Justin Shavora Smith v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-23-00178-CR
10-23-00179-CR

Justin Shavora Smith,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
County Court at Law of Navarro County, Texas
Judge Amanda Doan Putman, presiding
Trial Court Cause Nos. C40,960-CR; C40,962-CR

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury found Appellant, Justin Shavora Smith, guilty of murder and

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The jury assessed his punishment

at thirty-five years confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas

Department of Criminal Justice on the murder and twenty years confinement

on the aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court sentenced
Smith accordingly and ordered the two sentences to run concurrently. This

appeal ensued. We will affirm.

Background Facts

On March 27, 2021, law enforcement responded to a shooting incident

at M.R. Smith Funeral Parlor in Corsicana, Navarro County, Texas,

involving Smith and his two sisters, Shaneen Romero and Carneisha

Stewart. Sergeant Mark Nanny with the Corsicana Police Department was

one of the first officers on scene after the shooting. Nanny testified at trial

that when he arrived on scene, Stewart was in the road screaming that her

brother, Smith, had shot her sister, Romero, and that he was going to kill

Stewart too. Nanny observed Smith chasing Stewart into the street before

Smith turned and walked back towards the funeral home. Nanny testified

that Stewart did not have a purse or gun with her during the incident or

when she was fleeing from Smith. Nanny also observed Romero laying under

the carport motionless when he arrived on scene.

Smith fled the scene before additional law enforcement arrived, but he

was later arrested and interviewed by law enforcement. Multiple officers

testified that Smith said some variation of “I can’t believe I did that,” “I can’t

believe I shot my sister,” or “I’m guilty” multiple times, both unsolicited and

in response to questioning during his interview with officers. During the

Smith v. State Page 2
interview with law enforcement, Smith stated he and Romero had been

arguing, and he went to his vehicle while she followed him, continuing with

“a bunch of nagging.” Smith stated that when he got to the vehicle, he

grabbed his gun, turned around, and fired to try to scare her. He said he was

trying to aim to the side, but Romero ducked into the line of fire and was hit

by his shot. Smith also stated that after he shot Romero, Stewart was

talking to him as she was coming outside to the carport area, and when he

came around the corner with the gun in his hand, he asked, “What are you

talking about?” and Stewart took off running. As Stewart was running away,

Smith stated he fired a shot into the air. During his interview, Smith made

no mention of being attacked by either sister. When asked about scratches

on his body when he was arrested, he stated the marks were from running

through the woods after he fled the scene.

Paul Salazar, a witness who called 911, testified that he observed

Stewart running across the road while fleeing from Smith and that he heard

the two gunshots. He stated Stewart was not carrying a purse as she was

running from Smith.

Vincent Brown, a friend of Smith who occasionally worked at the

funeral parlor, was on scene during the incident and testified to what he

observed. He testified that a meeting was taking place at the funeral home

Smith v. State Page 3
which included himself, Smith, Romero, Stewart, and M.R. Smith, the father

of Smith, Romero, and Stewart. Brown testified that the meeting got heated,

and at one point Smith went outside the building, and Romero followed him

outside. Brown stated that he did not see what occurred outside, but heard

Romero say “You sorry motherfucker. You son of a bitch. You ain’t shit.” He

then heard a gunshot, went towards the gunshot, and encountered Smith,

and asked Smith to calm down. Brown then left the building, saw Romero

laying on the ground, and went to his vehicle to leave the scene. Before he

left the scene, he observed Stewart running from Smith while Smith used

profanities and shot at her. When Brown was asked to confirm whether he

told detectives that Smith said “Bitch, you’ve been talking all that shit, now

talk that shit” to Stewart, Brown stated that was probably accurate. Brown

also stated he did not see either Romero or Stewart with any firearms that

day.

The medical examiner, Dr. Gruszetki, testified Romero died of gunshot

wounds and that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the

entrance wound was at least 18 inches. Gruszetki also testified that she did

not observe any other injuries on Romero’s body, nor did she observe any

other physical signs consistent with a struggle.

