Efrain Santillan Jr v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 5, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00224-CR
__________

EFRAIN SANTILLAN JR, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 106th District Court
Gaines County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 23-6057

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Efrain Santillan Jr, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault family
violence with a deadly weapon and causing serious bodily injury, a first-degree
felony, which was enhanced by at least one prior felony conviction. See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West Supp. 2025), § 22.02(b)(1) (West 2019). Pursuant to the
terms of a plea agreement between Appellant and the State, the trial court placed
Appellant on deferred adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years.
Due to violations of his community supervision conditions, the trial court
subsequently adjudicated Appellant’s guilt, revoked his community supervision, and
sentenced him to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment.
In a single issue, Appellant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective during
revocation proceedings in failing to “limit and/or exclude sizable portions of the
State’s most damaging evidence.” We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
Appellant was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision on
September 28, 2023, after pleading guilty to the offense as indicted. The indictment
alleged that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused serious bodily
injury to G.V. 1 by striking her with a hard object and pouring hot oil on her, that he
used or exhibited deadly weapons, a metal pipe and hot oil, and that G.V. was a
member of his family or household, or a person with whom he had or had had a
dating relationship. PENAL § 22.02(b)(1).
A. The Application to Adjudicate
Five months later, on February 27, 2024, the State filed an application to
adjudicate Appellant’s guilt, alleging, in the State’s numbered paragraphs, that
Appellant had committed the following acts in violation of his community
supervision conditions:
2. [allegation no. 30] On or about 02/03/2024, at approximately 17:10,
in the city of Seminole, Gaines County, Texas, [Appellant] committed
the offenses of Aggravated Assault w/Deadly Weapon, Aggravated
Kidnapping, Aggravated Sexual Assault, Interfering w/Public Duties,
Resisting Arrest Search or Transport, Unlawful Possession of Firearm

1
Because this case concerns sexual assault allegations, to protect the identity of the complainant,
we refer to her by a pseudonym. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the
right to be treated . . . with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice
process”); see generally TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8 cmt. (“The rule does not limit an appellate court’s authority to
disguise parties’ identities in appropriate circumstances in other cases.”).
2
by Felon, and Violating a Protective order 2+ Times w/in 12 months
[against G.V.]. (Report No. 24-000058)[.]

7. [Appellant] failed to report in person to Gaines County CSCD as
ordered for an office visit scheduled on 10/26/2023.

10. On or about 02/03/2024, [Appellant] failed to submit his person
and/or residence when requested by Gaines County Deputy’s in
reference to a welfare check being conducted.

16. [Appellant] is delinquent in the amount of $7.00. He failed to pay
this fee on or after the 31st day after the date of the judgment was
entered[.]

17. [Appellant] is delinquent in the amount of $50.00. He failed to pay
this fee within thirty (30) days of the date he was placed on community
supervision.

19. To date, [Appellant] has performed zero (0) hours of community
service. At the rate of 20 hours per month, [he] should have performed
100 hours of community service.

22. [Appellant] failed to attend and successfully complete the Drug
Awareness Class.

24. To date, [Appellant] failed to complete the educational
requirements to obtain the high school diploma or GED.
B. The Adjudication Hearing
The following evidence was introduced at a hearing on the State’s application
to adjudicate.
On February 3, 2024, G.V.’s mother called law enforcement, requesting a
welfare check on G.V. because she had not heard from G.V. since the day before,
when G.V. called her sounding “frantic.” Lieutenant Victor Montes with the Gaines
County Sheriff’s Office responded, and his body camera recording was admitted into
evidence at the hearing. In the recording, Lieutenant Montes can be seen waiting

