Carlin David Staples, Jr. v. the State of Texas

Opinion issued May 28, 2026

In The

Court of Appeals
For The

First District of Texas
————————————
NO. 01-25-00468-CR
———————————
CARLIN DAVID STAPLES, JR., Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 149th District Court
Brazoria County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 103816-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Carlin David Staples, Jr. pled guilty to four counts of the felony

offense of sexual abuse of a child, enhanced by four prior felony convictions. A

jury assessed his punishment at eighty years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine for

each of the four counts. The trial court ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
In two issues on appeal, Staples argues the trial court abused its discretion by

(1) admitting unauthenticated recorded jail phone calls during the punishment

phase of trial, and (2) ordering that the sentences run consecutively, resulting in a

punishment that is “grossly disproportionate” to the crimes committed.

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background1

Staples was thirty-eight years old when he met A.D.P, who was then

fourteen or fifteen years old.2 Staples moved into the trailer where A.P.D. lived

with her family. A.P.D. testified that she and Staples had sex every day in the

trailer for about two months. She became pregnant around the time of her high

school homecoming.3 A.P.D. testified that she believed she was in love with

Staples during the sexual encounters. She testified that Staples gave her

methamphetamines sometimes before and after they had sex to make the

experience better.

1
In this opinion, we use initials for the complainant to protect her privacy. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 58.152 (permitting the use of pseudonyms for the victims
of certain crimes).
2
At the time of trial, Staples was forty years old and A.P.D. was seventeen.
3
A.P.D. gave birth to a boy whom she named after Staples. DNA testing indicates
he is the likely father.

2
Staples was indicted on eleven counts of sexual assault of a child, 4 enhanced

by four prior felony convictions: two for burglary of a habitation and two for

assault family violence. Staples pled guilty to four counts5 of sexual assault, a

second-degree felony, which carries a punishment range of two to twenty years in

prison and a fine of up to $10,000. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.33, 22.011(a)(1),

(c)(1), (f). Staples’ previous convictions increased the punishment range to that of

a first-degree felony, which carries a prison term of five to ninety-nine years or life

plus a fine up to $10,000. Id. §§ 12.32, 12.42(b).

The case proceeded to punishment, and a jury sentenced Staples to eighty

years’ confinement and a $10,000 fine for each count. The trial court ordered the

sentences to run consecutively. This appeal followed.

The Telephone Calls

In his first issue, Staples argues the trial court erred in admitting certain

recorded phone calls from the Brazoria County Jail without proper authentication.

Staples argues that admission of the phone calls during the punishment phase of

trial harmed him because they were used, among other things, to establish that if

released, he “would seek out A.P.D. again, purportedly to continue having sex with

her.”

4
See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a) (defining sexual assault); id. § 22.011(c)(1)
defining “child” as person younger than 17 years of age.
5
The State abandoned the remaining counts.

3
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Rule of Evidence 901 governs the authentication of evidence including the

recording of telephone calls. It provides that to “satisfy the requirement of

authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims

it is.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(a); see also Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018) (explaining that Rule 901 “merely requires some evidence

sufficient to support a finding that evidence in question is what the proponent

claims”) (quoting Reed v. State, 811 S.W.2d 582, 587 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).

Rule 901(b)(5) provides that a voice may be authenticated by

[a]n opinion identifying a person’s voice—whether heard firsthand or
through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording—based on
hearing the voice at any time under circumstances that connect it with
the alleged speaker.

TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(5). In addition, the identity of a telephone caller may be

authenticated through

self-identification of the caller coupled with additional evidence such
as the context and timing of the telephone call, the contents of the
statements made during the telephone call, internal patterns and other
distinctive characteristics, and disclosure of knowledge and facts
known particularly to the caller.

Morris v. State, 460 S.W.3d 190, 196 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no

pet.) (citing Mosley v. State, 355 S.W.3d 59, 69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2010, pet. ref’d)). Authenticating evidence may be direct or circumstantial. Butler

4
v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Wallace v. State, 782

S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).

We review the trial court’s ruling on authentication issues for abuse of

discretion. Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 848. Using this deferential standard, we will

uphold a ruling on authentication if the trial court’s ruling is within the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Id. (citing Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001)). Under this liberal standard, “it is the jury’s role ultimately to

determine whether an item of evidence is indeed what its proponent claims; the

trial court need only make the preliminary determination that the proponent of the

item has supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that

the proffered evidence is authentic.” Butler, 459 S.W.3d 595 at 600. That is, the

trial court “need not be persuaded that the proffered evidence is authentic” but

must determine only whether the offering party “has supplied facts that are

sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence he has

proffered is authentic.” Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App.

