TPLC29 LLC; TP1488 LLC; Lindsey Interests, L.L.C.; TPStorage LLC; And Lindsey Commercial Properties LLC v. Lock Away Hwy 105 West, LLC; Pacific Reliant One, LLC; Victoria Drive, LLC; Lock Away FM 1488, LLC; Brundage/Clauson, LLC; Lock Away Little Egypt Road, LLC and Strat Property Management, Inc.

Opinion issued August 26, 2025.

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00465-CV
———————————
TPLC29 LLC; TP1488 LLC; LINDSEY INTERESTS, L.L.C.; TPSTORAGE
LLC; AND LINDSEY COMMERCIAL PROPERTIES LLC, Appellants
V.
LOCK AWAY HWY 105 WEST, LLC; PACIFIC RELIANT ONE, LLC;
VICTORIA DRIVE, LLC; LOCK AWAY FM 1488, LLC;
BRUNDAGE/CLAUSON, LLC; LOCK AWAY LITTLE EGYPT ROAD,
LLC; AND STRAT PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 152nd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2023-88171

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This interlocutory appeal arises from a commercial dispute between

Appellants TPLC29 LLC, TP1488 LLC, Lindsey Interests, L.L.C., TPStorage LLC,
and Lindsey Commercial Properties LLC and Appellees Lock Away Hwy 105 West,

LLC, Pacific Reliant One, LLC, Victoria Drive, LLC, Lock Away FM 1488, LLC,

Brundage/Clauson, LLC, Lock Away Little Egypt Road, LLC, and Strat Property

Management, Inc. Appellees sought an application for a temporary injunction

preventing Appellants from among other things, foreclosing on three commercial

properties and contacting and collecting rental payments from the tenants of the

businesses located on those properties.

In four issues, Appellants argue (1) the temporary injunction order is void

because it fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil

Procedure, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary

injunction because Appellees failed to establish a probable, imminent, and

irreparable injury and instead only established monetary damages capable of

calculation, (3) the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary

injunction because Appellees failed to establish they had a probable right to relief

on the merits of their claims against Appellants, and (4) even if Appellees met their

burden, the trial court nevertheless abused its discretion in granting the temporary

injunction because Appellees admitted to fraud, and thus their request for injunctive

relief is barred by their unclean hands as a matter of law.

2
Because the temporary injunction order does not comply with Rule 683 of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, we declare the order void, we dissolve the

injunction, and we remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Background1

This appeal arises from a dispute involving three commercial and self-storage

properties: (1) The Tall Pines-HWY 105 property (“105 Property”), (2) The Tall

Pines-FM 1488 property (“1488 Property”), and (3) The Tall Pines-Little Egypt

property (“Little Egypt Property”) (collectively, the “Properties”). The Properties

contain both self-storage and commercial office space.

Donald Clauson is the owner, operator, and managing member of Appellees

Lock Away Hwy 105 West, LLC, Pacific Reliant One, LLC, Victoria Drive, LLC,

Lock Away FM 1488, LLC, Brundage/Clauson, LLC, and Lock Away Little Egypt

Road, LLC. He is also the owner, operator, president, chief executive officer, and

50% owner of Strat Property Management, Inc.

Curtis Lindsey is the owner and operator of Appellants TPLC29 LLC, TP1488

LLC, Lindsey Interests, L.L.C., TPStorage LLC, and Lindsey Commercial

Properties LLC.

1
The underlying dispute involves a complicated commercial transaction, the details
of which are not necessary for the Court to expound upon for purposes of this
opinion.

3
In 2021, Clauson, on behalf of Strat Property Management, Inc. (“Strat”) and

Lock Away Hwy 105 West, LLC, Pacific Reliant One, LLC, Victoria Drive, LLC,

Lock Away FM 1488, LLC, Brundage/Clauson, LLC, and Lock Away Little Egypt

Road, LLC (collectively, “Owners”), and Lindsey, on behalf of TPLC29 LLC (“105

Developer”), TP1488 LLC and Lindsey Interests, L.L.C. (“1488 Developers”), and

TPStorage LLC (“Little Egypt Developer,” collectively with 105 Developer and

1488 Developers, the “Developers”), entered into a series of related agreements for

the sale and development of the Properties. Pursuant to the agreements, the Owners

purchased the Properties from the Developers for a total of $111,000,000 (“Purchase

Price”) and the Developers agreed to develop structures and other improvements on

the Properties. The Owners paid the $27,000,000 cash portion of the Purchase Price

and they borrowed the remaining $84,000,000 balance from the Developers.

