Westview Drive Investments v. Harris Central Appraisal District F/K/A Harris County Appraisal District

Opinion issued November 25, 2025

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00205-CV
———————————
WESTVIEW DRIVE INVESTMENTS, Appellant
V.
HARRIS CENTRAL APPRAISAL DISTRICT F/K/A HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL DISTRICT, Appellee

On Appeal from the 157th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2024-50252

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The underlying case involves a dispute between Westview Drive Investments,

LLC (WDI) and Harris Central Appraisal District (HCAD)1 over the 2024 appraised

1
Harris Central Appraisal District was formerly known as Harris County Appraisal
District.
value of WDI’s real property for ad valorem tax purposes. WDI seeks permission

in this Court to bring an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s amended order

denying its motion for summary judgment. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 51.014(d), (f); TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(a).

In the amended order, the trial court certified one question for permissive

appeal: “whether TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231 limits the appraised value of WDI’s

property . . . for tax year 2024, to no more than 20 percent above the appraised value

of the property in tax year 2023.” Because we conclude that the issue presented by

this question is not ripe for review, we deny WDI’s petition for permissive appeal.

Background

We begin with an overview of Tax Code Section 23.231 because it aids in

understanding the procedural history of the case.

A. Circuit Breaker Limitation

Tax Code Section 23.231 (the Circuit Breaker Limitation2) was enacted in

2023.3 The statute became effective on January 1, 2024.4

2
The title of Section 23.231 is “Circuit Breaker Limitation on Appraised Value of
Real Property Other than Residence Homestead.” TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231.
3
See Act of July 13, 2023, 88th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, § 4.03, sec. 23.231, Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. 4700, 4706–08.
4
See Act of July 13, 2023, 88th Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, §§ 8.01, 8.05, Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 4700, 4721.
2
The Circuit Breaker Limitation applies to real property “with an appraised

value of not more than the amount determined under Subsection (j) for the tax year

in which the property first qualifies for the circuit breaker limitation.” TEX. TAX

CODE § 23.231(b). For the 2024 tax year, that amount is $5 million or less.5 Id.

§ 23.231(j).

When a property qualifies, Subsection (d) limits the amount that an appraisal

office can increase the appraised value of the property:

(d) Notwithstanding the requirements of Section 25.186 and regardless
of whether the appraisal office has appraised the property and
determined the market value of the property for the tax year, an
appraisal office may increase the appraised value of real property to
which this section applies for a tax year to an amount not to exceed the
lesser of:

(1) the market value of the property for the most recent tax year
that the market value was determined by the appraisal office; or

(2) the sum of:

(A) 20 percent of the appraised value of the property for
the preceding tax year;

(B) the appraised value of the property for the preceding
tax year; and

5
The Circuit Breaker Limitation does not apply to a residence homestead that
qualifies for an exemption or property appraised under other subchapters of the Tax
Code, such as agricultural or timber land. See TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231(c).
6
Section 25.18 provides for periodic reappraisals of property at least once every three
years. TEX. TAX CODE § 25.18(b).
3
(C) the market value of all new improvements to the
property.

Id. § 23.231(d).

B. Dispute over Appraised Value of WDI’s Property

WDI owns a Houston apartment complex (the Property). In 2023, HCAD and

WDI were parties in another lawsuit involving the Property. The parties settled that

suit, agreeing that the Property’s 2023 appraised value was $4,975,000.

In April 2024, HCAD sent a notice of the Property’s 2024 appraised value to

WDI. The notice stated that, “[a]s of January 1, 2024,” HCAD determined that the

market value and the appraised value of the Property for tax purposes were

$28,233,487. The notice informed WDI that, “[b]y law, we must appraise property

at market value”—meaning “the price for which [the Property] would have sold on

January 1 in the open market.”