Smith v. State Page 4
Stewart testified about what she observed during the incident. She

stated that she, Romero, Smith, Brown, and M.R. Smith were having a

meeting after finishing the funerals they were working that day. She said

the conversation started out calm but would escalate when Smith did not like

what Romero said to Brown. At one point, Brown exited the building like he

was going to leave, and Smith and Romero followed. Eventually they all came

back inside, but Smith went back outside, and Romero followed him after a

few seconds. Stewart stated that Romero and Smith were screaming, but she

could not make out what they were saying. After about thirty to forty-five

seconds of screaming, Stewart heard a gunshot. Brown was the first to go

towards the carport area, followed by M.R. Smith, while Stewart stayed

inside. Then, Stewart heard Smith say, “It’s done, it’s done, where’s the other

bitch?”, so she ran out the front door and across the street. She stated she

heard a gunshot behind her, and after she got to the other side of the street,

she turned and saw Smith holding the gun and making a motion with his

hand. At this point, officers arrived on the scene and Smith left the scene.

Stewart testified that she did not own a gun before or during the incident, nor

did she keep a gun in her purse. She also denied any previous physical

altercations, including spitting at Smith, by either her or Romero. She did

Smith v. State Page 5
admit to previous incidents of cussing at Smith and verbal altercations with

him, involving both herself and Romero.

Smith also testified during both phases of trial. Smith stated he had a

history of conflict with Stewart and Romero regarding their father’s funeral

home business. He testified that the prior arguments had been primarily

verbal, but that Stewart got physical with him on three previous occasions:

(1) when she “chest bumped him,” (2) when she showed him a gun in her

purse and told him to “do something” approximately two weeks prior to the

shooting, and (3) when she spit in his face. On the day of the shooting, Smith

stated he was arguing with Romero and Stewart at the funeral home.

Stewart went back inside, and he and Romero stayed outside. Smith said

Romero got very emotional during the argument, so he went to his father’s

van to retrieve his gun and cigarettes, then was going to go to his own vehicle

to leave. He stated Romero ran at him, yelling obscenities, and jumped on

him while grabbing at his hand holding the gun. Smith said he fired the gun

to scare her because she was trying to get the gun from him. He also stated

he was scared, although he did not specify why he was scared at this point.

He stated he did not intend to hit Romero. At this point, Smith said he

dropped the gun but picked it back up when he heard Stewart yelling in an

aggressive tone and saw her with a purse in her hand. He testified that he

Smith v. State Page 6
was afraid of how Stewart would react when she realized what happened.

When he picked up the gun, Stewart took off running, and he pursued her to

get her off the property. He did not remember whether she had her purse

with her when she was running away from him but knew that she did not

have the purse with her by the time she was across the street. He also

admitted to saying “You’ve been talking that shit, talk that shit now” while

chasing Stewart away from the property. Once Stewart was across the street,

Smith fired the gun in the air, then walked back to the funeral home,

dropped the gun, and fled the scene as officers arrived. Smith testified he

was in fear of a deadly threat from Stewart because of her purse, where she

kept her gun, and the verbal altercation they had that day, but he did not see

Stewart with a gun at any point in time that day.

In two separate indictments, Smith was charged with murder for

causing the death of Romero and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon

against Stewart. Smith was tried for both offenses in a single jury trial. He

requested self-defense instructions on both charges, but the trial court denied

the self-defense instruction on the aggravated assault charge. The jury

rejected the self-defense claim on the murder charge and found Smith guilty

of murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Following the

punishment hearing, Smith requested a sudden passion instruction, which

Smith v. State Page 7
the trial court included in the punishment jury charge for the murder. The

jury rejected the defense of sudden passion.

