In the Interest of S.B., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed March 27, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00267-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF S.B., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11136-CX

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated
the parental rights of the mother and father, Appellants, to their child, S.B.1 On
appeal, Appellants contend that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that terminating their parental rights is in the child’s
best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2) (West Supp. 2024).

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We use initials to refer to the child. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
I. Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Id. § 161.001(b). To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1)(A)–(V), and that termination is in the best interest of the
child. Id. § 161.001(b)(2). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree
of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West
2019).
In this case, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
established that Appellants committed at least one of the acts listed in
Section 161.001(b)(1)—specifically, that Appellants: (1) knowingly placed or
knowingly allowed the child to remain in conditions or surroundings which
endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and (2) engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct
which endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The trial court further found, pursuant to
Section 161.001(b)(2), that termination of Appellants’ parental rights was in the
child’s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
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facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266
(Tex. 2002) then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)). As such,
when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be
proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not restrict
the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley
factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex.
1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the child; (2) the
emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; (3) the emotional
and physical danger to the child now and in the future; (4) the parental abilities of
the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these individuals
to promote the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by these
individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or
proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the

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existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id.
To support a best interest finding, the Department is not required to prove
each Holley factor; in some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one
factor will suffice. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.). Additionally, the same evidence that proves one
or more statutory grounds for termination may also constitute sufficient, probative
evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the child’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates that
the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety and
well-being of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best interest
analysis evaluates the best interest of the child, not the parent. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at
548 (citing In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet.
denied)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship
is in the child’s best interest. Id.; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379, 384 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s past conduct that
endangered the safety and well-being of the child may recur in the future if the child
is returned to the possession of the parent. In re J.D., 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied). Additionally, the factfinder
may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the child’s physical and emotional
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needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent to meet the child’s physical and
emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-
16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no
pet.) (mem. op.).
II. Factual and Procedural Background
In the early morning hours on March 20, 2023, Appellants left five-year-old
S.B., and her eight-year-old half-brother, R.C., 2 home alone so they could go to a
methadone clinic. While S.B. was watching television on the couch and R.C. was
asleep in another room, a lit candle fell over and ignited a fire. The mother later
admitted to lighting the candle before she and the father left. The children were able
to escape without injury and they flagged down a person that was driving by. Law
enforcement contacted the Department of Family and Protective Services (the
Department) when they were unable to reach Appellants. Appellants were each
charged with the state jail felony offense of endangering a child. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.041(c), (f) (West Supp. 2024).
The Department initially gave Appellants the opportunity to participate in
family-based safety services (FBSS). 3 Jamie Olson, Appellants’ assigned FBSS
caseworker, testified that Appellants did not comply with the requirements of their
family-based safety services. “[I]t was very hard to keep track of [Appellants]” and
“to maintain consistent contact with them.” Appellants moved without notifying the

2
R.C.’s biological father was originally a party to the underlying suit, but neither R.C. nor his father
are parties to this appeal. Prior to the trial court’s issuance of its final order of termination, the mother and
R.C.’s father executed a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) with the Department, and the action
concerning R.C. was severed into a separate cause number.
3
“Family-based safety services are protective services provided to a family whose children are not
in the conservatorship of the Department.” 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 700.710 (2021). The
Department’s Child Protective Services Division provides family-based safety services to families and
children “to: (1) protect the children from abuse and neglect; (2) help the family reduce the risk of future
abuse or neglect; and (3) prevent the removal of the children from their home.” Id.