2012) (citing Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).

B. Admissibility of the Evidence

During the punishment phase of trial, the State sought to admit several

telephone calls Staples made to his wife while in the Brazoria County Jail to shed

light on Staples’ “mindset” during the “several months” before trial. The State

5
called Detective Juanita Cardozo of the Freeport Police Department to authenticate

the recording of the phone calls to Staples’ wife, which were identified as State’s

Exhibit 11. Staples objected to admission of the calls based on hearsay and chain

of custody.6, 7

Our review of the record establishes that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting Exhibit 11 into evidence. Detective Cardozo testified in

response to questioning by the State that she recognized the voice in the calls as

that of Staples, and that the phone calls were made while he was in jail.8 She

testified that inmate calls are routinely recorded, that she has received recordings

of inmate calls in other cases, and that inmate calls are date-stamped:

Q: So you’re aware at the beginning of each of these calls there’s a
message—you would agree with me—that says these calls are
going to be recorded and I think it says they may be used
against you. Correct?

A: Yes, sir.

6
The trial court overruled the hearsay objection based on statements of a party
opponent and because the recordings were not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.
7
Staples only argues on appeal about the telephone call recordings to his wife,
which were admitted as State’s Exhibit 11. He does not complain of the admission
of the telephone call recordings of conversations with his brother, which were
admitted as State’s Exhibit 12.
8
Before Staples objected to the recordings, Detective Cardozo testified that in
addition to recognizing Staples’ voice on the calls, the contents discussed during
the calls “would be the same topics discussed in this case and things of that
nature” and that the recordings were fair and accurate representations of Staples’
conversations in the months before trial.

6
Q: Okay. And each call that was provided to you said the same
thing. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And then the—all the calls you received then are also dated.
Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And those date ranges would fall within the time the defendant
has been incarcerated. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And you’ve listened I would assume to jail calls in other cases
that originated out of the Brazoria County Jail. Correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And the same system is used. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: So is your understanding that they—the calls are automatically
recorded as soon as the defendant starts making them. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And does that seem to be what happened in this case, all the
calls that were provided to you?

A: Yes.

Q: You don’t have any reason to believe that they were not taken
out of the jail—or the phone calls were not recorded from the
jail system. Correct?

A: Correct.

7
Q: And, of course, that would be digitally done. Right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Okay. And then you’re aware that law enforcement agencies,
the D.A.’s Office has access to those particular calls that were
made from the jail. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: They can be then pulled off and put onto media. Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: And is that what happened in this case, that the calls were taken
and then provided to you? Correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. Which would fit with your understanding of how the
system records calls and makes them available. Is that—is that
correct?

A: Yes, sir.

In response to Staples’ questioning, Detective Cardozo testified that she was

not “at the jail or any other place recording the[] telephone calls,” she never

worked for the Brazoria County Sheriff’s Department, and she did not know the

“actual intricacies of how things are recorded” in the Brazoria County jail. In

overruling Staples’ objection and admitting the phone calls into evidence, the trial

court stated:

The trial court need only make a preliminary determination that the
proponent of the evidence has supplied facts sufficient to support a
reasonable jury determination that the proffered evidence is authentic.
8
The jury makes the final determination whether the evidence is what it
proposes to be.

Staples argues on appeal that the lack of witness who was “familiar with the

recording mechanism” at the Brazoria County Jail or who had any personal

knowledge of “how the system operated at the jail, or how the individual

recordings were ‘linked’ up to particular inmates, whether it be through unique

individual pin numbers that they dialed in, or otherwise” should have resulted in

the exclusion of the recorded calls. Staples argues that Detective Cardozo merely

was “handed a disc containing some recordings, listen[ed] to it, and [said,] ‘Yep,

that sounds like the Appellant to me.”’ Staples argues that the underlying

recordings themselves were never authenticated. Staples relies on cases where

jailhouse calls were admitted after they were authenticated through a witness who

was familiar with the recording mechanism at the jail.9

The State relies on our opinion in Garcia v. State, where we held that a

recording of a jailhouse phone call was properly authenticated because (1) there

was evidence the call was made from the Harris County Joint Inmate Processing

9
See Diamond v. State, 496 S.W.3d 124, 142 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, pet. ref’d) (admitting jail phone calls after testimony regarding how calls are
saved into recording system and accessed upon request, but noting that testimony
by officer “that he was familiar with appellant’s voice and that the voice in the
telephone calls belonged to appellant” was “sufficient to authenticate the phone
calls”); Banargent v. State, 228 S.W.3d 393, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, pet. ref’d) (concluding recordings of jail phone calls properly
authenticated through testimony demonstrating how recording system worked and
identifying appellant’s voice).

