Shawn Allen v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00218-CR
10-24-00219-CR
10-24-00220-CR

Shawn Allen,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
12th District Court of Madison County, Texas
Judge David W. Moorman, presiding
Trial Court Cause Nos. 21-13764, 21-13766, and 21-13816

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

After a bench trial, Shawn Allen was found guilty of one count of

trafficking a child and two counts of sexual assault of a child. After Allen

pleaded true to one prior felony conviction, the trial court assessed his

punishment at life in prison on each count and sentenced him accordingly.

Allen now appeals. We will affirm.
A. Issue One, Two, and Three

In Allen’s first three issues, he contends the evidence is insufficient to

support each of his convictions.

1. Authority

The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of

sufficiency issues as follows:

When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d
560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer “to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review
must not engage in a “divide and conquer” strategy but must
consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d
at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of
facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable
inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by
the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App.
2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to
the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are
equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 2
sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of
all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support a conviction by comparing it to “the elements of the
offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the
case.” Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that “accurately sets
out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Id.; see
also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). The “law as authorized by the indictment” includes the
statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified
by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

2. Discussion

The charge of trafficking a child as indicted required the State to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Allen knowingly “trafficked” a child, causing

her to engage in or be a victim of sexual assault, prostitution, or compelling

prostitution. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 20A.02(a)(7)(C), (E), (H). Section

20A.01(4) defines “traffic” as meaning to “transport, entice, recruit, harbor,

provide, or otherwise obtain another person by any means.” Id. § 20A.01(4).

The charges of sexual assault of a child as indicted in cause number 21-13766

required the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Allen intentionally

or knowingly caused the sexual organ of a child younger than seventeen years

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 3
of age to contact Allen’s sexual organ and in cause number 21-13816 required

the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Allen intentionally and

knowingly caused the penetration of the sexual organ of a child younger than

seventeen years of age by Allen’s sexual organ. Id. § 22.011(a)(2)(A), (C).

Allen contends that the deference afforded the “factfinder does not

permit a reviewing court to abandon the obligation to determine whether the

factfinder’s resolution of conflicting evidence was a rational one.” He argues

that under a rigorous and proper application of the Jackson v. Virgina legal-

sufficiency standard that the evidence supporting the conviction was so

implausible and controverted that a factfinder could not rationally have given

credit to it. Allen acknowledges that the victim’s testimony, when viewed in

isolation, could meet the elements of the offence of trafficking a child.

However, he argues that a “sufficiency review requires review of all the

evidence, and that evidence shows that a finding that [the victim’s] testimony

is sufficient to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard would not be

rational.” We look to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals hypothetical in

Brooks v. State to provide direction in assessing whether a finding is irrational.

The hypothetical is as follows:

The store clerk at trial identifies A as the robber. A properly
authenticated surveillance videotape of the event clearly shows
that B committed the robbery. But, the jury convicts A. It was
within the jury’s prerogative to believe the convenience store clerk

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 4
and disregard the video. But, based on all the evidence, the jury’s
finding of guilt is not a rational finding.

Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

Here, the victim (I.H.) testified that when she was fourteen years old,

she and Allen were living in a trailer house with three other people. All of

them were using methamphetamine on a daily basis. The three other

occupants of the trailer house were Tammy, and her two sons Casey and

Dewayne. I.H. explained that she was initially introduced to

methamphetamine by Allen, and it was during this time that I.H. became

addicted to methamphetamine and when the offenses occurred. I.H. testified

that her social security benefits were regularly used to purchase

methamphetamine initially, and when the social security benefits ended, Allen

started taking her to other trailers in their trailer park to have sex with men

for money and methamphetamine. I.H. detailed that she was scared of Allen

and that he made her have sex with two men, later identified as Bud and Josh,

on multiple occasions. I.H. said that Allen or Casey would accompany her

when she went to the other trailers and that usually Allen would get the money

and methamphetamine directly from the men. I.H. also detailed that Allen

had sex with her in their trailer house during this time period and indicated it

was on multiple occasions.