In conjunction with the sale of the Properties, Industry State Bank loaned

$75,000,000 to the Developers to finance the construction of certain buildings and

other improvements to their respective properties, as evidenced by promissory notes

exectued by the 105 Developer, the 1488 Developers, and the Little Egypt Developer

in favor of Industry Bank, which were secured by a deed of trust for each property.

Lock Away HWY 105 West, LLC, Pacific Reliant One, LLC, and Victoria

Drive, LLC (collectively, “105 Owners”) executed a promissory note (“105

Promissory Note”) in favor of the 105 Developer in the principal amount of

4
$28,500,000, secured by a second lien deed of trust. The 105 Owners also entered

into a development agreement with the 105 Developer for the construction and

developments of improvements to the 105 Property, and a tri-party agreement with

the 105 Developer and Industry Bank.

Lock Away FM 1488, LLC and Brundage/Clauson, LLC (“1488 Owners”),

executed a promissory note (“1488 Promissory Note”) in favor of TP1488 LLC and

Lindsey Interests, L.L.C. (“1488 Developers”) in the principal amount of

$27,000,000, secured by a second lien deed of trust. They also entered into a

development agreement with the 1488 Developers, and a tri-party agreement with

the 1488 Developers and Industry Bank.

Lock Away Little Egypt Road, LLC (“Little Egypt Owner”) executed a

promissory note (“Little Egypt Promissory Note”) in favor of the Little Egypt

Developer in the principal amount of $28,500,000, secured by a second lien deed of

trust. It also entered into a development agreement with the Little Egypt Developer,

and a tri-party agreement with Little Egypt Developer and Industry Bank.

The purpose of each tri-party agreement was to require Industry Bank’s

consent to the sale of the 105 Property, the 1488 Property, and the Little Egypt

Property by the properties’ respective owners to their respective developers and “to

establish certain rights and obligations” of the respective owners and developers and

with respect to Industry Bank’s loans to each respective developer.

5
Soon after the agreements were executed, Clauson, on behalf of the 1488

Owners and the Little Egypt Owner, requested redesigns for the 1488 Property and

the Little Egypt Property that, according to Appellants, “required significant

modifications and material changes in the types and sizes of improvements to be

constructed” by the 1488 Developer and the Little Egypt Developer and for which

the 1488 Developer and the Little Egypt Developer would incur additional costs to

be paid by the 1488 Owners and the Little Egypt Owner. While the costs for the

requested redesigns were pending, work on the Properties continued. The work on

the 105 Property was substantially completed by December 2022, and the work on

the 1488 Property was substantially completed prior to December 2023. Although

the Little Egypt Developer constructed a parking area and covered parking, the Little

Egypt Property remains substantially undeveloped.

On April 26, 2023, after months of negotiation concerning the costs associated

with the change orders, Lindsey Commercial Properties and Strat executed a letter

agreement “regarding change orders, agreements for financing and payment of

change orders and other miscellaneous items” (“Lindsey Letter”). Among other

provisions, the Lindsey Letter required Strat to “provide monthly updates to

[Lindsey Commercial Properties] regarding the refinance of” of the 105 Property

and the 1488 Property.

6
In August 2023, Clauson asked the Little Egypt Developer to stop working on

the resign for Little Egypt Property until they could resolve a dispute regarding the

change order. In response to Clauson’s request, the Little Egypt Developer ceased

all work on the development project.

On December 1, 2023, the Developers delivered notices of default with

respect to all three Properties alleging that the Owners breached the Lindsey Letter

and failed to provide financial information to the Developers as required by the

various agreements associated with the Developers’ loans to the Owners, including

the deeds of trust between the Developers and Industry Bank. The same day, the

Developers delivered notices to the Properties’ tenants stating that the Owners had

defaulted on their loan documents and that the tenants were required to pay to the

Developers all rents under their rental agreement. The Developers also delivered

those notices to Storable, Inc., the vendor that processed rents at all three Properties

for Strat.

