025, no pet.), modified and supplemented by No. 01-23-00493-CV, 2025 WL

863775 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 20, 2025) (mem. op.) (evidence that

contractor charged amount consistent with multiple other contractors’ estimates to

complete repair job and that amount was in line with cost of work not completed by

initial contractor was more than scintilla of evidence to demonstrate amount paid

was reasonable). Similarly, in Gupta, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that

evidence of repair damages was reasonable when the plaintiff “presented receipts

29
displaying the cost of the repair materials,” “met with various contractors,”

“determined what a reasonable cost would be to repair their building,” and “enlisted

the help of both the contractor and handyman to complete the repairs.” Gupta v.

Manwani, No. 04-03-00152-CV, 2004 WL 2097514, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio

Sept. 22, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) In Gupta, as here, neither the contractor nor

handyman testified at trial. Id. The court of appeals nonetheless determined that the

plaintiff’s “testimony about his reliance on the contractor’s advice about repair work

[was] enough to establish that he was knowledgeable about the costs of repairs.” Id.;

see also SAS & Assocs., Inc. v. Home Mktg. Servicing, Inc., 168 S.W.3d 296, 302

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (holding trial court did not err in admitting

lay witness testimony on value of property and costs of repair from witness who

testified that he investigated costs and obtained bids).

We similarly conclude that Angelino’s and Rivera’s testimony was sufficient

to establish the reasonableness of the repairs to their townhouses. Their testimony

established the process they undertook to select the contractors and that they each

considered additional “factors” to establish the reasonableness of the costs incurred.

McGinty, 372 S.W.3d at 627. Both women testified to the multiple bids they received

and the process by which they selected the contractor that they ultimately selected.

Both were cognizant of the increased demand for contracting work following each

flood and the impact that demand had on pricing. Each researched the contractor she

30
ultimately hired by either seeing other jobs he worked on or reviewing photographs

of past remodeling jobs. They both selected the lowest quote and presented

documentary and testimonial evidence of the price paid. Appellants offered no

contradicting evidence.

To the extent appellants argue that the jury’s remedial damages awards have

no basis in the record or that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to segregate

the cost of repairing the flood damage to Rivera’s townhouse from the cost of

performing renovation work unrelated to the flooding, we disagree. Rivera testified

that Martinez said he could repair the flood damage for $18,000. Rivera’s contractor

also gave her an invoice for $18,000 to repair her townhouse. As Rivera testified,

the invoice included a list of tasks the contractor would perform. The list included

work unrelated to the flooding, such as painting the townhouse, fixing the roof and

ceiling, building a pantry, and installing a concrete patio. On cross-examination,

Rivera testified that she did not know the cost of any line-item on the invoice. On

re-direct, she testified that she paid Martinez $4,000 for extra work, for a total of

$22,000, but that she was only seeking recovery for $18,000. In light of all the

evidence, including evidence that other contractors quoted Rivera $75,000, $35,000,

and $30,000 to repair the flood damage to her townhouse, we conclude there was

some evidence to allow the jury to conclude that the reasonable cost of repairs for

the flood damage to Rivera’s townhouse was $14,000. The jury could determine the

31
weight and credibility to give Rivera’s testimony. We must defer to the jury’s

determinations. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819.

As to the amounts the jury awarded overall, the evidence is legally and

factually sufficient to support the jury’s $14,000 award for Rivera and $20,000

award for Angelino. “Damages must be established with reasonable certainty, not

mathematical precision.” O & B Farms, Inc. v. Black, 300 S.W.3d 418, 422 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied). A jury has broad discretion to award

damages within the range of evidence presented at trial. CCC Grp., Inc., 450 S.W.3d

at 200. “Evidence corresponding to the exact amount found by the trier of fact is not

essential.” Id. (quoting Powell Elect. Sys., Inc. v. Hewlett Packard Co., 356 S.W.3d

113, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.)).

As we are limited in our analysis by the standard of review, we conclude that

there is more than a scintilla of evidence for the factfinder to conclude that the

remedial damages awarded to Rivera and Angelino were reasonable and necessary

and that conclusion is not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

We overrule appellants’ issues related to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the remedial damages awards.

