In the Interest of E.M., I.M., W.M., E.M., M.M., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 27, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00248-CV
__________

IN THE INTEREST OF E.M., I.M., W.M., E.M., AND M.M.,
CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 42nd District Court
Callahan County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 22430

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the mother (Appellant) to five of her children: E.M., I.M.,
W.M., E.M.2., and M.M. 1 In a single issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is
legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that terminating
her parental rights is in the children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 161.001(b)(2) (West Supp. 2024).

1
We use initials to refer to the children. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). Because two children have the
same initials, we will refer to the younger child as “E.M.2.” to avoid confusion.
Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. § 161.001(b). To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V), and that termination is in the best interest of the
children. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or
degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or
conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007
(West 2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellant failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that
specifically established the actions necessary for Appellant to obtain the return of
the children, who had been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship
of the Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) for not less
than nine months as a result of the children’s removal under Chapter 262 for abuse
or neglect. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The trial court further found, pursuant to
Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed

2
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex. 2002) then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As such,
when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict
the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). Courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors
to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).
These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the emotional
and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional and physical
danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of the individuals
seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote
the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the
agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) the
acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child

3
relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the
parent. Id.
To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that
the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. In re E.C.R., 638
S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet. denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479
S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship
is in the child’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825,
829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past
conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the
future if the child is returned to the possession of the parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d
105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d
373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied). Additionally,

4
the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical
and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent to meet the child’s
physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118; see also
In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The Evidence Presented at Trial
Appellant and the children’s father were common-law married for eighteen
years, and they had seven children together: K.M., L.M., E.M., I.M., W.M., E.M.2.,
and M.M. In October 2022, the Department received allegations of domestic
violence between Appellant and the father, and physical abuse of the children. The
father had been arrested for assaulting Appellant but claimed that it “was more
pushing” and “shov[ing]” than any hitting. The father admitted that he and
Appellant fought with each other in front of the children “a few times,” and that he
was “not proud of what [he] did.” The Department initially attempted to avoid
removing the children by providing Appellant and the father with family-based
safety services (FBSS). 2
In January 2023, due to Appellant’s “drug abuse [and] serious domestic
violence between [Appellant] and [the father],” the Department sought and was
granted temporary managing conservatorship of the children. Following the full
adversary hearing3 on February 16, 2023, the trial court ordered Appellant to
complete a substance abuse treatment assessment and “submit urine, hair, saliva,
and/or blood samples, at times to be determined by the Department, for analysis by

2
“Family-based safety services are protective services provided to a family whose children are not
in the conservatorship of the Department.” 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 700.710 (2021). The Department’s
Child Protective Services Division provides family-based safety services to families and children “to:
(1) protect the children from abuse and neglect; (2) help the family reduce the risk of future abuse or neglect;
and (3) prevent the removal of the children from their home.” Id.
3
See FAM. § 262.201.

5
a drug testing laboratory.” The order further advised that the “failure to appear for
or submit to a requested test” would be considered “the equivalent of a positive drug
test.” Meagan Davis, the permanency case manager, also notified Appellant that a
failure to submit to required drug testing would be a “presumed positive.”
On April 13, 2023, the trial court approved Appellant’s Family Plan of
Service, through which Appellant was ordered to complete counseling, parenting
classes, a mental health assessment, and a psychological evaluation. Appellant was
also required to maintain safe and stable housing, obtain and maintain legal
employment and provide proof thereof, attend scheduled parent-child visitation,
submit to random drug and alcohol screens through urine, oral, or hair follicles as
requested by the Department, and test negative for all substances. Appellant
completed her counseling requirements, parenting classes, a psychological
evaluation, and a mental health assessment. However, Appellant did not consistently
inform Davis where she was living, or of changes in phone number and employment.
She only submitted to drug testing twice throughout the pendency of the case and
ignored over twenty other directives to drug test. On September 27, 2023, she
provided a hair sample that tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
Following Appellant’s positive drug test, her parent-child visitation was suspended.
Despite Appellant knowing that “she would need three clean drug screens” for visits
to resume, she refused to submit to drug testing until February 2024.
The father, on the other hand, “completed pretty much all of the services on
[his] family service plan,” including his drug screening requirements. His urinalysis
drug tests were negative for all substances, but his hair follicle samples yielded
positive results for methamphetamine on several occasions. Although the father
attributed his positive test results to Appellant’s methamphetamine use, the
Department nonetheless halted the impending monitored return of the children to the