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 5
In Allen’s brief, he directs us to trial testimony unfavorable to the victim

relating to her attacking her sister, being admitted to mental health hospitals

on multiple occasions, having a diagnosis of a mood disorder and oppositional

defiance disorder, and telling lies. Further, Allen directs us to testimony of

other witnesses that he believes contradicts and controverts I.H.’s testimony

and renders it implausible. Allen contends that Casey, Dewayne, and Tammy,

along with other witnesses who testified in the guilt/innocence phase of the

trial, offered contradictory testimony and no factfinder could rationally find

the elements of the offenses alleged against Allen were established beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Allen contends that Casey’s testimony contradicted I.H.’s testimony

when Casey confirmed that he never saw Allen go to the trailer house that

belonged to Bud and his family. The trial court could have believed Casey’s

testimony on this issue and also believed I.H.’s testimony that Allen had gone

to Bud’s trailer house with her. Casey did not make an assertion that he

constantly watched Bud’s trailer house to monitor who was coming and going,

nor did Casey make an assertion that Allen never went to Bud’s trailer house.

Only that he never saw Allen go to Bud’s trailer house.

Allen asserted that Casey’s testimony that I.H. only left their trailer

house two or three times controverts I.H.’s testimony. However, Casey’s

testimony was limited to the occasions when I.H. would leave alone. Casey

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 6
acknowledged that I.H. would leave with Allen and then return with money

and methamphetamine. The trial court could have rationally believed both

I.H.’s and Casey’s testimony were not contradictory.

Allen asserted that I.H.’s testimony was controverted when Casey

testified that he and I.H. went to visit the children living in Bud’s trailer house.

The reporter’s record reflects the following testimony from I.H. while on cross-

examination:

[Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. And you mentioned earlier there
may have been times that you went over there for other reasons.
Did you -- let me say it this way: Did you ever go to Bud’s house to
see the kids or to do something else –

[I.H.]: Yes.

[Defendant’s Counsel]: -- other than sex?

[I.H.]: Yes.

[Defendant’s Counsel]: Okay. How many times did you go over
there for that?

[I.H.]: A couple. Me and Casey used to go over there and hang out
with the kids and watch them for him and his wife, and we played
video games with them and stuff. They were, like, young.

The trial court could have rationally believed Casey’s testimony did not

amount to a conflict or contradiction in their testimony.

Allen further contends that I.H.’s claim that Casey took her over to

Josh’s trailer was contradicted by Casey’s denial that he ever took I.H. to a

trailer for sex in exchange for methamphetamine or money. I.H. also testified

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 7
that Casey would be in the bedroom, or he would come in the bedroom while

sexual things were happening between her and Allen. Casey testified that

Allen did not allow him in Tammy’s and Allen’s bedroom and that the only

people Casey knew for sure were having sex in the trailer house were he and

I.H., and Allen and Tammy. The trial court could have rationally rejected

Casey’s denial and lack of knowledge about Allen having sex with I.H. because

of the potential for criminal liability.

Allen also contends that Casey’s testimony did not establish any element

of the offense of trafficking, other than the element of transporting, and that it

amounted to nothing more than speculation regarding the elements of the

offense of trafficking. Allen argues that Casey’s speculation on the elements

of the offense of trafficking was negated by evidence that Allen took I.H. to the

store to withdraw her social security income. However, I.H.’s testimony

provided proof of all the elements of the offense of trafficking a child. In his

brief, Allen conceded that I.H.’s testimony, when viewed in isolation, could

meet the elements of the offense of trafficking a child. A conviction may be

based on the testimony of a single witness. Santiago v. State, 425 S.W.3d 437,

443 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref'd). The trial court could have

disregarded any speculative testimony and relied on the testimony of I.H.

Allen contends that Dewayne’s testimony controverted I.H.’s claim that

it was Allen who took her over to the neighbors’ trailers where she would have

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 8
sex in return for methamphetamine and money. Dewayne testified that when

I.H. would leave the home, she would be with Tammy, and it was Tammy and

I.H. who would return after hours with money and methamphetamine.