Economic Loss Rule

Appellants contend that the economic loss rule bars Angelino and Rivera from

recovering mental anguish damages and treble damages. We disagree.

32
Angelino and Rivera elected to recover under the DTPA. The jury found that

Shafaii Investments and Raj Shafaii engaged in unconscionable actions, taking

advantage to a grossly unfair degree of Rivera’s and Angelino’s lack of knowledge,

ability, experience, or capacity as consumers. The jury also found that Shafaii

Investments and Raj Shafaii engaged in false, misleading, or deceptive practices—

including “[f]ailing to disclose information about an agreement that was known at

the time of the transaction with the intention to induce [Rivera and Angelino] into a

transaction.” The jury further found that the appellants did so knowingly.

For DTPA violations, the appellees could recover economic and mental

anguish damages, attorney’s fees, and up to three times their economic damages. See

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.50(b)(1) (for acts committed knowingly, consumer

may recover additional damages up to three times economic damages). Appellants

allege that the economic loss rule precludes recovery of mental anguish damages

because Rivera’s and Angelino’s losses resulted from a breach of contract. See

Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1991) (holding mental

anguish and exemplary damages unavailable for breach of contract). “An allegation

of a mere breach of contract, without more, does not constitute a ‘false, misleading

or deceptive act’ in violation of the DTPA.” Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa,

212 S.W.3d 299, 304 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Ashford Dev., Inc. v. USLife Real Estate

Serv. Corp., 661 S.W.2d 933, 935 (Tex. 1983) (citations omitted)).

33
We disagree that the economic loss rule precludes recovery here. The jury

found more than a mere breach of contract. The jury found that Shafaii Investments

or Raj Shafaii engaged in false, misleading or deceptive acts that Rivera and

Angelino “relied on to their detriment and that was a producing cause of damages.”

The charge defined “false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice” as specific

unlawful acts found in the DTPA laundry list. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE

§ 17.46(b)(12), (24). Appellants do not challenge these liability findings on appeal.

Rivera and Angelino alleged and the evidence established that despite

receiving payment from them for insurance, appellants failed to secure insurance for

the townhouses and that appellees suffered damages as a result. Rivera and Angelino

argued, and the jury found, that appellants never had any intention of providing

insurance; that appellants induced appellees to purchase the townhomes and pay

monthly for insurance either by representing that they would have insurance or by

failing to disclose that there was no insurance. These are false, misleading, or

deceptive acts within the scope of the DTPA that are not contractual in nature. The

economic loss rule therefore does not preclude recovery or bar appellees from

recovering mental anguish damages under the DTPA. See Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 306

(stating that procuring contract by fraud is more than simple contract dispute and

holding “[b]ecause Chapa proved more than mere breach of contract here, we hold

she was entitled to assert fraud and DTPA claims as well.”).

34
Having held that the economic loss rule does not preclude Angelino’s and

Rivera’s recovery under the DTPA, we necessarily overrule appellants’ argument

that appellees could not recover treble damages under the DTPA. See TEX. BUS. &

COM. CODE § 17.50(b)(1) (allowing up to three times economic damages for DTPA

violations committed knowingly).

We overrule appellants’ issues related to the economic loss rule and the

appellees’ DTPA claims.

Mental Anguish Damages

Appellants next assert that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to

support the award of mental anguish damages.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Earlier in the opinion, we have outlined the standards for reviewing the legal

and factual sufficiency of the evidence. Mental anguish awards require evidence of

both the existence of compensable mental anguish and the amount of damages

awarded. Team Indus. Servs. Inc. v. Most, 711 S.W.3d 31, 57 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] May 16, 2024, no pet.) (citing Gregory v. Chohan, 670 S.W.3d 546, 555

(Tex. 2023) (plurality op.)).

“As a type of compensatory damages, noneconomic damages’ purpose is to

make the plaintiff whole for any losses caused by the defendant’s interferences with

the plaintiff’s rights by placing the plaintiff in the position that she would have been

35
absent the defendant’s tortious conduct.” Team Indus. Servs., 711 S.W.3d at 57.

