Darius Castille v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued May 28, 2026.

In the

Court of Appeals
for the

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-24-00418-CR
———————————
DARIUS CASTILLE, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 180th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 1730955

OPINION

A jury found appellant Darius Castille guilty of murder, and the trial court

sentenced him to 45 years’ imprisonment. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02. During the

trial, appellant—who is paraplegic and wheelchair-bound—was shackled. In his sole

issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by requiring appellant to remain
shackled, over objection, in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights

under the United States Constitution. Regardless of whether the jury perceived

appellant’s shackles, on this record, we hold that the trial court’s error was harmless

even under the more rigorous harm analysis applicable to constitutional errors. The

evidence of appellant’s guilt was overwhelming, appellant admitted to shooting the

complainant and did not argue he did so in self-defense, appellant’s trial counsel

specifically asked that appellant be convicted of the lesser-included offense of felony

murder instead of capital murder, and the jury convicted appellant of the lesser-

included offense—as appellant requested—and rejected the State’s theory of capital

murder. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Use of Shackles During Jury Trial

On July 11, 2021, appellant was charged by information with the capital

murder of complainant Marcesa Lewis, who was shot and killed in the early hours

of that same day. TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03. A grand jury later returned an

indictment charging appellant with capital murder. Appellant was tried and

convicted of the lesser-included offense of murder. Throughout his criminal trial,

appellant—who is paraplegic and wheelchair-bound—was shackled at the legs. At

appellant’s election, the trial court assessed punishment.

In his sole issue, appellant contends that the trial court erred by requiring his

legs to remain shackled during trial in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth

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Amendment rights. He argues that the trial court failed to make any particularized

findings that justified the use of shackles and that his shackles were visible to the

jury, requiring reversal. The State responds that the trial court made sufficient

findings to justify the use of shackles, the shackles were not visible to the jury, and

any error was harmless.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

The United States Constitution forbids the routine and visible shackling of

defendants during a criminal jury trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005);

Ex parte Chavez, 560 S.W.3d 191, 201 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Bell v. State, 415

S.W.3d 278, 281-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The visible shackling of criminal

defendants during trial “undermines the presumption of innocence and the related

fairness of the factfinding process.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 630. Even if the shackles are

not visible to the jury, criminal defendants have a common-law right to be free of

restraints during trial. Chavez, 560 S.W.3d at 202. However, a criminal defendant’s

constitutional and common-law rights to appear at trial unbound “may be overcome

in a particular instance by essential state interests such as physical security, escape

prevention, or courtroom decorum.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 628; Chavez, 560 S.W.3d at

202 (noting that common-law right may be overcome if restraints are “necessary for

a particular defendant in a particular proceeding”). We review the trial court’s

decision to shackle appellant for abuse of discretion. See Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 281

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(noting that decision to shackle a defendant is committed to “trial [court] judge’s

discretion”). “When the record fails to detail the grounds for restraint, a trial [court]

judge errs in ordering a defendant shackled.” Id.

B. Abuse of Discretion

Prior to voir dire, appellant’s counsel noted that appellant was shackled,

objected to the use of shackles, and requested that appellant be unshackled. In

response, the trial court discussed with the bailiff:

THE COURT: What’s the policy?

THE BAILIFF: The policy, he’s not shackled to the table. He’s just
shackled with his legs—

THE COURT: That’s fine.

THE BAILIFF: Yes, sir.

Appellant’s counsel then notified the trial court that appellant is paralyzed.

The trial court stated, “I usually don’t get into the business of the Harris County

Sheriff’s security matters. . . . I’m not going to get in their business like that.”

Appellant’s counsel persisted in objecting, but appellant’s shackles were not

removed. The trial court deferred to the Harris County Sherriff’s Office’s “policy,”

pursuant to which appellant was shackled. The contours of the policy and how it

applied to appellant are not part of the record. Other than deferring to that policy,

the trial court did not make any findings on the record that justified shackling

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appellant during trial. The trial court stated only that he would not “get into the

business of the Harris County Sheriff’s security matters.”

Generalized concerns for courtroom security do not justify the shackling of a

criminal defendant during trial. Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 283. In Long v. State, 823

S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that

a trial court abused its discretion in ordering a criminal defendant shackled when it

failed to “make specific findings of fact justifying the use of shackles” and only

“stated in the record general concerns regarding security because appellant was

charged with capital murder.” 823 S.W.2d at 283. Two decades later, in Bell, the

court of criminal appeals held it was “clearly error to order [appellant] shackled

during his trial” where the trial court found only that “[e]verybody who is in custody

has the same necessity of restraint.” 415 S.W.3d at 283.

