Leonel Villarreal v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 3, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00218-CR
__________

LEONEL VILLARREAL, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 35th District Court
Brown County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR28564

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant, Leonel Villarreal, of the third-degree felony
offense of driving while intoxicated (DWI). See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04,
49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2024). Enhanced by a habitual-offender finding, the trial
court assessed Appellant’s punishment at confinement in the Institutional Division
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a term of fifty years. 1 See id. 0F

§ 12.42(d) (West 2019). In two issues, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his conviction and argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress. We affirm.
Factual and Procedural History
At 8:39 p.m. on September 21, 2021, Brownwood Police Department Officers
James Holdar and Roberto Rodriguez received a call from dispatch regarding an
intoxicated individual, later identified as Appellant, at a Stripes convenience store.
At trial, the 9-1-1 recording between the dispatch operator and the caller was
admitted into evidence. The caller, Chasity Allison, a Stripes employee, can be
heard telling the operator that a “highly intoxicated” Hispanic male wearing all black
had come into the store “acting kinda weird.” Allison said that she declined to sell
him alcohol and she provided a description and location of his vehicle: a two-door,
maroon, older model Oldsmobile parked behind the Stripes.
Officers Holdar and Rodriguez arrived at the Stripes separately within
seconds from each other and immediately located a vehicle matching Allison’s
description. The vehicle was registered to Appellant. Officer Rodriguez was the
first to make contact with Appellant and noted that he was “buckled” in the driver’s
seat, the vehicle’s engine was running, and the steering wheel had been tilted down,
ready to drive. Officers Rodriguez and Holdar both testified that Appellant’s eyes
appeared glossy and bloodshot, he slurred his speech slightly when he spoke, and
that he smelled of alcohol.
According to Officer Holdar, Appellant spoke as if he were “stuck in this
loop,” repeating the same questions to Officer Holdar even after Officer Holdar had

1
Appellant was previously convicted of felony driving while intoxicated in July 2007 (probation
revoked May 2011) and again in July 2014.
2
already answered them. Officer Holdar then administered standard field sobriety
tests; Appellant performed poorly on all of them.
Officer Holdar testified that Appellant admitted to driving to the Stripes
despite having an expired driver’s license, but that he initially denied having
consumed any alcohol prior to driving. Appellant’s admissions were captured by
Officer Rodriguez’s body camera, and the recording was admitted into evidence.
Appellant can be heard explaining what he did after he “drove up” to the Stripes and
answering in the affirmative when Officer Rodriguez sought to clarify that Appellant
had, in fact, driven there. Appellant later admitted to drinking three beers at a local
restaurant before driving to the Stripes.
Appellant was placed under arrest. After Appellant refused to consent to a
blood draw, Officer Holdar obtained a search warrant. Approximately two hours
elapsed between when officers arrived at the Stripes and when a sample of
Appellant’s blood was taken. Theresa Salazar, a forensic scientist at the Texas
Department of Public Safety Crime Laboratory in Midland, performed the analysis
of Appellant’s blood sample and determined that, at the time of the blood draw,
Appellant had 0.195 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood—over two times
the legal limit at the time of the blood draw. Using retrograde extrapolation, Salazar
estimated that Appellant’s blood alcohol content could have been 0.215 to 0.255
grams per 100 milliliters of blood prior to the officers’ arrival at the Stripes.
Sufficiency
Appellant first argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that he
was operating his vehicle while intoxicated because no one witnessed him actually
driving, and “the State must show beyond a reasonable doubt that [he] was
intoxicated while driving, not just intoxicated at the gas station.”