3
for several minutes for Appellant to exit the RV. Lieutenant Montes testified that
he did finally make contact with G.V., who had remained inside the RV while
Lieutenant Montes first spoke to Appellant. When Lieutenant Montes spoke with
G.V., he noted swelling on G.V.’s face and heavy makeup around one eye. While
still in Appellant’s presence, G.V. attributed her injuries to a recent fight she had had
with a former friend, and she denied that Appellant had hit her. Lieutenant Montes
testified that he then requested that Appellant step away, giving Lieutenant Montes
an opportunity to speak with G.V. in private. Appellant refused, and following failed
attempts to move Appellant away from the immediate area, Appellant was detained
and then arrested for interfering in the investigation.
As soon as Appellant was removed from the area, G.V. requested to be taken
to the hospital and began repeatedly asking Lieutenant Montes to promise her that
she would be “okay.” G.V. told Lieutenant Montes that Appellant had threatened to
kill her and had beaten her with a chain and hammer. G.V. said that at some
unspecified point during their fight, Appellant “shoved his whole fist” up her anal
cavity. Lieutenant Montes testified that this was one of the worst domestic violence
situations he had ever responded to in over ten years of service.
Lieutenant Montes testified that Appellant was ultimately charged with sexual
assault, kidnapping, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon involving family
violence, and felon in possession of firearm. Both the hammer and chain were seized
at the residence and admitted at the hearing. A firearm and ammunition magazines
belonging to the firearm were also confiscated.
Becky Kesner, the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) who examined G.V.
following the assault, testified that G.V. was “very scared” and tearful during the
SANE exam. Kesner obtained G.V.’s medical history as part of her treatment plan,
and Kesner’s notes were among the medical records admitted at the hearing.
According to Kesner, G.V. told her that Appellant started hitting her with a chain
4
before giving her two options: he could either continue to hit her with the chain or
“fist her.” Believing it “would be quick and over with,” G.V. chose Appellant’s fist.
Appellant then “worked up to his entire fist” into her anus, and despite the presence
of “a lot of blood,” Appellant refused to take her to the hospital. Kesner noted that
there was a “fairly significant tear in [G.V.’s] anus” and substantial bruising all over
G.V.’s body. Kesner additionally identified a “chain pattern” bruise on G.V.’s
abdomen. Photographs depicting G.V.’s injuries on her face, shoulder, neck, hands,
legs, and buttocks were also admitted.
Gaines County Sheriff’s Office Detective Blain Stanfield testified that prior
to the hearing, G.V. had reached out requesting an opportunity to recant her recorded
statement to law enforcement. G.V. claimed that someone else had assaulted her,
and the “anal fisting” she previously described had been a consensual sexual act.
Detective Stanfield testified that G.V.’s characterization of the act as consensual was
a departure from her prior statements to Lieutenant Montes and medical staff.
Detective Stanfield further testified that as part of his investigation, he reviewed
recordings of telephone calls from the jail between Appellant and G.V., wherein
Appellant was heard instructing G.V. how to testify at the adjudication hearing.
G.V. testified at the hearing. Although G.V. confirmed she had been assaulted
on February 3, 2024, and had required treatment for multiple injuries, including a
broken collarbone and multiple lacerations, she denied Appellant’s involvement.
G.V. testified that she felt pressured by law enforcement to blame Appellant.
With respect to the remaining allegations, Julie Miller, a probation officer who
supervised Appellant testified that he failed to report as ordered on October 26, 2023,
“failed to submit for a welfare check” on February 3, 2024, was delinquent in the
payment of fees, had failed to perform any court-ordered community service hours,
and had failed to attend and successfully complete a drug awareness class. On cross-

5
examination, Miller acknowledged that Appellant had since caught up on the
payment of his fees.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court made a finding of “true” for
all allegations with the exception of allegation number 16, which alleged that
Appellant failed to pay a $7 fee. The trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty,
revoked his community supervision, and sentenced him to imprisonment for a term
of ninety-nine years.
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We review an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel complaint under the two-part
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To succeed
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must satisfy both prongs
of the Strickland standard: (1) performance and (2) prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 687; see Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). The failure
to succeed on either Strickland prong is fatal to a claim of ineffectiveness. Perez,
310 S.W.3d at 893.
First, Appellant must show that trial counsel’s representation was deficient in
that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Perez, 310 S.W.3d at 892–
93. Second, Appellant must show that trial counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced his defense—that is, counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
Appellant of a fair trial and, as a result, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of his trial would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Id. at 893;
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687–88). The “reasonable probability” component must rise to the level
such that it is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “This is a heavy burden which requires a ‘substantial,’
and not just a ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.” Walker v. State, 406

