Dr. Leonard Bright v. Texas A&M University

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-22-00282-CV

Dr. Leonard Bright,
Appellant

v.

Texas A&M University,
Appellee

On appeal from the
272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas
Judge John L. Brick, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 20-000811-CV-272

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Dr. Leonard Bright appeals from the trial court’s order granting Texas

A&M University’s plea to the jurisdiction. We will affirm.

I. Background

Dr. Bright is a tenured associate professor in the Department of Public

Service and Administration (PSAA) in the Bush School of Government and

Public Service at Texas A&M University (TAMU). In May 2018, Dr. Bright
applied for promotion to full professor in the Bush School. His promotion

application was denied, and he filed suit against TAMU alleging causes of

action for racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.

A. TAMU Promotion Process

TAMU University Rule 12.01.99.M2 University Statement on Academic

Freedom, Responsibility, Tenure, and Promotion sets out the policies for

promotion at TAMU. Section 4.4 of that Rule designates the categories of

performance as (1) teaching, (2) scholarship or research and its publication,

and (3) service. Section 4.4.2 of the Rule allows the faculty and administrators

of each college to develop written guidelines describing the evaluation criteria

employed in the unit consistent with TAMU criteria and procedures. Section

4.4.3.3 provides that in addition to criteria developed in the college, the

minimum requirements to be met by individuals being considered for

promotion to full professor are (1) continuing accomplishment in teaching,

(2) continuing accomplishment and some measure of national or international

recognition in research or another form of creative activity, and (3) evidence of

valuable professional service.

The Bush School at TAMU provided Submission Guidelines for those

seeking promotion. The Guidelines detail the required contents of the

candidate’s dossier as well as the multi-level review process. The dossier

includes documents submitted by the candidate, external peer-review letters,

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 2
and reports prepared by the various voting bodies—departmental promotion

and tenure committee, department head, college promotion and tenure

committee, and dean. The candidate submits a possible list of external

reviewers, and the P&T committee also provides a list of possible reviewers. A

group of at least seven external reviewers are selected. After receiving the

external reviews and the documents provided by the candidate, the review

process begins.

• The first level of review is the department P&T committee

recommendation. The department P&T committee reviews the

candidate’s dossier, creates a report, and then makes a

recommendation on whether or not to promote the candidate.

• The second level of review is by the department head who notifies

the candidate of the department P&T committee’s

recommendation. The department head reviews the dossier,

prepares a report, and then makes a recommendation. The

department head notifies the candidate upon submission of the

recommendation to the dean.

• The third level of review is by the college P&T committee. The

college P&T committee prepares a report and recommendation on

promotion. The college dean notifies the department head that the

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 3
college P&T committee has reached a decision, and the department

head notifies the candidate.

• The fourth level of review is by the dean of the college. The dean

reviews the dossier, prepares a report, and makes an independent

determination on the candidate’s promotion. The dean of the

college notifies the department head upon submission of the

recommendation to the Provost, and the department head notifies

the candidate.

• The fifth level of review is by the Provost. The Provost reviews the

dossier and makes a recommendation. The dean of faculties

notifies the department head who then notifies the candidate.

• The sixth level of review is by the President of TAMU who makes

the final determination on the candidate’s promotion. The

President notifies the Provost, who notifies the dean of faculties,

who notifies the college dean, who notifies the department head,

who then notifies the candidate.

B. Dr. Bright’s Promotion Process

Dr. Bright began working as a tenured associate professor at TAMU in

the PSAA Department at the Bush School of Government in 2011. In May

2018, he applied for promotion to full professor. The PSAA Department P&T

committee consisted of Dr. William Brown, Dr. Kent Portney, and Dr. William

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 4
West. According to Dr. Bright, his working relationship with Dr. West had

deteriorated years prior. Dr. Bright believed that Dr. West would recuse

himself from the PSAA P&T committee, but instead he was appointed to serve

as chair of the committee.

On December 20, 2018, Department Head Dr. Lori Taylor informed Dr.

