Rusty Taylor v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed October 9, 2025

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

Nos. 11-24-00069-CR & 11-24-00070-CR
__________

RUSTY TAYLOR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court
Brown County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 057921 & 057922

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a jury trial, Appellant, Rusty Taylor, was convicted of two Class A
misdemeanor assaults. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1), (b) (West Supp.
2024). The trial court assessed his punishment for each offense at confinement for
one year in the Brown County Jail. See id. § 12.21 (West 2019). In a single issue
in each appeal, Appellant complains that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of trial.1 We modify and affirm.
I. Factual Background
On March 3, 2023, Appellant visited the “saloon” at Los Trece Texas (Los
Trece), an “old west town” themed bar and event center in Brownwood; altercations
ensued that day and Appellant assaulted two individuals. In trial court cause
no. 057921 (11-24-00069-CR), Appellant was charged by information with assault
causing bodily injury to Robert Snyder—a retired “gunfighter” at Los Trece. See
PENAL § 22.01(a)(1). In trial court cause no. 057922 (11-24-00070-CR), Appellant
was charged by information with assault causing bodily injury to Darrin St. Ama—
the former owner of Los Trece. See id.
St. Ama testified that Appellant appeared agitated and that he observed
Appellant arguing with his girlfriend in the saloon. At some point, St. Ama
approached Appellant, tapped him on the shoulder, and requested that Appellant go
outside with him. After he and Appellant left the saloon and walked outside,
St. Ama testified that he kept his “hands in [his] pockets” during their interaction,
and that the two men stopped near a picnic table to talk. St. Ama sat down with one
leg propped on the picnic table bench and Appellant stood behind him. St. Ama later
observed on video surveillance footage that Appellant “unbuttoned” and “was taking
his shirt off” as they exited the saloon.

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Appellant’s first court-appointed appellate counsel submitted an Anders brief and filed a motion
to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Following the procedures set forth in Anders,
Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), and In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008), we independently reviewed the record and concluded that this appeal was not particularly
amenable to disposition under Anders. We granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw, abated this
appeal, and remanded this cause to the trial court with instructions to appoint other appellate counsel. New
appellate counsel was directed to file a brief on the merits and address any substantive issues that appellate
counsel deemed to be arguable. This appeal was reinstated after the trial court appointed new appellate
counsel.

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Appellant and St. Ama were conversing when Appellant told him to “watch
his attitude.” However, before St. Ama could respond, Appellant struck him in the
jaw with a closed fist, knocking him to the ground. St. Ama testified that Appellant
also struck several other individuals who were outside and attempting to restrain
him, all of whom described Appellant as being “on a rampage.” Eventually, a group
of people were able to “corral” Appellant—without physically touching him—and
“talk him [in]to leaving” Los Trece.
While in the parking lot, Appellant struck St. Ama a second time; St. Ama
also saw Appellant strike Snyder on the side of the head with his fist. According to
St. Ama, Snyder was “just walking” with the group when Appellant struck him.
Thereafter, Appellant’s girlfriend drove Appellant’s pickup around the parking lot,
but the pickup became stuck in the mud. St. Ama and Snyder, along with others,
helped push the pickup out of the mud as Appellant taunted them from inside the
pickup. St. Ama’s testimony was corroborated by (1) Snyder, (2) Carrie Wells,
(3) Kynzi Atchley, (4) D.J. Callaway, and (5) video surveillance footage, which was
played for the jury.
Appellant testified that St. Ama approached him from behind in the saloon,
and that St. Ama loudly knocked on the table with his hand where Appellant was
sitting. Appellant stated that “there was no nonsense in [St. Ama’s] tone” and that
he “smelled alcohol on [St. Ama’s] breath.” Appellant testified that he felt
“threatened and afraid for [his] life” when St. Ama knocked on the table, and he
believed it was necessary to defend himself.
Appellant testified that he followed St. Ama outside the saloon to a picnic
table, where St. Ama allegedly told Appellant to “get that s--t-eating grin off [his]
face.” In response, Appellant took off his shirt and told St. Ama that he needed to
“choose [his] next words carefully.” Appellant testified that his hands were in a
defensive position, and he was waiting for St. Ama to hit him. Shortly thereafter,
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and as soon as St. Ama “put his finger on [Appellant’s] chest,” Appellant punched
St. Ama in the face. Appellant testified that he was then “blindsided” by another
individual and “backed into a corner” by a group of others.
Appellant stated that the group taunted him as he and his girlfriend were
leaving the parking lot in his pickup. Before that, Appellant believed that the group
was “trying to circle [him]” while he was walking to the parking lot. After entering
the parking lot, Appellant testified that he saw his girlfriend being attacked by
another woman. Appellant stated that, while trying to defend his girlfriend, he was
attacked by a male who had a Bowie knife and who threatened to kill him.
According to Appellant, he struck Snyder in the face while they were in the parking
lot.
Appellant’s trial counsel mentioned self-defense in his opening statement,
stating, “So, self-defense, we hear about the stand your ground rule. That is kind of
where this comes back to. Even though there are no weapons involved, you do have
the right to defend yourself if you feel threatened, and we’re going to show that
today.” However, Appellant’s trial counsel did not request an instruction on self-
defense or defense of a third party during the charge conference, nor did he object
to the omission of either instruction in the trial court’s charge. Appellant’s trial
counsel also briefly alluded to self-defense in his closing argument to the jury.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
We review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel complaint under the two-part
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To succeed
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must satisfy both prongs
of the Strickland standard: (1) performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687; see Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The failure