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Department, never submitted to drug testing, and denied Olson access to their home
on several occasions.
Then, on July 26, 2023, the mother was arrested for possession of
methamphetamine, a state jail felony. She went with the children to the Noah
Project, a shelter in Abilene for victims of family violence, sexual assault, and
human trafficking, because she claimed the father “had started hitting her regularly
and . . . spitting on her.” Inside the mother’s bag in her room, staff with the Noah
Project found a small plastic bag of methamphetamine, syringes, and a broken pipe.
The mother blamed the father for “planting drugs on her,” and reported that he
“possibly relapsed.” However, she later admitted to using methamphetamine on
July 25.
Following the mother’s arrest, the Department took custody of S.B. and R.C.,
and Olson contacted the father. Olson testified about the mother’s drug
possession arrest, and the father’s alleged domestic abuse and relapse. When Olson
advised the father to submit to drug testing and asked for possible relatives with
whom the children could stay, the father responded, “I’m not going to do s--t for you
a------s.”
The Department was granted temporary managing conservatorship of the
children on July 27, 2023. The children were drug tested upon removal; S.B.’s
results were negative, but R.C. tested positive for methamphetamine. At the
adversary hearing on August 3, 2023, the father conceded that he had relapsed on
methamphetamine and marihuana.
The final hearing commenced on July 18, 2024, and was recessed until
August 15, 2024. Patricia Ray, the 2INgage permanency case manager, testified that
Appellants completed most of the services required by their family plans of service.
The mother, specifically, had complied with her community supervision conditions.
She also completed inpatient substance abuse treatment at Serenity House in Abilene
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and tested negative on every drug screen except one. However, the mother did not
have “long-term” stable housing. According to Ray, the mother’s “longest living
arrangement . . . was living at the 180 House,” a transitional home after inpatient
treatment, “from the end of September [through] the end of March [2024].” Due to
its residents being “known addicts and people with past criminal history,” it was not
safe or appropriate for a child. Similarly, the father had “moved various different
places, but none . . . have really been appropriate for [S.B.]”
The father testified that in August 2023, while he and the mother were still
together, he bonded her out of jail before she went to the Serenity House. The father
candidly admitted that their drug of choice was methadone and that
“methamphetamine was the secondary problem.” While the mother was in
treatment, he “stayed on the streets,” and sometimes stayed with a friend whom the
Department suspected was also a drug addict. When the mother was discharged
from Serenity House, she ended the relationship with the father and informed him
that she would only communicate with him about the children.
The father began the inpatient treatment program at Serenity House in
October 2023, but according to the father, “they kicked [him] out” after he “jumped
the fence.” He went to Discovery Point Retreat shortly thereafter and completed
the thirty-day residential program in November 2023. From November 2023 to
April 2024, the father lived in a transitional home. Since leaving the transitional
home, the father had been staying with his close friends and plans to remain there.
Ray opined that this was a safe and appropriate home for a child, but the father had
only been there one and one-half months at the time of the final hearing.
In March 2024, the mother married a person with an extensive criminal history
that includes, among other things, two convictions for assault family violence. The
mother did not notify the Department of the marriage until over a month later.
Between March and June, the mother and her new husband lived in Gainesville, then
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Azle, then moved into an apartment in Sweetwater. In July 2024, her new husband
was arrested because he tested positive for methamphetamine while on bond. He
remained in the Parker County Jail until August 13, 2024, when he pled guilty to the
third-degree felony offense of evading arrest or detention with a vehicle, which he
committed in January 2024, and was placed on community supervision. See PENAL
§ 38.04(b)(2)(A).
The mother has “had about four different jobs throughout the [pendency of
the] case,” missed three scheduled visits with S.B. in March 2024, and another visit
on April 7, 2024, because she was incarcerated. The father attended all of his
scheduled visits but would discuss his services and medical issues with S.B., “which
upset her.” The father explained that he has been diagnosed with a blood disorder,
seizures, and post-traumatic stress disorder. His purported narcolepsy “was pretty
much a direct result of methadone.” S.B. also contracted head lice “three to four
times” after her visits with the father and needed several treatments to get rid of
them.
The father’s in-person visitation was suspended due to a “behavioral incident
between [the father] and [Ray].” On February 15, 2024, Ray attempted to conduct
an unannounced home visit. While talking to the father outside the home, the father
became “very upset and was getting verbally aggressive and was cussing at [Ray].”
Thereafter, the father was only permitted to visit with S.B. via Zoom. Since the
suspension of the in-person visits with the father, S.B. has not contracted head lice.
The father reported to Ray in July 2024 that he began working at a carpet
cleaning company. Before that, the father claimed to work “under the table” at a
construction company. However, he never showed actual proof of employment in
the form of a paystub for either job.
Additionally, the father’s “drug test results over the last year” revealed that he
was not abstaining from drug use. He admitted to methamphetamine and methadone
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use prior to October 2, 2023, but claimed that he “[has] not touched any drug at all”
since then unless prescribed. The father tested positive for marihuana
consistently throughout the case but has been “on the Compassionate Use Registry”
since June 2024. The father purportedly had prescriptions for Alprazolam,
Fluoxetine, Suboxone, and Adderall for his “excessive sleepiness.” However, he
never provided proof of those prescriptions to the Department. He attributed his
positive drug test results for Nordazepam and Temazepam in June 2024 to the
Alprazolam, but Ray confirmed that using Alprazolam would not cause one to test
positive for those substances.
At the time of the final hearing, S.B. had been living with R.C.’s paternal
grandparents for approximately eleven months. When S.B. was placed with R.C.’s
grandparents, they noticed “the back of an earring imbedded into the back of her
ear.” The skin on her ear had grown over it, and it was “severe enough that it
required” a medical procedure involving “numbing and anesthesia” to remove it.
S.B. has also been engaging in play therapy because she initially expressed anger by
throwing things and screaming at people. The grandmother attested that R.C.
exhibited the same issues when he came into their care, but both children have
learned how to express themselves in better, healthier ways.
In April 2024, R.C.’s grandparents took S.B. to have surgery on her tonsils
and ears. She had suffered mild hearing loss due to multiple ear infections; Ray did
not know whether Appellants had arranged for S.B. to be medically treated for these
infections. But S.B.’s hearing has improved since the surgery, and she “is doing
really well.” Ray explained that since living with the grandparents, S.B. has “opened
up a lot,” is “very happy there, and . . . that home is very suitable and appropriate for
her.” R.C. was also living with them, and Ray opined that “any separation from each
other would cause severe harm emotionally.” R.C.’s grandparents hope to adopt
S.B., and it was the Department’s position that the grandparents, “at this point in
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time . . . are the only safe and stable home [for the children].” Ray testified that it is
in S.B.’s best interest to remain with R.C.’s grandparents with the ultimate goal of
adoption.
In addition to his felony indictment that coincided with the Department’s
involvement, the father had been previously convicted of possession of heroin, a
state jail felony, in June 2016, and misdemeanor drug possession in January 2010.
See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 481.102(2), 481.115(b) (West Supp.
2024). The mother was ultimately convicted of endangering a child and possession
of methamphetamine and was placed on community supervision. See id.
§§ 481.102(6), 481.115(b); PENAL § 22.041(c). The father’s child endangerment
case was still pending when the trial court signed its termination order.
The trial court terminated Appellants’ parental rights under
Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and found termination to be in the best interest of
S.B. This appeal followed.
III. Best Interest of the Child Determination
Appellants only challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court’s finding that termination of their parental rights is in the best
interest of S.B. “‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader,
facts-and-circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In
re Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72).
We reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We may not disturb the factfinder’s
determinations so long as those determinations are not unreasonable. Id. at 311–12;
In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Affording due deference to the trial
court, as we must, we hold that, based on the evidence in the record and the
application of the Holley factors, the trial court could have formed a firm belief or