Issue One

In his first issue, Smith argues that there is insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s rejection of Smith’s claim of self-defense against the

murder charge.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court of Criminal Appeals has defined our standard of review of a

sufficiency issue as follows:

When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, we consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99
S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227,
232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard requires the appellate
court to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to
draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”
Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. Williams v.
State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court
conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a “divide and
conquer” strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all
the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d at 232. Although juries may not
speculate about the meaning of facts or evidence, juries are
permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so
long as each inference is supported by the evidence presented at
trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 16–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We presume that the

Smith v. State Page 8
factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences from the evidence in
favor of the verdict, and we defer to that resolution. Merritt v.
State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). This is
because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the facts, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to the
testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally
probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to
uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was
sufficient to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements
of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge
for the case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that
“accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does
not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and
adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.” Id.; see also Daugherty v. State, 387
S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The “law as authorized
by the indictment” includes the statutory elements of the offense
and those elements as modified by the indictment. Daugherty,
387 S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

AUTHORITY

A person commits the offense of murder if the person intends to ·cause

serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that

causes the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(b)(2). It is

a defense to prosecution if the conduct in question is justified under Chapter

Smith v. State Page 9
9 of the Penal Code. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.02. A person is justified in

using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably

believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31.

Under Texas Penal Code 9.32, a person is justified in using deadly force

against another if the actor would be justified in using force against the other

under Section 9.31, and when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes

the deadly force is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the

other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 9.32.

In a claim of self-defense, a defendant bears the initial burden of

production, while the State bears the burden of persuasion against the raised

defense. See Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).

The defendant’s burden of production requires him to adduce some evidence

that would support a rational jury finding in his favor on the defensive issue.

See Krajcovic v. State, 393 S.W.3d 282, 286 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The

State’s burden of persuasion does not require the production of evidence to

rebut the claim of self-defense; it requires only that the State prove its case

beyond a reasonable doubt. Zuliani, 97 S.W.3d at 594.

Smith v. State Page 10
The jury is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the

witnesses, and the weight to be given to the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323

S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We determine whether after

viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense

beyond a reasonable doubt and could have found against appellant on the

self-defense issue beyond a reasonable doubt. See Braughton v. State, 569

S.W.3d 592, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

ANALYSIS

Smith concedes that there is sufficient evidence in the record for the

jury to have found the essential elements of murder beyond a reasonable

doubt, but he argues that the jury should have found that Smith was justified

in his use of deadly force against Romero because he was acting in self-

defense.

The jury had sufficient evidence to reject appellant’s claim of self-

defense. Smith’s trial testimony was the only evidence supporting his claim

of self-defense. A jury’s decision to reject witness testimony must be rational

in light of the totality of the record, and any underlying inferences used to

reject that testimony must be reasonable based upon the cumulative force of

all of the evidence. See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex. Crim.

Smith v. State Page 11
App. 2011). Smith’s description during his interview with police of how

Romero was shot differed from his trial testimony such that a rational jury

could reasonably reject his claims of self-defense. Additionally, other

witnesses’ testimonies contained details of the events from which a rational

jury could reasonably infer that Smith was not acting in self-defense.

Specifically, the medical examiner’s testimony contradicts Smith’s claim that

Romero was grabbing at him or close enough to be trying to get the gun from

him when she was shot. Stewart testified that after the gunshot, she heard

Smith say, “It’s done, it’s done, where’s the other bitch?” Viewing all the

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have

found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and

could have found against Smith on the self-defense issue beyond a reasonable

doubt.

We overrule Smith’s first issue.

Issue Two

In his second issue, Smith argues that the trial court erred in refusing

to instruct the jury on self-defense in the charge of aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon.

Smith v. State Page 12
STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review alleged jury charge error by considering two questions: (1)

whether error existed in the charge and (2) whether sufficient harm resulted

from the error to compel reversal. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). A defendant is entitled to an instruction on any defensive

issue that is raised by the evidence, regardless of the strength or credibility of

the evidence. Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). A

defensive issue is raised by the evidence if there is sufficient evidence to

support a rational jury finding as to each element of the defense. Shaw v.

State, 243 S.W.3d 647, 657–58 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the defendant’s requested defensive instruction.

Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). A trial court

errs to refuse a self-defense instruction if there is some evidence, viewed in

the light most favorable to the defendant, that will support its elements.

Gamino, 537 S.W.3d at 510.