On December 11, 2023, the Developers noticed the Properties for foreclosure

due to the purported defaults. After receiving the notices of foreclosure sales, the

Owners and Strat sued the Developers and Lindsey Management for breach of the

development agreements and promissory notes and tortious interference with

existing contracts. They also sought declarations regarding the parties’ obligations

and applied for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction to halt the

7
foreclosure actions and the Developers’ collection of rent from the Properties’

tenants.

On December 29, 2023, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order,

which the parties later extended by agreement until the temporary injunction hearing

was held.

On February 16, 2024, Appellants filed an original answer and affirmative

defenses asserting, among other things, that Appellees’ claims were barred as a

matter of law pursuant to Appellees’ unclean hands.

The trial court held the temporary injunction hearing on March 25, 2024.

Temporary Injunction Order

On June 3, 2024, the trial court entered the Order Granting Temporary

Injunction and Setting Date for Trial on the Merits. The Order includes a series of

findings regarding the parties’ commercial dispute. In the Order, the trial court

found (1) the Owners made Promissory Notes to the Developer in connection with

the Owners’ purchase of the Properties, (2) the promissory notes are secured by

Second Lien Deeds of Trust and are governed by the respective Development

Agreements and Tri-Party Agreements, (3) the Developer distributed notices to the

Properties’ commercial tenants and the management office of the storage business

asserting the Developer was entitled to collect rent because the Owners had defaulted

on the promissory notes, (4) the Developer had collected at least $16,500 in rent

8
from the Properties’ commercial tenants, (5) the Developer notified the Owners that

it had accelerated the promissory notes’ maturity dates and the Properties would be

sold at a public foreclosure sale on January 2, 2024, (6) the Owners disputed they

had defaulted on the promissory notes and claimed the Developer breached the

development agreements by making “false statements to the Owners in connection

with its work at the Properties,” and (7) the Owners “claim[ed] that Defendants [had]

wrongfully interfered with Owners’ contracts with the tenants at the Properties and

with Storable, Inc. because there is no default by the Owners that would entitle the

Developer to seek rents from the tenants of the Properties or from Storable, who

process[es] rent payments for the Owners from storage tenants at the Properties.”

The Order states that Appellants are “prohibited from foreclosing on” the

Properties, “undertaking any attempts to foreclose” on the Properties, “or otherwise

taking possession of, transferring, or selling” the Properties. The Order also

prohibited Appellants from:

d. . . . accelerating the 105 Promissory Note’s maturity date due to any
alleged failure by the 105 Owners to provide financial information
and/or rent rolls for the 105 Property to the 105 Developer.

e. . . . accelerating the 1488 Promissory Note’s maturity date due to any
alleged failure by the 1488 Owners to provide financial information
and/or rent rolls for the 1488 Property to the 1488 Developer.

f. . . . accelerating the 1488 Promissory Note’s maturity date in
connection with any allegedly unpaid change order work at the 1488
Property under the April 26, 2023 letter agreement between Strat
Property Management and Lindsey Commercial Properties.

9
g. . . . accelerating the Little Egypt Promissory Note’s maturity date due
to any alleged failure by the Little Egypt Owner to provide financial
information and/or rent rolls for the Little Egypt Property to the Little
Egypt Developer.

h. . . . accelerating the Little Egypt Promissory Note’s maturity date in
connection with any allegedly unpaid change order at the Little Egypt
Property under the April 26, 2023 letter agreement between Strat
Property Management and Lindsey Commercial Properties.

i. . . . making any contact with the tenants of the 105, 1488, and Little
Egypt Properties; or with Storable, Inc. concerning renter leases at the
Properties[; and].

j. . . . soliciting or accepting any rent payments from the tenants of the
105, 1488, and Little Egypt Properties or from Storable, Inc. for tenants
at the Properties.

The trial court further ordered that Appellants:

k. . . . shall segregate and hold any rent payments received from the
tenants of the 105, 1488, and Little Egypt Properties, or from Storable,
Inc. for tenants at the Properties, throughout the pendency of this
litigation.

1. . . . shall notify Plaintiffs in writing of their receipt of any rent
payments from the tenants of the Properties, or from Storable, Inc. for
tenants at the Properties, within three days of receiving such payment.