10
conviction that termination of Appellants’ parental rights was in the best interest of
S.B. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest
finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). Put differently, the absence of
evidence regarding some of these factors does not preclude a best interest finding,
“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.). Consequently, “evidence relating to one single factor may be
adequate in a particular situation to support a finding that termination is in the best
interests of the child.” J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852,
855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, no pet.)).
As the factfinder, the trial court, in its best interest determination, may infer
that a parent’s past endangering conduct may recur if the child is returned to the
parent. See In re L.N.C., 573 S.W.3d 309, 318 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2019, pet. denied); J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 118. Evidence that is relevant to and supports
Section 161.001(b)(1) termination grounds may also be probative and relevant to the
best interest determination. See E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 768 (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d
at 28); In re C.V.L., 591 S.W.3d 734, 753 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019, pet. denied);
C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266. Here, Appellants do not challenge the trial court’s
endangerment findings. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). So long as the evidence
supports those findings, they are binding on this court as valid grounds for
termination. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013); In re A.V., 113
S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552; In re J.G., 592 S.W.3d 506,
506 n.2 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, no pet.). In this regard, the trial court could
properly consider Appellants’ endangering conduct in determining whether the
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termination of their parental rights was in the best interest of S.B. See E.C.R., 402
S.W.3d at 249–50; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The evidence that Appellants endangered S.B. supports the trial court’s
finding that terminating their parental rights was in S.B.’s best interest. The
Department intervened because Appellants left S.B. and another child, R.C., home
alone to go to a methadone clinic, and a fire started in the home because the mother
left a candle burning. As a result, Appellants were indicted for endangering a child.
A few months later, the mother took S.B. and R.C. to the Noah Project after the
father was allegedly violent toward the mother. See In re D.J.W., 624 S.W.3d 60,
67 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.) (“domestic violence may support a finding
of either environmental or course-of-conduct endangerment”). The mother brought
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia into the shelter and was charged with
another felony offense. See In re J.A.R., 696 S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (the parents’ years of drug use supported the trial
court’s best interest finding). The mother was placed on community supervision in
May 2024, and the father was still awaiting trial for child endangerment when the
final hearing concluded. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–281 (Tex. 2024);
In re S.H., No. 01-22-00255-CV, 2022 WL 17254956, at *18 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Criminal activity that exposes
the parent to the potential for incarceration is relevant to the trial court’s best-interest
determination.”). And while S.B. tested negative upon removal, R.C. tested positive
for methamphetamine. See Cervantes-Peterson v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective
Servs., 221 S.W.3d 244, 253 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (an
endangerment finding may be supported by evidence that shows how a parent treated
other children).
Appellants’ endangering conduct was largely attributable to their persistent
methamphetamine and methadone use before and after the children’s removal. A
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parent’s illegal drug use supports a finding that termination is in the child’s best
interest. See, e.g., In re C.S., No. 11-24-00186-CV, 2024 WL 5080505, at *13–15
(Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 12, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (considering mother’s
unrepentant marihuana use in the best interest analysis (citing J.S., 687 S.W.3d at
554)); see also In re Z.B., No. 11-24-00061-CV, 2024 WL 3995522, at *4–5 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Aug. 30, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.). That is because persistent drug
use by parents poses infinite potential dangers to their children. See, e.g., In re E.D.,
682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (A
continuing pattern of illegal drug use “implicates most of the Holley factors.”);
E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d at 768 (A parent’s drug use supports a finding that termination
of parental rights is in the best interest of the child.); In re S.B., 207 S.W.3d 877,
887–88 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.) (“A parent’s drug use, inability to
provide a stable home, and failure to comply with his family service plan support a
finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”). Further, the Texas
Supreme Court recently reiterated that a parent’s continuing pattern of drug use may
support a finding of endangerment, due to the “attendant risks to employment,
housing, and prolonged absence from the children.” R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281.
This case is indicative of the risks posed by a parent’s ongoing drug use. See
id. at 279–281. Appellants’ drug use directly endangered S.B., which also resulted
in their absence from S.B.’s life while they were either in jail, residential treatment,
or on felony community supervision. See PENAL §§ 12.35(a), 22.04(c) (Endangering
a child has a punishment range of no less than 180 days but no more than two-years’
confinement in a state jail facility.). Such conduct “exposes the children to the
possibility that [Appellants] may be impaired or imprisoned,” which weighs in favor
of finding that the termination of Appellants’ parental rights is in S.B.’s best interest.
See J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 551. Moreover, the father’s aggression also caused the
suspension of his in-person visits with S.B., and neither parent demonstrated the
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ability to maintain steady employment. The mother was legally employed at the
time of the final hearing but only had that job for a few months. And the father never
provided proof of employment. See J.D., 436 S.W.3d at 119 (“A parent’s inability
to provide adequate care for her children, unstable lifestyle, lack of a home and
income, lack of parenting skills, and poor judgment may be considered when looking
at the children’s best interest.”).
Appellants failed to maintain long-term, stable housing that was safe and
appropriate for S.B. The father was homeless prior to inpatient treatment, and the
mother moved several times during the pendency of the case. Further, neither parent
articulated any plan to personally provide for S.B. See id. at 119–20 (“The fact
finder may compare the contrasting plans for a child by the parent and the
Department and consider whether the plans and expectations of each party are
realistic or weak and ill-defined.”). In fact, the father expressed that he is “grateful
that [the Department] stepped in,” and agreed that he did not have a stable living
situation for S.B. while residing in various treatment facilities or transitional homes.
He asked the trial court, at minimum, to permit him to maintain contact with S.B.,
then said: “I didn’t put her in any compromising situations or anything until I—until
I relapsed—until I relapsed.” Because a parent’s illegal drug use “implicates most
of the Holley factors,” the trial court was reasonably concerned that Appellants
would continue to expose S.B. to drug-related danger, other criminal activity, and
instability were she returned to their care. See E.D., 682 S.W.3d at 607; see also
In re N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d 822, 834–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet.
denied) (father’s history of drug use and continued drug use during case bore on the
second, third, fourth, and seventh Holley factors—child’s emotional and physical
needs, emotional and physical danger to the child, father’s parental abilities, and
stability of the home—thus supporting the best interest finding).