WDI filed a protest of the Property’s 2024 appraised value with the county’s

Appraisal Review Board (ARB). In August 2024, the ARB issued its “Order

Determining Protest.” The ARB determined that HCAD’s “property appraisal [was]

incorrect and should be changed.” The order reflected that the ARB determined that

the Property’s 2024 market and appraised values were $14,515,618. The order

notified WDI that it had the right to appeal the order to district court.

WDI filed suit against HCAD, seeking judicial review of the ARB’s order. In

its amended petition, WDI alleged that the Property’s 2024 appraised value was not

4
equal and uniform when compared to other properties. WDI also alleged that the

appraised value exceeded the market value “as of the Jan. 1 date[] of valuation” and

was “therefore excessive and unlawful.” WDI asked the trial court “[to] determine

the market value[]” of the Property and, “under [Tax] Code Sections 42.24 and

42.25, reduce [the Property’s] appraised value on [the] appraisal rolls to the true

market value.”

WDI asserted that, because the Property’s 2023 appraised value of $4,975,000

was under $5 million, the Property qualified for the Circuit Breaker Limitation.

WDI claimed that, under the limitation, the Property’s maximum appraised value for

2024 was $5,970,000. This amount represented the maximum increase permitted by

the Circuit Breaker Limitation of (1) 20 percent of the Property’s 2023 appraised

value plus (2) its 2023 appraised value.7 See id. § 23.231(d)(2)(A)–(B). WDI

alleged that the ARB’s 2024 valuation of $14,515,618 was “in gross violation of

Texas law.”

WDI moved for traditional summary judgment, asserting two grounds. In its

first ground, WDI claimed that the “undisputed facts,” as shown in its summary-

judgment evidence, established that the Property’s 2024 market and appraised values

7
The Circuit Breaker Limitation also permits the market value of all new
improvements to be added to the appraisal limitation, but the record does not
indicate that new improvements were made to the Property in 2023. See TEX. TAX
CODE § 23.231(d)(2)(C).

5
were $4,859,794, an amount less than the Property’s 2023 appraised value of

$4,975,000.

In its second ground, WDI argued that, if the trial court rejected its first

ground, then the court should grant summary judgment because the Property’s 2024

appraised value was “statutorily limited” by the Circuit Breaker Limitation. WDI

asserted that, because the Property “was appraised at $4,975,000 in 2023,” the

maximum appraised value for the Property in 2024 was $5,970,000. WDI asked the

trial court to “hold that the maximum 2024 appraised value that HCAD can set for

the subject property is 2023’s value plus 20%, i.e., $5,970,000.”

HCAD responded that the facts were not “undisputed” and asserted that

WDI’s summary-judgment evidence did not establish that the Property’s 2024

appraised value was $4,859,794. HCAD also asserted that the Circuit Breaker

Limitation did not limit the Property’s 2024 appraised value. HCAD pointed out

that the statute became effective on January 1, 2024, and asserted that it “only applies

to the subject property if it was valued at or below $5,000,000 on January 1, 2024.”

HCAD contended that the $5 million ceiling set for a property to qualify for the

limitation was measured by a property’s 2024 appraised value and not, as WDI

claimed, its 2023 appraised value. HCAD offered its records to show that the

Property’s appraised value on January 1, 2024, was $14,515,618, meaning that the

Property did not qualify to receive the statutory cap.

6
In its summary-judgment briefing, HCAD framed the controlling issue as

follows: “Does TEX. TAX CODE §23.231 limit the appraised value of Westview Drive

Investments, LLC’s property . . . for tax year 2024, to no more than 20% above the

appraised value of the property in tax year 2023?” It answered, “No, the statute

specifically states that it is effective January 1, 2024[,] and does not consider the

2023 value.”

The trial court denied WDI’s motion for summary judgment.

C. Motion for Permissive Appeal

WDI filed a motion for permissive appeal, seeking to appeal the trial court’s

order denying its summary-judgment motion. WDI stated that, if permitted to appeal

the summary-judgment order, it “intend[ed] to assert only its statutory argument”

regarding the Circuit Breaker Limitation. WDI agreed that HCAD had accurately

framed the controlling question of law in its summary-judgment briefing.

