In the Matter of D. L. A. v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued February 26, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00246-CV
NO. 01-24-00247-CV
———————————
IN THE MATTER OF D. L. A.

On Appeal from the 314th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2022-01509J
Trial Court Case No. 2022-01510J

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant D.L.A., a juvenile, appeals from the trial court’s orders finding

that he engaged in delinquent conduct by committing robbery against two

complainants. In one issue, appellant argues the trial court erred by denying his

motion for directed verdict because the evidence was legally insufficient to show
that he committed robbery. We affirm the trial court’s judgment because the

complainants’ testimony alone was sufficient to show that D.L.A. committed

robbery.

Background

Around 6:00 p.m. on August 15, 2022, Gloria Castillo parked her car in the

Burlington Coat Factory parking lot on South Post Oak in southwest Houston. She

turned off the engine and was reaching for her purse when she felt someone pulling

on her door and trying to open it. When she turned to look, she saw a young man in

a “red hoodie” pointing a weapon at her. He was aiming a gun at her and

demanding that she open the door. Castillo was afraid and “thought he was going

to shoot at me.” Castillo testified the man who held the gun was accompanied by

another young man wearing a yellow sweatshirt. Castillo did not open the door,

and the man did not enter the car.

Sam Melrose, a supervisor at Burlington had just left work and was sitting in

his car near Castillo’s car around 6:00 p.m. that day. He saw two young black men

run in front of him and approach Castillo’s vehicle. He saw one of them point a

gun at Castillo’s window and, though his car doors were closed, he heard them

yelling at her and telling her to get out of the car. He recalled that the young men

were about the same height, and one was wearing a yellow pullover or sweater.

After about a minute, Melrose got out of his car and told them to stop.

2
The two men then approached Melrose and demanded his keys. Melrose

testified that they pointed the gun at him and threatened to shoot. Melrose

recognized the men, generally, because he had been tracking them for weeks as

part of his job and in relation to other incidents.1 Melrose assumed the gun might

be fake, but he was nevertheless afraid that he would be hurt. When he refused to

give them his keys, they grabbed him, and the man in the yellow sweater hit him

on the head with the gun. The gun broke, and the pieces fell to the ground. Melrose

began to laugh in relief while still wrestling with the man who had hit him. The

other man said, “Let’s leave,” to Melrose’s assailant, and the two men walked

away.

A short time later, two young black men, one wearing a “black hoodie” and

the other wearing a “yellow hoodie,” stole a blue Nissan Rogue SUV at gunpoint

from a woman in the parking lot of Food Town grocery store on Fondren Road in

southwest Houston, about ten minutes from the Burlington Coat Factory parking

lot. Later the same day, video surveillance recorded D.L.A. get out of a blue SUV

at the Chevron on Hiram Clarke Road. He was wearing a “yellow hoodie,” and he

took a woman’s purse.

1
Melrose testified that, although it was unconfirmed, it was his belief that D.L.A.
and his accomplice had been seen on surveillance footage from Burlington Coat
Factory on more than one day. He recognized the yellow “hoodie” or sweater as
having been worn more than once.
3
The Houston Police Department was investigating serial robberies in the

southwest Houston area, and it located the stolen blue Nissan Rogue parked near

an apartment on Taintor Street, which was in the middle of a larger apartment

complex near West Airport Road and Hiram Clarke Road. On August 18, 2022, a

Houston Police officer conducting surveillance in an unmarked car observed

D.L.A. put a black backpack in the Nissan Rogue, pick up a second man, who had

medium-length dreadlocks, and drive away. The officer asked other officers in the

immediate area to initiate a felony traffic stop because they knew the vehicle was

stolen. When marked police cars attempted to pull the vehicle over, a short pursuit

ensued and ended in a crash. D.L.A., the man with the dreadlocks, and a third man

who had been in the backseat were apprehended after they fled on foot. The Nissan

Rogue was towed to a “vehicle exam building” for processing, where the police

found a yellow hoodie, a black backpack, and a pellet gun inside the backpack.

After D.L.A. was arrested, and in light of the circumstantial evidence,

officers prepared a photographic array from which both Castillo and Melrose

identified D.L.A. Both Castillo and Melrose also identified D.L.A. in open court.

Castillo said he was the person who pointed the gun at her. Melrose said D.L.A.

was the person who physically attacked him. In addition, the surveillance officer

identified D.L.A. in court as the person who drove the blue Nissan Rogue on

August 18, 2022.