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A. Standard of Review
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, regardless of
whether it is framed as a legal or factual sufficiency challenge, under the standard of
review set forth in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–
89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. ref’d). In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we must “consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on the evidence and
reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational juror could have found that the State has
proven the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Baltimore v.
State, 689 S.W.3d 331, 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319). “This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Edward v. State, 635
S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
Therefore, if the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must
“presume that the factfinder resolved the conflicts in favor of the prosecution” and
defer to the factfinder’s factual determinations. Garcia v. State, 667 S.W.3d 756,
762 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023) (quoting Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2012)). “[A] reviewing court does not sit as the thirteenth juror and may not
substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder by reevaluating the weight and
credibility of the evidence.” Id. (citing Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010)); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.13 (West 2007).
Under this standard, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including
evidence that may have been improperly admitted, and we treat direct and
circumstantial evidence equally. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013); Starks v. State, 684 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no
4
pet.). In this regard, it is not necessary that the evidence directly prove the
defendant’s guilt; circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing a defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence can alone be sufficient
to establish the defendant’s guilt. Carrizales v. State, 414 S.W.3d 737, 742 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2013) (citing Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)); Lee v. State, 676 S.W.3d 912, 915 (Tex. App.—Eastland, no pet.). Each fact
need not point directly and independently to guilt if the cumulative force of all
incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction. Hooper, 214
S.W.3d at 13. Because evidence must be considered cumulatively, we may not use
a “divide and conquer” strategy for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence.
Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). We consider the
cumulative force of all the evidence. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017). But “juries trump both trial and appellate judges on weight-of-evidence
determinations.” Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326).
B. Applicable Law
We measure the sufficiency of the evidence by comparing the evidence
produced at trial against “the [essential] elements of the offense as defined by the
hypothetically correct jury charge.” Turley v. State, 691 S.W.3d 612, 617 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2024); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
“The hypothetically correct jury charge accurately sets out the law, is authorized by
the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or
unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the
particular offense for which the defendant was tried.” Turley, 691 S.W.3d at 617
(citing Alfaro-Jimenez v. State, 577 S.W.3d 240, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). “The
law authorized by the indictment consists of the statutory elements of the offense as
modified by the indictment allegations.” Baltimore, 689 S.W.3d at 341.
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Appellant was charged with felony driving while intoxicated. See PENAL
§§ 49.04, 49.09(b)(2). To support a conviction for this offense, the State was
required to prove that Appellant was “intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle
in a public place.” See id. § 49.04(a) (emphasis added); State v. Espinosa, 666
S.W.3d 659, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “Intoxicated” is defined, in relevant part,
as “not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the
introduction of alcohol” or “having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.”
PENAL § 49.01(2) (West 2011).
Although the Penal Code does not define “operate” or “operating” in this
context, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “under a sufficiency review,
the totality of the circumstances must demonstrate that the defendant took action to
affect the functioning of [a] vehicle in a manner that would enable the vehicle’s use.”
Maciel v. State, 631 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (citing Denton v. State,
911 S.W.2d 388, 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). That court has additionally “defined
‘to operate’ as ‘to exert personal effort to cause the vehicle to function.’” Id.
(quoting Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 652 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)). Under this
standard, Texas courts have interpreted “operating” a motor vehicle “very broadly.”
Priego v. State, 457 S.W.3d 565, 569 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet. ref’d)
(quoting Smith v. State, 401 S.W.3d 915, 919 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet.
ref’d)). “[W]hile driving does involve operation, operation does not necessarily
involve driving.” Denton, 911 S.W.2d at 389; Priego, 457 S.W.3d at 569. Operation
of a vehicle can be proven absent eyewitness evidence of the defendant driving.
White v. State, 412 S.W.3d 125, 128–29 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, no pet.); see
Kinnett v. State, 623 S.W.3d 876, 898 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet.
ref’d) (courts have upheld DWI convictions in situations in which the vehicle engine
was running but, at the time engaged by law enforcement, defendant was not actually
in the car or driving the vehicle); see also Gameros v. State, No. 11-19-00395-CR,
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2021 WL 4998897, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 28, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (collecting cases).
C. Analysis
Although no witnesses at trial testified to seeing Appellant drive his vehicle
during the night in question, the State presented evidence from which a rational jury
could have logically inferred and found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
operated the vehicle and was intoxicated at the time. See Murray, 457 S.W.3d at
449–50. Significantly, Appellant admitted to drinking prior to driving to the Stripes,
and it was a Stripes employee who contacted 9-1-1 to report Appellant for attempting
to purchase alcohol while appearing intoxicated. See Maciel, 631 S.W.3d at 725
(“She admitted to being intoxicated, admitted to being behind the wheel of her
vehicle with the engine running. . . . In accord with our jurisprudence, [a]ppellant’s
testimony was sufficient to admit commission of DWI.”); see also, e.g., Dansby v.
State, 530 S.W.3d 213, 228 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2017, pet. ref’d) (concluding that
evidence was sufficient to support DWI conviction when an officer found an
unoccupied vehicle running in restaurant parking lot and located the appellant, who
appeared intoxicated, inside the restaurant, and the appellant admitted he had driven
his vehicle).
Although the precise length of time that Appellant had been at the Stripes
before Allison called 9-1-1 was unknown, Appellant had somehow gotten to the
Stripes and was by himself in the vehicle. Officers Rodriguez and Holdar
independently observed signs of intoxication within moments of interacting with
Appellant and testified to Appellant’s continued operation of his vehicle; that is, he
was buckled into the driver’s seat of a vehicle registered to him and the engine was
running. See Kirsch v. State, 306 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(providing that “post-driving behavior such as stumbling, swaying, slurring or
mumbling words” and bloodshot eyes are “usual indicia of intoxication”); see also,
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e.g., Gameros, 2021 WL 4998897, at *1, *7 (concluding that evidence was sufficient
to support DWI conviction where Appellant was found as the sole occupant in the
vehicle, “in and out” of sleep in the driver’s seat, while the engine was on and vehicle
was in gear).
Shortly after the officers initiated their detention, Appellant failed all field
sobriety tests administered and refused to submit to a blood test—further evidencing
Appellant’s intoxication. See Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745; see also Perez v. State,
495 S.W.3d 374, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (“The jury
may consider appellant’s refusal to provide a breath or blood sample as probative
evidence of his intoxication.”); Robles v. State, No. 11-19-00358-CR, 2021
WL 4899030, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Oct. 21, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (“[R]efusal to submit to a breath test [is] relevant to show
a consciousness of guilt.” (citing Bartlett v. State, 270 S.W.3d 147, 153 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008)); see, e.g., Nelson v. State, 504 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2016, pet. ref’d) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to show the appellant was
intoxicated where officers observed his eyes were glassy and his speech was slurred,
the appellant admitted to drinking, and the appellant did not successfully complete
field sobriety tests).
Following the execution of a search warrant, Appellant was confirmed to have
had a blood alcohol content of 0.195 nearly two hours after officer’s arrived, which
Salazar testified may have put Appellant at a blood alcohol content of 0.215 to 0.255
prior to the officers’ arrival at the Stripes. See Kirsch, 306 S.W.3d at 745 (“[Blood
alcohol content]-test results, even absent expert retrograde extrapolation testimony,
are often highly probative to prove both per se and impairment intoxication.”); see
also Robles, 2021 WL 4899030, at *5 (considering retrograde extrapolation
testimony in its sufficiency analysis).