With the motion, WDI offered the declaration of its CEO and attorney, Jack

Yetiv. Yetiv stated that if WDI prevailed on appeal, “resulting in a maximum value

for WDI’s property of $5,970,000,” then WDI would agree to that value, pay the

2024 taxes on that value, and dismiss the suit.

HCAD opposed the motion for permissive appeal, again asserting that the

“[a]pplicability of the [Circuit Breaker Limitation] is not determined by 2023 tax

year values” but by the value of the Property on January 1, 2024. HCAD stated that

7
the Property’s appraised value on January 1 was $14,515,618, an amount greater

than the $5 million ceiling for the Circuit Breaker Limitation to apply.

HCAD also asserted that WDI was engaging in a “backward application” of

the statute because the trial court, in its de novo review, would first determine the

Property’s 2024 market value and then apply the limitation if appropriate. HCAD

compared the Circuit Breaker Limitation “to the homestead exemption (§ 23.23 of

the Tax Code) which has been in existence for some time.” HCAD explained that

“in trials involving the homestead exemption, the fact-finder [first] determines

market value and then the cap is applied, if applicable.” HCAD asserted that,

likewise, here the market value must first be found “in order to determine the

applicability of the [Circuit Breaker Limitation].”

The trial court signed an amended order denying WDI’s motion for summary

judgment. In the same order, the trial court granted WDI’s motion for permissive

appeal. The trial court found that the requirements of Rule of Civil Procedure 1688

8
Rule of Civil Procedure 168 provides,

On a party’s motion or on its own initiative, a trial court may permit
an appeal from an interlocutory order that is not otherwise appealable,
as provided by statute. Permission must be stated in the order to be
appealed. An order previously issued may be amended to include such
permission. The permission must identify the controlling question of
law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion,
and must state why an immediate appeal may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 168.
8
were satisfied “because there is a controlling question of law: whether TEX. TAX

CODE § 23.231 limits the appraised value of WDI’s property . . . for tax year 2024,

to no more than 20 percent above the appraised value of the property in tax year

2023.” The court answered the question negatively, “finding that HCAD’s valuation

of WDI’s property did not violate TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231 because [the statute]

does not limit the appraised value of WDI’s property for tax year 2024, to no more

than 20 percent above the appraised value of the property in tax year 2023.”

The trial court concluded that (1) the controlling question of law was “a novel

and difficult question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of

opinion” because there were “no appellate opinions on this question” and (2) “an

immediate appeal will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation.”

The court stated, “If WDI wins an appeal on this issue, HCAD would be limited to

increasing its appraised value to no more than 20 percent of the 2023 value of the

property—an amount WDI has agreed to pay.” The trial court stayed the

proceedings “pending the outcome of the permissive appeal.”

Petition for Permissive Appeal

WDI filed a petition for permissive appeal in this Court, seeking permission

to appeal the amended order denying its motion for summary judgment. WDI

focuses on the trial court’s denial of its claim that the Circuit Breaker Limitation

limits the Property’s appraised value for the 2024 tax year.

9
HCAD filed a response opposing the petition. Among its arguments, HCAD

asserts that the question of whether the Circuit Breaker Limitation caps the appraised

value of the Property for the 2024 tax year is not ripe for review.

A. Applicable Law

Appellate review is ordinarily limited to final judgments. Harley Channelview

Props., LLC v. Harley Marine Gulf, LLC, 690 S.W.3d 32, 37 (Tex. 2024). An

appellate court has no jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order unless review is

conferred by statute. Id. “A departure from the final judgment rule in the form of

an interlocutory appeal must be strictly construed because it is ‘a narrow exception

to the general rule that interlocutory orders are not immediately appealable.’” Sabre

Travel Int’l, Ltd. v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG, 567 S.W.3d 725, 736 (Tex. 2019)

(quoting CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2011)).