6
father. The Department encouraged the father to “leav[e] the home or figur[e] a way
to get [Appellant] out of the home” because reunification “would not be safe with
[Appellant] in the home.” The father ultimately heeded that advice after continuing
to test positive for methamphetamine—Davis heard the father say, “I am done with
this,” and that he chose his children.
Beginning in early 2024, the father endeavored to remove Appellant from the
home. He obtained a fourteen-day “kickout order,” changed the locks to the home,
and initiated eviction proceedings. However, Appellant broke in on two separate
occasions while the father was at work, “trashed the house,” and left
methamphetamine in the closet. The Department had previously begun a monitored
return of L.M. to the father, 4 so L.M. was living at the home during Appellant’s
January 2024 break-in. The father was subsequently informed that he “doesn’t have
the right to legally evict [Appellant]” because she is a co-borrower on his mortgage
loan.
The final hearing commenced on May 9, 2024, and was recessed until
August 7, 2024. By then, E.M. was twelve years old, I.M. was ten, W.M. was seven,
and the twins, M.M. and E.M.2., were five years old. The two older children
involved in the separate suits, K.M. and L.M., were fourteen and fifteen,
respectively. E.M. and I.M. were placed in a foster home in Brownwood, Texas,
and W.M., M.M., and E.M.2. were placed in a foster home in Tuscola, Texas. Davis
testified that “[t]hey’re doing well” in their placements, and their caregivers arrange
for the siblings to visit each other. The children’s paternal grandfather who lives in
Arizona is willing to adopt the children.
Davis and the father were the only two witnesses who testified at the
termination hearing. Davis was concerned “that [Appellant] is still actively using”

4
L.M. and K.M. were children involved in a separate action.

7
methamphetamine because she “will not drug test.” Throughout the case, Davis
instructed Appellant by text message and e-mail to drug test, but Appellant either
ignored Davis’s messages or gave an excuse for her noncompliance. For instance,
Appellant demanded to be notified by e-mail before 5:30 a.m. due to her purported
work schedule, and Davis accommodated that request. Even then, Appellant
failed to submit to drug testing because “her position [was] she [did] not receive[]
those e-mails.” And according to the father, Appellant was not employed.
After the first day of trial recessed, the trial court ordered Appellant to “submit
to an oral drug screen, a urine drug screen, and a hair follicle drug screen on May 9,
2024 . . . in Abilene, before close of business.” Appellant did not comply with the
trial court’s order, and when trial resumed Davis testified:
[Appellant] said . . . she didn’t realize I had to give her the oral [drug
screen] . . . [a]nd then she said her car broke down, but that her car made
it home. And then she said she would go -- I asked her to go on the
13th of May and she did not go. I’ve also offered to transport her myself
and she won’t go.”
The Department moved to enforce the trial court’s order by contempt. The father
also filed an application for a “permanent protective order” on behalf of himself and
the children. Appellant did not appear on August 7 for the second day of trial, and
“has been avoiding service” of the application for the protective order. Law
enforcement attempted to serve Appellant at the father’s home, but she “ran out the
back, and jumped the fence.”
When Appellant was instructed to report for drug testing at the end of June,
she misrepresented that she was in Salt Lake City visiting her mother. Davis
arranged for Appellant to be drug tested in Salt Lake City, but when she failed to do
so, Davis confirmed with Appellant’s mother that Appellant “never showed up to
Salt Lake City.” Davis again directed Appellant to submit to drug testing on July 10,
2024, but Appellant replied that she would either be in Fort Worth or Sherman,

8
Texas. Davis set up drug testing for Appellant in both cities, but Appellant never
went to either location. On cross-examination by the father’s attorney, Davis
conceded that it is “because [Appellant] won’t stay out” of the father’s home that the
children cannot return there.
The father explained that his relationship with Appellant has been extremely
volatile in the past three years. According to the father, Appellant used
methamphetamine “[o]n and off [their] whole relationship.” He did not know until
“probably about seven years in[] . . . when [he] finally caught her doing it.” The
father “can’t even count” how many times he tried to help Appellant achieve
sobriety, and “even told her [he] would do drug rehab with her . . . counseling . . .
whatever it took.” Appellant “would get clean for a while,” but always reverted to
methamphetamine use. The Department offered Appellant the opportunity to attend
inpatient treatment, but she “never would sign the releases [to] . . . get the substance
abuse assessment completed.”
The last time Appellant saw her children in person was September 2023, and
she did not appear for the second day of trial. E.M. and I.M. “do not desire to live
in the same home” as Appellant, “and a lot of times don’t desire to talk to her.”
Davis agreed that the “younger children really don’t understand,” so she cannot
attest to their desires regarding termination of their relationship with Appellant.
Davis testified that terminating Appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best
interest because:
[Appellant has] not completed all the services on her family plan.
We’re pretty sure she’s still actively using drugs. [The father] says
she’s using drugs, and that that’s why he’s testing positive. And [the
home] would not be a safe environment for the children.”
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the
Department’s “reasonable attempts at reunification,” Appellant “continues to use