The Order further states:

Based on the facts set forth in Plaintiffs’ Application, the evidence
presented at the hearing on Plaintiffs’ Application for a Temporary
Injunction, and the arguments of counsel, Plaintiffs have shown that
unless this order is immediately entered without notice to the
Defendants, the Owners will suffer irreparable injury in the form of loss
of the unique Properties, loss of goodwill, and loss of business
reputation because no other legal remedy can be obtained and effected
before the injury occurs that cannot be compensable through monetary
relief alone. In turn, injunctive relief is appropriate.

10
This interlocutory appeal followed.2

Temporary Injunctions

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the

litigation’s subject matter pending trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co.,

84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). Temporary injunctions are an extraordinary

remedy and do not issue as a matter of right. Id. (citing Walling v. Metcalfe, 863

S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993) (per curiam)). To obtain a temporary injunction, an

applicant need not establish that it will prevail upon a final trial on the merits, but it

must plead and prove that it (1) has a cause of action against the opposing party;

(2) has a probable right on final trial to the relief sought; and (3) faces probable,

imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Hoist

Liftruck Mfg., Inc. v. Carruth–Doggett, Inc., 485 S.W.3d 120, 122 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.).

Rule 683 governs the form and scope of injunctions and temporary restraining

orders. TEX. R. CIV. P. 683. Although the decision whether to grant or deny a

request for a temporary injunction is committed to the sound discretion of the trial

court, once the court decides to grant injunctive relief, the order itself must comply

with the requirements of Rule 683. See Hoist Liftruck Mfg., 485 S.W.3d at 122. The

2
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(4) (authorizing interlocutory
appeals from order granting temporary injunction).

11
requirements of Rule 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed. Qwest

Commc’ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000). A temporary

injunction order that violates Rule 683 “is subject to being declared void and

dissolved.” Id.; see also Clark v. Hastings Equity Partners, LLC, 651 S.W.3d 359,

370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.).

Pursuant to Rule 683, every order granting a temporary injunction must,

among other things, “set forth the reasons for its issuance” and “shall be specific in

terms.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; see also El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 S.W.3d

740, 744 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (“A trial court’s order stating its reasons

for granting a temporary injunction must be specific and legally sufficient on its face

and not merely conclusory.”); Clark, 651 S.W.3d at 374 (limiting analysis to

four-corners of temporary injunction order and holding order did not comply with

Rule 683).3 A temporary injunction order must provide “the reasons the trial court

3
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 states in its entirety:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth
the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in
reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to
the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and
upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive
actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
Every order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the
cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought. The
appeal of a temporary injunction shall constitute no cause for delay of the
trial.

12
believes irreparable injury will result if an injunction preserving the status quo

pending a trial on the merits is not granted.” Clark, 651 S.W.3d at 370; see also El

Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 744 (stating temporary injunction order must state “the

reasons the court deems it proper to issue the injunction, including the reasons why

the applicant will suffer injury if the injunctive relief is not ordered”). A trial court’s

description of the reasons why an applicant will suffer irreparable injury will vary

from case to case because each case in which a temporary injunction is sought

presents a unique set of facts. El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 747–48.

Conclusory explanations as to why a party will suffer irreparable harm do not

satisfy Rule 683. See Clark, 651 S.W.3d at 374; see also In re Chaumette, 456

S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding) (stating

temporary injunction order must “include specific reasons and not merely

conclusory statements”). A statement is conclusory if it does not articulate the

factual basis on which it rests, effectively insisting that the reader accept the writer’s

say-so without explanation. See Arkoma Basin Expl. Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990–A,

Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 & n.32 (Tex. 2008) (defining “conclusory” as

“[e]xpressing a factual inference without stating the underlying facts on which the

inference is based”). A trial court must provide a factual basis explaining the reason

for its finding that the applicant will suffer a probable, imminent, and irreparable

TEX. R. CIV. P. 683.

13
injury unless the temporary injunction is issued, and it must connect the enjoined

actions to the irreparable injury. See El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 747 (holding

temporary injunction order violates Rule 683 when “the order provides no nexus

between the actions restrained and an irreparable injury to [the applicant] that cannot

be adequately compensated”); see also Kotz v. Imperial Cap. Bank, 319 S.W.3d 54,

56 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2010, no pet.) (“The trial court must set forth specific

reasons, not merely conclusory statements, in the order granting temporary

injunctive relief.”).