However, Dewayne also testified that I.H. left the trailer house sometimes

accompanied by Tammy, or both Tammy and Allen, or just by herself and that

I.H. and whoever had accompanied her, would return later with money and

drugs. Dewayne did add that most of the time I.H. left with his mom, Tammy.

The trial court could have rationally believed this testimony did not amount to

a conflict or contradiction in the testimony.

Allen also asserts that Dewayne expressly denied that I.H. was ever

“pimped out” while he lived at the trailer house, and that she never claimed he

had done so. The portion of the record before us which was referenced by Allen

in his brief reads:

[Defendant’s Counsel]: Well, then, what is all this evidence you’re
talking about about getting money?

[Dewayne]: The suspiciousness of how [Allen] was moving with
these females is what I’m talking about, sir.

[Defendant’s Counsel]: Oh. So your testimony is that [the victim]
was never pimped out to the neighbors while you were there?

[Dewayne]: I didn’t say all that. I said that’s a possibility.

[Defendant’s Counsel]: Just a second ago you said none of that
happened while –

[Dewayne]: While I was there.

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 9
[Defendant’s Counsel]: That’s what I am asking –

[Dewayne]: Never happened while I was in their house, sir.

[Defendant’s Counsel]: – while you were there.

[Dewayne]: Doesn’t mean it never happened when I wasn’t there,
sir.

(emphasis added). From the reporter’s record, Dewayne’s testimony does not

appear to be as conclusive as Allen alleges in his brief, and Dewayne does not

conclusively exclude the possibility that I.H. was ever trafficked, only that it

did not occur while he was there. The trial court could have rationally believed

this testimony did not amount to a significant conflict or contradiction in the

testimony given Dewayne’s acknowledgement that it “[d]oesn’t mean it never

happened . . .”

Allen contends that I.H.’s testimony was contradicted by Tammy’s

testimony that Tammy never saw I.H. leave the trailer with Allen, including

taking her to any other trailer. Tammy confirmed that she did not see Allen

walk I.H. to another trailer and force I.H. to have sex with other men. But

later Tammy confirmed that she had no knowledge whether Allen did or did

not take I.H. to other trailers in the neighborhood to sell her for sex. When

Tammy was asked whether she had heard about I.H.’s allegation, she replied,

“I have heard about them, but I can’t say whether they happened or whether

they didn’t happen because I – I didn’t see it with my eyes.” Tammy testified

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 10
that Allen required her to stay in their bedroom in the trailer house and that

she was not able to leave the bedroom unless Allen went with her. She stated

that initially she believed it was just she and Allen living in the trailer house

while she was confined to her bedroom until she heard the voices of Casey,

Dewayne, and I.H. The trial court could have rationally believed this

testimony did not amount to a conflict or contradiction in the testimony

because of Tammy’s inability to observe activities in the trailer house because

of her confinement to her bedroom. Tammy was essentially saying that she

did not see any abuse, but not seeing it and having no knowledge is not an

assertion that it never happened. I.H. also testified that Tammy came in the

bedroom while I.H. and Allen were nude and sexual things were happening

between them. Tammy denied that she saw any sexual conduct between Allen

and I.H. The trial court could have rationally rejected Tammy’s denial because

of the potential for criminal liability.

Allen contends I.H.’s testimony was contradicted by Allen’s stepsister,

Erika, who lived in the same trailer park. In Erika’s testimony, she denied

ever seeing I.H. walking around the trailer park and going to different trailers,

other than seeing I.H. walking to her grandmother’s trailer or Erika’s trailer.

Erika added that she never noticed anything else. The trial court could have

rationally believed this testimony did not amount to a conflict or contradiction

in the testimony because Erika was testifying about what she had observed,

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 11
she did not indicate she was constantly on the watch for people walking around

the trailer park and never missed any activity there.

