Arthur Gallegoz v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 5, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-24-00222-CR
__________

ARTHUR GALLEGOZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 350th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 15348-D

MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Appellant, Arthur Gallegoz, of one count of murder and two
counts of aggravated assault. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 19.02(b)(3),
22.02(a)(2) (West Supp. 2025). The jury assessed Appellant’s punishment at thirty
years’ imprisonment in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice for the murder conviction, and eight years’ imprisonment for each
aggravated-assault conviction. The trial court ordered that the sentences be served
concurrently.
In a single issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it admitted a surveillance video of the murder that Appellant claims was not
properly authenticated. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Because the only issue in this appeal concerns the trial court’s admission of
the surveillance video of which Appellant complains, we will restrict our recitation
of the facts to those that are relevant to this issue.
Derrick Compton lived in apartment no. 202 at the Claystone Apartments in
Abilene. On February 1, 2022, his girlfriend (Catrina Messer), Paul John Delacruz
(P.J.), and another friend were staying with him. That evening, Catrina parked her
vehicle in the space that she knew was routinely used by the occupant of apartment
no. 201; however, she believed that this person would not be returning to the
apartment complex until sometime after midnight. Catrina testified that when they
attempted to leave the complex, they noticed that a vehicle had parked in front of
her vehicle, blocking it. She testified that while P.J. and Derrick asked the neighbor,
Edward Minjarez, to move this vehicle, she returned to Derrick’s apartment to use
the restroom, and when she left the restroom, she could hear “mouthing” emanating
from outside the apartment.
Appellant’s uncle, sisters, and mother lived in other apartments in the
complex, and Appellant would routinely stay with them. Appellant’s sister, Serenity
Gallegoz, testified that a confrontation ensued between P.J. and their uncle, Edward,
over the parking space, and that P.J. was yelling at their group from the second-floor
landing of the complex. Appellant testified that he overheard the banter, went to
investigate, and subsequently intervened in the altercation that had begun between
P.J. and Appellant’s other sister, Destiny Gallegoz. Appellant testified that the three
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of them were yelling at each other and challenging the other to fight. Appellant
claimed that he heard P.J. shouting threats at Destiny, and after Appellant
informed P.J. that Destiny was pregnant, P.J. responded that “he was going to shoot
that b---h.” Appellant stated that he tried to persuade Destiny to walk away, but P.J.
threw a water bottle at them. Destiny then ran up the stairs after P.J.; Appellant, who
testified that he believed that he needed to protect her, followed.
P.J. ran to his apartment, and Appellant and Destiny followed him to the front
door of the apartment unit. There is conflicting testimony regarding the state of the
front door when they got to the apartment. Catrina testified that P.J. entered the
apartment and attempted to close the front door, but it remained open. According to
Appellant, the door was open, and when he observed P.J. grab something from his
waist and lift it, Appellant drew his handgun and fired it at P.J. to “scare him.”
Appellant testified that, as he was walking away, he could hear the door being pulled
open and he saw a light. Believing that P.J. was returning to attack them, Appellant
fired another round into the apartment before leaving the complex.
Although wounded, Catrina was able to call 9-1-1. Officers Quint Woody and
Matt Clopton with the Abilene Police Department responded to the 9-1-1 call. Upon
entering the apartment, the officers saw Derrick and Catrina on the floor. Officer
Woody then cleared the apartment and found P.J. lying on the floor in a bedroom.
Officer Woody testified that P.J. was staring at the ceiling with a fixed gaze and
struggling to breathe, and as he observed the body, he noticed a gunshot wound in
P.J.’s chest. Catrina also sustained gunshot wounds to her right arm and upper and
lower abdomen. EMS later arrived and transported P.J., Catrina, and Derrick to the
hospital.
The officers and detectives who investigated the scene found three bullet holes
in the front door of Derrick’s apartment and a bullet strike on the wall. A blood trail
extended from the front door to the bedroom where P.J. was found, and five shell
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casings were located outside the apartment, both on and in between the wood slats
of the landing, and on the sidewalk below. No firearms were found inside the
apartment. Investigators also noticed two surveillance cameras that were associated
with apartment no. 201—one camera faced in the direction of Derrick’s apartment,
and the other faced the parking lot. They noted that the lights to the surveillance
cameras were activated when they arrived at the scene, however, sometime later, the
lights to these cameras were no longer on.
Sergeant Paul Martinez with the Abilene Police Department was assigned to
the cyber unit at the time of the shooting, and the investigating detectives contacted
him and requested his assistance with securing the security/surveillance cameras.
After identifying Edward as the occupant of apartment no. 201, Sergeant Martinez
questioned him about the status and conditions of the cameras. Edward indicated
that the cameras did not work, and he showed Sergeant Martinez that the lines from
the cameras that were inside his apartment were not plugged in. Nevertheless,
Sergeant Martinez testified that he believed that the cameras were operational.
Edward allowed Sergeant Martinez to collect one of the cameras and search his cell
phone for an app that was linked to that camera, which was not located. Sergeant
Martinez later researched this type of camera and found that the video footage from
it needed to be stored on a physical storage device, and he shared his findings with
the detectives on the case.
Edward’s girlfriend, Sandra Pierce, lived with him in apartment no. 201. She
testified that Edward had four or five cameras mounted inside and outside of the
apartment. The two outside cameras pointed toward his vehicle in the parking lot
and down the landing toward the neighbor’s apartment. The other cameras were
mounted inside. According to Sandra, the lines that powered the cameras were
attached to a “box” inside the apartment. After the shooting, Edward called her, and