8
Thus, a factfinder could have reasonably inferred that there was sufficient
evidence that Appellant not only drove his vehicle to the Stripes after drinking to
intoxication, but that he was still intoxicated while continuing to operate his vehicle
at the time of the officers’ arrival. See Murray, 457 S.W.3d at 449–50 (concluding
that because appellant was in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with a running engine and
the only person in the vicinity, although there were no alcoholic beverages or
containers in the vehicle, the jury could have nonetheless inferred that appellant had
been driving while intoxicated); White, 412 S.W.3d at 127, 129 (concluding same
where the appellant was sitting in a McDonald’s drive-through lane, “passed out”
behind the steering wheel of the vehicle with the engine running, the transmission in
drive, and the brake lights illuminated); see Crawford v. State, 496 S.W.3d 334, 340
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016, pet. ref’d) (concluding that evidence was sufficient
to support DWI conviction where police responded to a convenience store cashier’s
call concerning a customer asleep in their vehicle alone, with the engine running and
the gear shift in park).
After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we hold
that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably found that Appellant operated his
vehicle while intoxicated and that the evidence, therefore, was sufficient to support
his conviction. See Acosta v. State, 429 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)
(recognizing that jurors may “use common sense and apply common knowledge,
observation, and experience gained in ordinary affairs when drawing inferences
from the evidence”).
We overrule Appellant’s first issue.
Motion to Suppress
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence, and the trial court
set the motion for hearing. At the hearing Officers Rodriguez and Holdar, the
arresting officers, testified and exhibits were admitted, including the recording of
9
the initial 9-1-1 call. Appellant argued that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion
to detain him and were without probable cause to arrest him. The trial court issued
a written order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress. In Appellant’s second issue,
he argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Although Appellant frames his argument as a “probable cause” challenge in
his issue statement, the “Argument & Authorities” portion of his brief concerns only
the officers’ alleged lack of “reasonable suspicion” to justify Appellant’s detention. 2 1F