9
Center when the appellant was there, (2) there was evidence the call was made to a

phone number later called using the appellant’s individual processing number, (3)

the recording included a self-identification because it said the call was from

“Josh,” (4) the call contained facts related to the alleged crime, and (5) the

sponsoring witness, a police officer, testified that she recognized Garcia’s voice on

the call. No. 01-21-00349-CR, 2022 WL 17981855, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

The State argues that the trial did not abuse its discretion because testimony

from an investigator that she recognizes a defendant’s voice from a prior interview

and recognizes the voice in a recording is sufficient to authenticate a recorded jail

call. The State notes that the trial court did not have to be persuaded that the

proffered evidence was authentic, but only that the State supplied facts sufficient to

support a reasonable jury determination that Exhibit 11 was authentic. Relying on

Garcia, the State argues that Detective Cardozo’s testimony was sufficient to meet

this threshold finding because the same factors present in Garcia—voice

identification, call origin, and the self-identification and contextual details—were

present and sufficient to support the trial court’s authenticity ruling. We agree.

The authentication requirement may be satisfied by testimony “identifying a

person’s voice—whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic

transmission or recording—based on hearing the voice at any time under

10
circumstances that connect it with the alleged speaker.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(5);

see Diamond v. State, 496 S.W.3d 124, 142 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2016, pet. ref’d). Indeed, in Garcia, we acknowledged that “testimony from a law

enforcement officer that he was familiar with the appellant’s voice from a prior

interview and that he recognized it in a recorded call has [] been held to be

sufficient to authenticate a recorded jail call.” 2022 WL 17981855, at *4 (citing

Diamond, 496 S.W.3d at 142).

Detective Cardozo testified that she recognized Staples’ voice in the calls,

that the recordings were date-stamped, and that the phone calls were made while

Staples was in jail. She also testified that inmate calls are routinely recorded and

that she has received recordings of inmate calls in other cases. The calls also

provide context indicating it was Staples on the calls. In the calls, Staples is heard

talking to his wife, Nakeda, about his potential sentence, the DNA testing

indicating he fathered A.P.D.’s child, the fact that the child looks like him and their

son when he was born, and A.P.D.’s cooperation with authorities.

We thus conclude that the trial court satisfied its gatekeeping role by finding

the State, as proponent of the evidence, provided facts that were “sufficient to

support a reasonable jury determination that the evidence [it] has proffered is

authentic.” See Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. The trial court thus did not abuse its

discretion in admitting the telephone calls.

11
We overrule Staples’ first issue.

The Sentences

In his second issue, Staples argues that the trial court erred by “stacking” his

four sentences and ordering that they be served consecutively rather than

concurrently.10 He argues that by stacking the sentences, the trial court imposed a

sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed, violating his

rights under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section

13 of the Texas Constitution.11

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s decision to stack sentences, or to order that they

run consecutively, for abuse of discretion. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

42.08(a); Beedy v. State, 194 S.W.3d 595, 597 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2006), aff’d, 250 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).12 An abuse of

discretion generally occurs only if (1) the trial court imposes consecutive sentences

when the law requires concurrent sentences, (2) the trial court imposes concurrent

10
The trial court stacked the prison time but not the fines.
11
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment whereas Article 1, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution
forbids the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII;
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. See Duran v. State, 363 S.W.3d 719, 723–24 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d) (comparing provisions).
12
Article 42.08 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the trial
judge has the discretion to order the sentences for two or more convictions to run
consecutively. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.08(a).

12
sentences when the law requires consecutive ones, or (3) the trial court otherwise

fails to observe the statutory requirements pertaining to sentencing. Beedy, 194

S.W.3d at 597 (citing Nicholas v. State, 56 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Tex. App.—Houston

[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d)).

B. Discussion

“[T]he cumulation of sentences does not constitute cruel and unusual

punishment.” Stevens v. State, 667 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984);

Williamson v. State, 175 S.W.3d 522, 524 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.).

Staples does not seem to contest this statement of law, rather he argues that the

cumulation of the sentences in his case is grossly disproportionate to the crimes

committed.

The United States Supreme Court has “emphasized that a sentence is grossly

disproportionate to the crime only in the exceedingly rare or extreme case.” State v.