9
drugs to the point that it necessitates terminations for the children.” The trial court
further explained that Appellant being “in [the children’s] lives, out of their lives,”
and causing “volatile situations . . . can’t keep going on.” The trial court terminated
Appellant’s parental rights under Section 161.001(b)(1)(O) and found termination
to be in the best interest of the children. 5 This appeal followed.
Best Interest of the Children
In Appellant’s sole issue, she challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of
the evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
is in the best interest of the children. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing
a much broader, facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded
significant discretion.” In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72). We reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the
sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at
liberty to disturb the determinations of the factfinder so long as those determinations
are not unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005).
Giving the requisite due deference to the trial court, we hold that, based on the
evidence in the record and the application of the Holley factors, the trial court could
have formed a firm belief or conviction that termination of Appellant’s parental
rights was in the best interest of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Appellant ignores the well-established law that evidence of each Holley factor
is not required to support a best-interest finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351,
366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-
01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.)
(mem. op.). Texas courts consistently recognize that the absence of evidence
regarding some of these factors does not preclude a best-interest finding,

5
The trial court denied the Department’s petition to terminate the father’s parental rights and
granted him possessory conservatorship and in-person visitation upon negative urinalysis drug test results.

10
“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.). Consequently, “evidence relating to one single factor may be
adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination is in the best
interests of the child.” J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852,
855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)).
Evidence that is relevant to Section 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds may
be probative of the child’s best interest. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50
(Tex. 2013) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28). Appellant does not challenge the trial
court’s finding that she failed to comply with the provisions of one or more court
orders that specifically established the actions necessary for her to obtain the return
of her children. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). So long as the evidence supports that
finding, it is binding on this court as a valid ground for termination. See E.C.R., 402
S.W.3d at 249–50; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); J.S., 687 S.W.3d
at 552; In re J.G., 592 S.W.3d 506, 506 n.2 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, no pet.). In
this regard, the trial court could properly consider Appellant’s failure to comply with
her court-ordered service plan and additional court-ordered drug testing in assessing
whether the termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the children.
See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249–50; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at
266.
The clear and convincing evidence that Appellant failed to comply with court
orders aimed at reunifying her with her children also established that terminating
Appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. Most concerning
was the evidence of Appellant’s methamphetamine use, and her brazen disregard of
drug-testing requirements. A parent’s illegal drug use supports a finding that
termination is in the children’s best interest. See, e.g., In re C.S., No. 11-24-00186-

11
CV, 2024 WL 5080505, at *13–15 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 12, 2024, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (considering mother’s unrepentant marihuana use in best-interest
analysis) (citing J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 554); see also In re Z.B., No. 11-24-00061-CV,
2024 WL 3995522, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 30, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).
That is because persistent drug use by parents poses infinite potential dangers to their
children. See, e.g., In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2023, pet. denied); E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 768 (“A parent’s drug use supports a
finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.”); In re
S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877, 887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s
drug use, inability to provide a stable home, and failure to comply with his family
service plan support a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”).
The Texas Supreme Court recently reiterated that a parent’s continuing pattern of
drug use can support a finding of endangerment, which in turn supports a best-
interest finding, due to the “attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged
absence from the children.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 281 (Tex. 2024).
A parent’s refusal to submit to drug testing permits the inference that he or
she is continuing to abuse drugs, which is properly considered in determining
whether termination is in the children’s best interest. See In re I.E.P., No. 04-24-
00255-CV, 2024 WL 3802517, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14, 2024, no
pet.) (mem. op.) (“drug use can destabilize the home and expose children to physical
and emotional harm if not resolved”); see In re F.T., No. 07-24-00205-CV, 2024
WL 4692125, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 5, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.)
(mother’s failures to appear for several drug tests were considered positive results);
In re Z.G., No. 02-23-00038-CV, 2023 WL 3521848, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
May 18, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[E]vidence of past drug use and a refusal
to submit to drug testing supports a finding that the parent has endangered the child’s