The State construes Appellant’s issue as one challenging reasonable suspicion,
and we do as well. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1; see also Allison v. State, No. 01-01-
00383-CR, 2002 WL 31388717, at *1 n.6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 24,
2002, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding appellant
waived any issue listed under the heading “Issues Presented for Review” that were
not discussed in the body of appellant’s brief).
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a
bifurcated standard of review that gives almost total deference to the trial court’s
determination of historical facts that the record supports and consider de novo the
application of the law to the facts.” State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2024); Baiza v. State, 487 S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2016, pet.
ref’d). We will affirm the trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress if it is
supported by the record and correct under any applicable theory of law. Espinosa,
666 S.W.3d at 667. When, as here, “the trial court does not file findings of fact
concerning its ruling on a motion to suppress, we assume that the court made implicit
findings that support its ruling, provided that those implied findings are supported
by the record.” Ex Parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

2
Appellant’s “Summary of Argument” uses the phrase “probable cause to detain.” As expounded
on infra, the standard for a warrantless detention is “reasonable suspicion” not “probable cause.”
10
(citing Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)); Swanger v.
State, No. 11-23-00183-CR, 2024 WL 3817325, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland
Aug. 15, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
B. Applicable Law
“Under the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless detention of the person that
amounts to less than a full-blown custodial arrest must be justified by a reasonable
suspicion.” Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011);
see State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“It is only
when an officer, ‘by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen,’ will courts conclude that a Fourth Amendment
‘seizure’ has occurred.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968))). It is
the State’s burden to establish that a warrantless investigative detention was
supported by reasonable suspicion. State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018); Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 913 & n.24 (citing Ford v. State,
158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)). “Reasonable suspicion exists if the
officer has specific articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from
those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude the person is, has been, or
soon will be engaged in criminal activity.” State v. Hardin, 664 S.W.3d 867, 872
(Tex. Crim. App. 2022). This standard “looks to the totality of the circumstances,”
asks “whether there was an objectively justifiable basis for the detention,” and
“disregards the actual subjective intent of the arresting officer.” Derichsweiler, 348
S.W.3d at 914. “[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is innocent
or criminal, but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular non-criminal acts.”
Id. (quoting Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
An officer may rely on the statements of a citizen caller to initiate a detention
if the citizen’s information contains sufficient indicia of reliability. Ibarra v. State,
479 S.W.3d 481, 490 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, pet. ref’d); Esquivel v. State,
11
No. 11-12-00313-CR, 2015 WL 544944, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 15, 2015,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding same where officer
received an anonymous tip). In situations where a caller places themself in a position
to be held accountable for their report, minimal corroboration is required.
Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914–15; Boyd v. State, No. 11-10-00059-CR, 2011
WL 2175874, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 2, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication). “In such a scenario, the only question is whether the
information that the known citizen-informant provides, viewed through the prism of
the detaining officer’s particular level of knowledge and experience, objectively
supports a reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity is afoot.”
Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 915.
C. Analysis
On appeal, Appellant specifically complains that his detention was unlawful
because Allison’s claim that he was intoxicated went uncorroborated, and there was
insufficient evidence for either officer to believe that he had committed the offense
of driving while intoxicated at the time he was detained. Contrary to Appellant’s
assertions, the legality of Appellant’s detention is not solely contingent on the
existence of evidence that he had already committed the offense for which he was
subsequently arrested; it is sufficient that the State prove that the officers reasonably
believed Appellant would soon be engaged in any criminal activity. See Hardin,