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683

In their first issue, Appellants argue that the Order is void because it fails to

set forth in specific terms the reasons the trial court believes irreparable injury will

result absent an injunction in violation of Rule 683. Citing to section (h) of the

Order, Appellants contends the Order “provides a single conclusory statement with

regard to [Appellees’] alleged irreparable harm,” and wholly fails to specify why

irreparable injury in the form of loss of the Properties, loss of reputation, and loss of

goodwill would result if injunctive relief was not granted. Appellants argue that the

mere fact Appellees face the prospect of losing their interest in the Properties due to

foreclosure does not mean that Appellees cannot be adequately compensated with

monetary damages for the loss of their commercial real estate. They argue that even

14
in cases in which real property interests are at stake, an order granting a temporary

injunction must still comply with the specificity requirements of Rule 683.

Appellees argue that the Order complies with Rule 683 because the statement

“the Owners will suffer irreparable injury in the form of loss of the unique Properties,

loss of goodwill, and loss of business reputation,” is similar to other injunctive orders

courts have found complied with Rule 683, and the Owners’ loss of the Properties

due to foreclosure is a “unique (and sufficiently irreparable) injury” that warrants

injunctive relief. Appellees further contend that in addition to section (h), the Order

contains additional fact findings regarding Appellees’ loss of goodwill and business

reputation, and such findings, independently or together with the loss of the

Properties, constitute legally sufficient irreparable injury.

The Order includes a series of findings regarding the parties’ commercial

dispute, including findings that the Developer distributed notices to the Properties’

commercial tenants and the management office of the storage business asserting the

Developer was entitled to collect rent because the Owners had defaulted on the

promissory notes, that the Developer notified the Owners that it had accelerated the

promissory notes’ maturity dates and the Properties would be sold at a public

foreclosure sale on January 2, 2024, and that the Owners “claim that Defendants

have wrongfully interfered with Owners’ contracts with the tenants at the Properties

and with Storable, Inc. because there is no default by the Owners that would entitle

15
the Developer to seek rents from the tenants of the Properties or from Storable, who

process rent payments for the Owners from storage tenants at the Properties.”

The Order also lists twelve separate injunctions against Appellants, including

prohibiting Appellants from “foreclosing on” the Properties, “undertaking any

attempts to foreclose” on the Properties, “or otherwise taking possession of,

transferring, or selling” the Properties. Appellants are also prohibited from

accelerating the maturity dates of the 105 Promissory Note, the 1488 Promissory

Note, and the Little Egypt Promissory Note, making any contact with the Properties’

tenants or Storable, Inc. concerning renter leases at the Properties, and “soliciting or

accepting any rent payments” from the Properties’ tenants. The Order also compels

Appellants to “segregate and hold any rent payments” they receive from any of the

Properties’ tenants and notify Appellees in writing if Appellants receive any rent

payments.

With regard to the irreparable harm requirement, section (h) of the Order

states that the Owners will “suffer irreparable injury in the form of loss of the unique

Properties, loss of goodwill, and loss of business reputation” if the injunction is not

entered and the Owners will suffer theses injuries “because no other legal remedy

can be obtained and effected before the injury occurs that cannot be compensable

through monetary relief alone.”

16
To establish irreparable injury, an applicant “must show that it cannot be

‘adequately compensated in damages or the damages cannot be measured by any

certain pecuniary standard.’” Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106

S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (quoting Butnaru,

84 S.W.3d at 204). The loss of an interest in real property, loss of reputation, and

loss of goodwill can each support an award of injunctive relief. See Intercontinental

Terminals Co. v. Vopak N. Am., Inc., 354 S.W.3d 887, 895 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (“Threatened injury to a business’s reputation and good

will with customers is frequently the basis for temporary injunctive relief.”); Tex.

Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Holmes, 294 S.W.3d 328, 334 (Tex. App.—Austin

2009, pet. denied) (“Irreparable harm for purposes of a temporary injunction may

include noncompensable injuries such as a ‘company’s loss of goodwill, clientele,

marketing techniques, office stability and the like.’”) (quoting Graham v. Mary Kay,

Inc., 25 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied));

Stewart Beach Condo. Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Gili N Prop Inv.’s, LLC, 481

S.W.3d 336, 350 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (stating temporary

injunction appropriate to block foreclosure of real property); Guardian Sav. & Loan

Ass’n v. Williams, 731 S.W.2d 107, 108–09 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987,

no writ) (holding business losses as well as unique nature of real estate justified

enjoining foreclosure of commercial properties).

17
Injuries to a business’ reputation and goodwill, however, are not necessarily

irreparable, and such losses can be compensated with monetary damages depending

on the circumstances. See Intercontinental Terminals, 354 S.W.3d at 895 (stating

goodwill and reputational injuries “are not categorically irreparable”); Indep.

Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins, 261 S.W.3d 792, 796 n.2 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008,

no pet.) (stating “any damage to Collins’s reputation is compensable through

monetary damages”); Orbison v. Ma-Tex Rope Co., Inc., 553 S.W.3d 17, 29 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2018, pet. denied) (stating monetary damages are available to

compensate party for injury to its goodwill) (citing Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. Mercer, 127

Tex. 220, 90 S.W.2d 557, 560 (1936)). The same is true for the loss of real property.

See Kotz, 319 S.W.3d at 58 (stating that although “every piece of real estate is

unique” and property’s “uniqueness may . . . constitute some evidence of an

irreparable injury,” “that alone is not conclusive”); In re Stark, 126 S.W.3d 635, 641

(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2004, orig. proceeding) (stating “under some circumstances

monetary damages afford adequate relief for the loss of real estate and under some

circumstances it does not”); Home Asset, Inc. v. MPT of Victory Lakes Fcer, LLC,

No. 01-22-00441-CV, 2023 WL 3183322, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

May 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[E]ven when a lawsuit relates to real estate in

some fashion, the trial court is not excused from Rule 683’s mandate that a

temporary-injunction order explain why irreparable harm will result without an

18
injunction.”); see generally Ugarte v. Hathcock, No. 10-19-00470-CV, 2022 WL

1256929, at *2 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 27, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (rejecting

argument applicant established foreclosure of property would result in irreparable

injury for which no adequate remedy at law existed based on unique nature of real

estate; “While each piece of real estate is unique, an injunction to forestall

foreclosure requires more than just the existence of real property—it requires some

evidence regarding the unique nature of the property.”).

The Order does not explain the basis for the court’s finding that in this case

monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate the Owners for the loss of

the Properties, loss of goodwill, or the damage to their business reputation they

would incur if the injunction had not issued. Thus the trial court’s finding of

irreparable injury—“because no other legal remedy can be obtained and effected

before the injury occurs that cannot be compensable through monetary relief

alone”—is conclusory. See Arkoma Basin Expl., 249 S.W.3d at 389 n.32 (stating

conclusory statement “[e]xpress[es] a factual inference without stating the

underlying facts on which the inference is based”). Nor does the Order assert that

damages associated with such losses cannot be quantified or otherwise measured by

a pecuniary standard. Compare with IAC, Ltd. v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 160

S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding injunction set forth

sufficient reasons for its issuance where it explicitly stated defendants had data

19
entitled to trade secret protection and were actively using that data to compete with

plaintiff, and defendants’ product would be priced lower than plaintiff’s, which

would lead to “incalculable loss of business goodwill”); Transport Co. of Texas v.

Robertson Transports, Inc., 261 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex. 1953) (holding injunction

sufficiently specific when it stated defendant “would interfere with the markets

established by the plaintiffs and would probably divert freight tonnage and revenue

from the plaintiff” and “that such interference with customers and markets and

diversion of freight tonnage and revenues would result in irreparable and inestimable

damage to the plaintiffs”); see, e.g., 101 Lexington Tower, LLC v. 830 N. St. Mary’s

Hotel, Ltd., 678 S.W.3d 291, 300–01 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.)

(holding sufficient evidence supported trial court’s finding hotel’s damages could

not be measured by any certain pecuniary standard based on testimony it was

“difficult to calculate damages to the [hotel’s] reputation and goodwill because the

[hotel] had no way of knowing, e.g., (1) whether a complaining guest would come

back to the hotel or choose to go elsewhere, or (2) how many prospective guests

were choosing to stay in a different hotel because of the online reviews complaining

of the [nearby restaurant grill’s] exhaust’s effects”).