12
emotional and physical needs and posed a danger to the child. . . . And as to future
drug use, a factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct.”);
In re O.G.H.D., No. 09-21-00172-CV, 2021 WL 4466002, at *9, *12 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont Sept. 30, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering a parent’s failure to
comply with drug testing requirements in best-interest analysis). The trial court
could therefore reasonably infer that Appellant avoided drug testing because she was
using drugs, a pattern of which “implicates most of the Holley factors.” E.D., 682
S.W.3d at 607; see also In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834–36 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (father’s history of drug use and continued drug use
during case bore on second, third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors—child’s
emotional and physical needs, emotional and physical danger to the child, father’s
parental abilities, and stability of the home—thus supporting the best-interest
finding).
Despite Davis’s efforts to accommodate Appellant’s numerous
misrepresentations of travel plans, transportation issues, and work schedule,
Appellant circumvented all but two required drug screens. Appellant’s obstinance
in avoiding required drug testing suggests that Appellant never addressed her illegal
drug use and was unwilling or unable to meet the children’s emotional and physical
needs. See In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 289 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no
pet.). By her own actions, the trial court could rationally infer that Appellant chose
to continue drug use rather than regain in-person visitation with her children, as
September 2023 was the last time she saw them. Such “significant evidence of
parental indifference weighs heavily in favor of a factfinder’s finding that
termination is in [the] child[ren]’s best interest.” In re A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d 813,
823 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, no pet.). And E.M. and I.M. had no
desire to see or speak to Appellant. The evidence strongly suggests Appellant’s

13
parental indifference and inability to adequately parent her children, which supports
the conclusion that the parent-child relationship is not an appropriate one. See
Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372.
Moreover, Appellant’s partial compliance with her service plan was
insufficient to alleviate the Department’s and trial court’s rational concerns that her
drug problems remained. She tested positive for methamphetamine while
participating in counseling and parenting courses, broke into the father’s home at
least twice, and left methamphetamine in the home. She also failed to provide proof
of employment after December 2023, and failed to inform Davis of her living
situation. Appellant likewise refused the Department’s offer to provide inpatient
substance abuse treatment. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249 (a parent’s failure to
complete court-ordered services can support best-interest finding). “A fact finder
may infer from a parent’s failure to take the initiative to complete the services
required to regain possession of [her] child that [she] does not have the ability to
motivate [herself] to seek out available resources needed now or in the future.” In
re J.M.T., 519 S.W.3d 258, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied).
As such, Appellant’s continued failure to utilize the available programs or regularly
visit the children demonstrates that she lacked the motivation or willingness to
promote the well-being of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372.
Further, Appellant did not appear for the second day of the final hearing.
When a parent is absent from termination proceedings without a valid
explanation, “the factfinder may reasonably infer that the parent is indifferent to the
outcome,” which supports a finding that termination is in the children’s best
interest. A.J.D.-J., 667 S.W.3d at 826; In re A.V.G.-P., No. 10-23-00294-CV, 2024
WL 1327908, at *4 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 28, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). Because
Appellant forfeited participation in legal proceedings where her parental rights were

14
at stake, she could be presumed to lack the interest, ability, and desire to be involved
in her children’s lives. See A.V.G.-P., 2024 WL 1327908, at *4.
As to the plans for the children and the stability of the home or proposed
placement, the evidence showed that the children’s paternal grandfather was willing
to adopt them. The father was also willing to move to Arizona to be with the
children. While this plan was not solidified by the final termination hearing, a “lack
of evidence about definitive plans for permanent placement and adoption cannot be
the dispositive factor.” J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 553 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28).
“Otherwise, terminations would regularly be subject to reversal on the sole ground
that ‘an adoptive family has yet to be located.’” Id. (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28);
see also In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, pet. denied). The children’s current caregivers in their respective placements
are providing them with an environment and structure in which they can succeed
until the grandfather and father finish arranging a safe, permanent home. Appellant
has not provided her children with a safe, drug-free home environment—to the
contrary, the trial court was reasonably concerned that Appellant would continue to
expose the children to violence and drugs were they returned to her care. See
In re A.V., No. 11-23-00144-CV, 2023 WL 8631492, at *8 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Dec. 14, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Appellant not only prioritized drug use over her own relationship with her
children; her actions interfered with the children’s desires to be with their father.
Appellant left the trial court little choice but to find that terminating her parental
rights is in the best interest of the children. The evidence is legally and factually
sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental
rights is in the best interest of the children. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley,
544 S.W.2d at 371–72.

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Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

February 27, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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