Bright that the PSAA Department P&T committee unanimously voted against

promotion. When Dr. Bright asked the reason for the decision, Dr. Taylor

informed him that it was based upon his low research performance. The PSAA

Department P&T committee determined that Dr. Bright’s research record was

“thin” in comparison to others promoted to full professor. The committee noted

that Dr. Bright had fourteen peer-reviewed articles and only one had been

published in a journal targeted to the general field of public affairs. The

committee further stated that five of the seven articles Dr. Bright had

published since arriving at TAMU were not in important outlets for research.

According to Dr. Bright, Dr. Taylor suggested that he withdraw his application

for promotion. He declined to do so and perceived Dr. Taylor’s suggestion as a

threat.

On December 23, 2018, Dr. Bright complained to Dean Mark Welsh

about the recommendation to deny his promotion. Dr. Taylor conducted her

own review of Dr. Bright’s dossier and recommended against promotion to full

professor. Dr. Taylor noted that the criteria for promotion consisted of the

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 5
candidate’s performance in three areas: teaching, research, and service. Dr.

Taylor believed that research was the most determinative in qualifying for

promotion and that Dr. Bright’s performance in this category did not meet the

standard required for promotion to full professor. According to Dr. Taylor, Dr.

Bright’s early research and writing remains influential, but his work at the

Bush School was “neither similarly well-received nor particularly well-placed.”

On January 7, 2019, Dr. Bright filed a formal complaint of discrimination

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and on

January 17, 2019, he notified Dean Welsh of his EEOC complaint. Dr. Bright’s

complaint alleging discrimination was filed with TAMU’s Department of Civil

Rights and Equity Investigations which triggered an investigation into the

allegations and resulted in TAMU directing that Dr. Bright’s promotion

process be stopped pending the investigation. Following a five-month

investigation, TAMU’s Department of Civil Rights and Equity Investigations

found no evidence to support Dr. Bright’s allegations of discrimination, and the

promotion process resumed.

Dean Welsh recused himself from reviewing Dr. Bright’s promotion

application believing it was “the fairest thing to do.” Dean Welsh wanted to

have “someone with no exposure to the months of investigations, grievances,

and related communications” make a recommendation on Dr. Bright’s

promotion. The Bush College P&T committee reviewed Dr. Bright’s dossier,

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 6
and all four committee members determined that his research had not met the

standards for promotion to full professor. The interim dean appointed to serve

in place of Dean Welsh and the Provost also determined that Dr. Bright’s

research was not sufficient to qualify for promotion. The final determination

on Dr. Bright’s promotion to full professor was made by the President of TAMU

at the time, Dr. Michael Young. Dr. Young conducted his own independent

review of Dr. Bright’s promotion materials and decided against promotion. Dr.

Young concluded that “Dr. Bright’s scholarship did not yet merit promotion to

full professor.” Dr. Bright was informed on December 12, 2019, that Dr. Young

had denied his promotion application.

II. Procedural History

On March 18, 2020, Dr. Bright filed suit against TAMU alleging causes

of action for discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in

violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). He alleged

that TAMU discriminated and retaliated against him based on his race,

retaliated against him for engaging in a protected activity of filing a

discrimination complaint, and put him in a hostile working environment.

TAMU filed a plea to the jurisdiction in which it argued that Dr. Bright (1) did

not exhaust his claims with the EEOC as required, (2) cannot make a prima

facia case for any of his claims, and (3) is seeking to challenge an academic

determination. Dr. Bright responded that he was not trying to undermine an

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 7
academic decision but rather challenging the process that was used by TAMU

in reviewing his application and applying the applicable standards. Dr. Bright

maintained that he was treated differently than his comparators and that the

different treatment was motivated by race. He further responded that there

were material issues of fact precluding TAMU’s plea to the jurisdiction. After

a hearing, the trial court granted TAMU’s plea to the jurisdiction. This appeal

followed.

III. Discussion

Dr. Bright argues in three issues that the trial court erred in granting

the plea to the jurisdiction because he administratively exhausted all of his

claims, satisfied his burden to make a prima facia case for discrimination,

retaliation, and hostile work environment, and that an evaluation of his claims

does not require the court to undermine an academic determination. In his

brief, Dr. Bright included Appendices A through P to support his arguments.