Here, the trial court did not make any findings specific to appellant or take

into account the fact that appellant—who was shackled at the legs—is paraplegic

and wheelchair-bound. The trial court’s decision to keep appellant shackled rested

solely on the Harris County Sheriff’s Office’s “policy,” not on any findings

particular to appellant. Reliance on a policy without consideration of a criminal

defendant’s particular circumstances constitutes no more than “general concerns”

for security, a rationale that the court of criminal appeals rejected in Long and Bell.

See Long, 823 S.W.2d at 283; Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 283; see also Deck, 544 U.S. at

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634-35 (holding that mere conviction of capital murder was not sufficient reason to

justify trial court’s decision to shackle defendant during punishment phase);

Gennusa v. State, No. 01-22-00519-CR, 2023 WL 5436395, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (concluding that trial court abused its discretion in ordering defendant

shackled where trial court relied on “general policy of leaving restraints on people

who were ‘in custody’”).1 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion by overruling appellant’s objections to being shackled.

C. Harmless Error

Without making any particularized findings, or identifying an essential state

interest, the trial court ordered a paraplegic man shackled at the legs during his

criminal trial. The trial court’s error is serious. However, we are required to review

the error for harmlessness. Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 283-84.

1
The State argues that we should not find error at all because Gennusa v. State, No.
01-22-00519-CR, 2023 WL 5436395 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24,
2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication), is an unpublished
decision without precedential value. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7(a). The State does not
address the facts of Long v. State, 823 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), Bell v.
State, 415 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), or Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622
(2005), all of which the State references in its brief. In each of those cases, the court
of criminal appeals or the United States Supreme Court concluded that the trial court
abused its discretion by relying on only generalized concerns for security. See Long,
823 S.W.2d at 283; Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 283; Deck, 544 U.S. at 634-35. The State
also does not address the fact that appellant is paraplegic and was shackled at his
legs.

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When “the record shows a reasonable probability that the jury was aware of

the defendant’s shackles,” the error is a constitutional one that requires reversal

unless we “determine[] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute

to the conviction or punishment.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a); Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 282.

If the record does not show a reasonable probability that the jury was aware of

appellant’s shackles, we consider whether the error affected his substantial rights

and whether such error “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the

jury’s decision to convict appellant. Mason v. State, 322 S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b)); see Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 283-84

(noting that rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure guides proper

harm analysis for non-constitutional error). Because we conclude that the trial

court’s error was harmless even under the more rigorous standard applicable to

constitutional errors, we do not address whether the jury perceived appellant’s

shackles. See Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 283 (noting that, when court of appeals held error

harmless under constitutional-error harm analysis, it “logically held that” shackling

“did not affect [appellant’s] substantial rights”).

When reviewing constitutional errors for harm, factors we consider include

(a) “the nature of the error,” (b) “whether it was emphasized by the State,” (c) “the

probable implications of the error,” and (d) “the weight the jury would likely have

assigned to it in the course of its deliberations.” Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815,

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822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Ultimately, the “harmless-error inquiry under Rule

44.2(a) should adhere strictly to the question of whether the error committed in a

particular case contributed to the verdict obtained in that case.” Id. at 821. We do

not deem error “harmless simply because” we are “confident that the result the jury

reached was objectively correct or that, in any event, the jury could have reached the

same result no matter how much the error may have facilitated that resolution.” Id.

at 819.

Here, the State argued that appellant committed capital murder and principally

relied on the theory that appellant intentionally killed complainant in the course of

committing a robbery. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.03(a)(2). Appellant’s counsel

argued to the jury that the evidence did not support the State’s capital-murder theory.

He contended that appellant did not rob or attempt to rob complainant, but neither

appellant nor his trial counsel shied from the fact that appellant shot and killed

complainant. In his opening statement, appellant’s counsel informed the jury that the

evidence would show that appellant killed complainant and asked that, as between

murder and capital murder, the jury find appellant guilty of the lesser-included

offense of murder:

We’re going to ask you to see it for exactly what it is. It’s a murder. It’s
a murder. Because if you assault somebody, like he did, you can’t turn
around and claim self-defense. So you’re not going to hear evidence of
self-defense. . . . Then you’re going to have to make a decision of what
kind of murder this is. . . . We’re not going to ask you to find him not
guilty and send him home. That’s not what’s going to happen in this
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case. . . . [W]hen you deliberate in this case, we’re going to ask you to
find him guilty of murder, felony murder. And felony murder is what
we think and we believe the judge will charge you with if you don’t
believe it’s capital murder. . . . He is willing to accept responsibility for
that and take the punishment that’s going to be dealt to him by this
judge.