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to succeed on either Strickland prong is fatal to a claim of ineffectiveness. Perez,
310 S.W.3d at 893.
First, Appellant must show that trial counsel’s representation was deficient in
that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 892–
93. Second, Appellant must show that trial counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced his defense—that is, counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
Appellant of a fair trial and, as a result, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of his trial would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Id. at 893;
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687–88). The “reasonable probability” component must rise to the level
such that it is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “This is a heavy burden which requires a ‘substantial,’
and not just a ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Walker v. State, 406
S.W.3d 590, 599 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, pet. ref’d) (quoting United States v.
Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2012)).
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Isham v.
State, 258 S.W.3d 244, 250 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). To overcome
this deferential presumption, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the
alleged ineffectiveness. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814; Walker, 406 S.W.3d at 593–94. In this regard,
we will not inquire into counsel’s trial strategy unless no possible basis exists to
support such strategy or tactics. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Thus, in our analysis, we must make every effort to
“eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Challenges on Direct Appeal
In most instances, direct appeal is an inadequate means by which to overcome
the deferential presumption and show that trial counsel’s representation was
deficient and lacked tactical or strategic decision-making, because the record is
typically undeveloped and will not show the extent of counsel’s conduct and alleged
failures. Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Mallet v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14. This is especially true when the
basis for counsel’s trial strategy and decisions do not appear in the record.
Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. In such circumstances, trial counsel should be
afforded an opportunity to explain his or her actions before being denounced as
ineffective. Id.; Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
When the record contains no direct evidence of trial counsel’s reasons or
explanations for the challenged conduct, counsel’s performance must be reviewed
with great deference and without resort to hindsight, and we “will assume that
counsel had a [valid] strategy if any reasonably sound strategic motivation can be
imagined.” Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We will
not speculate about counsel’s motives or strategy in the face of a silent record.
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. Therefore, if the record is silent as to any reason or
explanation for counsel’s actions, strategies, and alleged failures, as it is in this case,
we “will not conclude [that] the challenged conduct constituted deficient
performance unless the conduct was so outrageous that no competent attorney would
have engaged in it.” Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001);
see also State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 696–97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);
Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002) (The defendant must show that there was no plausible, professional reason for
counsel’s specific acts or omissions.).