Mental anguish is a “relatively high degree of mental pain and distress” that is “more

than mere disappointment, anger, resentment, or embarrassment, although it may

include all of these.” Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995).

Mental anguish includes the mental sensation of pain resulting from such emotions

as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair, and

public humiliation, and recovery is warranted when the plaintiff’s mental pain has

risen to such a level that it has rendered her incapable of dealing with certain

everyday activities like eating, sleeping, working, and socially interacting. Katy

Springs & Mfg., Inc. v. Favalora, 476 S.W.3d 579, 595 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2015, pet. denied). There are no magic words to establish mental anguish. Id.

“[A]n award of mental anguish damages will survive a legal sufficiency

challenge when the plaintiff introduces direct evidence of the nature, duration, and

severity of his mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the

plaintiff’s daily routine.” Id.; see also Serv. Corp. Int’l v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221,

231 (Tex. 2011) (stating that when occurrence is of type for which mental anguish

damages are recoverable, “evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of the

mental anguish is required”). When a claimant fails to present direct evidence of the

nature, duration, or severity of mental anguish, courts apply a traditional no-evidence

standard of review to determine whether the record reveals any evidence of “a high

36
degree of mental pain and distress” that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,

embarrassment, or anger, to support any award of damages. Parkway Co., 901

S.W.2d at 444.

B. Analysis

We review whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support

the existence of compensable mental anguish and the amount of mental anguish

damages awarded.

1. Angelino’s Mental Anguish Award

Angelino, a single mother of three young children, testified that she purchased

her townhouse with money she earned working at a car wash. She earned $10,000-

$12,000 annually. Shafaii told her she had to pay him $80 each month for insurance

because he had “insurance on the whole property that covered all the houses on the

property.” He told her that insurance would cover her “in case of fire, in case of

flood . . . .” Angelino made monthly payments to appellants for insurance, believing

that should something happen to her townhouse, she would have insurance coverage.

Angelino’s townhouse took on about four feet of water during Hurricane

Harvey, and she had to evacuate with her young children. Her townhome suffered

“a lot of damage” and all of her “furniture and belongings on the first floor [were]

destroyed.” When she evacuated her townhouse, Angelino believed insurance would

37
pay to repair her damaged home. Instead, Shafaii told her “there was no insurance”

and he threatened her with jail if she did not pay to repair the townhome.

Angelino testified that when she first returned to her home, Shafaii “tried to

take [her] house away from [her].” He later entered her home without permission

with some men who took pictures of her home and belongings. Shafaii told her they

were “from the insurance company” and that he was going to “take care of it,” but

he never did.8 Shafaii told her “there was no insurance,” that “it was [her] house,”

and “it was [her] problem.” He then threatened her with jail if she did not make the

repairs: “[I]f you don’t fix it, I’m going to throw you in jail, and you’re going to pay

for the price of the house, penny after penny, because we have a contract and your

signature is on that piece of paper.” Angelino testified that the combination of

Shafaii’s failure to get insurance for her townhouse, being threatened with

incarceration, having to pay Shafaii, and the stress of litigation with appellants left

her unwell, and she could not sleep or eat. She testified that she usually eats “a lot,”

but she was unable to do so because she was “under so much stress.” After she

discovered there was no insurance coverage for her townhouse, she felt she had

8
Angelino testified that Shafaii told her sister, who unlike Angelino could speak
some English, that the strangers in Angelino’s house were from insurance and that
they were going to cover all of Angelino’s damages.

38
failed her children because they had no home, and she did not “have any place to

take them.”

She also testified that during the litigation, she learned that Shafaii had

recorded the closing of her townhouse.9 During the closing, she went to the restroom

and she “does not know what [Shafaii] did when [she] was in the restroom.” She

does not “know if he recorded her when [she] was in the restroom” and that is

“something that’s been on [her] mind all this time.” This added to her worry and

inability to sleep.