6
S.W.3d 590, 599 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, pet. ref’d) (quoting United States v.
Wines, 691 F.3d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 2012)).
There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct fell within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Isham v.
State, 258 S.W.3d 244, 250 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. ref’d). To overcome
this deferential presumption, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
firmly founded in the record, and the record must affirmatively demonstrate the
alleged ineffectiveness. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App.
2005); Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814; Walker, 406 S.W.3d at 593–94. In this regard,
we will not inquire into counsel’s trial strategy unless no possible basis exists to
support such strategy or tactics. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex. Crim.
App. [Panel Op.] 1981). Thus, in our analysis, we must make every effort to
“eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
III. Analysis
In his sole issue on appeal, Appellant contends that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance because he failed to “exclude and/or limit critical portions of
the State’s evidence at the revocation hearing.” Specifically, Appellant argues that
counsel should have objected on the basis of hearsay to the admission of (1) G.V.’s
emergency room and sexual assault examination records; (2) testimony from Miller,
Lieutenant Montes, and Detective Stanfield; and (3) Lieutenant Montes’s body
camera footage.
At the outset, we note that Appellant did not file a motion for new trial. As
such, Appellant’s trial counsel did not have the opportunity to explain or defend his
actions or strategy or respond to what Appellant now contends constitutes deficient
performance. Thus, for Appellant to demonstrate on direct appeal that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance, the record must affirmatively show that his
counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as a
7
matter of law, and that no reasonable trial strategy could justify trial counsel’s acts
or omissions, regardless of his or her subjective reasoning.” Lopez v. State, 343
S.W.3d 137, 143 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); see Strickland 466 U.S. at 687.
Furthermore, when, as here, the record does not divulge counsel’s reasoning or
strategies, we “presume that counsel is better positioned than the appellate court to
judge the pragmatism of the particular case, and that [trial counsel] ‘made all
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’”
Delrio v. State, 840 S.W.2d 443, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690); see State v. Morales, 253 S.W.3d 686, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008);
Screws v. State, 630 S.W.3d 158, 164–65 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, no pet.).
We first address the statements that, for reasons explained below, the trial
court would not have erred in overruling a hearsay objection, had one been made,
because either a hearsay exception applied, or the statement was simply not hearsay.
See Poor v. State, 715 S.W.3d 15, 41 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, pet. ref’d) (“When
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to object, an appellant
must demonstrate that the trial court would have erred in overruling an objection had
trial counsel made one.” (first citing first Ex parte Martinez, 330 S.W.3d 891, 901
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011); and then citing Munoz v. State, No. 11-13-00139-CR, 2015
WL 4053483, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 30, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
designated for publication)).
A. Hearsay Exceptions
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement. TEX. R. EVID. 801(d). Hearsay is inadmissible unless
made admissible by statute or rule. TEX. R. EVID. 802; Bahena v. State, 634 S.W.3d
923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). “When hearsay contains hearsay, the Rules of
Evidence require that each part of the combined statements be within an exception