Furthermore, to satisfy the requirements of Rule 683, the order must provide

a “nexus between the actions restrained and an irreparable injury to [the applicant]

that cannot be adequately compensated.” El Tacaso, 356 S.W.3d at 747. Even

20
assuming the Order sufficiently connects the prohibitions against foreclosure and

contacting and collecting rent from tenants, there is nothing in the Order explaining

why the trial court believes that the Owners will suffer any form of irreparable injury

unless Appellants are required to notify Appellees in writing when Appellants

receive any rent payments from the Properties’ tenants and “segregate and hold any

rent payments” Appellants receive from any tenants, or unless Appellants are

prohibited from accelerating the promissory notes’ maturity dates. In other words,

the Order provides no nexus between this prohibited conduct and an irreparable

injury to the Owners for which no other adequate legal remedy exists. See id.

Appellees argue that the statement “the Owners will suffer irreparable injury

in the form of loss of the unique Properties, loss of goodwill, and loss of business

reputation,” is similar to injunctive orders courts found complied with Rule 683 in

Transport Company of Texas v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 261 S.W.2d 549, 553

(Tex. 1953) and Kelley v. Ivey, No. 14-14-00686-CV, 2015 WL 4387941, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 16, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.). Robertson and

Kelley are distinguishable.

In Robertson, the enjoined party argued that the order was invalid because it

did not state the reasons for its issuance. In holding the order was valid, the court

observed:

In the case at bar the trial court’s order contained [an] express finding
that the petitioners had made “a proper showing of a probable right and
21
a probable injury”, and set forth as reasons for the granting of the writ
that if respondent operated under the amended permit “he would
interfere with the markets established by the plaintiffs and would
probably divert freight tonnage and revenue from the plaintiff” and
“that such interference with customers and markets and diversion of
freight tonnage and revenues would result in irreparable and
inestimable damage to the plaintiffs.” This we deem to be a sufficient
compliance with the requirements of Rule 683.

261 S.W.2d at 553 (emphasis added). The order in that case thus specifically stated

that unless prohibited from doing so, the defendant would interfere in the future with

the markets the plaintiffs had created, and the defendant’s conduct would not only

cause the plaintiffs to lose markets, customers, and revenue, it would also “result in

irreparable and inestimable damage to the plaintiffs.” Id. (emphasis added).

Here, Appellants argue the Order is void because it does not explain in specific

terms the reasons the trial court believes irreparable injury will result absent an

injunction. Unlike in Robertson, there is no finding in the Order that the Owners’

damages are “inestimable,” or otherwise cannot be calculated or monetized. The

Order states instead that the injury “cannot be compensated through monetary relief

alone” without any indication as to why monetary damages are inadequate or why

monetary damages cannot be quantified or measured. See Cardinal Health, 106

S.W.3d at 235 (stating irreparable injury requires showing applicant cannot be

“adequately compensated in damages or the damages cannot be measured by any

certain pecuniary standard”) (quoting Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204). Furthermore,

unlike in Robertson, there are no findings in the Order that Appellants will continue

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to engage in any of the enjoined conduct in the future. At most, the Order merely

reflects that Appellants have engaged in such conduct in the past.

In Kelley, the appellants obtained a judgment against Willie Ray Kelley, and

they obtained a writ of execution to have what they characterized as Willie’s interest

in Tract 19 sold to satisfy the judgment. Kelley, 2015 WL 4387941, at *1. Ivey filed

a declaratory judgment action and suit to quiet title, seeking a judgment that she and

Guillory were sole owners of Tract 19 and requesting a temporary injunction

enjoining the sale of any part of Tract 19. Id. at *2. The Kelley court, which held

that the order granting the temporary injunction which enjoined the appellants “from

selling, transferring, conveying or pursuing any action to sale [sic], transfer or

convey the property or cloud the title to the property” in dispute satisfied Rule 683,

stated:

The trial court recited that absent injunctive relief, Ivey “probably will
be deprived of property she inherited and/or obtained from members of
her immediate family and that has been in her family for a number of
years. If the Defendants are not enjoined, there is substantial likelihood
that Plaintiff’s property will be sold, transferred, conveyed and/ or will
have the title clouded.”