Simpson, 488 S.W.3d 318, 322–23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73 (2003)); see Ex parte Chavez, 213 S.W.3d 320, 323–24

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (noting that “the sentencer’s discretion

to impose any punishment within the prescribed range [is] essentially

‘unfettered’”). The “proportionality analysis is guided by (1) the gravity of the

offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other

criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for commission

13
of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Williamson, 175 S.W.3d at 525. To

determine whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate under the first factor, we

must “judge the severity of the sentence in light of the harm caused or threatened

to the victim, the culpability of the offender, and the offender’s prior adjudicated

and unadjudicated offenses.” Simpson, 488 S.W.3d. at 323. Only in the rare

instance in which the reviewing court finds an inference of gross proportionality

will a court consider the remaining factors and “compare the defendant’s sentence

with the sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the

sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. (citing Graham v.

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 60 (2010)); see Peto v. State, 51 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (discussing proportionality analysis set

forth in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991)).13

Staples does not address “the severity of the sentence in light of the harm

caused or threatened” to A.P.D., or his prior adjudicated and unadjudicated

offenses. See Simpson, 488 S.W.3d. at 323. Staples argues instead that his sentence

was grossly disproportionate because (1) there was no force used in the

13
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 597 (1991) modified the proportionate-sentence
analysis the Supreme Court created in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In
Harmelin, the Supreme Court held that if a court determines a sentence is grossly
disproportionate after comparing gravity of the offense with the severity of the
sentence, the court must consider “the sentences received for similar crimes in the
jurisdiction and the sentences for similar crimes in other jurisdictions to determine
the constitutionality of the sentence.” Peto v. State, 51 S.W.3d 326, 329 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d) (citing Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1006).

14
commission of the crimes, (2) he pled guilty to four counts and “accepted

responsibility for his actions,” and (3) he has “significant health problems.” His

arguments lack merit.

First, although Staples concedes that A.P.D. was not capable of consenting

given her age when the assaults occurred, he appears to argue that she consented

nonetheless to the assaults, because “[p]er her own testimony she was in love with

[Staples], wanted to marry him and have his child. When she did get pregnant, she

even named her eventual newborn son after [Staples].” We are not persuaded by

Staples’ argument. We do not agree that our analysis should consider the fact that

Staples engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor who believed she loved him

(as opposed to committing the same crime with a stranger). See generally Culton v.

State, 95 S.W.3d 401, 402, 404 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d)

(holding that even though sixteen-year-old engaged in “consensual sexual

intercourse” with thirty-four-year-old appellant and named their child after him,

automatic life sentence was not cruel and unusual given his “very serious prior

criminal history”); see also generally Delarosa v. State, 677 S.W.3d 668, 675

(Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (“noting consent is irrelevant in a case of sexual assault of

a child”).

15
Second, Staples argues that his guilty pleas to four counts of sexual assault

of a child militate against stacking the sentences.14 He argues that he “conceded to

the [j]ury that he understood that he needed to be punished” and that “an

appropriate sentence for his crime would be a very significant 30 years in prison.”

Staples does not cite any authorities in support of this argument.15 Rather, relevant

authorities suggest that remorse and the voluntary nature of a plea play little or no

role in our analysis of the severity of the offense. See Baldridge v. State, 77

S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d) (concluding

appellant’s “sincere remorse,” was not “compelling” reason to find sentence

received was grossly disproportionate to crime); Bailey v. State, Nos. 14-01-00486-

CR & 14-01-000487-CR, 2002 WL 122295, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] Jan. 31, 2002, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(“Appellant’s cooperation in the proceedings below, expressions of remorse, and

apparent willingness to learn about and receive treatment for his problem may well

have been considered by the trial court in its assessment of punishment; however,

such considerations play little or no role in our analysis of the severity of the

offense.”).

14
Staples told the trial court when he opted to plead guilty that he understood that
“the State ha[d] filed a motion to stack and there [was] a potential of these
sentences being stacked upon each other.”
15
Indeed, Staples does not cite caselaw in support of any of his three arguments as to
why he contends his sentence was grossly disproportionate.