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III. Analysis
In his sole issue in each appeal, Appellant contends that his trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to request an instruction on self-
defense or defense of a third party. Specifically, Appellant contends that his trial
counsel was ineffective because: (1) the record shows that trial counsel’s entire
defense strategy focused on self-defense; (2) the evidence shows that Appellant was
entitled to a self-defense instruction; and (3) no reasonable trial strategy can justify
counsel’s failure to request this instruction. In response, the State asserts that
Appellant has not established either Strickland prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687.
At the outset, we note that Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. As
such, Appellant’s trial counsel did not have the opportunity to explain or defend his
actions or trial strategy or respond to what Appellant now contends constitutes
deficient performance. Thus, for Appellant to demonstrate on direct appeal that his
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the record must affirmatively show that
his counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as
a matter of law, and that no reasonable trial strategy could justify trial counsel’s acts
or omissions, regardless of his or her subjective reasoning.” Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at
143; see Strickland 466 U.S. at 687. Furthermore, when, as here, the record does
not reveal counsel’s reasoning or strategies, we “presume that counsel is better
positioned than the appellate court to judge the pragmatism of the particular case,
and that [trial counsel] ‘made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment.’” Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex. Crim. App.
1992) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690); see Morales, 253 S.W.3d at 697;
Screws v. State, 630 S.W.3d 158, 164–65 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.).
To prove deficient performance based on trial counsel’s failure to request a
defensive instruction, an appellant must first show that he was entitled to such an
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instruction. See Hart v. State, 667 S.W.3d 774, 782 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).
“However, even if the appellant is entitled to a defensive instruction, the decision to
forgo such an instruction may not be objectively unreasonable, as these decisions
are frequently grounded in trial strategy.” Id. (citing Okonkwo v. State, 398 S.W.3d
689, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). In this regard, a competent defense attorney may
recognize that a particular defense may be available but could nevertheless decide
that, given the circumstances of the case, asserting or relying on such a defense
would not be appropriate or advisable. Id.
Section 9.31(a) of the Penal Code provides that “a person is justified in using
force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force
is immediately necessary to protect the actor against the other’s use or attempted use
of unlawful force.” PENAL § 9.31(a). However, to receive a self-defense instruction
submission, the defendant must admit to his illegal conduct. Jordan v. State, 593
S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Juarez v. State, 308 S.W.3d 398,
404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). A trial court errs if it refuses to submit a self-defense
instruction if there is some evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
defendant, to support its elements. Id. (citing Gamino v. State, 537 S.W.3d 507, 510
(Tex. Crim. App. 2017)).
Here, had counsel pursued a justification defense, the evidence must have
showed that Appellant believed his use of force was immediately necessary under
the circumstances to protect himself against St. Ama’s and/or Snyder’s use of
unlawful force. See PENAL § 9.31(a). Although Appellant testified that he believed
that he was in “imminent danger” because St. Ama knocked on the table with his
hand, several witnesses testified that Appellant was the instigator and aggressor in
both instances and that St. Ama’s hands were in his pockets when Appellant struck
him in the face. As such, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Appellant’s
conduct was in anticipation of an altercation with St. Ama based on his testimony,
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Appellant’s testimony that he took off his shirt to show St. Ama that he “meant
business” before their altercation, or his testimony where he described how he
waited for St. Ama to touch him before he punched him in the face. Additionally,
Appellant seemingly punched Snyder in the face without provocation. Thus, this
evidence, including Appellant’s admissions, dilute his claim of self-defense. See
Dannhaus v. State, 928 S.W.2d 81, 86 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet.
ref’d).
Appellant argues that no reasonable trial strategy justifies counsel’s decisions
and conduct because “the record it is clear counsel did not make any decision to
forgo a justification defense” and counsel’s entire defense strategy was based on
self-defense. In support of his contention, Appellant specifically references the
following statements made by his trial counsel during closing arguments:
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I want to start -- you know, we
talked a little bit about self-defense in my opening. One
only has to fear imminent danger, and it’s a reasonable
person. It’s not -- there is no clear cut what somebody
might feel to be imminent. So, that is another question that
you guys are going to have to kind of tussle with a little bit
back there. But from the knock on the table.

