Ruben Arredondo v. the State of Texas

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00217-CR

Ruben Arredondo,
Appellant

v.

The State of Texas,
Appellee

On appeal from the
19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Thomas C. West, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2018-662-C1

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

A jury convicted Ruben Arredondo of four counts of sexual assault of a

child, one count of indecency with a child, and two counts of prohibited sexual

conduct. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison for each count of sexual

assault, 20 years in prison for the one count of indecency, and 20 years in prison

for each count of prohibited sexual conduct. The sentence in the last count was
ordered to run “consecutively to and shall begin only when” the judgments and

sentences on the first six counts “cease[] to operate.”

Arrendondo raises five issues on appeal—the trial court erred in failing

to grant a mistrial, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

Arredondo’s prior juvenile adjudication into evidence, and the evidence was

insufficient to support each conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

BACKGROUND

J.D. lived with his mother and, starting at about the age of seven, had

visitation with Arredondo, his father. J.D. had a half-sister with whom he

shared visitation weekends with Arredondo. When Arredondo discovered that

J.D. was inappropriately touching his half-sister, Arredondo did not report the

incident to the authorities. Instead, he offered J.D a spanking, anal sex, or

oral sex as punishment. J.D. chose oral sex because he thought it would be

quick and less painful. Arredondo had J.D. perform oral sex on him and did so

every time he discovered J.D. had touched his half-sister. Eventually, J.D. and

his half-sister’s visitations were moved to different weekends, but the oral sex

between J.D. and Arredondo continued. Eventually, J.D. requested oral sex

and then also requested anal sex. Arredondo complied. The sexual encounters

between J.D. and Arredondo began when J.D. was around 13 years old and

ended when J.D. was 17 years old.

Arredondo v. State Page 2
When J.D.’s mother and step-father discovered a nude photo of J.D. on

the family tablet, they confronted J.D. who told them what had been

happening. J.D. also volunteered to go to the police to report what Arredondo

had been doing to him and what he had been doing to his half-sister.

MISTRIAL

In his first issue, Arredondo complains the trial court erred in denying

his motion for mistrial requested during voir dire because, according to

Arredondo, the State specifically implied to the jury that Arredondo had

previously been convicted of sexual assault of a child.

The State began its questioning of the jury panel by asking how many

panel members knew a victim of sexual abuse. Almost everyone raised their

juror card. The group was reduced by more specific scenarios, such as was the

victim a relative or a child, was law enforcement involved, and how long before

the victim made an outcry, until only one panel-member card was raised. The

State then asked another broad group question:

Now, again, this is Mr. Arredondo. Those of you, which is pretty
much the whole room, those of you who raised your card, I want to
know: Did it involve Mr. Arredondo? Raise your card if the abuse
that you raised your hand on—

Arredondo objected and when in chambers, immediately requested a

mistrial because he claimed the State had:

Arredondo v. State Page 3
…basically told this entire jury panel that my client has previously
been involved in an act of sexual assault of a child. That entire
panel needs to go. This case needs to be thrown out. And I'm going
to ask that it be dismissed for intentional error.

The trial court denied Arredondo’s request.

The State contends Arredondo’s issue is not preserved because trial

counsel failed to make a specific objection or request an instruction to

disregard. We agree with the State’s second contention.

Most appellate complaints must be preserved by a timely request for

relief at the trial court level. Unkart v. State, 400 S.W.3d 94, 98 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). The "traditional and preferred procedure" for seeking relief at trial

for a complaint that must be preserved is "(1) to object when it is possible, (2) to

request an instruction to disregard if the prejudicial event has occurred, and

(3) to move for a mistrial if a party thinks an instruction to disregard was not

sufficient." Id. at 98-99 (quoting Young v. State, 137 S.W.3d 65, 69 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004)). A party may skip the request for an instruction to disregard, but

the party will be entitled to a mistrial only if such an instruction would not

have cured the harm flowing from the error. See id. at 99. See also Lee v. State,

549 S.W.3d 138, 145 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

Instructions to the jury are generally considered sufficient to cure

improprieties that occur during trial. Gamboa v. State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 580

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). And we generally presume that a jury will follow the

Arredondo v. State Page 4
judge's instructions. Id. Thus, if a curative instruction would have sufficed, it

cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion to deny a mistrial

request. See Lee, 549 S.W.3d at 145; Ocon v. State, 284 S.W.3d 880, 885 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2009).

Immediately after Arredondo objected and before the mistrial was

requested in chambers, the trial court intervened and directed the jury to an

example of bias toward Arredondo, explaining:

Anything that you have incurred in your past, for all of those who raised
your card, if there's anybody that is going to take those feelings and then
direct them in an attack form [sic] against Mr. Arredondo, raise your
card.

