Carol Johnene Morris v. City of Midland, Texas:J.M. Cox Resources: And I.C.E.E.D. Inc.

Opinion filed August 7, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-23-00190-CV
__________

CAROL JOHNENE MORRIS, Appellant
V.
CITY OF MIDLAND, TEXAS; J.M. COX RESOURCES; AND
I.C.E.E.D., INC., Appellees

On Appeal from the 238th District Court
Midland County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CV59879

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appearing pro se both at trial and on appeal, Appellant, Carol Johnene Morris,
filed suit against several defendants 1 alleging that they committed “wrongful acts”

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The defendants sued by Appellant are as follows: “City of Midland, Texas; BP America Prod. Co.:
J. M. Cox Resources; Endeavor Energy Resources, Autry Stephens, L. P., Atmos Energy; Midland Central
Appraisal District; David H. Arrington Oil & Gas Operating, L.L.C., Midland-Petro D.C. Partners, L.L.C.,
Permian Deep Rock Drilling, L.L.C., 3 Platinum, L.L.C., and David H. Arrington; and Pioneer Natural
Resources.”
and that they “[refused] to recognize and pay funds” owed to Appellant “for theft of
minerals.” She also alleged that the defendants “falsely arrested, maliciously
prosecuted, wrongfully convicted, illegally sentenced, and wrongfully imprisoned
her.” The three Appellees in this appeal, the City of Midland (the City), J.M. Cox
Resources, and I.C.E.E.D., Inc., filed motions to dismiss under Rule 91a. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The trial court granted Appellees’ motions, severed the claims
against them, and entered a final judgment in their favor.
Appellant brings four issues on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal
under Rule 91a of Appellant’s claims against Appellees.
Background Facts
Appellant filed the underlying lawsuit in 2023. She purported to allege three
causes of action in her petition: “malice and felony theft,” “fraudulent concealment,”
and “conspiracy.” Appellant stated the basic factual premise of her suit as follows:
This dispute arises out of the wrongful acts of the Defendants and
their refusal to recognize and pay funds owed to [Appellant] for theft
of minerals in connection with violations of Title 28 U.S.C. §1358,
Eminent Domain Statute, and U.S.C.A. Commerce Clause, art. 1, Sec.
8, cl. 3. . . .

The same conspirators that illegally deprived [Appellant] of her
Entitlement to just compensation; also, falsely arrested, maliciously
prosecuted, wrongfully convicted, illegally sentenced, and wrongfully
imprisoned her.
In support of these claims, Appellant alleged factual matters beginning in 1981. The
bulk of the factual matters pleaded by Appellant are alleged to have begun occurring
in 2001. The genesis of Appellant’s “theft” claim is her allegation that the City
“illegally executed” a “right-of-way license” on September 11, 2001.2 With respect

Appellant filed a federal lawsuit in 2020 against Appellees alleging the same general allegation.
2

The federal district court described her claim in the following manner: “Plaintiff alleges that, on

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to Cox and I.C.E.E.D., other than naming them as defendants, Appellant does not
assert any specific allegations against them. She alleges generally that Cox and
I.C.E.E.D., along with all of the other defendants, “stole” her “minerals and
properties while she was incarcerated . . . without notification, authorization[,] nor
just compensation.”
With respect to Appellant’s claim for “malice and felony theft,” she alleges
two general claims: 1) the wrongful taking of her property interests, and 2) a claim
that is best described as a claim for malicious prosecution. With respect to her claim
of “fraudulent concealment,” Appellant is not asserting a separate claim, but rather
she is apparently asserting it as a defensive measure. In this regard, “fraudulent
concealment estops the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations as an
affirmative defense to [the] plaintiff’s claim.” Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv.
Services of Nevada, Inc. v. Triex Tex. Holdings, LLC, 659 S.W.3d 456, 463 (Tex.
2023) (quoting Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex.
1996)). Appellant premised her claim of fraudulent concealment on the fact that the
former city attorney for the City in 2001, the Honorable Keith Stretcher, was
appointed to this court in 2019.
Appellant stated her conspiracy claim in its entirety as follows:
The same judge3 that corruptly issued to conspirators temporary
restraining order (i.e., for oil and gas companies to drill for oil and gas)
against plaintiff in violation of her substantive due process to her
properties and minerals; also, falsely arrested, maliciously prosecuted,

September 11, 2001, the City illegally issued a right of way license on Plaintiff’s property to Western Gas
Resources, then to Anadarko, and later to Occidental Petroleum.” Morris v. City of Midland, Tex.,
No. MO:20-CV-00120-DC, 2021 WL 2953686, at *1 (W.D. Tex. May 20, 2021). Morris references the
2020 federal litigation in her petition, along with another federal lawsuit she filed in 2008 against the same
defendants.
3
Based on her brief, Appellant is referencing the Honorable Rodney Satterwhite, the former
presiding judge of the 441st District Court of Midland County.