....

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So, once they get outside and
they start the tussle, he felt like he was in a fight for his
life because there was -- he hit the bar owner, and then he
was immediately brought to the ground by another bigger
gentleman, who then tackled him to the ground. So, then
he had to fight.
However, despite Appellant’s contention, we will not conclude that counsel’s
actions constituted deficient performance unless the challenged conduct was “so
outrageous that no competent attorney would have engaged in it.” Garcia, 57
S.W.3d at 440. Moreover, and contrary to Appellant’s assertions, the record shows
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that counsel’s closing argument did not focus solely on self-defense. Rather,
counsel’s closing argument indicates that he chose to focus on inconsistencies in the
evidence adduced at trial and that the State had failed to prove its cases against
Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt.
Appellant also argues that because the evidence was sufficient to support an
instruction on self-defense, trial counsel’s failure to request it constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, even if Appellant was entitled to a self-defense
instruction submission, and we do not hold that he was, trial counsel’s failure to
request it will not constitute ineffective assistance if counsel presents a defense at
trial that is objectively reasonable. See Dannhaus, 928 S.W.2d at 86. Trial counsel
could have concluded that requesting and receiving a self-defense instruction may
have shifted the jury’s view of Appellant’s alleged defensive conduct—of defending
himself from St. Ama’s and Snyder’s alleged use of unlawful force against him—to
his otherwise aggressive conduct in committing the assaults. Thus, relying on this
defense and the accompanying instruction may have harmed, rather than assisted,
Appellant. See Hart, 667 S.W.3d at 782 (“[J]ust because a competent defense
attorney recognizes that a particular defense might be available to a particular
offense, he or she could also decide it would be inappropriate to propound such a
defense in a given case.” (quoting Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948, 950 n.3 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam))).
Based on the record before us, and because counsel was not afforded the
opportunity to explain his trial strategies and reasoning, we cannot say that the
decision to not request either justification instruction was so outrageous that no
competent attorney would have forgone the same. See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at
392; Vasquez, 830 S.W.2d at 950 n.3; see also Martini v. State, No. 05-17-00693-
CR, 2018 WL 3598978, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.,
not designated for publication) (“Where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, and
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the evidence to support an affirmative defense is weak, a strategy of focusing the
jury on the strongest theory of innocence supported by the evidence is not objectively
unreasonable.”); Roberts v. State, No. 01-16-00059-CR, 2016 WL 6962308, at *5
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2016, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated
for publication) (“Appellant’s counsel could have reasonably determined that the
evidence was weak enough that to include the instruction in the charge could risk
credibility with the jury.”). Further, because the undeveloped record does not
affirmatively demonstrate that Appellant’s trial counsel had no reasonable strategic
basis for his decisions, we cannot conclude that his actions and decisions constitute
ineffective assistance as Appellant suggests. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687;
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812; see also Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142; Richardson v. State,
No. 11-18-00185-CR, 2021 WL 747529, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 26,
2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (The appellant was
convicted of assault-family violence, and trial counsel was not ineffective for not
requesting a self-defense instruction.).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue in each appeal.
IV. Modification of Judgments
Although not raised by either party, we note that the trial court’s judgments
contain nonreversible errors. We have the authority to modify and reform the trial
court’s judgments to make the judgments speak the truth when we have the necessary
information to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26,
27–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1992). Here, the trial court’s judgments recite that Appellant’s cases were tried
before the “Brown County Court at Law”; however, these cases were tried before
the Brown County Court. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.01,
§ 1(12) (West Supp. 2024) (requiring that a “judgment shall reflect . . . [t]he county
and court in which the case was tried”). Therefore, we modify both judgments to
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delete “At Law” in the style of each case and recite that Appellant’s cases were tried
before the “County Court of Brown County.”
V. This Court’s Ruling
As modified, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

October 9, 2025
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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