WDI seeks to appeal the amended order denying its motion for summary

judgment under Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(d)—a statutory

exception to the final judgment rule. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d).

Under that section, a trial court in a civil action may permit an appeal from an

otherwise unappealable interlocutory order if two requirements are met:

(1) the order to be appealed involves a controlling question of law as to
which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion; and

(2) an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the
ultimate termination of the litigation.

10
Id.

If a trial court permits an appeal from an interlocutory order pursuant to

Section 51.014(d), the party seeking to appeal must then petition the court of appeals

for permission to appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(a). A court of appeals may accept

an appeal that is permitted by Section 51.014(d) if the appealing party explains why

the appeal is warranted under that section. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§ 51.014(f). To show why the permissive appeal is warranted, the petition must

“argue clearly and concisely [1] why the order to be appealed involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion

and [2] how an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation.” TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. &

REM. CODE § 51.014(d). “Appellate courts have no discretion to accept a permissive

appeal if section 51.014(d)’s two requirements are not satisfied.” Zurich Am. Ins.

Co. v. MB2 Dental Sols., LLC, 698 S.W.3d 355, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no.

pet.) (citing Indus. Specialists, LLC v. Blanchard Refin. Co., 652 S.W.3d 11, 15–16

(Tex. 2022) (plurality op.)).

B. Analysis

The trial court certified for permissive appeal the question of whether the

Circuit Breaker Limitation limits the Property’s appraised value for tax year 2024 to

no more than 20 percent above the Property’s appraised value for tax year 2023.

11
Because the issue presented by the question is not ripe for review, we conclude that,

as explained below, Section 51.014(d)’s two requirements are not satisfied.

WDI exercised its right to appeal the ARB’s appraisal determination by filing

a petition for judicial review against HCAD. See TEX. TAX CODE § 42.01(a)

(providing that property owner can appeal appraisal review board’s order to district

court). In tax appraisal suits, the taxpayer has the burden of proof. See Amelang v.

Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 695 S.W.3d 348, 356 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2022, no pet.). In the suit, “[a]ny party is entitled to trial by jury on demand.”9 TEX.

TAX CODE § 42.23(c).

Tax Code Section 42.23(a) provides that judicial review of the board’s order

is by trial de novo. Id. § 42.23(a). The trial court “shall try all issues of fact and law

raised by the pleadings in the manner applicable to civil suits generally.” Id. “Once

in court, the parties start from scratch, without any deference to the board’s

decision.” Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694

S.W.3d 752, 756 (Tex. 2024). “The court may not simply affirm the appraisal review

board’s order, and it ‘may not admit in evidence the fact of prior action by the

appraisal review board . . . except to the extent necessary to establish its

jurisdiction.’” Id. at 760 (quoting TEX. TAX CODE § 42.23(b)).

9
WDI has requested a jury trial in its pleadings.

12
In its amended petition, WDI asserted a claim for excessive appraisal. See

TEX. TAX CODE § 42.25.10 A taxpayer is entitled to relief for excessive appraisal if

it proves to the court “that the appraised value of property according to the appraisal

roll exceeds the appraised value required by law.” See id. (“If the court determines

that the appraised value of property according to the appraisal roll exceeds the

appraised value required by law, the property owner is entitled to a reduction of the

appraised value on the appraisal roll to the appraised value determined by the

court.”). “The duty of the trial court is to ‘fix the appraised value of property in

accordance with the requirements of law.’” Cherokee Water Co. v. Gregg Cnty.

Appraisal Dist., 801 S.W.2d 872, 877 (Tex. 1990) (quoting TEX. TAX CODE

§ 42.24)).