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based on their conversation, she unplugged the lines that connected the cameras to
the box and hid the box in a space under the water heater.
Because of Sergeant Martinez’s discovery, law enforcement obtained a search
warrant for apartment no. 201 where they believed the camera equipment was
located. Edward initially denied the existence of a storage device for the cameras
but later admitted that the storage device was hidden under the water heater. The
officers, Detective Mike Scott, Edward, and Sandra watched the video footage from
that night on the television in Edward’s apartment, and Edward narrated the events
as depicted on the video footage. The storage device was then seized by law
enforcement and transported to the police station where it remained until trial.
At trial, Appellant’s trial counsel objected to the admission of the surveillance
video footage that was retrieved from Edward’s camera, contending that Detective
Scott did not properly authenticate it. Outside the presence of the jury, Detective
Scott testified that: (1) the video footage was viewed by him in Edward’s presence
on a television in Edward’s apartment; (2) Sandra had also viewed the video footage
with the detectives; (3) the video footage that they viewed was time stamped; (4) the
video storage device worked properly throughout their viewing of the video; (5) the
time and date stamp on the video accurately depicted when the shooting occurred;
and (6) the video had not been altered in any way after it was seized and taken into
police custody. Despite Appellant’s objection, the trial court admitted the video into
evidence and granted Appellant a running objection each time the video was
published to the jury.
The video footage had no audio. Detective Scott testified that the video
footage showed Edward arriving at the complex at 11:07 p.m., and Appellant
entering Edward’s apartment several minutes later. Appellant, his brother, and
Edward left Edward’s apartment shortly before Destiny arrived at 11:23 p.m., and
she met them in the parking lot. Detective Scott testified that the video footage
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showed an exchange between P.J., Appellant, and Destiny that resulted in P.J.
throwing a water bottle from the second-floor landing at Appellant and Destiny.
Appellant and his sister then chased P.J., who ran to his apartment. Detective Scott
testified that when Appellant and Destiny reached the partially opened door of the
apartment, muzzle flashes can be seen. As Destiny attempted to pull Appellant
away, the door cracked open, and Appellant returned and fired at least two more
shots into the apartment. Destiny then ran toward her apartment, and Appellant left
the complex with his brother.
There was also video footage from a camera inside apartment no. 201 that
Detective Scott testified showed Sandra talking on a cell phone while looking out
the apartment window at the detectives. She then began disassembling the lines that
were connected to the hard drive, and the video ended.
II. Analysis
In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it admitted
the surveillance video footage that depicted the shooting. Specifically, Appellant
argues that the video footage was improperly admitted based on Detective Scott’s
testimony because: (1) Detective Scott did not witness the events depicted on the
video and, therefore, could not verify that the video accurately represented the scene
on that date and time; and (2) sufficient evidence was not presented that (a) the video
equipment worked properly at the time the events were recorded and (b) the video
equipment or video was neither modified nor tampered with before it was seized by
law enforcement. He also asserts that the State’s reliance on testimony that the
occupants of apartment no. 201 (Edward and Sandra) never indicated that the video
equipment had been tampered with or failed to function properly prior to its
discovery by the police placed an improper duty upon them to share such information
with law enforcement.