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wrongfully convicted, illegally sentenced, and wrongfully imprisoned
her. RE: CR 36,894; The State Of Texas v. Carol Johnene Morris, re-
indictment filed March 31, 2010, in the 441ˢᵗ Judicial District Court,
Midland County, Texas.4
We note in this regard that “civil conspiracy is not an independent tort,” but rather
it is a theory of derivative tort liability. See Agar Corp., Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l,
LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 142 (Tex. 2019).
Analysis
Under Rule 91a, “a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the
grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. As specified in
the rule: “A cause of action has no basis in law if the allegations, taken as true,
together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do not entitle the claimant to
the relief sought.” Id. “A cause of action has no basis in fact if no reasonable person
could believe the facts pleaded.” Id.
We review the trial court’s rulings on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss de novo.
City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). “We look
solely to the pleading and any attachments to determine whether the dismissal
standard is satisfied.” Estate of Savana, 529 S.W.3d 587, 592 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.); accord Wooley v. Schaffer, 447 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). To determine if the cause of action
has a basis in law or fact, we construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff,
look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings.
Wooley, 447 S.W.3d at 76. Under a Rule 91a de novo review, “the availability of a
remedy under the facts alleged is a question of law and the rule’s factual-plausibility
standard is akin to a legal-sufficiency review.” Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d at 724.

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We affirmed Appellant’s conviction for felony theft by deception arising from trial court cause
no. 36894 in Morris v. State, No. 11-10-00249-CR, 2012 WL 424923 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 9, 2012,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

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Rule 91a also “permits motions to dismiss based on affirmative defenses.”
Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595 S.W.3d 651, 656
(Tex. 2020). In ruling on a Rule 91a motion, the trial court “may not consider
evidence” and “must decide the motion based solely on the pleading of the cause of
action, together with any pleading exhibits” permitted by the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; see also Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. But “[i]n
deciding a Rule 91a motion, a court may consider the defendant[s’] pleadings if
doing so is necessary to make the legal determination of whether an affirmative
defense is properly before the court.” Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. A trial court may
grant a Rule 91a motion to dismiss based on an affirmative defense if it meets the
rule’s standard. Id.
Appellant states her first two issues as follows:
Issue 1: Judge Rodney Satterwhite of the 441ˢᵗ Judicial District
Court, Midland County Texas, conspired with the Defendants to violate
Appellant Carol Johnene Morris’s, TDCJ-ID #1681899 fundamental
rights and her substantive due process to her minerals and properties.

Issue 2: Appellant Carol Johnene Morris is “actually innocent”
of the substantive offense of ‘Theft By Deception’ Over $1500 But Less
Than $20,000; pursuant to TEX. Penal Code §31.10; and “actually
innocent” of being a habitual offender with a 20-yrs. enhanced sentence
under TEX. Penal Code §12.42(a)(2).
As stated and argued by Appellant, these two issues do not directly address the trial
court’s order dismissing her case or the application of Rule 91a. Appellant’s first
issue is a restatement of some of the claims she asserted below in the trial court.
Appellant’s second issue is an “actual-innocence” claim that is the proper subject of
a postconviction habeas corpus proceeding. See Ex parte Brown, 205 S.W.3d 538,
544 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Because Appellant’s first and second issues do not
challenge the trial court’s dismissal under Rule 91a and do not affect the final