8
to the hearsay rule.” Sanchez v. State, 354 S.W.3d 476, 485–86 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (citing TEX. R. EVID. 805).
1. Business Records & Medical Records Exceptions
Relevant to Appellant’s challenge to the admissibility of G.V.’s emergency
room and sexual assault examination records, we consider the business record and
the medical-diagnosis-or-treatment exceptions to the hearsay rules. See TEX. R.
EVID. 803(4), (6).
A record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis, commonly called
a “business record,” is admissible hearsay if: (A) the record was made at or near the
time by, or from information transmitted by, someone with knowledge; (B) the
record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity; (C) the
making of the record was a regular practice of that activity; (D) all these conditions
are shown by the testimony, affidavit, or unsworn declaration of the custodian or
another qualified witness; and (E) the opponent fails to demonstrate that the source
of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of
trustworthiness. TEX. R. EVID. 803(6); Bahena, 634 S.W.3d at 927–28.
A “statement made for medical diagnosis or treatment” is a “statement that:
(A) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical diagnosis or treatment;
and (B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their
inception; or their general cause.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(4). The identity of a
perpetrator may be pertinent to a patient’s diagnosis or treatment, particularly with
regard to ensuring the victim’s safety when the perpetrator is a family or household
member. Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 591 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing
Munoz v. State, 288 S.W.3d 55, 58–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no
pet.)); Parham v. State, No. 14-23-00782-CR, 2024 WL 5250427, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 31, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (concluding that appellant failed to show counsel had been ineffective
9
in failing to object to the admission of medical records, wherein the victim identified
appellant as the perpetrator).
All G.V.’s admitted medical records, including the sexual assault examination
records, were proved up at the hearing by testimony consistent with the hearsay
exception requirements contained in Rule 803(6). However, Appellant maintains on
appeal that the State failed to show that the hearsay within the medical records—i.e.,
G.V.’s statements—were admissible, arguing that the statements do not fall under
the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or
treatment.
The record demonstrates that G.V. was admitted to the emergency room and
thereafter underwent a SANE exam for treatment from her injuries sustained from
an assault. The mere fact that G.V. was transported to the hospital and a SANE
exam was conducted as part of a criminal investigation does not strip the
examinations performed and statements obtained thereof of their medical purpose.
Courts have repeatedly recognized that these mixed purposes do not render the
examination non-medical or transform the patient’s statements into purely
investigative declarations. See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589 (providing that in the
context of an emergency medical examination, “it seems only natural to presume
that adults . . . will have an implicit awareness that the doctor’s questions are
designed to elicit accurate information and that veracity will serve their best
interest”); Franklin v. State, 459 S.W.3d 670, 676 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, pet.
ref’d) (noting that the Rule 803(4) hearsay exception “is based on the assumption
that the patient understands the importance of being truthful with the medical
personnel involved to receive an accurate diagnosis and treatment”) (quoting
Bautista v. State, 189 S.W.3d 365, 368 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2006, pet. ref’d)); see
also, e.g., Trollinger v. State, No. 11-22-00089-CR, 2023 WL 5622111, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Aug. 31, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
10
(“That [the victim] underwent a sexual assault examination at the referral of law
enforcement does not change the medical nature of the examination.”). Moreover,
we can infer from the record that G.V. knew that it was important to tell the treating
physicians in the emergency room and thereafter the SANE the truth in order to
obtain proper medical treatment or diagnosis. See Taylor, 268 S.W.3d at 589;
Henslee v. State, No. 11-17-00163-CR, 2019 WL 3451490, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Eastland July 31, 2019, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). There
is nothing in the record to indicate otherwise.
When—as here—a medical assessment was conducted and the documented
questions were asked to determine the extent of the victim’s injury, the mechanism
of trauma, possible internal damage, and risks of further harm, the victim’s responses
are reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment and therefore fall squarely
within Rule 803(4). See, e.g., Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 888 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d) (“[W]e held that [the SANE’s] testimony was
admissible under the medical-diagnosis-or-treatment exception to the hearsay rule.
Her handwritten report is similarly admissible under the medical-diagnosis-or-
treatment exception to the hearsay rule.”). Given this legal framework, Appellant
has not established that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness by declining to object to hearsay in the medical records. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142.
2. Excited Utterance Exception
We turn to G.V.’s statements to Lieutenant Montes, either testified to by
Lieutenant Montes at the hearing or admitted via Lieutenant Montes’s body camera
recording. Another exception to the hearsay rule allows for the admissibility of
hearsay testimony when the testimony includes a statement that constitutes an
excited utterance. Templeton v. State, 629 S.W.3d 616, 626 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2021, no pet.). An excited utterance is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or
11
condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it
caused.” TEX. R. EVID. 803(2). “The type of emotion that dominates the declarant
is not critical; what is controlling is whether, at the time the statement was made, the
declarant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear, or pain that was
caused by the startling event or condition.” Templeton, 629 S.W.3d at 626.
“Therefore, if the statement is an excited utterance, there can be no abuse of
discretion to admit it.” Id. (citing Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 537–38 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2002)).
When determining the admissibility of a statement that is offered as an excited
utterance, we reflect on three concerns:
(1) the “exciting event” should be startling enough to evoke a truly
spontaneous reaction from the declarant; (2) the reaction to the startling
event should be quick enough to avoid the possibility of fabrication;
and (3) the resulting statement should be sufficiently “related to” the
startling event, to ensure the reliability and trustworthiness of that
statement.
McCarty v. State, 257 S.W.3d 238, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). Nevertheless,
“under the excited utterance exception, the startling [or exciting] event may trigger
a spontaneous statement that relates to a much earlier incident.” Id. at 240. This
comports with the purpose of the exception, which assumes that the person who
makes an excited utterance is not then capable of the kind of reflection that would
enable that person to fabricate the information that is related. Apolinar v. State, 155
S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Thus, “[t]he trustworthiness of the
statement is founded on the fact that it is the event that speaks through the person
and not merely the declarant relating the event.” Tienda v. State, 479 S.W.3d 863,
875 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.) (emphasis added) (citing Zuliani v. State,
97 S.W.3d 589, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)); see Evans v. State, 480 S.W.2d 387,
389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). An occurrence of an assault, sexual or physical, may