4
The State charged D.L.A. with delinquent conduct by two petitions, one

alleging that he committed the robbery of Castillo (Cause No. 2022-01509J) and

Melrose (Cause No. 2022-1510J). The trial court held an adjudication hearing at

which Castillo and Melrose testified, along with a Houston Police Department

detective who administered the photographic lineups, the HPD crime scene

investigator who examined the Nissan Rogue and collected evidence, a former

HPD detective who compiled the photo arrays after D.L.A. was arrested, and a

witness to the robbery of the Nissan Rogue. Although Castillo and Melrose

identified D.L.A. both before and during trial, the State also presented evidence

about the robbery of the Nissan Rogue, the purse-snatching at the gas station, and

the final apprehension of D.L.A. after police tracked down the stolen Nissan

Rogue.

Throughout trial, D.L.A.’s attorney repeatedly objected to the admission of

exhibits related to the extraneous offenses on the grounds that it was improper

character evidence related to D.L.A.’s alleged “character” for wearing a yellow

hoodie and that the exhibits, such as aerial maps showing the relative locations

where events transpired or photographs of the Nissan Rogue, did not include

images of D.L.A. or directly link D.L.A. to the robberies of Castillo and Melrose.

The State argued that the extraneous offense evidence was offered for the purpose

5
of identity, to connect D.L.A. to the Castillo and Melrose robberies. The court

admitted the evidence.

At the close of evidence, D.L.A. moved for a directed verdict. His counsel

argued that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.L.A. was the

perpetrator of the robberies of Castillo and Melrose. He argued that inconsistencies

in Castillo’s testimony rendered her in-court identification unreliable. Castillo

prefaced some of her affirmative answers to questioning with the word “possibly,”

she testified that the man who aimed a gun at her wore a red hoodie, and she said

she did not see the man who wore a yellow hoodie. D.L.A. pointed out that

Melrose said it was difficult to identify the accomplice because he was wearing a

mask. D.L.A. argued that the crime scene investigator who examined and collected

evidence from the Nissan Rogue testified that he could not directly link D.L.A. to

any item found in the vehicle or to the robberies of Castillo and Melrose. Finally,

D.L.A. argued that the court should grant his directed verdict because the evidence

was circumstantial, not direct.

The trial court denied the directed verdict. The trial court found that D.L.A.

had engaged in delinquent conduct. The court made the following special findings:

“That [D.L.A.] need[s] a highly structured environment with a level of supervision

and control that cannot be met by resources available in the community.” The trial

6
court rendered a disposition of commitment to the Texas Juvenile Justice

Department.

D.L.A. appealed.

Analysis

In his sole issue, D.L.A. argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

denying his motion for directed verdict. He maintains that the trial court

improperly admitted several of the State’s exhibits, in particular photographs

depicting a yellow sweatshirt allegedly worn by D.L.A. on August 15, 2022, in an

attempt to prove that D.L.A. committed the robberies against Castillo and Melrose.

He argues that the exhibits did not identify him or link him to the robberies of

Castillo and Melrose.

I. We review legal sufficiency issues in juvenile cases using the same
standard applicable to criminal cases.

“The Legislature enacted the Juvenile Justice Code as a separate system for

the prosecution, adjudication, sentencing, and detention of juvenile offenders to

protect the public and provide for the wholesome moral, mental, and physical

development of delinquent children.” In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. 2009);

see TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.01. “The Code covers the proceedings in all cases

involving a child’s delinquent conduct.” Hall, 286 S.W.3d at 927; see TEX. FAM.

CODE § 51.04(a). Juvenile courts generally have exclusive original jurisdiction

over proceedings involving delinquent conduct by a person who was a child at the

7
time that he engaged in the conduct. Hall, 286 S.W.3d at 927. Generally, the

Juvenile Justice Code defines a “child” as a person who is ten years of age or older

and under seventeen.2 TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.02(2). As relevant to this case,

delinquent conduct is defined as “conduct, other than a traffic offense, that violates

a penal law of this state or of the United States punishable by imprisonment or by

confinement in jail.” Id. § 51.03(a)(1).

Although juvenile cases are classified as civil proceedings, they are “quasi-

criminal” in nature. In re M.A.F., 966 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1998); see In re

L.D.C., 400 S.W.3d 572, 574 (Tex. 2013). Civil and criminal rules apply at

different stages of the same proceeding. In re I.F.M., 525 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 51.17. For

example, procedure in a juvenile delinquency proceeding is set forth by the Texas

Family Code. In a juvenile proceeding, the trial court first conducts an adjudication

hearing for a factfinder to determine whether the juvenile engaged in delinquent

conduct. TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.03. If the factfinder determines that the juvenile

engaged in delinquent conduct, then the trial court conducts a disposition hearing.