Id. at *5. The trial court thus specifically stated that the probable loss of real property

or a cloud on its title constituted an irreparable injury, not because it involved an

interest in real property, but because the real property at issue had been in the

plaintiff’s family for a number of years. The loss of real property can support a

finding of irreparable harm, but not in all cases, nor does the loss of real property

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relieve the trial court of its obligations under Rule 683. See Kotz, 319 S.W.3d at 58

(stating although real estate’s “uniqueness may . . . constitute some evidence of an

irreparable injury,” “that alone is not conclusive” and observing no authority states

“trial court is relieved of the mandatory requirements of Rule 683 in cases involving

real estate”); see also In re Stark, 126 S.W.3d at 641 (stating that monetary damages

may afford applicant “adequate relief for the loss of real estate”). Here, unlike the

order in Kelley, the trial court did not specifically explain why monetary damages

are inadequate to compensate the Owners for loss of the Properties nor did it state

any facts concerning the commercial properties which would render monetary

damages inadequate.

Appellants argue that the Order is similar to the temporary injunction order in

Kotz, where the court held the order did not comply with Rule 683. 319 S.W.3d at

58. We agree that the Order is more similar to the order in Kotz than to the orders

in Robertson and Kelley. In Kotz, Patrick Man and Grace Man sought to enjoin

Carole Kotz temporarily from “taking or attempting to take possession of certain

commercial real estate, communicating with any tenants of the property, or receiving

any rents from the tenants currently occupying the premises under leases held by”

the Mans. Id. at 55. On appeal, Kotz argued that the order granting the injunction

was void because it did not “detail why irreparable injury w[ould] occur if the

temporary injunction [was] not granted.” Id. at 56. The order stated:

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The Court finds that Intervenors Patrick Man and Grace Man will suffer
irreparable injury in their possession and use of the Subject Property in
the event that the requested injunctive relief is not granted, that they
have no adequate remedy at law, and that the requested injunctive relief
is necessary to preserve the status quo pending final trial.

Id. The court observed that, “At most, this language characterizes by what means

harm will occur unless Kotz is enjoined from taking possession and use of the subject

property—but does not state or explain the reasons why irreparable injury will result

absent an injunction.” Id. at 57 (emphasis in original).

Similar to the language in Kotz, the trial court’s statement that “the Owners

will suffer irreparable injury in the form of loss of the unique Properties, loss of

goodwill, and loss of business reputation” characterizes the types of injuries the

Owners will suffer if injunctive relief is not granted, but it does not state the reasons

why such losses will occur, explain why monetary damages are inadequate to

compensate the Owners for their losses, or assert that damages associated with such

losses cannot be quantified or measured by a pecuniary standard. See Cardinal

Health, 106 S.W.3d at 235 (“To establish an irreparable injury, the applicant must

show that it cannot be ‘adequately compensated in damages or the damages cannot

be measured by any certain pecuniary standard.’”) (quoting Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at

204). Compare with Khaledi v. H.K. Global Trading, Ltd., 126 S.W.3d 273, 280

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (holding injunction was sufficiently

specific where it stated business partner’s actions prevented other parties “from

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realizing the significant loan values” in specified properties and significantly

impaired their ability to pay amounts owed under promissory note and that their

business plan and ability to obtain financing on properties were “adversely affected

in a way that cannot be effectively measured in dollars”).

Focusing on the four corners of the Order, as we must, we hold that the order

does not specifically set forth in specific terms the reasons the trial court believes

irreparable injury will result absent an injunction and thus fails to comply with the

requirements of Rule 683. See Clark, 651 S.W.3d at 374 (limiting analysis to four-

corners of temporary injunction order and holding order did not comply with Rule

683). The order is thus void. Id.4

Conclusion

Because the Order does not strictly comply with the requirements of Rule 683,

we declare the Order void, we dissolve the injunction, and we remand the case to the

trial court for further proceedings.5 We dismiss any pending motions as moot.

Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

4
Because of our disposition, it is not necessary to address Appellants’ remaining
issues. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
5
This dissolution is without prejudice as to future relief the parties may seek.

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