12
qualify as a startling or exciting event. Luna v. State, No. 11-22-00259-CR, 2024
WL 3056135, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 20, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication); Wear v. State, No. 02-16-00170-CR, 2017 WL 929529,
at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 9, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication).
Importantly, the evidence at the hearing established that Lieutenant Montes’s
presence at Appellant’s and G.V.’s residence interrupted an ongoing assault. As
soon as Appellant was removed from the area, G.V. blurted out that she needed to
be transported to the hospital for a head wound. G.V. then began crying, and any
statements regarding Appellant’s assault on G.V. were followed or preceded by
G.V.’s requests for assurances that Lieutenant Montes keep her safe. As Appellant
notes in his brief, G.V. even attributed Lieutenant Montes to saving her life.
Under these circumstances, trial counsel could have reasonably concluded
that the emotions and fear experienced by G.V. from the assault at the time she made
the complained-of statements to Lieutenant Montes were likely ongoing—in other
words, G.V.’s statements fell under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay
rules and were therefore admissible. See, e.g., Donald v. State, 543 S.W.3d 466,
479–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (holding that domestic
assault victim’s recorded statements to police were excited utterances); see also
Rodriguez v. State, No. 11-18-00101-CR, 2020 WL 1467259, at *4 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Mar. 26, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Trial
counsel could also have reasonably concluded that [the complainant’s] statements to
[an officer] were admissible as excited utterances in light of the testimony that [the
complainant] was crying and seemed frightened.”); McFadden v. State, No. 11-16-
00221-CR, 2018 WL 4137594, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 30, 2018, no pet.)
(mem. op., not designated for publication) (considering that minimal amount of time
had elapsed between the exciting event and statement made). Accordingly,
13
Appellant has not established that trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness by declining to object to Lieutenant Montes’s testimony
concerning G.V.’s statements or to the admission of Lieutenant Montes’s body
camera recording. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142.
B. Miller’s Statements
We next address statements made by Miller that Appellant argues should have
been objected to on the basis of hearsay. Appellant specifically argues that Miller
improperly based her testimony on the “chronos”—documents that contained
hearsay and were never admitted into the record. On the face of the record, however,
Miller at no point appears to be reading off any documents during her testimony.
While Miller references “chronos” in cross-examination, it is in response to a
question asked by counsel:
[TRIAL COUNSEL]: What is this failure to report on 10/26?
You might be able -- I’ve got the chronos here. Let me get to it. Did
he -- I just don’t see from the -- from -- 10/26/23, it just says,
Appointment scheduled and assist- -- and -- but that’s all it says. And
-- and I’m not sure how he missed that.