Id. § 54.03(h). “Disposition is akin to sentencing and is used to honor the non-

criminal character of the [juvenile] proceedings.” In re B.D.S.D., 289 S.W.3d 889,

2
D.L.A. was sixteen years old at the time of the offenses alleged in the petitions.
8
893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (internal quotations

omitted).

On the other hand, the burden of proof in a juvenile-adjudication proceeding

is beyond a reasonable doubt, not a preponderance of the evidence. Moon v. State,

451 S.W.3d 28, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). “Although juvenile [adjudication]

proceedings are civil matters, the standard applicable in criminal matters [i.e.,

proof beyond a reasonable doubt] is used to assess the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying a finding the juvenile engaged in delinquent conduct.” In re R.R., 373

S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied); see also

TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.03(f) (“The child shall be presumed to be innocent of the

charges against the child and no finding that a child has engaged in delinquent

conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may be returned unless the

state has proved such beyond a reasonable doubt.”).

Accordingly, we review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding

that a juvenile engaged in delinquent conduct using the standard applicable to

criminal cases. R.R., 373 S.W.3d at 734. In criminal cases, a challenge to the denial

of a motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the legal sufficiency of

the evidence and is reviewed under the same standard. Williams v. State, 937

S.W.2d 479, 482 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Wharton v. State, 711 S.W.3d 92, 101

9
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. ref’d), cert. denied, No. 25-5977, 2025

WL 3507076 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2025).3

Every criminal conviction must be supported by legally sufficient evidence

as to each element of the offense that the State is required to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Adames v.

State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). To determine whether this

standard has been met, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

verdict and decide whether a rational factfinder could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Brooks

v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899–902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Our standard of

review applies to cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence. R.R.,

373 S.W.3d at 735.

3
In his brief, D.L.A. states that “the directed verdict ruling against him lacks legal
sufficiency in the context of an elevated abuse of discretion review.” In an appeal
from a disposition order under Family Code section 54.04, we first review any
challenged findings for sufficient evidence and then review the disposition
decision for an abuse of discretion. In re J.H., 698 S.W.3d 101, 106 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, no pet.). “This standard is faithful to the requirement
that juvenile courts make certain statutory findings while also acknowledging the
juvenile courts’ broad discretion in assessing an appropriate disposition.” Id.; see
also In re J.P., 136 S.W.3d 629, 630–31 (Tex. 2004) (discussing the requirement
of statutory findings); In re K.H., 682 S.W.3d 567, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (“A juvenile court has broad discretion to determine a
suitable disposition for a juvenile who has been adjudicated as having engaged in
delinquent behavior.”). In this case, D.L.A. has challenged only the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s adjudication, not the disposition to the
Texas Juvenile Justice Department. Therefore, we apply a sufficiency of the
evidence standard of review to determine the sole issue raised in this appeal, not
an abuse of discretion standard.
10
The factfinder is the sole judge of “the facts proved, and of the weight to be

given to the testimony.” See Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008). Thus, an appellate court does not resolve any conflict of fact, weigh

any evidence, or evaluate the credibility of any witnesses, as this is the function of

the factfinder. See Adames, 353 S.W.3d at 860; Wiley v. State, 388 S.W.3d 807,

813 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d). We presume that the

factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict, and we defer

to that resolution. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

II. Legally sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the
motion for directed verdict.

D.L.A.’s defensive theory at trial and on appeal is that he was not the person

who robbed Castillo and Melrose. He argues that the trial court improperly

admitted evidence of extraneous offenses that deprived him of a fair trial and

caused the court to erroneously deny his motion for directed verdict. In the trial

court, D.L.A.’s motion for directed verdict was based on (1) inconsistencies in

Castillo’s and Melrose’s testimony and (2) the allegedly erroneous admission of

evidence. D.L.A. specifically argued in the trial court about the admission of

Exhibit 17 (a photograph of the rear, exterior of the Nissan Rogue), Exhibit 19 (a

photograph showing a black backpack with yellow hoodie on top of it on the front

passenger seat), Exhibit 20 (a close up photograph of the black backpack and

yellow hoodie on the front passenger seat), and Exhibit 21 (a photograph of the

11
black backpack on a white background), Exhibit 22 (a photograph of the black

backpack, partially opened, showing blue gloves inside), Exhibit 23 (a photograph

of the black backpack and its contents, including the black pellet gun, on a white

background), and 24 (there is no exhibit 24).