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We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);
Ruiz v. State, 631 S.W.3d 841, 855 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, pet. ref’d) (citing
Rhomer v. State, 569 S.W.3d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019)). This standard of
review also applies to a trial court’s threshold determination of evidence
authentication. Butler v. State, 459 S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015);
Hester v. State, 590 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
“We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence, and there
is no abuse of discretion, unless that decision lies outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement.” Barron v. State, 630 S.W.3d 392, 410 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021,
pet. ref’d) (citing Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
Furthermore, we will uphold a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, even if the trial court’s
reasoning is flawed, if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the
record and is applicable to the case. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 93 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2016); Wishert v. State, 654 S.W.3d 317, 330 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, pet.
ref’d); Dering v. State, 465 S.W.3d 668, 670 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2015, no pet.).
Authentication is a condition precedent to the admission of evidence. See
TEX. R. EVID. 901(a). To properly authenticate evidence, “the proponent must
produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent
claims it is.” Id.; see Walter v. State, 581 S.W.3d 957, 982 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2019, pet. ref’d). As reiterated by the Court of Criminal Appeals, it is within the
jury’s purview to “determine whether an item of evidence is indeed what its
proponent claims; the trial court need only make the preliminary determination that
the proponent of the item has supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury
determination that the proffered evidence is authentic.” Fowler v. State, 544 S.W.3d
844, 848–49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (quoting Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600); see
TEX. R. EVID. 104(a); Walter, 581 S.W.3d at 982. This standard has been
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characterized as a “liberal standard of admissibility.” Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849
(quoting Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600).
Evidence may be authenticated in several ways, including by the direct
testimony of a witness with personal knowledge that the evidence is what it is
claimed to be, the comparison of such evidence with other authenticated evidence,
or by circumstantial evidence. TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(1), (3), (4); Tienda v. State, 358
S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Authenticity may also be established with
evidence of “[d]istinctive [c]haracteristics and the [l]ike,” which include “[t]he
appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics
of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
“Video recordings without audio are treated as photographs and are properly
authenticated when it can be proved that the images accurately represent the scene
in question and are relevant to a disputed issue.” Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849 (citing
Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212, 222 (Tex. Crim App. 1988) (concluding that the
rules relating to the admission of ordinary photographs applied to an exhibit that was
only a visual portion of a videotape)); see also Garcia v. State, No. 11-16-00347-
CR, 2018 WL 6928986, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 31, 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (citing Gordon v. State, 784 S.W.2d 410, 411
(Tex. Crim. App. 1990)).
Appellant contends that Detective Scott could not properly authenticate the
video footage because he was not present when the events depicted on the video
occurred. As previously noted, the critical inquiry for the authentication of video
recordings that do not have accompanying audio is whether there is sufficient
evidence to show that the video images accurately represent the scene in question.
Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849 (citing Huffman, 746 S.W.2d at 222). In this regard, “the
only identification or authentication required is that the offered evidence properly
represent the person, object or scene in question.” Huffman, 746 S.W.2d at 222.
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Thus, to authenticate the video evidence offered by the State, it was not necessary
for Detective Scott to have personally witnessed the events that were depicted in the
video, and the absence of accompanying audio does not taint or invalidate his
testimony provided he confirmed that the images in the video footage accurately
depicted the scene that he observed, which it did. Further, Appellant and his sisters
testified to and confirmed the events as depicted in the video.
Appellant also contends that Detective Scott’s authentication testimony was
flawed because he could not attest that the video equipment worked properly at the
time the video recording was made or that the video equipment had not been
tampered with prior to its discovery by law enforcement. In response to Appellant’s
assertions, the State relies on Fowler, where the court found that evidence from a
similar circumstance to be properly authenticated. The State also argues that
additional circumstances were shown to authenticate the video footage beyond those
present in Fowler. We agree.
In Fowler, the trial court found that the State had adduced sufficient evidence,
through the testimony of an officer, to support the authenticity of security camera
footage obtained from a store. Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 847. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court’s judgment and held that the video was not properly
authenticated by the officer’s testimony alone. Id. at 849. The court of appeals
concluded that the State failed to adduce evidence that the video equipment and the
date and time stamp functioned properly on the date of capture, or that the video
accurately portrayed the events as they occurred that day. Id. The Court of Criminal
Appeals disagreed and held that, although the most common method to authenticate
evidence is through a witness with personal knowledge, it is not the only acceptable
way to do so. Id.
As we have said, Rule 901 provides that such evidence can be supported by
“[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
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characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” TEX. R.
EVID. 901(b)(4). The court in Fowler relied on additional circumstantial evidence
to support the authenticity argument advanced by the State, including:
• the officer’s in-person request for the manager of the Family Dollar store to
retrieve the surveillance video for a certain date and time;
• the distinctive characteristic of a date and time stamp on the video;
• the date and time on the video corresponded to the date and time on the
receipt that was found within three feet of the stolen ATV;
• the video retrieved by the store manager showed that Fowler was at the store
on the date and the time that the items listed on the receipt were purchased
and that were found near the stolen ATV.
Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849–50. Because of these circumstances, the court held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the video footage, even
in the absence of authentication testimony from additional witnesses, because such
a decision was within the zone of reasonable disagreement. Id. at 850.
Here, Detective Scott testified that (1) the video equipment and the video itself
functioned properly when it was first discovered in Edward’s apartment, and
(2) neither the video nor the video equipment had been tampered with after they
were seized by law enforcement. Detective Scott also referred to circumstantial
evidence to support the authenticity of the video. He testified that once Edward
agreed to produce the video storage device, the detectives viewed the video footage
with Edward and Sandra on a television in their apartment, and Edward narrated the
events as shown on the video footage as they watched it in his apartment. 1
This circumstantial evidence, coupled with Detective Scott’s direct testimony
concerning the video footage, the video equipment, and its condition from the time
they were discovered until trial, supports the trial court’s reasonable decision to