TAMU filed a Motion to Strike Appendices A through K because they were not

part of the appellate record. An appellate court may not consider matters

outside of the appellate record. In re Marriage of Roman and Gonzalez, No.

10-06-00023-CV, 2007 WL 1378493, at n.2 (Tex. App.—Waco May 9, 2007, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Sabine Offshore Serv. v. Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840,

841 (Tex.1979)). Attaching documents as exhibits or appendices to a brief is

not a formal inclusion in the record, and those documents cannot be considered.

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 8
Id. Therefore, because Appendices A through K were not included in the

appellate record, we grant TAMU’s motion and will not consider those

appendices in this appeal. See id.

A. Legal Principles

As a state university, TAMU is immune from suit absent an express

legislative waiver. See Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. – El Paso v. Flores,

709 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. 2024). Immunity from suit defeats a trial court’s

subject matter jurisdiction and is properly raised in a plea to the jurisdiction.

Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 225–26 (Tex.

2004). Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law

reviewed de novo. Id. at 226.

Customarily a plea to the jurisdiction challenges whether facts have

been alleged that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the

case. Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629, 635 (Tex.

2012). “When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine

if the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s

jurisdiction to hear the cause.” Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette

County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 927 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). In conducting our

review, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff and look to

the plaintiff's intent. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226. The plaintiff has the

burden to plead facts affirmatively showing the trial court has subject-matter

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 9
jurisdiction. Id. at 226. A court deciding a plea to the jurisdiction is not

required to look solely to the pleadings but may consider evidence and must do

so when necessary to resolve the jurisdictional issues raised. Bland Indep.

Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555 (Tex. 2000). If a plea to the jurisdiction

challenges jurisdictional facts, the court can consider evidence necessary to

resolve any dispute over those facts even though the facts implicate the merits

of the cause of action. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 635. In considering this evidence,

we “take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant” and “indulge every

reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.”

Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228. If evidence does create a fact question on a

jurisdictional issue, the trial court cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction. Id.

at 227–28. The fact issues will then need to be resolved by the finder of fact.

Id. at 228. However, if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a

fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the trial court rules on the plea to the

jurisdiction as a matter of law. Id. If pleadings affirmatively negate the

existence of jurisdiction, then a plea may be granted without allowing an

opportunity to amend. Id. at 227.

Dr. Bright alleged causes of action for discrimination, retaliation, and

hostile work environment in violation of the TCHRA. Under the TCHRA, “an

employer commits an unlawful employment practice if because of race, color,

disability, religion, sex, national origin, or age the employer . . . discharges an

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 10
individual or discriminates in any other manner against an individual in

connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment.” Garcia, 372 S.W.3d at 633 (quoting TEX. LABOR CODE ANN.

§ 21.051). When a plaintiff fails to demonstrate a prima facia case of

discrimination under the TCHRA, the trial court has no jurisdiction, and the

claim should be dismissed. Id. at 637. Therefore, we must first determine

whether Dr. Bright demonstrated a prima facia case for his claims of

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment.

B. Discrimination

To establish discrimination in violation of the TCHRA, Dr. Bright must

show that he was (1) a member of the class protected by the TCHRA,

(2) qualified for his employment position, (3) terminated by the employer, and

(4) treated less favorably than similarly situated members of the opposing

class. See AutoZone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588, 592 (Tex. 2008). The

parties’ arguments focus on whether Dr. Bright was treated less favorably than

similarly situated comparators outside of his protected class.

Dr. Bright offered Dr. Taylor and Dr. Brown as comparators. The

question of whether Dr. Bright presented a prima facie case of racial

discrimination turns on whether either or both of them were similarly situated

to him. If Dr. Bright established this element of his prima facie discrimination

case, the burden shifts to TAMU to demonstrate that it had a legitimate

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 11
nondiscriminatory reason for denying Dr. Bright’s promotion. See Lee v.

Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). Employees with

different supervisors, who work for different divisions of a company or who

were the subject of adverse employment actions too remote in time from that

taken against the plaintiff generally will not be deemed similarly situated. Id.

To prevail, Courts require that an employee who proffers a fellow employee as

a comparator demonstrate that the employment actions at issue were taken

“under nearly identical circumstances.” Id. at 260. The employment actions

being compared will be deemed to have been taken under nearly identical

circumstances when the employees being compared held the same job or

responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment status

determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation

histories. Id. TAMU argues that Dr. Bright is not similarly situated to Dr.

Taylor and Dr. Brown. We agree.

Dr. Taylor is an economist, and her field of study and expertise concerns

state and local public finance, especially education finance. In contrast, Dr.

Bright holds a Ph.D. and M.P.A. in Public Administration and a B.A. in

psychology. His field of study and expertise is public administration,

management, and public service motivation. It is generally accepted that

professors who work in different academic disciplines are not similarly

situated employees. See Chatha v. Prairie View A&M Univ., No. 4:14-CV-3234,

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 12
2016 WL 4543887, at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2016), report and recommendation

adopted sub. nom. Chatha v. Prairie View A&M Univ., No. 4:14-CV-3234 2016

WL 4557504 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 2016). Working in different academic

disciplines within a university typically requires distinctive skills, and so any

comparison for racial discrimination is inappropriate. Niemann v. University

of N. Tex., No. 4:17-CV-00206, 2018 WL 588273, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2018).

Dr. Bright argues on appeal that he and Dr. Taylor should have been subjected

to the same standards during their promotion reviews, but he offers no

evidence to show that they are similarly situated. He further offers no evidence

that he was subjected to different promotion standards than Dr. Taylor.

Dr. Brown is an organizational psychologist. His field of study concerns

serving, consulting, and studying nonprofit operations and management.

Although Dr. Bright and Dr. Brown are both in the Bush School of Government

and Public Service, they are in different academic disciplines. See Chatha,

2016 WL 4543887, at *8. In addition, the Bush School had a different dean

when Dr. Brown applied for promotion. Thus, Dr. Bright and Dr. Brown were

not similarly situated because they did not have the same supervisor at the

time they sought promotion. See Lee, 574 F.3d 253 at 260.

Dr. Bright maintains that he and Dr. Brown are similarly situated

because they research similar topics. He contends that Dr. Brown was not

subjected to the same standards during his promotion review because Dr.

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 13
Brown published less articles than he did while employed at TAMU. However,

Dr. Brown’s promotion records indicate that he had three papers in press or

draft form when he joined the Bush School in 2006. Since then, he has

published three joint articles. In addition, he published three other pieces. In

2010, he wrote a chapter in Handbook of Nonprofit Management & Leadership.

In 2014, the textbook he wrote, Strategic Management in Nonprofit

Organizations, was published. He also had a number of conference

presentations that sometimes get converted into published manuscripts. Dr.

Bright has not shown that Dr. Brown was deficient in research and scholarship

or that he was subjected to different standards in the promotion process.

The PSAA Department P&T committee determined that Dr. Bright’s

research record was “thin” in comparison to others promoted to full professor.

The PSAA Department P&T committee also determined that Dr. Bright’s

articles published since arriving at TAMU were not in important outlets for

research. Courts are ill equipped to evaluate the academic judgment of

professors and universities. Tex. S. Univ. v. Villereal, 620 S.W.3d 899, 907

(Tex. 2021). Therefore, we will not evaluate what constitutes an important

outlet for research. Dr. Bright states that he is not asking the Court to compare

the quality of his research to that of Dr. Brown’s, nor is he asking the Court to

determine what journals are more valuable. Rather, he contends that he is

claiming TAMU followed the Department’s bylaws when determining whether

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 14
to promote Dr. Brown but deviated from the bylaws when evaluating his

promotion dossier. The only evidence Dr. Bright offered in support of this

argument is a comparison of his and Dr. Brown’s publications. The parties

agree that the bylaws do not require a minimum number of citations, but state

that quality should be valued above sheer number.