Appellants argue that the evidence is legally insufficient because Angelino

testified that she suffered mental anguish based on other events, such as fleeing her

home during Hurricane Harvey or Shafaii recording her at the closing. When

reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we “view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could,

and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of

Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807. We determine whether the evidence at trial would enable

reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review. Id. at 824. The

jury may decide the weight and credibility of the evidence and may credit all or part

of any witness’s testimony. Id. at 819; Golden Eagle Archery, 116 S.W.3d at 761.

9
Shafaii recorded ten minutes of the closing when he and Angelino discussed
insurance. On cross-examination, he had no explanation for why he only had this
part of the meeting recorded and not the entire meeting.
39
Unless the record demonstrates otherwise, we must presume the jury followed the

instructions given. Golden Eagle Archer, 116 S.W.3d at 771.

Evidence that Angelino suffered mental anguish based on other sources does

not negate Angelino’s evidence that she suffered mental anguish based on

appellants’ actions; it merely raises a fact issue that the jury resolved in Angelino’s

favor. See Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 179 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2016, no pet.) (holding testimony that plaintiff engaged in day-to-day activities does

not negate plaintiff’s evidence of substantial disruption to her routine, it merely

creates fact issue the jury resolved in plaintiff’s favor). Although Angelino testified

that she suffered mental anguish based on some events unrelated to appellants’

actions, we do not rely on that testimony in upholding the jury’s verdict for mental

anguish damages.

Angelino’s testimony established that she suffered a high degree of mental

pain and distress because of Shafaii’s actions in threatening her with incarceration

and failing to procure insurance for her property. Angelino had an annual salary of

$10,000 to $12,000, and she had three minor children. She and her children were

displaced from her home and could not return until the house was repaired. To afford

the $25,000 repairs, which was more than one-third of her home’s value, Angelino

had to exhaust her savings and secure a family loan. She testified in May 2021, four

years after the flood damage, that her sleep remained disrupted, and she could not

40
eat. This constitutes some evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of

Angelino’s mental anguish sufficient to survive a legal sufficiency challenge. See

e.g. Anderson v. Durant, 550 S.W.3d 605, 620 (Tex. 2018) (evidence that plaintiff’s

familial relationships were impacted, his demeanor changed, he was unable to sleep,

and he was treated for anxiety and depression was some evidence he suffered

compensable mental anguish). Considering the evidence presented and the

reasonable inferences therefrom, the jury could reasonably conclude that in addition

to incurring economic damages to repair the flood damage, Angelino suffered mental

anguish caused by appellants due to the strain of dealing with repairing her

townhouse without insurance and the threats of incarceration. City of Keller, 168

S.W.3d at 821 (reviewing courts assume jurors made all inferences in favor of

verdict if reasonable minds could and disregard all other inferences).10

We conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to support the existence of

Angelino’s mental anguish stemming from appellants’ actions. See Formosa

10
See Kelly Custom Homes, LLC v. Hopper, No. 14-23-00793, 2024 WL 3765393, at
*7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(holding there was legally and factually sufficient evidence to support mental
anguish damages based on evidence plaintiffs had “burned through” their savings,
had to take time away from their jobs and kids, felt stress, anxiety, helplessness, and
anger, and had “dark cloud” hanging over them as a result of their neighbor building
a ditch that diverted water onto their property); Vermillion v. Vermillion, No. 07-
20-00111-CV, 2022 WL 4799019, at *7 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 30, 2022 no.
pet.) (mem. op.) (upholding legal sufficiency of mental anguish damages and noting
trial court observed witnesses’s demeanor and body language and “the raw emotion
as events were re-lived” and declining to substitute judgment for that of the trial
court).
41
Plastics, 960 S.W.2d at 48 (explaining that anything more than a scintilla of evidence

is legally sufficient to support the challenged finding).

Further, after reviewing all the evidence relevant to mental anguish, we hold

that the credible evidence supporting the finding is not so weak or so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of all the evidence that the finding should be set aside and a

new trial ordered. The jury’s finding that Angelino suffered mental anguish is not

clearly unjust or wrong. We thus hold there is factually sufficient evidence to that

Angelino suffered compensable mental anguish because of appellants’ actions.