AUTHORITY

A person commits the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon if the person intentionally, knowingly or recklessly threatens bodily

injury to another person, and the person uses or exhibits a deadly weapon

during the alleged assault. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01; 22.02. The use of

Smith v. State Page 13
deadly force is a defense to prosecution for aggravated assault if the use of

deadly force is justified. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.02. A person is

justified in using force against another when and to the degree the actor

reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect the actor

against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE

ANN. § 9.31. The use of force against another is not justified: (1) in response

to verbal provocation alone. Id. Under Texas Penal Code 9.32, a person is

justified in using deadly force against another if the actor would be justified

in using force against the other under Section 9.31, and when and to the

degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately

necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use of

unlawful deadly force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32.

ANALYSIS

For a self-defense instruction to be given, Smith must have reasonably

believed that the force or deadly force was immediately necessary. The

“reasonably believes” language contains subjective and objective components.

See Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d 25, 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Werner v.

State, 711 S.W.2d 639, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Smith must have

subjectively believed that Stewart used or attempted to use unlawful force or

deadly force against him and that his use of unlawful or deadly force in

Smith v. State Page 14
response was immediately necessary. See Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d at 33;

Semaire v. State, 612 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Here, viewing

the evidence in a light most favorable to Smith having a subjective belief that

force or deadly force was immediately necessary to protect himself against

Romero’s use or attempted use of unlawful force or deadly force, the relevant

evidence shows that:

• Smith was afraid of how Stewart would react, including that she

might shoot him, when she realized he had killed Romero,

• Smith picked up the gun when he heard Stewart yelling in an

aggressive tone,

• Smith thought Stewart had a purse with her when he first saw

her after he killed Romero,

• Stewart had shown him a gun that she had in her purse

approximately two weeks prior to the incident.

A case can be made that this evidence establishes that Smith held a

subjective belief that his use of force was immediately necessary to protect

himself from Stewart.

Additionally, a defendant’s subjective belief must be reasonable. A

defendant’s subjective belief can be presumed reasonable if the defendant:

Smith v. State Page 15
(1) knew or had reason to believe that the person against whom

the deadly force was used:

(A) unlawfully and with force entered, or was attempting to

enter unlawfully and with force, the actor’s occupied

habitation, vehicle, or place of business or employment;

(B) unlawfully and with force removed, or was attempting

to remove unlawfully and with force, the actor from the

actor’s habitation, vehicle, or place of business or

employment; or

(C) was committing or attempting to commit an offense

described by Subsection (a)(2)(B) 1;

(2) did not provoke the person against whom the force was used;

and

(3) was not otherwise engaged in criminal activity, other than a

Class C misdemeanor that is a violation of a law or ordinance

regulating traffic at the time the force was used.

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32. There is no evidence that Smith believed

Stewart was acting in a way that qualifies for any of the conduct described in

§9.32(b)(1). Additionally, Smith does not contest that he had just killed
1
Aggravated kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or
aggravated robbery. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2)(B).

Smith v. State Page 16
Romero, which could be considered both provocation and criminal activity

under (2) and (3). Therefore, a case can be made that the presumption of

reasonableness does not apply in this case. See Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d

at 33.

A reasonable belief is one held by an “ordinary and prudent man in the

same circumstances as the actor.” TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.07(a)(42). The

“ordinary and prudent person” standard is meant to operate as a limitation

on defendants who harbor unreasonable beliefs that the use of deadly force

was immediately necessary. See Lozano v. State, 636 S.W.3d at 33. By his

own testimony, Smith never saw Stewart with a gun on the day of the

incident. He only mentions seeing her with a purse when she first came

outside after he shot Romero, but he confirmed that he did not remember

seeing her with the purse at any other time, including while he was chasing

her and when he fired his gun to scare her. Smith stated that when Stewart

saw him with the gun, she immediately turned and fled. Given this evidence,

we cannot say that Smith’s belief that the force or deadly force was

immediately necessary was reasonable. Therefore, the trial court did not err

in denying Smith’s request for a self-defense instruction on the aggravated

assault charge.