“Appraised value” is “the value determined as provided by [Tax Code]

Chapter 23.” TEX. TAX CODE § 1.04(8). Section 23.01 provides that “all taxable

property is appraised at its market value as of January 1.” Id. § 23.01(a). “Appraised

value according to law is fair market value.” Cherokee Water, 801 S.W.2d at 877;

see Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, 694 S.W.3d at 755 (“[A] subject property is

appraised at its ‘market value.’”). Thus, to determine a property’s appraised value

10
WDI also alleged an unequal-appraisal claim, asserting that the appraised value was
not equal and uniform when compared to other properties. See TEX. TAX CODE
§ 42.26 (providing that taxpayer is entitled to relief if property is appraised
unequally to its value).

13
in accordance with the law, a trial court determines the property’s market value.11

See Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, 694 S.W.3d at 755; Cherokee Water, 801 S.W.2d at

877; see also Amelang, 695 S.W.3d at 358 (stating that, to prevail on its excess-

appraisal claim, taxpayer had to prove property’s fair market value).

Once market value is determined, a court uses that figure (and other factors)

to determine if there is a statutory cap on the appraised value of the property by

comparing the current tax year’s market value to the prior tax year’s appraised value.

See Dall. Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Cunningham, 161 S.W.3d 293, 296 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2005, no pet.) (explaining that whether Section 23.23’s 10-percent cap on

increasing appraised value of residence homestead applies is determined by

comparing current year’s market value to prior year’s appraised value). If the trial

court determines that the current tax year’s market value is the same as or less than

the preceding tax year’s appraised value, then a statutory cap plays no role in

determining the current year’s appraised value because there would be no increase

11
“Market value” is “the price the property will bring when offered for sale by one
who desires to sell, but is not obligated to sell, and is bought by one who desires to
buy, but is under no necessity of buying.” City of Harlingen v. Estate of
Sharboneau, 48 S.W.3d 177, 182 (Tex. 2001) (citation modified); see TEX. TAX
CODE § 1.04(7) (defining “market value” to mean “price at which a property would
transfer for cash or its equivalent under prevailing market conditions” when certain
listed conditions are met). An appraiser determining market value “must use
‘generally accepted appraisal methods,’ and the Tax Code endorses specific kinds
of appraisal methods for determining market value.” Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill,
Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 755 (Tex. 2024) (quoting TEX.
TAX CODE § 23.01(b)).
14
in the appraised value. See TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231(d) (placing cap on increase in

property’s appraised value). In those circumstances, a property’s appraised value

and the market value are the same amount. See Cherokee Water, 801 S.W.2d at 877

(“Appraised value according to law is fair market value.”).

Here, the Property’s 2024 market value has not yet been determined in the de

novo trial court proceedings. Even if the Property otherwise qualifies under the

statute, the Circuit Breaker Limitation will not affect the Property’s 2024 appraised

value if its 2024 market value is found to be the same as or less than the 2023

appraised value of $4,975,000. See TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231(d).

We note that in its first summary-judgment ground, WDI asserted that the

Property’s correct 2024 market value is $4,859,794, an amount less than the 2023

appraised value of $4,975,000. WDI offered summary-judgment evidence to

support that amount. Although the trial court denied summary judgment, the fact

finder may ultimately find that amount—or another amount less than $4,975,000—

to be the Property’s 2024 market value. If that occurs, then the Circuit Breaker

Statute will not affect the Property’s 2024 appraised value because there will be no

increase in the appraised value from 2023. See id.

Given that the 2024 market value has not yet been judicially determined, the

issue raised by the question certified by the trial court—whether the Circuit Breaker

Limitation caps the Property’s appraised value for tax year 2024 to no more than 20

15
percent above the Property’s appraised value for tax year 2023—is not ripe for

review. An issue is not ripe when its resolution depends on “uncertain or contingent

future events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.” See Perry

v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2001) (citing Patterson v. Planned Parenthood

of Hous. & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex. 1998)). Here, the resolution

of the issue presented by the certified question depends on “uncertain or contingent

future events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.” See id.;

Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442. Specifically, the resolution depends on the trial

court’s de novo determination of the Property’s 2024 market value. Thus, the issue

raised by the certified question is not ripe for review.