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Additionally, Appellants’ partial compliance with their service plans is
insufficient to alleviate the Department’s and the trial court’s rational concerns for
S.B.’s safety and well-being. Significantly, the mother’s service plan required that
she “shall not knowingly associate with anyone who engages in criminal activities
or is a known addict outside of a therapeutic environment.” Yet, her new husband
had several criminal convictions and was placed on community supervision for a
felony offense that he committed two months before he and the mother were wed.
As for the father, he did not cease using methamphetamine and methadone until
October 2, 2023, nearly seven months after the Department’s initial involvement.
See, e.g., S.O., 2023 WL 2237084, at *12–13 (“Mother’s drug use was not isolated
but had been an ongoing problem in her life.”); see also N.T., 474 S.W.3d at 479
(“[R]ecent improvement alone is not sufficient to avoid termination of parental
rights.” (quoting In re K.D.C., No. 02-12-00092-CV, 2013 WL 5781474, at *16
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth, Oct. 24, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)). The trial court could
properly consider the father’s continued drug abuse after the children’s removal, and
the mother’s choice of companion, in determining whether termination was in S.B.’s
best interest. See In re I.E.P., No. 04-24-00255-CV, 2024 WL 3802517, at *3–4
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 14, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“drug use can
destabilize the home and expose children to physical and emotional harm if not
resolved”); In re Z.G., No. 02-23-00038-CV, 2023 WL 3521848, at *4–5 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth May 18, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“[E]vidence of past drug
use . . . supports a finding that the parent has endangered the child’s emotional and
physical needs and posed a danger to the child. . . . [A]s to future drug use, a
factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his past conduct.”) (internal
citations omitted). The record is thus replete with evidence of Appellants’ inability
to adequately parent S.B. or provide her with a safe, drug-free home environment,