We overrule Smith’s second issue.

Smith v. State Page 17
Issue Three

In his third issue, Smith primarily argues that the evidence is legally

insufficient to support the jury’s negative finding on sudden passion. He

alternatively argues that the evidence is factually insufficient to support the

jury’s negative finding on sudden passion.

AUTHORITY

After being found guilty of murder, a defendant may raise the issue

during the punishment phase as to whether he caused the death under the

immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. TEX.

PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(d). “Sudden passion” means passion directly

caused by and arising out of provocation by the individual killed or another

acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense

and is not solely the result of former provocation. Id at §19.02(a)(2).

“Adequate cause” means cause that would commonly produce a degree of

anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to

render the mind incapable of cool reflection. Id at §19.02(a)(1). If the

defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the

evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree. Id at §19.02(d).

For matters in which the defendant bears the burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence, including a claim of sudden passion, we

Smith v. State Page 18
employ the civil standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency of the

evidence. See Matlock v. State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

First, we review the evidence for legal sufficiency by examining the

record for any evidence that supports the jury’s findings while ignoring all

evidence to the contrary unless a jury could not. See Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at

669. If no evidence supports the finding, we review the entire record to

determine whether the evidence establishes the opposite as a matter of law.

Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 668.

We then review the evidence for factual sufficiency to support the

finding by examining all the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether

the verdict is “so against the great weight and preponderance of that evidence

to be manifestly unjust.” Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 672–73; Meraz v. State, 785

S.W.2d 146, 154–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc).

ANALYSIS

Beginning with the legal sufficiency, we examine the record for any

evidence that supports the jury’s finding that Smith did not act under a

sudden passion, ignoring all evidence which would support a finding of

sudden passion. Smith argues that there is no evidence which would support

the jury’s rejection of sudden passion. Smith points to his testimony during

both phases of trial that Romero was aggressive and trying to grab his gun

Smith v. State Page 19
from him, and that he did not have time to reflect on his actions before firing

the gun. He asserts that his testimony conclusively established that he acted

under a sudden passion. However, Smith’s testimony was contradicted by

several witnesses and pieces of evidence, including his own statements to

police after the incident. During his interview with police, Smith stated he

and Romero had been arguing, and he went to his vehicle while she followed

him, continuing with “a bunch of nagging.” Smith stated that when he got to

the van, he grabbed his gun, turned around, and fired to try to scare her. He

said he was trying to aim to the side, but Romero ducked into the line of fire

and was hit by his shot. The medical examiner’s testimony also contradicted

Smith’s trial testimony that he and Romero were struggling over the gun and

that it was during this struggle that the gun went off. Additionally, both

Stewart and Brown testified to statements made by Smith directly after he

shot Romero from which a jury could infer he intended to shoot Romero.

Since some evidence exists that Smith had time to reflect before firing the

gun, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s negative finding on

the issue of sudden passion.

To determine factual sufficiency to support the finding that Smith did

not act under a sudden passion, we examine all the evidence in a neutral

light to determine whether the verdict is so against the great weight and

Smith v. State Page 20
preponderance of that evidence to be manifestly unjust. However, we do not

intrude on the jury’s role as sole judge of the weight and credibility of the

evidence. See Rankin, 617 S.W.3d 169, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2020, pet. ref’d). As explained in the legal sufficiency analysis, there was

conflicting evidence on Smith’s state of mind when he fired the shot which

killed Romero. The only evidence which supports a finding of sudden passion

is Smith’s own testimony at trial. Here, the jury was free to reject Smith’s

testimony as a matter of witness credibility, lack of supporting evidence, or

because he changed his story between his police interview and trial. Viewing

all the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot say that the jury’s finding

rejecting sudden passion is so weak as to be manifestly unjust or against the

great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the evidence is

factually sufficient to support a finding that Smith did not act under a

sudden passion.

We overrule Smith’s third issue.

Conclusion

Having overruled Smith’s three issues, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

Smith v. State Page 21
MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: July 10, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM

Smith v. State Page 22