A. The Testimony

The trial court, as factfinder, was the sole judge of the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. See Bartlett, 270 S.W.3d at 150.

In fulfilling that role, the court was entitled to resolve any inconsistencies in the

testimony and to find credible both Castillo’s and Melrose’s in court identifications

of D.L.A. See Romano v. State, 610 S.W.3d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (“The

fact-finder is responsible for judging the credibility of witnesses and may find

credible all, some, or none of the testimony that the witnesses give.”). The

testimony of a single eyewitness can be sufficient to support a felony conviction.

Aguilar v. State, 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Floyd v. State, No.

02-22-00082-CR, 2023 WL 2033831, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 16,

2023) (mem. op., not designated for publication), aff’d, 714 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2024). And a victim’s in-court identification of a defendant can be sufficient

to support a robbery conviction, even when there were inconsistencies between the

victim’s prior and in-court descriptions of the defendant and his accomplice.

Bowden v. State, 628 S.W.2d 782, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).

12
Castillo testified that the person who pointed the gun at her wore a red

hoodie, however, at trial she said she remembered his face, and then she identified

D.L.A. as the person who pointed the gun at her and tried to get into her car.

Likewise, Melrose identified D.L.A. as the person who assaulted him after trying

to gain entry to Castillo’s car. Because our standard of review requires us to defer

to the factfinder’s determinations, we conclude that a rational factfinder could have

found beyond a reasonable doubt that D.L.A. is the person who robbed Castillo

and Melrose based on their in court identification of him. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at

318–19; Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 901–02. Therefore, the evidence was legally

sufficient.

B. The Exhibits

In arguing his oral motion for directed verdict in the trial court, D.L.A. relied

on two grounds to support his contention that the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that D.L.A. “was the perpetrator in these two cases.” First,

D.L.A.’s counsel argued about Castillo’s and Melrose’s testimony, which we

addressed in section II.A. above. Second, he argued about some exhibits, saying:

Finally, we have the evidence from today from the primary
investigator and the secondary investigator who had the evidence
especially in Exhibits 20—17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24. Mr. Matos
[the crime scene investigator for the Houston Forensic Science Center
who photographed the Nissan Rogue and its contents] was unable to
link my client to any of those items of clothing or the gun or anything
else to the actual crimes that my client is accused of, Judge.

13
And for that reason, it has cast doubt on the whole
proceeding . . . .

On appeal, D.L.A. raised only a single issue: that the trial court erred by

denying his motion for directed verdict. D.L.A. did not raise an issue challenging

the trial court’s admission of evidence, arguing that he was harmed by the

admission of evidence, and seeking a new trial based on the allegedly erroneous

admission of evidence. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 314 S.W.3d 118, 135 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.) (remanding for new trial after concluding

that erroneous admission of evidence was harmful under Texas Rule of Appellate

Procedure 44.2(b)). Instead, D.L.A. argued that the trial court should have granted

his motion for a directed verdict because it improperly admitted 18 exhibits over

his objection. These 18 exhibits included the five exhibits (photographs of the

Nissan Rogue, inside and outside, and its contents) that he mentioned in his oral

motion for directed verdict in the trial court. “[A] challenge to the denial of a

motion for a directed verdict is not the appropriate vehicle for challenging the

admissibility of evidence.” Carroll v. State, No. 14-14-00178-CR, 2015 WL

4984961, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 20, 2015, no pet.) (mem.

op.; not designated for publication).

Moreover, when examining the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate

court considers “all of the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces of evidence

that may have been improperly admitted.” Parker v. State, 727 S.W.3d 38, 51
14
(Tex. Crim. App. 2025); Ragsdale v. State, 713 S.W.3d 435, 454 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (rejecting argument that evidence would be

legally insufficient if allegedly improperly admitted evidence was ignored because

court of appeals considers all evidence when conducting legal sufficiency review).

This is so because “[o]ur duty as a reviewing court is merely to ensure the evidence

presented actually supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime.”

Carroll, 2015 WL 4984961, at *2; see Ragsdale, 713 S.W.3d at 453 (“Our role is

that of a due process safeguard, and we consider only whether the factfinder

reached a rational decision.”).

We have already concluded that the court reached a rational decision based

on the testimony of Castillo and Melrose, which we found to be legally sufficient

in section II.A., above. We hold therefore that the trial court did not err by denying

the motion for directed verdict. We overrule D.L.A.’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Susanna Dokupil
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Caughey and Dokupil.

15