16
Last, Staples argues that the punishment was grossly disproportionate given

his “significant health problems,” which included schizophrenia, depression, post-

traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and heart disease. Again, we are not

persuaded. It is well-settled that a defendant’s health does not render a crime

committed any less severe and thus a defendant’s health has no bearing on the

“grossly disproportionate” analysis. See generally Quick v. State, 557 S.W.3d 775,

789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (rejecting argument that

appellant’s age, deafness, and mental illness lessened his “moral culpability” and

warranted shorter sentence, given that no expert testified that mental illness caused

him to commit crimes); see also Turk v. State, No. 01-94-01190-CR, 1995 WL

694735, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 22, 1995, pet. ref’d) (not

designated for publication) (“A sentence will generally not be held to violate the

eighth amendment because of the defendant’s age or infirmity.”) (citing cases)16;

Jackson v. State, No. 13-01-497-CR, 2002 WL 366523, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg Mar. 7, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“The fact

that appellant may suffer from a cancerous tumor does not factor into the required

analysis regarding the proportionality of appellant’s sentence compared to the

16
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held itself to be without authority to hold a
punishment excessive on the ground of a defendant’s claimed illness and infirmity.
See Treadwell v. State, 262 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1953). However, it
is unclear whether the defendant in Treadwell challenged his punishment under
the Eighth Amendment or the Texas Constitution.

17
severity of the crime. Appellant’s disease does not render the crime committed any

less severe, nor does it affect the appropriateness of a thirty-year sentence imposed

on a repeat felony offender convicted of aggravated robbery.”); Copeland v. State,

Nos. 05-16-00293-CR & 05-16-00295-CR, 2017 WL 3725729, at *3 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Aug. 30, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (rejecting

argument that punishment was grossly disproportionate given appellant’s drug

addiction and mental health issues); Oglesby v. State, No. 07-15-00002-CR, 2015

WL 5302466, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 10, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (holding appellant’s mental illness did not render his

sentence cruel or unusual).

We hold that Staples failed to establish that his sentence was grossly

disproportionate. First, the punishment was within the statutory range.17 Second,

the record reflects that Staples sexually assaulted A.P.D. multiple times and that he

provided A.P.D. with alcohol and drugs during the assaults. The record also

reflects that Staples is a repeat offender with four prior felony convictions

enhancing the punishment range to 25 to 99 years or life per count. Given the

17
There are multiple cases where cumulative sentences in connection with multiple
sexual assaults against a child victim have been upheld and the appellant’s “cruel
and unusual” or “grossly disproportionate” punishment argument overruled. See
Cisneros v. State, 622 S.W.3d 511, 522–23 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2021, no pet.) (affirming imposition of two consecutive ninety-nine-year sentences
for continuous sexual abuse of child); Williamson v. State, 175 S.W.3d 522, 525
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.) (affirming stacked life sentences for
appellant who pled guilty to three counts of aggravated sexual assault on a child).

18
record before us, we cannot say the imposition of consecutive sentences resulted in

grossly disproportionate punishment for the offenses for which Staples was

convicted.18

And even if we conclude that the punishment is grossly disproportionate,

Staples failed to carry his burden to present evidence regarding punishments for

the same or similar crimes in Texas and in other jurisdictions. Staples does not cite

any cases to support his argument that his sentence is disproportionate when

compared with other sentences for the same or similar crimes—in Texas or in any

other jurisdiction. And there is likewise no evidence in the record of these relevant

comparisons. Staples thus failed to establish a grossly disproportionate sentence.

See Trevino v. State, 676 S.W.3d 726, 730 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2023, no pet.) (overruling argument about grossly disproportionate nature of

sentence because, among other things, “appellant provided no evidence necessary

for this Court to ‘compare the defendant’s sentence with the sentences received by

other offenders in the same jurisdiction and with the sentences imposed for the

same crime in other jurisdictions”’) (quoting Simpson, 488 S.W.3d at 323, 324);

see also Hammer v. State, 461 S.W.3d 301, 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, no

18
The State points out that, given Staples’ admission that he had sex with A.P.D.
roughly fifty times, each of which constitutes a separate offense of sexual assault
of a child, the four offenses for which he was sentenced represent about eight
percent of the sexual assaults to which he admitted. A.P.D. testified that she and
Staples had sex daily for about a two-month period.

19
pet.) (overruling argument that punishment was grossly disproportionate when

appellant failed to offer evidence of sentences imposed for same crime in same and

other jurisdictions); Pantoja v. State, 496 S.W.3d 186, 193 n.4 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2016, pet. ref'd) (declining to undertake proportionality analysis because

appellant did not offer evidence of sentences imposed for same crime in same and

other jurisdictions).

We overrule Staples’ second issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Veronica Rivas-Molloy
Justice

Panel consists of Justices Rivas-Molloy, Johnson, and Dokupil.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

20