1
Edward did not testify about the video’s authenticity as he had passed away prior to the time of
trial.
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admit the surveillance video. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849–50. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Detective Scott’s testimony
sufficiently authenticated the video footage.
Appellant further contends that the State failed to prove that the video and the
video equipment were not tampered with or altered prior to being seized and taken
into police custody. The possibility that Appellant may be “the victim of some
elaborate and ongoing conspiracy” by “unknown malefactors” is a question for the
jury. Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 645–46. Detective Scott’s testimony was sufficient to
make a prima facie showing of authenticity, and the jury had the discretion to
consider the credibility of the video evidence after the trial court made its threshold
determination of authenticity. Id. Accordingly, Appellant’s contention that the trial
court abused its discretion in finding sufficient evidence to support authenticity is
unavailing.
Finally, Appellant argues that the State’s reliance on Detective Scott’s
testimony that neither Edward nor Sandra indicated that the equipment failed to
function properly suggests they had an affirmative duty to notify law enforcement
of that fact. He asserts that such a duty would violate their Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination because of their conversation with law enforcement
officers regarding the possible consequences of tampering with evidence. While a
person cannot be compelled to provide information that may be personally
incriminating,2 no such duty was placed on Edward or Sandra here. See Salinas v.
State, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (holding that in pre-arrest, pre-
Miranda circumstances, a suspect’s interaction with police officers is not
compelled). Additionally, the trial court was free to consider the additional

2
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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circumstantial evidence provided in its threshold authenticity determination. See
TEX. R. EVID. 901(b)(4); see also Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849–50.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
the surveillance video because its threshold determination of authenticity fell within
the zone of reasonable disagreement. See Blake v. State, No. 11-23-00165-CR, 2024
WL 3607930, at *4–6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 1, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op., not
designated for publication) (The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted authenticated video clips captured by a neighboring home surveillance
camera that showed certain events connected to a murder and aggravated robbery.).
Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
III. This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

W. STACY TROTTER
JUSTICE

February 5, 2026
Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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