In the Interest B.H. and D v. Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed April 10, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-24-00299-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF B.H. AND D.V., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 446th District Court
Ector County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. E-23-053-PC

MEMORAND UM OPI NI ON
Appellant-Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental
rights to her children, B.H. and D.V. 1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West
Supp. 2024). The alleged and unknown fathers whose parental rights were
terminated did not appeal the trial court’s order. We affirm the order of termination.
The evidence presented at the final termination hearing showed that the
Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) received a report in
December 2023 that Appellant was using drugs, and physically and medically

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We use initials to refer to the children. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
neglecting B.H. and D.V. At that time, B.H. was seventeen months old, and D.V.
was not yet six months old. Appellant had a history with the Department prompted
by similar reports of “instability, drug use, and neglectful supervision of her
children.” The children were removed on December 19, 2023 after Appellant tested
positive for methamphetamines and amphetamines, lied about her lack of stable
housing, and continued missing her daughters’ medical appointments.
The Department caseworker testified that Appellant failed to comply with
several provisions of her court-ordered service plan. For instance, Appellant refused
to submit to all but two of her required monthly drug screens, one of which was
positive for cocaine. And because Appellant only attended two parent-child visits in
“the beginning of the case,” she had not seen her daughters in at least eight months
by the time of the final hearing. Appellant admitted during her testimony that
she “just stopped calling” her caseworker after she “failed one drug test,”
refused to submit to drug testing once because she “got upset,” and “just gave up” on
visiting her children. Appellant acknowledged that B.H. tested positive for
methamphetamines at birth, and D.V. was born positive for marihuana. She then
admitted to using methamphetamine in February 2024 while the underlying
termination suit was pending.
The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Appellant
endangered the children as set forth in Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E),
constructively abandoned the children pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(N), and
failed to comply with the provisions of her court-ordered service plan under
Section 161.001(b)(1)(O). See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O). The trial
court further found that termination was in the children’s best interest, and issued its

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order terminating Appellant’s parental rights to B.H. and D.V. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2).
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this
court. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and
conscientiously examines the record and applicable law, and concludes that there are
no arguable issues to present on appeal. Counsel certified to this court that he
provided Appellant with a copy of the brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an
explanatory letter, and a copy of the clerk’s record and reporter’s record. Counsel
also advised Appellant of her right to object to his motion to withdraw, and to file a
pro se brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5. As such, court-appointed counsel has complied
with the requirements of Anders, Schulman, and Kelly. See Kelly v. State, 436
S.W.3d 313, 318–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406–
09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
Appellant has not filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Following
the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have independently reviewed
the record in this case, and we agree that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and without
merit.
However, in light of the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in In re P.M., an
Anders motion to withdraw “may be premature” if filed in the court of appeals under
the circumstances presented in this case. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex.
2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in the
absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.”). The court held
in P.M. that, in parental termination cases, court-appointed counsel’s duty to his or
her client generally extends “through the exhaustion of [all] appeals.” Id. at 27–28.

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In this regard, “appointed counsel’s obligations can be satisfied by filing a petition
for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” Id.
Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial
court’s order of termination.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

April 10, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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