The record shows that Dr. Bright’s promotion application was measured

against the PSAA Department Bylaws and that his research did not meet the

standard required for promotion to full professor. The record does not support

Dr. Bright’s argument that Dr. Taylor and Dr. Brown were similarly situated

comparators or that Dr. Bright was treated less favorably than Dr. Taylor and

Dr. Brown. We conclude that Dr. Bright did not demonstrate a prima facia

case for his claim of discrimination.

C. Retaliation

To establish a prima facia case for retaliation, Dr. Bright must show that

(1) he engaged in an activity protected by the Texas Commission on Human

Rights Act, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) there exists a

causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Exxon

Mobile Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 585 (Tex. 2017). Dr. Bright contends

that TAMU has taken several adverse employment actions against him

including (1) allowing Dr. West to remain chair of his promotion review

committee, (2) Dean Welsh recusing himself from the promotion process,

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 15
(3) Dr. Taylor giving him an unfavorable performance review, and (4) denying

his promotion application.

For purposes of discrimination, the TCHRA only addresses ultimate

employment decisions; it does not address every decision made by employers

that arguably might have some tangential effect upon employment decisions.

Navy v. Coll. Of Mainland, 407 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist. 2013, no pet.) Generally, ultimate employment actions involve hiring,

granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensation, but not “events

such as disciplinary filings, supervisor’s reprimands, and even poor

performance by the employee—anything which might jeopardize employment

in the future.” Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707–

08 (5th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Ne. & Sante Fe

Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006)). Dr.

Bright’s complaints that Dr. West remained on the PSAA Department P&T

Committee, that Dean Welsh recused himself, and that Dr. Taylor gave him a

poor performance review are not ultimate employment decisions. See Navy,

407 S.W.3d at 899. Dr. Bright argues that “courts are not supposed to address

each action independently, but in the larger context of the plaintiff’s

employment as a whole.” However, he does not provide any authority for this

argument.

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 16
Moreover, there is nothing in the record to support Dr. Bright’s

argument that TAMU retaliated against him by allowing Dr. West to remain

chair of his promotion review committee or by Dean Welsh recusing himself.

While Dr. Bright explained that he did not have a good working relationship

with Dr. West, there is nothing to show that Dr. West remaining on the

promotion review committee was in retaliation for Dr. Bright filing a

discrimination complaint.

Dr. Bright stated that Dr. Welsh’s decision to recuse himself from the

promotion process intentionally harmed his promotion application and caused

him humiliation. Dean Welsh explained that he was disappointed in Dr.

Bright’s communication with TAMU staff and administrators about his

allegations of discrimination and the processes to consider them. Dean Welsh

believed the “fairest thing to do was to give Dr. Bright the benefit of the doubt,

recuse [himself] and have someone with no exposure to the months of

investigations, grievances, and related communications focus solely on the

material in the promotion portfolio” make a recommendation on Dr. Bright’s

promotion. While the record supports a finding that Dean Welsh’s recusal was

in response to Dr. Bright’s discrimination complaints, it does not support a

finding that it was in retaliation for the discrimination complaint.

Dr. Taylor’s performance evaluation noted that his research was “less

than is expected” from an associate professor. Dr. Taylor gave Dr. Bright a

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 17
favorable review on his teaching and service. There is no evidence that Dr.

Taylor’s performance review was in retaliation for his discrimination

complaint. Rather, it is consistent with multiple reviews of his research during

the promotion process.

As to Dr. Bright’s claim that his promotion was denied in retaliation for

filing a discrimination complaint, he filed a complaint with Dean Welsh and

the EEOC after the PSAA Department P&T committee recommended against

his promotion. Therefore, there was no retaliation by the PSAA Department

P&T committee. Dr. Bright maintains that it is misleading to state that he

made his EEOC complaint after his promotion was recommended to be denied

because TAMU uses a multi-level decision making process in conducting

promotion reviews.

Dr. Bright’s promotion application followed the TAMU promotion

process of a multi-level review. There is nothing in the record to affirmatively

show that any of the reviewers were aware of Dr. Bright’s EEOC complaint.