[MILLER]: So probably what happened -- he was on intensive
supervision, so he was probably reporting twice a month.

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Okay.

[MILLER]: That appointment was set on the 26th. If he missed
that appointment or attempted to reschedule it without coming in, the
appointment was going to be made. There was no chrono made that --
that an office visit was done on that day, so -- which tells us that he
didn’t report in person.

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Okay. So you wouldn’t necessarily know
if it was missed, but you would note if he made it? Is that what you’re
saying?

14
[MILLER]: If he reported in person on that day, it would be
chronoed that he reported in person.
It is unclear what “out of court statement” Appellant argues is presented here through
“chronos.” And Miller’s testimony may have been entirely based on her knowledge
as his assigned probation officer. Accordingly, we cannot say that counsel was
ineffective in failing to object to Miller’s testimony. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689;
Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142.
C. Strategic Motives
We now consider the last statements being challenged on appeal: Detective
Stanfield’s testimony that G.V.’s statements to him were consistent with her
statements to Lieutenant Montes, EMS, and hospital staff. As we noted previously,
because the record contains no direct evidence of trial counsel’s reasons or
explanations for the challenged conduct, counsel’s performance must be reviewed
with great deference and without resort to hindsight, and we “will assume that
counsel had a [valid] strategy if any reasonably sound strategic motivation can be
imagined.” Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 143. Although Stanfield’s brief statements
contained hearsay, Stanfield was the last of the State’s witnesses to testify, and by
then, G.V.’s prior statements had already been admitted into evidence, as had her
testimony recanting her prior statements. Therefore, counsel’s decision not to object
to two sentences containing information already in the record may have been entirely
strategic. See Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (providing
that a defendant must show that there was no plausible, professional reason for
counsel’s specific acts or omissions). On this record, we cannot conclude that trial
counsel’s decision to not object to hearsay was so outrageous that no competent
attorney would have engaged in it. See Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2001).

15
D. Limiting Instruction
To the extent Appellant additionally argues that his trial counsel should have
requested a limiting instruction, Appellant has provided no authority, nor have we
found any, requiring a limiting instruction in a revocation proceeding before the trial
court. “The purpose of a limiting instruction is to ‘restrict evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.’” Phillips v. State, 193 S.W.3d 904, 911
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006); see TEX. R. EVID. 105(a) (“When evidence which is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party
or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence
to its proper scope and instruct the jury appropriately[.]” (emphasis added)). “This
doctrine is a sensible one because otherwise a jury might sit through most of a trial
under the mistaken belief that certain evidence is admissible for all purposes when,
in fact, it is not.” Delgado v. State, 235 S.W.3d 244, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
However, where there is no jury and the evidence is being admitted before a judge,
we question the existence of the same risk since, unlike laymen jurors, the proper
scope of evidence in this context is familiar to the judiciary. A limiting instruction
would have been an unusual exercise in futility where the trial court is instructing
itself. In any event, the trial court is presumed to disregard offered information that
is inadmissible or evidentiary matters “inappropriate for consideration in his role as
fact-finder.” See, e.g., Lackey v. State, 364 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Therefore, counsel would not have been ineffective in declining to request a limiting
instruction in this instance.
E. Conclusion
Appellant has not controverted the strong presumption that his trial counsel’s
performance was within prevailing professional norms. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689; Isham, 258 S.W.3d at 250. Appellant’s ineffective-assistance claim therefore
fails because he has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his trial
16
counsel’s performance was deficient. See Lopez, 343 S.W.3d at 142. We overrule
Appellant’s sole issue on appeal.
IV. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
JUSTICE

February 5, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

17