To support an award of mental anguish, the evidence must also justify the

amount awarded. Appellants argue that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the amount of damages because “the jury essentially picked a

random number out of a hat.” App. Br. at 38. Although the impossibility of any exact

valuation requires that juries be given a measure of discretion in finding damages,

that discretion is limited. Saenz v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d

607, 614 (Tex. 1996). A jury must find an amount that would fairly and reasonably

compensate for the loss; however, juries cannot simply “pick a number and put it in

the blank.” Id. The jury has latitude in determining the award, but it must award an

amount that a reasonable person could possibly estimate as fair compensation.

Anderson, 550 S.W.3d at 618.

42
The jury awarded Angelino $20,000 in past mental anguish damages caused

by Shafaii Investments and $19,500 in past mental anguish damages caused by Raj

Shafaii. We conclude, based on the same evidence we have already detailed above,

that this award is reasonably supported by the evidence. The jury heard testimony

that Angelino makes $10,000 to $12,000 annually, that she is a single mother who

supported three minor children, that she bought her townhome for $65,000, that she

had to pay $25,000 in repair costs she expected insurance would cover, and that she

exhausted her savings and had to secure a family loan to cover the cost of the repairs.

Based on this evidence, we cannot say that the jury simply “pick[ed] a number and

put it in the blank.” Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614. The amount awarded is not

unreasonable considering other compensatory damage awards. See Kelly Custom

Homes, LLC v. Hopper, No. 14-23-00793, 2024 WL 3765393, at *9 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (upholding $150,000 in

mental anguish damages for damage to real property, despite award being $50,000

higher than counsel requested during closing); MBR & Assocs. Inc. v, Lile, 2012 WL

4661665, at *12–13, (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 4, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.)

(affirming $250,000 mental anguish award for damage to plaintiff’s home

foundation that made house uninhabitable).

We conclude that the amount awarded is reasonably supported by the

evidence described above, given the nature, duration, and severity of Angelino’s

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mental anguish. The jury could have concluded that the mental anguish damages

adequately compensated Angelino for the distress she suffered over four years.

Further, we hold that the credible evidence supporting the damages amount is not so

weak or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence that the finding

should be set aside and a new trial ordered. Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L. P. v.

Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016).

We hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the

mental anguish damages awarded to Angelino.

We overrule appellants’ issue related to mental anguish damages awarded

Angelino.

2. Rivera’s Mental Anguish

Turning to Rivera’s mental anguish damages, Rivera testified that she was

“irreparably” affected by her interactions with Shafaii, specifically related to her

being falsely accused of a crime and threatened with foreclosure in manner

prohibited by law. Rivera stated that, following Shafaii’s actions, she was “very

afraid” that he would press charges or call the police after she received Kouts’s letter

falsely accusing her of forging or illegally cashing the insurance check. She said that

her children cried because they saw her sad, stressed, and worried. In addition to

losing sleep, she testified that she became depressed and overwhelmed with anxiety,

so much so that she suffered migraines. She had panic attacks and was prescribed

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medication and anticipated further treatment for anxiety and depression. Rivera

testified that she is “very afraid” that Shafaii will “come after” her because she filed

suit against him. She testified that she worries Shafaii will retaliate and hurt her

children. The day after she gave a deposition in the case, she called an ambulance

because she was so stressed she could not breathe. Rivera testified that she has not

been able to obtain the psychological treatment she needs because she had to pay a

$4,500 bond to prevent appellants from foreclosing on her home.

Rivera’s testimony is legally sufficient to establish the nature, severity, and

duration of her mental anguish caused by appellants. See Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at

444. Rivera testified that the ordeal with appellants caused substantial disruption to

her life and her relationship with her children. She described loss of sleep, and

receiving treatment for anxiety and depression. Rivera testified that she was afraid

of continued interactions with Shafaii during the duration of her loan. The evidence

is also factually sufficient to support the existence of mental anguish caused by

appellants. We cannot say we that the credible evidence supporting the finding is so

weak or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence that the finding

should be set aside and a new trial ordered. We also cannot say that the finding is

unjust or wrong.

