In Re Sean Dwain Martin v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed August 29, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
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No. 11-25-00096-CV
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IN RE SEAN DWAIN MARTIN

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, Sean Dwain Martin, has filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this
court requesting that we order the respondent, Honorable Sara Kate Shock, the
presiding judge of the 446th District Court of Ector County, Texas, to rule on his
pending motions. The underlying suit began in 2015 when the trial court ordered
Relator to pay child support. On March 3, 2025, Relator filed a pro se petition
to dismiss his child support case, along with additional motions from March 3 to
April 14. We deny Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.
Mandamus is an “extraordinary” remedy that is “available only in limited
circumstances.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only if the trial court clearly abused its
discretion, and the relator has no adequate remedy on appeal. In re Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). A trial court
abuses its discretion if it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to
amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. In re A.L.M.-F., 593 S.W.3d 271, 282
(Tex. 2019); In re Cerberus Cap. Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005)
(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). When a motion is properly pending before a trial
court, the act of considering and ruling on the motion is a ministerial act. Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d 157, 158 (Tex. 1992). However, the trial court has a
reasonable time period within which to perform that ministerial duty. Safety-Kleen
Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig.
proceeding). Whether a reasonable period has elapsed is dependent on the
circumstances of each case. Ex parte Bates, 65 S.W.3d 133, 134–35 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). No bright line demarcates the boundaries of a
reasonable time period. Id. at 135.
We first note that Relator’s filings with this court do not include file-stamped
copies of his pending motions. It is the relator’s burden to provide the reviewing
court with a sufficient record to establish the right to mandamus relief. See Walker,
827 S.W.2d at 837; In re Pentland, No. 03-22-00717-CV, 2023 WL 307476, at *1
(Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 19, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Rule 52 of the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a petition for mandamus be
accompanied by “a certified or sworn copy of every document that is material to the
relator’s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying proceeding,” and “a
properly authenticated transcript of any relevant testimony from any underlying
proceeding . . . or a statement that no testimony was adduced in connection with the
matter complained.” TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7. To establish an abuse of discretion for a

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trial court’s failure to rule, Relator must show that: (1) the trial court had a legal duty
to rule on his motions; (2) he made a demand for the trial court to rule; and (3) the
trial court failed or refused to rule within a reasonable time. See In re Chavez, 62
S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding). Because Relator
has not provided us with file-stamped copies of his pending motions, he has failed
to demonstrate that proper filings are pending before the trial court. See In re
Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, orig. proceeding)
(mandamus record failed to establish that relator requested ruling or called motion
to trial court’s attention).
Furthermore, assuming Relator properly filed said motions and requested
rulings thereon, he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court failed or refused to
rule within a reasonable time. A reasonable time to rule depends upon “a myriad of
criteria,” such as the trial court’s actual knowledge of the motions, its overt refusal
to act thereon, the state of the court’s docket, and whether any other matters which
must be addressed first exist. Chavez, 62 S.W.3d at 228–29. “So too must the trial
court’s inherent power to control its own docket be factored into the mix.” Id. For
example, courts have considered periods such as thirteen months and eighteen
months as clearly too long, thereby supporting mandamus relief. See In re Ramirez,
994 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding); Kissam v.
Williamson, 545 S.W.2d 265, 266–67 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1976, orig. proceeding);
cf. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig.
proceeding) (determining that six-month delay in ruling would not be unreasonable).
Here, we cannot say that a delay of approximately five months constitutes an

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unreasonable length of time. 1 Relator has thus failed to show that he is entitled to
mandamus relief.
Accordingly, Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied. All pending
motions in this proceeding are denied or otherwise overruled.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

August 29, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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We nevertheless encourage Judge Shock to rule on any pending motions properly filed by Relator
at the earliest possible date.

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