In the Interest of P.M.P., a Child v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed January 22, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00290-CV
__________

IN THE INTEREST OF P.M.P., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 29th District Court
Palo Pinto County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. C51460

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant-Father appeals the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights
to his child, P.M.P.1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 (West Supp. 2025). After
a final termination hearing, the trial court found by clear and convincing evidence
that Appellant endangered P.M.P. as set forth in Sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E)
of the Texas Family Code, and that termination was in the child’s best interest. See
id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2). We affirm the order of termination.2

1
We use initials to refer to the child. TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the mother. The mother did not file a notice
of appeal.
Appellant’s court-appointed counsel has filed a motion to withdraw in this
court. The motion is supported by a brief in which counsel professionally and
conscientiously examines the record and applicable law, and concludes that there are
no arguable issues to present on appeal. Counsel sent by electronic mail, express
mail, and certified mail to Appellant’s last known address a copy of the brief, a copy
of the motion to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and the clerk’s record and reporter’s
record. Counsel certified to this court that he provided Appellant with a copy of the
brief, a copy of the motion to withdraw, an explanatory letter, and a copy of the
clerk’s record and reporter’s record. Counsel also advised Appellant of his right to
object to counsel’s motion to withdraw, and to file a pro se response to counsel’s
Anders brief. See TEX. R. APP. P. 6.5. This court has likewise made efforts to ensure
Appellant’s access to this court and to apprise him of the pendency of this appeal
and the actions by counsel on appeal. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318–20
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). As such, court-appointed counsel has complied with the
requirements of Anders, Schulman, and Kelly. See id.; In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d
403, 406–09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); see also Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967).
Appellant has not filed a pro se response to counsel’s Anders brief. Following
the procedures outlined in Anders and Schulman, we have independently reviewed
the record in this case, and we agree that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous and without
merit. With respect to the trial court’s endangerment findings in particular, the
evidence established that the Department intervened in August 2024 due to the
mother’s daily methamphetamine use and leaving the two-year-old child in the care
of known drug users. When the Department began its investigation, Appellant was
confined in the Palo Pinto County Jail following his arrest for possession of cocaine
and fentanyl. However, he used illegal drugs in the child’s presence prior to his
confinement. Shortly after his release on bond in September 2024, Appellant
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tested positive for methamphetamine and marihuana. He tested positive for
methamphetamine two more times while the case was pending, and refused to
submit to drug testing on at least nine occasions. The record as a whole demonstrates
that Appellant’s pattern of drug use, accompanied by related dangers to the child,
presented a substantial risk of harm to the child and rendered Appellant incapable of
parenting. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024); In re J.O.A., 283
S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009).
Although we agree with appellate counsel’s conclusion on the merits,
an Anders motion to withdraw “may be premature” if filed in the court of appeals
under the circumstances presented in this case. See In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27
(Tex. 2016) (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals, in
the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal, may be premature.”). The court
held in P.M. that, in parental termination cases, court-appointed counsel’s duty to
his or her client generally extends “through the exhaustion of [all] appeals.” Id. at
27–28; see also FAM. § 107.016(2). In this regard, “appointed counsel’s obligations
can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for
an Anders brief.” P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
Accordingly, we deny counsel’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the trial
court’s order of termination.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

January 22, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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