As to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the amount, we disagree with

the appellants that the jury simply “picked a random number out of a hat.” App. Br.

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at 38. The jury awarded Rivera $18,000 in past mental anguish damages caused by

Shafaii Investments and $12,500 in past mental anguish damages caused by Raj

Shafaii. Based on the same evidence detailed above, we hold that the amount of

damages is supported by credible evidence. The jury could have reasonably

concluded that the amount awarded adequately compensated Rivera for her distress.

The credible evidence supporting the finding is not so weak or contrary to the

overwhelming weight of all the evidence that it should be set aside and a new trial

ordered.

We overrule appellants’ issue related to sufficiency of mental anguish

damages as to Rivera.

Segregation of Attorney’s Fees

In their final issue, the appellants argue that the jury’s verdict for attorney’s

fees was not supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence because the

attorney’s fees were not properly segregated. Rivera and Angelino argue that the

appellants waived this challenge by failing to object at trial. We agree.

When attorney’s fees are submitted to a jury, the issue of fee segregation is

likewise submitted to the jury. Westheimer v. Ziemer, 702 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, no pet.) (citing C.M. Asfahl Agency v. Tensor, Inc.,

135 S.W.3d 768, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.)). A party who

insists on fee segregation waives any segregation-related error if the trial court

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submits a broad-form fee question and the party does not object that the question

does not allow for segregation between recoverable and unrecoverable attorney’s

fees. Westheimer, 702 S.W.3d at 626; C.M. Asfahl Agency, 135 S.W.3d at 801; see

also Green Int’l v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997).

Here the trial court submitted broad-form questions on attorney’s fees, asking

the jury to determine what amount in dollars and cents was a “reasonable fee for the

necessary services of [Rivera’s or Angelino’s respective] attorneys” for

representation through trial and completion of proceedings in the trial court. The

question did not provide blanks allowing the jury to make awards for fees incurred

with respect to any claim. The question and the jury’s findings neither allowed the

trial court nor allows this court to distinguish recoverable attorney’s fees from

unrecoverable ones.

Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 requires that a party lodge a “timely

request, objection or motion” to present a complaint for appellate review. TEX. R.

APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). The party seeking segregation waives error when that party does

not object to the attorney’s fees question in the jury charge on the ground that it does

not provide for segregation of any fees the jury might award among recoverable and

nonrecoverable claims. Hruska v. First State Bank of Deanville, 747 S.W.2d 783,

784–85 (Tex. 1998); C.M. Asfahl Agency, 135 S.W.3d at 801. At the charge

conference, the appellants objected to the legal and factual sufficiency of the

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evidence to support submission of the attorney’s fees question for each appellee, but

the objection did not specifically mention failure to segregate. Although appellants

later objected in a motion for new trial to Rivera’s and Angelino’s failure to

segregate attorney’s fees, appellants made no objection while the issue of attorney’s

fees was under consideration by the trial court or prior to the award of attorney’s

fees. Appellants were required to make a timely objection or motion and to alert the

trial court of its objection to allow the court an opportunity to correct any alleged

error. Raising an objection to the submission of fee segregation in the jury charge

for the first time in a motion for new trial does not preserve the issue for appellate

review. Pitts & Collard, L.L.P. v. Schechter, 369 S.W.3d 301, 322 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see also Sprague v. Roberts, No. 11-23-002313-

CV, 2025 WL 336964, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (citing C.M. Asfahl, 135 S.W.3d at 801); Kleas v. BMC W. Corp., No. 03-05-

00190-CV, 2008 WL 5264883, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 19, 2008, pet.

denied) (mem. op.). Because appellants failed to object to the failure to segregate

attorney’s fees at the time in which the issue was considered by the trial court,

appellants’ objection post-trial is untimely, and thus, any error is waived. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).

We overrule appellants’ complaint as to the failure to segregate attorney’s

fees.

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Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

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