WDI argues that the issue is ripe because the “2023 and 2024 appraised values

are already in the record.” But WDI’s claim of excessive appraisal for the 2024 tax

year will be resolved in a trial de novo without deference to the ARB’s determination

of the Property’s 2024 appraised value. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, 694 S.W.3d at

756. During the de novo proceeding, the 2024 appraised value for Property will be

determined “based on the evidence” presented, not based on the 2024 appraised

value “already in the record.” See id.

WDI also points out that the parties’ dispute centers on whether a property’s

2023 appraised value or its 2024 appraised value is used to determine whether a

property’s value is under the $5 million ceiling set for a property to qualify under

16
the Circuit Breaker Limitation. See TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231(b), (j). WDI argues

that the dispute is ripe for appellate review because it involves statutory

interpretation.

But even if the 2023 appraised value is the proper value to determine whether

the Property qualifies for the Circuit Breaker Limitation, a determination of whether

the Property’s 2024 market value is above its 2023 appraised value must first be

made in the de novo proceedings. If the 2024 market value is not above the 2023

appraised value—as WDI advocated in the first ground of its summary-judgment

motion—then the Circuit Breaker Limitation plays no role in determining the 2024

appraised value because there would be no increase in the appraised value to trigger

the statute’s application. See id. § 23.231(d). Thus, irrespective of the whether the

Property qualifies under the $5 million ceiling, the issue presented by the trial court’s

certified question is not ripe for review.12

12
We also observe that the phrasing of the certified question—whether the Circuit
Breaker Limitation caps the Property’s appraised value for tax year 2024 to no more
than 20 percent above the Property’s appraised value for tax year 2023—itself
implies that the litigation will continue in the trial court after appellate review.
Answering the question in WDI’s favor by determining that the maximum amount
of the increase is 20 percent above the Property’s 2023 appraised value would still
require the trial court to determine the precise amount of the increase. And that
amount could be less than a 20 percent increase. See TEX. TAX CODE § 23.231(d)
(providing that appraised value may be increased by 20 percent above preceding
year’s appraised value or by market value for most recent tax year that amount was
determined, whichever is less). “When other issues are left pending in the litigation,
ultimate termination of the litigation is not advanced by allowing immediate appeal
of an otherwise interlocutory order.” Wholesale, Inc. v. Hous. Specialty Ins. Co.,
17
Finally, WDI contends that, if it is granted permission to appeal the amended

summary judgment order, no further litigation would be required. WDI points to

Yetiv’s declaration offered with its motion for permissive appeal. Yetiv averred that,

if WDI prevailed on appeal, “resulting in a maximum value for WDI’s property of

$5,970,000, that will end this case” because WDI would agree to that value, pay its

2024 property taxes on that value, and dismiss the suit.

Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.3 requires WDI “[to] argue clearly and

concisely why the [amended summary judgment order] involves a controlling

question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion

and how an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4). Here, WDI provides

no argument that its unilateral, conditional statement would be enforceable if it

decides, post-appeal, to seek a lower appraised value than a 20 percent increase.

And, even if it is enforceable, WDI provides no argument showing how its statement

empowers this Court to provide an advisory opinion on an unripe issue that it cannot

otherwise address. See Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 443 (explaining that courts “are

not empowered to give advisory opinions” and “prohibition extends to cases that are

not yet ripe”).

No. 01-23-00867-CV, 2024 WL 234745, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Jan.
23, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation modified).
18
Conclusion

For the reasons detailed above, we conclude that WDI has not met the

requirements for permissive appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(d),

(g). Because the issue presented by the certified question is not ripe, WDI has not

shown that the question is a controlling question of law or that an immediate appeal

from the amended summary judgment order may materially advance the ultimate

termination of the litigation. See TEX. R. APP. P. 28.3(e)(4). Accordingly, we deny

WDI’s petition.

Andrew Johnson
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.

19