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which supports the conclusion that the parent-child relationship is not an appropriate
one. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372.
Given the child-centered focus of the best interest inquiry, we may not
discount S.B.’s improvement in her safe and stable placement with R.C.’s
grandparents. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 746–47. “When children are too young to
express their desires, the factfinder may consider that the children have bonded with
the foster family, are well-cared for by them, and have spent minimal time with
[their] parent.” In re Y.G., No. 01-22-00181-CV, 2022 WL 3362953, at *16 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (quoting J.D., 436
S.W.3d at 118); see also N.J.H., 575 S.W.3d at 834 (stating that evidence showing
that a young child had bonded with foster family supported the trial court’s best
interest finding). The evidence showed that S.B. formed a bond with the
grandparents, and was able to be in the same home as her half-brother, R.C. The
evidence likewise supports the inference that S.B. feared returning to the mother.
The grandmother observed that S.B. “was scared” and had nightmares at the thought
of returning to her mother. She further noticed while supervising virtual visits
between S.B. and the father that “it always seem[ed] like [S.B. was] becoming the
adult and checking on him.” Since being placed with R.C.’s grandparents, S.B.’s
physical health, emotional wellness, and behavioral issues have improved. The trial
court could have reasonably and rationally concluded that the grandparents provided
the safest and most stable home environment for S.B. and would continue to do so
upon adopting her as planned.
We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support
the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellants’ parental rights is in the best
interest of S.B. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Accordingly, we overrule each parent’s sole issue on appeal.

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IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

March 27, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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