Allen also points to the testimony of an investigator with the Texas

Attorney General’s Office who said that, after speaking with I.H., he was able

to develop leads on two potential suspected perpetrators in the trafficking

charge, Josh and Bud, and that he was able to speak with Bud who did not

admit to the criminal activity or make any inculpatory statements. The trial

court could have rationally rejected the suspected perpetrator’s denial to the

investigator that he abused I.H. because of the potential for criminal

prosecution. Moreover, Allen contends that the fact that I.H. could not identify

the suspect in a photo lineup shown to her by the investigator after she

indicated they had sex fifteen or twenty times makes her testimony so

implausible that a factfinder could not rationally give credit to it. However,

during the trial, it is notable that Casey testified that he could not remember

Bud’s face. The photo lineup was not admitted into evidence and was not

before the trial court, nor is it in the record before us. The investigator that

prepared the lineup stated that he “presented [I.H.] a photo lineup which

contained six individuals similar in appearance” only leaving an impression

that Bud was in fact in the lineup. The investigator was not questioned

regarding whether the lineup was appropriately assembled or how much time

had elapsed between the offenses and presentation of the lineup to I.H.

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 12
Without more information regarding the lineup, the trial court could have

rationally disregarded I.H.’s failure to identify an individual in the lineup.

Allen argues that the State did not call any eyewitnesses to corroborate

I.H.’s description of what occurred when she was sexually assaulted by the

second offender identified as Josh. I.H.’s testimony on this specific detail was

never controverted and the only two individuals that could corroborate I.H.’s

testimony on this specific detail would have been present during the time she

was sexually assaulted and would have been subject to potential criminal

prosecution. Moreover, a conviction may be based on the testimony of a single

witness. Santiago, 425 S.W.3d at 443.

Allen points to numerous inconsistencies in I.H.’s testimony with the

testimony of the other witnesses. However, we conclude that the

inconsistencies were not so significant that they rise to the level of establishing

that it would have been irrational for the trial court to credit any part of her

testimony. See Braughton v. State, 569 S.W.3d 592, 612 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018). The trial court was presented with testimony that Allen controlled the

household, restricted the movement of others, and provided methamphetamine

to all members of the household. The trial court could have rationally believed

that the contradictions and inconsistencies grew out of all members of the

household using methamphetamine daily and the potential for several of the

witnesses to be in jeopardy of potential criminal prosecution. The trial court

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 13
was free to evaluate the witness’s testimony and disregard the inconsistencies

in the testimony that Allen now raises. See id. We overrule Allen’s first three

issues.

B. Issue Four

In Allen’s fourth issue, he complains that the trial court erred in

admitting evidence of tattoos that were not relevant to any issue in the case

and were unfairly prejudicial.

1. Authority

We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an

abuse of discretion. Hart v. State, 688 S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

We will not reverse the trial court’s decision except where there has been a

clear abuse of discretion falling outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.

Id. Even if a trial court improperly admitted evidence, reversal is warranted

only if the appellant demonstrates that the erroneous admission affected his

substantial rights. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Kibble v. State, 340 S.W.3d 14, 20

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd). An error affects a substantial

right of the appellant when it has a substantial and injurious effect or influence

in determining the jury’s verdict. See King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997).

To be admissible at trial, evidence must be relevant. TEX. R. EVID. 402.

“Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a ‘fact ...

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 14
of consequence in determining the action’ more or less probable than it would

be without the evidence.” Hall v. State, 663 S.W.3d 15, 30–31 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). “In other words, evidence “must satisfy two requirements to be

considered relevant: first, materiality, and second, probativeness.” Miller v.

State, 36 S.W.3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). “To be relevant, evidence

must be both material—that is, it must be offered for a proposition that is of

consequence to the determination of the case—and probative, such that it

makes the existence of the fact more or less probable than it would otherwise

be without the evidence.” Boudreaux v. State, 631 S.W.3d 319, 332 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). The rules of evidence favor the

admission of all logically relevant evidence for the jury’s consideration.

Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). “Evidence

does not need to prove or disprove a particular fact by itself to be relevant

under this rule; it is sufficient if the evidence provides even a small nudge

toward proving or disproving a fact of consequence.” Hall, 663 S.W.3d at 31.

However, the evidence is inadmissible if it fails to meet this threshold

standard. Id.

2. Discussion

During the trial, the State offered twenty-four photos depicting tattoos

covering Allen’s body. After the State’s offer was made the following

transpired:

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 15
[Defendant’s Counsel]: Judge, unless the State can establish the
relevance of the photos of my client and the body art he has, I don’t
see the relevance of these photos for the decision-making process
you’re going to be in.

[State’s Attorney]: I think you will see the relevance of this ties into
the victim’s tattoos and how they are related and how the reasoning
for his -- their tattoos and how that is connected.

[Defendant’s Counsel]: Judge, if there are similar or same tattoos on
Mr. Allen that are on the victim, then I might could see the relevance
of that tattoo of him coming into evidence. But we have got every
tattoo on his body in those photos.

[State’s Attorney]: And to clarify, Judge, Officer Kishino is not
testifying to these. Just that he took these photos.

[Defendant’s Counsel]: That has nothing to do with the relevance of
their -- that they have to this case or lack thereof.

The Court: Overruled. State’s 7 through 30 are admitted.

The trial court had admitted State’s exhibits 36 and 34 during I.H.’s testimony.

Both exhibits are photos of I.H.’s lower legs that show tattoos on both her left

and right leg. On her left leg is a tattoo of the name “Allen” and on her right

leg is a vertical tattoo of the number “5150” and horizontally crossing the “1”

is a tattoo of the number “212.”

The State contends that Allen’s tattoos were needed for the purpose of

corroborating the trafficking offense, along with I.H.’s and Casey’s testimony

that Allen gave the victim tattoos. The State points to both Allen and I.H. each

having a tattoo of the name “Allen” in a similar style. The State presented

testimony from Sergeant Cora Flippo with the Texas Attorney General’s

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 16
human-trafficking unit on the use of tattoos by traffickers. Flippo testified

that tattoos were used by traffickers as a form of branding to show ownership

over victims. Flippo explained that tattoos are considered to be permanent

labeling of victims and often feature the trafficker’s name, a nickname, slang

term, or a reference to gang affiliation. Flippo found similarities between the

“Allen” tattoos on Allen and I.H., specifically the similar handwriting. It was

Flippo’s opinion that the “Allen” tattoo on the victim is consistent with the kind

of branding encountered in trafficking cases. Flippo, after examining State’s

Exhibits seven through thirty, was of the opinion Allen was associated with

the Aryan Brotherhood because of multiple tattoos found on Allen that are

commonly used by members of the Aryan Brotherhood. Flippo indicated that

Allen’s gang association was relevant to Flippo’s interpretation of the tattoos

“5150” and “212” on I.H. and explained that the numeric tattoos are used by

the Aryan Brotherhood as an indicator of membership, loyalty, and unity.

Here, the photos of Allen’s tattoos, in conjunction with Sergeant Flippo’s

testimony, were relevant to prove Allen’s intent and that I.H. was trafficked,

all which was clearly a proposition of consequence to the determination of the

case and made the existence of the above facts more probable than it would

otherwise be without the photographic evidence. See Boudreaux v. State, 631

S.W.3d at 332. At a minimum, the photographic evidence provided a small

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 17
nudge toward proving or disproving a fact of consequence. See Hall, 663 S.W.

3d at 31.

We conclude the photographic evidence of Allen’s tattoos satisfied the

two requirements to be relevant; materiality and probativeness. See Cooper v.

State, 95 S.W.3d 488, 490–91 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd).

We decline to address Allen’s complaint on appeal that the tattoo

evidence was unfairly prejudicial because he did not raise a separate trial

objection to the tattoo evidence based upon Rule 403, thus this issue is not

properly presented for our review. See Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 49 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1996).

We overrule Allen’s fourth issue.

C. Conclusion

We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: August 28, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM

Shawn Allen v. The State of Texas Page 18