Okay. Number 20.

That is the example of bias. She's, like, I'm taking my personal
experience and I'm going to find him guilty just because. I'm going to
find him not guilty just because.

I think that answers the question….

After the discussion of a mistrial in chambers, nothing more was

mentioned about whether Arredondo was “involved” in any of the sexual abuse

cases. The State continued with its voir dire examination based on the trial

court’s explanation, confirming with panel member 20 that knowing a sexual

abuse victim would affect the panel member’s ability to be fair and impartial

in the case. After noting two more panel members who felt the same way, the

State “flipped” the questioning to those members who knew someone accused

Arredondo v. State Page 5
of a sex crime and whether that would affect the members’ ability to be fair

and impartial. The State then began a discussion about the rights of a

defendant.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that an instruction to disregard

would have cured harm, if any, caused by the question proposed by the State

in voir dire. This is especially true when the trial court, as soon as the objection

was made, directed the jury’s attention to an example of a bias against

Arredondo. 1 Accordingly, because an instruction to disregard would have been

sufficient to cure harm, if any, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its

discretion in denying Arredondo’s motion for mistrial. Arredondo’s first issue

is overruled.

PRIOR JUVENILE ADJUDICATION

Arredondo next contends the trial court abused its discretion in

admitting during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial Arredondo's 1996

juvenile adjudication for engaging in the delinquent conduct of aggravated

sexual assault of a child because, he contends, the probative value of the

adjudication outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice under Texas Rule of

1
Arredondo contends he was harmed by the State’s question because after voir dire, two panel
members were overheard saying that if it were up to them, they would hang Arredondo. However,
nothing in the record indicated that the comment was made because of a potential prior sexual assault
conviction. Moreover, one of the panel members involved in the overheard conversation told the trial
court that the other member made the hanging comment and was not serious about it—he was “talking
nonsense.”

Arredondo v. State Page 6
Evidence 403.

We review a trial court's decision to admit or exclude extraneous offense

evidence under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. Perkins v. State, 664

S.W.3d 209, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). The trial court does not abuse its

discretion unless its determination lies outside the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

We uphold a trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and

is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case. Carrasco v. State, 154

S.W.3d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Holland v. State, 702 S.W.3d 836, 839

(Tex. App.—Waco 2024, pet. ref'd).

To determine whether evidence is admissible under Rule 403, we use the

Montgomery factors: (1) the strength of the evidence's probative value; (2) the

potential for the evidence to "impress the jury in some irrational but

nevertheless indelible way;" (3) the amount of time required at trial to develop

the evidence; and (4) the proponent's need for the evidence. Hart v. State, 688

S.W.3d 883, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024); Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372,

389-90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh'g). All testimony and physical

evidence are likely to be prejudicial to one party or the other. Davis v. State,

329 S.W.3d 798, 806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). It is only when there exists a

clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the evidence offered and its

Arredondo v. State Page 7
probative value that Rule 403 is applicable. Id.

Probative Value

Article 38.37, Section 2(b) provides: "evidence that the defendant has

committed a separate offense described by Subsection (a)(1)…may be admitted

in the trial of an alleged offense for any bearing the evidence has on relevant

matters, including the character of the defendant and acts performed in

conformity with the character of the defendant." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

38.37, §2(b). Arredondo argues the probative value of his prior juvenile

adjudication is weak because it was “too remote and dissimilar to the charged

offense.” We disagree with Arredondo.

Evidence of an extraneous sexual offense against a child admitted under

article 38.37, section 2(b) is probative of the defendant's character or

propensity to commit sexual assaults on children. Guedea v. State, 683 S.W.3d

549, 553 (Tex. App.—Waco 2023, no pet.); Holland v. State, 702 S.W.3d 836,

842 (Tex. App.—Waco 2024, pet. ref'd). The remoteness of such an offense

alone does not fully undermine its probative value. See Guedea, 683 S.W.3d at

553; Deggs v. State, 646 S.W.3d 916, 925-26 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, pet. ref’d).

Further, similarities between the extraneous offense and charged offense may

offset any loss of probative value resulting from the extraneous offense's

remoteness. Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin

Arredondo v. State Page 8
2016, pet. ref'd).