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disposition of this appeal, we will not address them. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (The
court of appeals must issue an opinion that addresses every issue raised that is
“necessary to final disposition of the appeal.”).
Appellant asserts in her third issue that the trial court violated her “substantive
right to a Jury Trial under Article 5 §10 and Article 1 §15 of the Texas Constitution.”
We construe this issue as a challenge to the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s
claims against Appellees under Rule 91a.
With respect to her claim that the trial court violated her right to a jury trial
by dismissing her claims against Appellees, we recently addressed a similar
contention in Aaron v. Caddo Minerals, Inc., No. 11-22-00020-CV, 2023
WL 5622115, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2023, pet. denied). We held in
Aaron that a dismissal under Rule 91a does not violate a litigant’s constitutional
right to a jury trial. Id.; see also Bliss v. NRG Indus., 162 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (holding that a summary judgment does not violate
a party’s constitutional right to trial by jury). We reaffirm our determination in
Aaron by holding that a dismissal under Rule 91a does not violate a litigant’s
constitutional right to trial by jury. See Aaron, 2023 WL 5622115, at *10.
A Rule 91a motion to dismiss must identify each cause of action being
challenged and must state specific reasons why the challenged causes of action have
no basis in law or fact. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.2. The City based its Rule 91a motion
to dismiss on the contention that Appellant’s complaint was deficient because it was
devoid of supporting facts to support her conclusory allegations. The City also
asserted the affirmative defenses of res judicata and limitations in its motion to
dismiss. Cox’s motion to dismiss was similar to the City’s motion because it alleged
the same affirmative defenses, and it adopted the City’s motion. Cox also asserted
that Appellant did not allege that Cox did anything that would give rise to her claims

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against Cox, and that she only mentioned Cox four times in her petition. In its
motion to dismiss, I.C.E.E.D. alleged that Appellant did not assert any causes of
action against it, and that I.C.E.E.D. is barely mentioned in the petition. I.C.E.E.D.
cited Guillory v. Seaton, LLC, 470 S.W. 3d 237, 240 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) for the proposition that a cause of action has no basis in law
under Rule 91a if the petition alleges too few facts to demonstrate a viable, legally
cognizable right to relief.
We first address Cox’s and I.C.E.E.D.’s contention that Appellant did not
allege sufficient facts to state causes of action against them. As previously noted,
Appellant listed Cox and I.C.E.E.D. as defendants along with several other parties.
Appellant went to great lengths to list numerous facts spanning over forty years and
she identified various parties allegedly involved in those factual allegations. But she
did not allege any specific acts against Cox and I.C.E.E.D. Instead, she included
Cox and I.C.E.E.D. in her broad allegation that they and fourteen other defendant’s
“stole” her mineral and properties while she was incarcerated. Presumptively,
Appellant included Cox and I.C.E.E.D. in the group of “conspirators” that “falsely
arrested, maliciously prosecuted, wrongfully convicted, illegally sentenced, and
wrongfully imprisoned her.”
The Texas Supreme Court recently addressed the pleading requirements to
overcome a “no basis in law” challenge under Rule 91a in In re First Reserve
Management, L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 661–62 (Tex. 2023). The court noted that
“allegations must satisfy our notice-pleadings rules, which require pleadings to not
only give notice ‘of the claim and the relief sought’ but also of the essential factual
allegations.” Id. (quoting Kinder Morgan SACROC, LP v. Scurry County, 622
S.W.3d 835, 849 (Tex. 2021)). “The plaintiff must plead ‘the essential factual
allegations supporting those claims[,]’ which must be sufficient to support a

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judgment if ultimately proven.” Id. at 662 (quoting Kinder Morgan, 622 S.W.3d at
849). “The key inquiry is whether the opposing party ‘can ascertain from the
pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and what testimony will be
relevant.’” Kinder Morgan, 622 S.W.3d at 849 (quoting DeRoeck v. DHM Ventures,
LLC, 556 S.W.3d 831, 835 (Tex. 2018)).
With respect to Appellant’s claim that the defendant’s “stole” her real
property, she has not alleged any facts that would support a cognizable claim against
Cox and I.C.E.E.D that would either support a judgment against them or provide
them with notice of the nature of the claim against them. See In re First Reserve,
671 S.W.3d at 661–62. As far as Cox and I.C.E.E.D. are concerned, Appellant took
a “shotgun approach” of lumping them in with several other defendants by filing “a
conclusory pleading asserting numerous causes of action against numerous
defendants without differentiating or further explaining their various roles and
actions.” See Nickerson v. T.D.C.J.-I.D., No. 09-06-197 CV, 2007 WL 3306703, at
*4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 8, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that pleadings
of this type are subject to sanctions) (citing Bradt v. Sebek, 14 S.W.3d 756, 770 (Tex.
App–Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)); see also Boswell v. Honorable
Governor of Tex., 138 F.Supp.2d 782, 785–786 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (dismissing claims
after finding that plaintiffs adopted a “shot-gun approach” to pleadings, which failed
to state why defendants had been included in lawsuit or the specific acts which
formed the basis for the defendants’ potential liability).
Appellant’s claim for malicious prosecution suffers from the same pleading
deficiencies. Appellant has not pleaded any facts that implicate Cox, I.C.E.E.D., or
the City in reference to her criminal prosecutions to the extent that they initiated or
procured her prosecutions. See Kroger Tex. Ltd. P’ship v. Suberu, 216 S.W.3d 788,
792 n.3 (Tex. 2006) (listing the elements of a malicious prosecution claim). Without