The decision on promotion ultimately rested with Dr. Young, the President of

TAMU. In order to establish the causation prong of a retaliation claim, the

employee should demonstrate that the employer knew about the employee’s

protected activity. Manning v. Chevron Chem. Co.., LLC, 332 F.3d 874, 883

(5th Cir. 2003). There is nothing in the record to show that Dr. Young was

aware of Dr. Bright’s EEOC complaint. In addition, each level of independent

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 18
review reached the same conclusion—Dr. Bright’s research did not meet the

standard required for a full professor. We conclude that Dr. Bright did not

demonstrate a prima facia case for his claim of retaliation.

D. Hostile Work Environment

TAMU argues that Dr. Bright failed to preserve this claim because he

did not include it in his EEOC charge. We agree.

Before a plaintiff can maintain a suit for employment discrimination

under the TCHRA, the plaintiff first must file a charge of employment

discrimination with the TWC or EEOC. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Brantley, 558

S.W.3d 747, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist. 2018, pet. denied). The Texas

Labor Code requires that a plaintiff file an EEOC complaint within 180 days

of the alleged discriminatory act. See TEX. LABOR CODE ANN. §§21.201–02. A

lawsuit under the TCHRA is limited to claims made in the EEOC charge and

factually related claims that can reasonably be expected to grow out of the

investigation. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 558 S.W.3d at 756.

Dr. Bright responds that he preserved this complaint because he checked

the box on the EEOC charge of discrimination form indicating that the

discrimination was ongoing. In Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., the plaintiff alleged for

the first time in his amended petition acts that contributed to a hostile work

environment. Id. The Court reasoned that even though the plaintiff did not

mention the specific acts in his EEOC charge, the charge included an adequate

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 19
factual basis to put the school district on notice that the plaintiff was

complaining of discrimination based upon his race and gender resulting in a

hostile work environment. Id. However, unlike the plaintiff in Alief Indep.

Sch. Dist., Dr. Bright did not allege any factual basis concerning a hostile work

environment. Dr. Bright only asserted allegations that TAMU denied his

promotion based upon his race and that he was retaliated against for engaging

in a protected activity. He made no allegation of a hostile work environment.

While he checked the box indicating ongoing discrimination, he did not allege

any facts to show a hostile work environment. Because he did not include a

hostile work environment allegation in his EEOC charge, Dr. Bright did not

exhaust his administrative remedy for this complaint and has not preserved

this complaint for review. See id.

Moreover, even if he had preserved his complaint for review, he did not

establish a prima facia case of a hostile work environment. A hostile work

environment claim “entails ongoing harassment, based on the plaintiff’s

protected characteristic, so sufficiently severe or pervasive that it has altered

the conditions of employment and created an abusive working environment.”

Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging and Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 445

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied) (quoting Bartosh v. Sam

Houston State Univ., 259 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 2008, pet.

denied)). To demonstrate a prima facie case of hostile work environment, a

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 20
plaintiff must show that: “(1) he belongs to a protected group; (2) he was

subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was

based on the protected characteristic; (4) the harassment complained of

affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the employer

knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take

prompt remedial action.” Id. To satisfy the fourth element of a hostile

environment claim, a plaintiff must show that the workplace was permeated

with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently severe or

pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working environment. Id.

Dr. Bright contends that several instances of discriminatory and

retaliatory behavior made his work environment at TAMU hostile including

allowing Dr. West to chair the promotion committee, Dean Welsh recusing

himself from the promotion review process, and the denial of his promotion.

However, he does not identify any acts that show his workplace was

“permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult sufficiently

severe” so as to create a hostile or abusive working environment. See id.

Accordingly, Dr. Bright has not demonstrated a prima facie case for his claim

of a hostile work environment.

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 21
IV. Conclusion

Having considered all of Dr. Bright’s complaints on appeal, we overrule

each of his three issues. We affirm the trial court’s order granting TAMU’s plea

to the jurisdiction.

MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: June 26, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed; motion granted
CV06

Bright v. Texas A&M Univ. Page 22