664 S.W.3d at 872; Swanger, 2024 WL 3817325, at *3. We find Derichsweiler to
be instructive. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 916.
In Derichsweiler, an officer was dispatched to a Wal-Mart parking lot
following a message from dispatch about “a suspicious car that was ‘circling the
parking lot of Wal-Mart and McDonald’s’” driven by an individual “grinning and
staring” at the caller. Id. at 909–10. Supplied with only the make, model, color and
license plate number of the suspicious car, the officer detained the driver. Id. at 910.
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The detention led to a DWI investigation that culminated in the appellant’s arrest
and prosecution. Id. at 911. The court concluded that “for purposes of a reasonable-
suspicion analysis, it is enough that the totality of the circumstances, viewed
objectively and in the aggregate, suggests the realistic possibility of a criminal
motive, however amorphous, that was about to be acted upon.” Id. at 917.
Here, Officers Rodriguez and Holdar testified during the suppression hearing
and at trial, their testimony did not substantially change. Officer Rodriguez testified
that he had worked for the Brownwood Police Department for over six years during
which time he had been trained in traits and signs of intoxication and on how to
administer standard field sobriety tests. Officer Holdar was less experienced than
Officer Rodriguez, having worked in law enforcement for approximately six months.
Both officers stated that they received a call from dispatch concerning an intoxicated
individual at a Stripes, and because the caller provided enough identifying
descriptors, officers were immediately able to locate the vehicle and individual, later
identified as Appellant. Both Officers Rodriguez and Holdar testified that they had
previously received calls from this Stripes location concerning intoxicated persons
that had proven to be accurate; Officer Rodriguez testified that they were “very
credible.” The 9-1-1 recording and dispatch call log were admitted at the hearing,
the former indicating that Appellant had been “acting strange” as well. The vehicle,
as described in the 9-1-1 call, was parked behind the store. Much like the caller in
Derichsweiler, Allison identified herself to the 9-1-1 dispatcher and remained
answerable to her report after the fact. Id. at 915. Here, Officer Rodriguez
personally spoke with the clerk, who he described as credible. Appellant was asked
to step out of the vehicle, he stumbled, and it was observed that he had “glossy[,]”
“bloodshot” eyes and had the “very apparent” smell of beer on him and on his breath.
Officer Holdar administered the standard field sobriety tests that he described, which
gave him “sufficient clues” of Appellant’s intoxication. Officers Rodriguez and
13
Holdar further testified that they had reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant based
on the totality of the circumstances, which included their consideration of Allison’s
information and the credibility of that information. See id. at 910, 916–17. Officer
Rodriguez further opined that detention was appropriate because Appellant’s
reported behaviors would tend to indicate that Appellant was either “impaired while
in a public place,” “about to commit a burglary,” or driving while intoxicated.
When information suggests that “a crime is about to occur, the requirement
that there be ‘some indication that the unusual activity is related to crime’ does not
necessarily mean that the information must lead inexorably to the conclusion that a
particular and identifiable penal code offense is imminent.” See id. at 917. Thus, it
is not fatal to the State’s claim of reasonable suspicion that the officers themselves
did not witness evidence of Appellant’s intoxication prior to initiating the detention
or that the “unusual activity” for which they detained Appellant was not the
crime with which he was eventually charged. See id.; see also Small v. State, No. 01-
22-00425-CR, 2023 WL 4239874, at *1–2, *15 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
June 29, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding
officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the appellant based on a 9-1-1 caller
claiming she had witnessed the appellant “stuffing someone into his car’s trunk”
although the appellate did nothing wrong in the officer’s presence, the 9-1-1 caller
turned out to be incorrect, and the appellant was ultimately arrested for felon in
possession of a firearm); State v. Hartley, No. 03-21-00230-CR, 2022 WL 2251659,
at *6–7 (Tex. App.—Austin June 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (concluding same where the 9-1-1 caller was reporting a reckless driver,
the officer did not observe any commission of a traffic offense, and the appellant
was later arrested for driving while intoxicated).

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Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Appellant’s motion to suppress. See Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 917–18; see also
Espinosa, 666 S.W.3d at 667.
We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

April 3, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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