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facts being alleged that indicate Appellees’ connection to Appellant’s criminal
prosecutions, Appellant’s inclusion of Appellees as defendants exceeds the “factual-
plausibility standard” to the point of having no basis in fact. See Sanchez, 494
S.W.3d at 724. Further, one of the elements of a cause of action for malicious
prosecution is that the prosecution terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Suberu, 216
S.W.3d at 792 n.3. Appellant did not plead that her criminal prosecutions ended in
her favor.
Cox and the City also asserted the affirmative defenses of res judicata and
limitations in their motions to dismiss. We conclude that Appellant’s claims are
time-barred without reaching the res judicata claims. Statutes of limitations are
intended to compel plaintiffs to assert their claims “within a reasonable period while
the evidence is fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses.” Comput. Assocs.,
918 S.W.2d at 455.
Appellant’s claim that Appellees “stole” her mineral interests with respect to
Cox and I.C.E.E.D. appears to be in the nature of a claim for trespass to try title or
perhaps a claim for fraud. 5 The limitations period for an action for trespass to real
property is two years. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (West 2017); Agar
Corp., 580 S.W.3d at 139. The limitations period for a fraud action is four years.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. § 16.004(a)(4) (West 2025); Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas
Co., 348 S.W.3d 194, 216 (Tex. 2011). As noted previously, Appellant alleges
matters beginning in 2001 with respect to any entity taking her property. The last
property taking she alleged occurred in 2011. Thus, Appellant’s own pleadings
establish that limitations have expired for her takings claims against Cox and
I.C.E.E.D.

5
Texas does not recognize a cause of action for conversion of real property. See Corral-Lerma v.
Border Demolition & Environmental Inc., 467 S.W.3d 109, 122 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, pet. denied).

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With respect to the City, Appellant’s claims against the City are based on a
right-of-way agreement that the City is alleged to have executed in 2001. A takings
claim premised on a governmental entity’s taking of real property is governed by the
ten-year limitations period to acquire land by adverse possession. City of Justin v.
Rimrock Enters., Inc., 466 S.W.3d 269, 279 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2015, pet.
denied); Trail Enters., Inc. v. City of Houston, 957 S.W.2d 625, 631 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet. denied); see CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.026.
Accordingly, limitations on Appellant’s takings claim against the City expired in
2011.
Appellant’s prior federal suits against Appellees establish that Appellant was
aware of her taking claims prior to this litigation. Additionally, the appointment of
the City’s attorney as a justice on this court in 2019 occurred well after the applicable
ten-year limitations period for bringing a takings claim against the City.
The limitations period for a suit for malicious prosecution is one year. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. § 16.002(a); Mead v. Property Owners’ Ass’n of Terlingua Ranch,
Inc., 410 S.W.3d 434, 437 (Tex.App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). The criminal
prosecutions which Appellant alleges all occurred more than one year prior to
Appellant filing suit. As such, her claim for malicious prosecution is time-barred.
We overrule Appellant’s third issue.
In her fourth issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court’s order of dismissal
was the result of “corruption, fraud, and other means.” While this issue appears to
challenge the dispositive order entered by the trial court, it does not address the
merits of the dismissal under Rule 91a. As such, we do not address Appellant’s
fourth issue because it is not necessary for the disposition of this appeal. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 47.1.

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This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

August 7, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Wright, S.C.J. 6

Williams, J., not participating

6
Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
sitting by assignment.

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