The adjudicated offense occurred 28 years prior to the instant trial. The

adjudication documents admitted into evidence showed that Arredondo was

adjudicated delinquent in 1996 when he was 14 years old for the offense of

aggravated sexual assault of a child. He pled true and was found to have

caused the “penetration of the anus of [A. A.], a child younger than 14 years of

age…by inserting his penis into the victim’s anus….” Testimony established

that A.A., who was seven years old at the time of the offense, was Arredondo’s

younger brother. In the case at hand, J.D. is Arredondo’s son. He was about

13 years old when Arredondo began sexually abusing him. The abuse began

with oral sex and progressed through the years to anal penetration.

While the charged offenses were not exactly the same as the adjudicated

offense, all of the charged offenses and the adjudicated offense were sexual

offenses by Arredondo against a younger, male relative. Further, both the

adjudicated offense and at least three of the charged offenses involved

Arredondo contacting or penetrating the anus of a younger, male relative.

Accordingly, we find these similarities to be more significant than the

differences and, as such, offset any potential loss of probative value resulting

from the adjudication's remoteness. This factor weighs in favor of admission.

Arredondo v. State Page 9
Impression on the Jury

Arredondo argues the adjudication improperly impressed the jury

because the offense was “significantly different” from the charges tried and

allowed the jury to overly focus on his past. We have already determined the

similarities of the offenses to be more significant than the differences. Further,

any potential improper focus by the jury was counterbalanced to some degree

by the trial court’s limiting instructions given during the trial and in the

charge. See Webb v. State, 575 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, pet.

ref'd). This factor also weighs in favor of admission.

Time

Although Arredondo takes issue with the State’s later use of the

adjudication in questioning other witnesses, the record reveals the amount of

time required to introduce the adjudication into evidence was minimal. This

factor weighs in favor of admission.

Need

Lastly, Arredondo contends the adjudication itself was not needed

because Arredondo’s mother testified about the offense. Arredondo’s mother

sponsored the introduction of the adjudication. When testifying about the

offense alleged and adjudicated, his mother would not agree that Arredondo

inserted his penis in his brother’s anus; she only agreed that Arredondo pled

Arredondo v. State Page 10
true to that allegation. Without the introduction of the adjudication itself, his

mother might have been a more difficult witness in confirming the allegations

to which Arredondo pled true and of which he was adjudicated.

Further, Arredondo’s defensive theory was that J.D. had the reputation

of being untruthful. The introduction of that theory began with voir dire when

the panel was questioned about children or young adults not being truthful

and continued through closing argument. Arredondo and his wife both

testified that J.D. was known for being untruthful. Challenges to the victim’s

credibility increases the State's need for the extraneous-offense evidence.

Holland v. State, 702 S.W.3d 836, 843 (Tex. App.—Waco 2024, pet. ref'd).

Moreover, the State had no eyewitness testimony other than J.D. and no DNA

evidence to link Arredondo to the charged offenses.

Accordingly, for these reasons, the State needed the prior adjudication.

This factor weighs in favor of admission.

Conclusion

Based on our review of the record and after weighing the Montgomery

factors, we conclude that while the prior adjudication may have been

prejudicial, there was nothing to suggest a "clear disparity" between the degree

of prejudice and its probative value. Accordingly, a balance of the factors shows

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Arredondo's prior

Arredondo v. State Page 11
adjudication over his Rule 403 objection. His second issue is overruled.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his last three issues, Arredondo challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his convictions under Counts I-IV, Sexual Assault (Issue

III), Count V, Indecency with a Child (Issue IV), and Counts VI and VII,

Prohibited Sexual Conduct (Issue V).

The Court of Criminal Appeals has expressed our standard of review of

a sufficiency issue as follows:

When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider whether, after viewing all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d
560 (1979); Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017). This standard requires the appellate court to defer "to the
responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the
testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment
for that of the factfinder. Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The court conducting a sufficiency review
must not engage in a "divide and conquer" strategy but must
consider the cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa, 514 S.W.3d
at 232. Although juries may not speculate about the meaning of
facts or evidence, juries are permitted to draw any reasonable
inferences from the facts so long as each inference is supported by
the evidence presented at trial. Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 750, 757
(Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319); see also
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 16-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We
presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences
from the evidence in favor of the verdict, and we defer to that
resolution. Merritt v. State, 368 S.W.3d 516, 525 (Tex. Crim. App.

Arredondo v. State Page 12
2012). This is because the jurors are the exclusive judges of the
facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to
the testimony. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2010). Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are
equally probative, and circumstantial evidence alone may be
sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of
all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the
conviction. Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.

We measure whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
to support a conviction by comparing it to "the elements of the
offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the
case." Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
The hypothetically correct jury charge is one that "accurately sets
out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily
restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes
the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.; see
also Daugherty v. State, 387 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). The "law as authorized by the indictment" includes the
statutory elements of the offense and those elements as modified
by the indictment. Daugherty, 387 S.W.3d at 665.

Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729, 732-33 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).

Arredondo contends the evidence is insufficient only because J.D.’s

testimony regarding the instances of sexual abuse is not credible. But it is the

jury’s duty as the sole factfinder to assess J.D.’s credibility and to resolve any

conflicts in the evidence or testimony. See Curry v. State, 622 S.W.3d 302, 310

(Tex. Crim. App. 2019); Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 729 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018). The jury determines the credibility of the witnesses and may believe

all, some, or none of the testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.

Arredondo v. State Page 13
Crim. App. 1986). We do not sit as the thirteenth juror or substitute our

judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and credibility

of the evidence. Edwards v. State, 666 S.W.3d 571, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

J.D. testified extensively as to the instances and to the elements of

sexual assault, indecency, and prohibited sexual conduct by Arredondo. We do

not recount in detail every part of J.D.’s testimony but provide only his

testimony regarding the elements of each offense charged and other evidence

relevant to the jury’s credibility determination.

Sexual Assault

As defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, a person commits the

offense of sexual assault of a child when the person intentionally or knowingly

causes the penetration of the mouth of a child, a person younger than 17 years

of age, by the sexual organ of the actor. TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.011(a)(2)(B);

(c)(1). J.D. testified that in 2013, when he was about thirteen years old,

Arredondo learned of J.D.’s sexual relationship with J.D.’s half-sister and

offered him three options as punishment for his behavior, one of the options

being oral sex. J.D. elected to perform oral sex on Arredondo because he

thought it would be the quickest and least painful option of punishment. A few

months later, in 2014, J.D. recalled performing oral sex on Arredondo a second

time after Arredondo learned of the continuing relationship between J.D. and

Arredondo v. State Page 14
his half-sister. J.D. said he was not allowed then to change the option for

punishment. He testified that he performed oral sex on Arredondo “several

dozen times” over the next few years.

Indecency

As defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, a person commits the

offense of indecency with a child, if the person, with the intent to arouse or

gratify the sexual desire of any person, engages in sexual contact with the child

by touching the buttocks of the child by means of the sexual organ of the

person, and the child is younger than 17 years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.11

(a)(1), (c)(2). J.D. testified that before 2017, Arredondo entered J.D.’s room.

J.D. pretended to be sleeping. J.D. felt Arredondo remove J.D.’s shorts and felt

Arredondo’s penis between J.D.’s “butt cheeks,” but not penetrating J.D.’s

anus. J.D. also felt Arredondo ejaculate on his back.

Prohibited Sexual Conduct

As defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge, a person commits the

offense of prohibited sexual conduct if the person, with the intent to arouse or

gratify the sexual desire of any person, engages in deviate sexual intercourse

with another person the actor knows to be, without regard to legitimacy, the

actor’s descendant by blood by placing the genitals of the actor in contact with

the anus of another person. TEX. PENAL CODE § 25.02(a)(1), (b)(1). The

Arredondo v. State Page 15
biological father-son relationship between J.D. and Arredondo was established

by a birth certificate. J.D. testified that twice, Arredondo engaged in anal sex

with him. He described performing oral sex on Arredondo prior to Arredondo

inserting his penis into J.D.’s anus.

Other Relevant Evidence

J.D. was 24 years old at the time of the trial. He was born near the end

of November in 1999. The abuse by his father began when J.D. was

approximately 13 years old. J.D. made an outcry of abuse when he was 17

years old. J.D. voluntarily made a report to the Bellmead Police Department

regarding Arredondo’s abuse and his own abuse of his half-sister.

J.D.’s step-father testified at trial that J.D. told him that, as a form of

punishment, J.D. performed oral sex on Arredondo and that their sexual

relationship evolved to include anal sex. An officer with the Bellmead Police

Department and Dr. Burkley with the Advocacy Center for Crime Victims and

Children each testified that J.D. made an outcry of sexual abuse to them

individually. Additionally, Dr. Burkley and Dr. Carter, a practicing

psychologist, shared their expertise in the field of child sexual abuse,

explaining delayed outcry and other dynamics common to child sexual abuse.

It was within the jury’s province to believe J.D. and disbelieve

Arrendondo’s claims of J.D.’s untruthfulness. Accordingly, after reviewing all

Arredondo v. State Page 16
the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and giving due

deference to the jury's weight and credibility determinations, we conclude that,

on the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Arredondo’s third, fourth,

and fifth issues are overruled.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled each issue on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s

judgments.

LEE HARRIS
Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: November 20, 2025
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CR25

Arredondo v. State Page 17