Christopher M. Perricone v. Katie Beth Perricone

Opinion filed September 11, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
___________

No. 11-25-00239-CV
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CHRISTOPHER M. PERRICONE, Appellant
V.
KATIE BETH PERRICONE, ET AL., Appellees

On Appeal from the 29th District Court
Palo Pinto County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C51852

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Christopher M. Perricone, filed a pro se notice of appeal from the
trial court’s orders denying his “Motion to Declare Void Judge Mike Moore’s
Recusal Letter for Failure to Comply with Mandatory Disqualification Under Texas
Law,” his “Request for Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,” and his “Notice
of Past Due Findings and Supplemental Request to Clarify the Record.” We dismiss
the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
When this appeal was docketed, we informed Appellant by letter that it did
not appear that the trial court had entered an appealable order in this case, and that
the appeal was subject to dismissal. Appellant responded and stated that the orders
that he is appealing “are void,” and that “[i]f these orders are allowed to stand, [he
is] prejudiced now” because “[t]he record suggests to a future jury that Judge Moore
acted properly . . . and the ‘without merit’ label [in the order denying the motion to
declare the recusal letter void] taints [his] filings and will likely be cited against
[him] in the pending sanctions hearing and in future rulings.” Appellant has not
shown grounds upon which this appeal may continue.
Unless specifically authorized by statute, appeals may be taken only from
final judgments. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex.
2007); Lehmann v. Har–Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). Judge
Moore’s voluntary recusal is not appealable. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j); Ritz v. State,
No. 11-12-00037-CR, 2014 WL 358358, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 31, 2014,
no pet.) (The voluntary recusal of a trial court judge is not an appealable order.). In
turn, the trial court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to declare Judge Moore’s
voluntary recusal letter void is not an appealable order because (1) it does not dispose
of all parties and claims in the proceeding below and (2) an interlocutory appeal
from such an order is not authorized by statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 51.014(a) (West Supp. 2024); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Likewise, the
trial court’s order denying Appellant’s requests for findings of fact and conclusions
of law is not a final, appealable order.1 Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195. Accordingly,

1
We note that the trial court was not required to file findings of fact and conclusions of law
regarding its order denying Appellant’s motion to declare Judge Moore’s voluntary recusal letter void. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 (only requiring findings of fact and conclusions of law following a request and when
the case has been “tried in the district or county court without a jury”).

2
we conclude that Appellant’s notice of appeal does not invoke this court’s appellate
jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a).
We dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

September 11, 2025
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

3