Appellant’s counsel restated his request that the jury find appellant guilty of

felony murder, instead of capital murder, in his closing argument. Additionally,

when testifying, appellant admitted to shooting the complainant and did not contend

that he did so in self-defense. Appellant testified that he struck complainant with a

handgun, complainant then pulled out a handgun, and both appellant and

complainant shot each other, resulting in complainant’s death and appellant’s

paralysis. Appellant testified, “I shot him,” referring to complainant. Video

surveillance admitted at trial confirmed that appellant drew a gun on complainant

and shot him. Appellant denied that he intended to rob complainant or attempted to

do so. Rather, he was merely upset with complainant for selling him “fake” pills and

wanted to confront complainant. The jury apparently agreed with appellant,

convicted him of murder, and rejected the State’s theory of capital murder. See

Fernandez v. State, No. 14-13-00376-CR, 2015 WL 778482, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 24, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (applying constitutional harm analysis and holding that error in

admitting appellant’s confession to extraneous offense, which court noted “offends

the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” was harmless beyond

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reasonable doubt where appellant confessed to shooting complainant, trial counsel

urged jury to “convict appellant of murder, not capital murder,” and appellant was

convicted of murder).

In determining whether the error was harmless, we may also consider whether

the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 356-57 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2002); Beck v. State, 712 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986);

Zepeda v. State, No. 11-14-00254-CR, 2016 WL 3923905, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—

Eastland July 14, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (relying

on overwhelming evidence of guilt to find shackling error harmless); see United

States v. McGill, 815 F.3d 846, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that error in

defendants’ wearing stun belts was harmless because of, in part, “the overwhelming

weight of evidence against” defendants); Lakin v. Stine, 431 F.3d 959, 966 (6th Cir.

2005) (holding that error in shackling defendant was harmless where evidence of

guilt was “overwhelming”); see also United States v. Cazares, 788 F.3d 956, 966

n.1 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that unconstitutional shackling cannot be prejudicial if

evidence of guilt is overwhelming).2

2
When, as here, we “address the merits of a federal claim,” i.e. the violation of a
federal constitutional right, our decision “must accord with federal law.” Ex parte
Argent, 393 S.W.3d 781, 784 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In determining whether a
constitutional shackling error is harmless, we are bound by the United States
Supreme Court to determine “beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635 (2005)
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Our state’s standard for
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As discussed, the record shows that:

• The jury saw video evidence of appellant’s drawing a gun on complainant
and complainant’s walking away from appellant with a bloody shirt;

• Appellant testified that he wanted to “beat” up complainant;

• Appellant admitted that he “hit [complainant] with the gun” that appellant
was wielding and then shot complainant;

• Appellant’s counsel requested that the jury convict appellant of murder,
not capital murder; and

• The jury apparently agreed with appellant that he did not rob or attempt to
rob complainant and convicted appellant of murder, as appellant’s counsel
requested.
See Zepeda, 2016 WL 3923905, at *2-3 (holding that error in shackling defendant

was harmless where he admitted to hitting and hurting complainant and was

convicted of aggravated assault); Fernandez, 2015 WL 778482, at *6 (holding that

error in admitting appellant’s confession to extraneous offense was harmless where

appellant confessed to shooting complainant and jury returned verdict that appellant

requested). Based on this record, we determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the

erroneous shackling of appellant did not contribute to his conviction.3

harmlessness for non-constitutional errors likewise derives from federal law.
Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
3
Because we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court’s error did not
contribute to appellant’s conviction, we necessarily conclude that the error did not
affect appellant’s substantial rights under the less rigorous harm analysis applicable
to non-constitutional errors. See Bell, 415 S.W.3d at 284 (noting that, when court of
appeals held error harmless under constitutional-error harm analysis, it “logically
held that” shackling “did not affect [appellant’s] substantial rights”).

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We overrule appellant’s sole issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Amparo “Amy” Guerra
Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Guerra and Guiney.

Publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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