In the Interest of A.M, L.M., A.M., M.M., Children v. the State of Texas

Opinion filed February 27, 2026

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals
__________

No. 11-25-00253-CV
__________

IN THE INTEREST OF A.M., L.M., AND M.M., CHILDREN

On Appeal from the 326th District Court
Taylor County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 11315-CX

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated appeal from an order in which the trial court, based upon
the jury’s verdict, terminated the parental rights of the mother and father of A.M.,
L.M., and M.M. 1 Both parents appealed. On appeal, each parent challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding that the termination of their
parental rights is in the children’s best interest—the mother contests the best interest
finding only as to A.M., while the father raises the issue as to all three children. See

1
We use initials to refer to the children. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2) (West Supp. 2024).2 We affirm the trial
court’s order.
Termination Findings and Standards
The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence. FAM. § 161.001(b). To terminate one’s parental rights, it must be shown
by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has committed one of the acts listed
in Section 161.001(b)(1), and that termination is in the best interest of the children.
Id. Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will
produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of
the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007 (West 2019).
In this case, the jury and the trial court found that clear and convincing
evidence established that the parents: (1) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed
the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endangered the physical
or emotional well-being of the children; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed
the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered the physical or
emotional well-being of the children; (3) were convicted of abandoning or
endangering a child under Section 22.041 of the Texas Penal Code and thus held
criminally responsible for the serious injury of a child; and (4) knowingly engaged
in criminal conduct that resulted in their convictions, imprisonment, and inability to
care for the children for not less than two years from the date of filing the petition.
See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (L)(x), (Q); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.041 (West
Supp. 2025). The jury and the trial court further found that termination of each
parent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(2).

2
We note that the legislature has amended Section 161.001(b)(1), which resulted in the renumbering
of several provisions. See Act of May 16, 2025, 89th Leg. R.S. ch. 211, § 2, 2025 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
573, 574–75. The amendments only apply to suits affecting the parent-child relationship that are pending
on or after the effective date of the amendments; thus, we apply the law in effect at the time the suit was
pending below. Id.§ 3.

2
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must decide whether “a
reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding
was true.” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 741 (Tex. 2022). Cognizant of the required
appellate deference to the factfinder, “we look at all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor
of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a
reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, we may not disregard ‘undisputed
facts that do not support the finding,’” and the factfinder is “the sole arbiter of the
witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.” Id. (first quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
266 (Tex. 2002); and then quoting In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 312 (Tex. 2021)).
As such, when considering the credibility of the evidence presented, we may not
substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 316.
In assessing whether the evidence is factually sufficient, we weigh the
disputed evidence that is contrary to the finding against all the evidence that favors
the finding. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We give due deference
to the finding and determine whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could
reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations against
the parent. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 25–26 (Tex. 2002); In re L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d 510, 512 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2023, pet. denied).
With respect to the best interest of the children, no unique set of factors need
be proved. L.C.C., 667 S.W.3d at 513; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). Further, the best interest determination does not
restrict the proof to any specific factor or factors. In re J.S., 687 S.W.3d 541, 547
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2024, no pet.). However, courts may use the non-exhaustive

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Holley factors to shape their analysis. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72
(Tex. 1976). These include, but are not limited to: (1) the desires of the children;
(2) the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future; (3) the
emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future; (4) the parental
abilities of the individuals seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist these
individuals to promote the best interest of the children; (6) the plans for the children
by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home
or proposed placement; (8) the acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the
existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and (9) any excuse for the acts
or omissions of the parent. Id.
To support a best interest finding, the Texas Department of Family and
Protective Services (the Department) is not required to prove each Holley factor; in
some circumstances, evidence of the presence of only one factor will suffice. C.H.,
89 S.W.3d at 27; In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 473 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014,
no pet.). And the same evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for
termination may also constitute sufficient, probative evidence illustrating that
termination is in the children’s best interest. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; C.J.O., 325
S.W.3d at 266.
The absence of evidence of some Holley considerations does not preclude the
factfinder from reasonably inferring or forming a strong conviction or belief that
termination is in the children’s best interest, particularly if the evidence indicates
that the parent-child relationship and the parent’s conduct has endangered the safety
and well-being of the children. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. This is so because the best
interest analysis evaluates the best interest of the children, not the parent. J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 548; In re E.C.R., 638 S.W.3d 755, 767 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2021, pet.

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denied) (citing In re B.C.S., 479 S.W.3d 918, 927 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no
pet.)).
In this regard, the factfinder may measure a parent’s future conduct by his or
her past conduct in determining whether termination of a parent’s parental rights is
in the children’s best interest. J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 548; In re Z.R.M., 665 S.W.3d
825, 829 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, pet. denied); In re D.S., 333 S.W.3d 379,
384 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.). The factfinder may infer that a parent’s
past conduct that endangered the safety and well-being of the children may recur in
the future if the children are returned to the possession of the parent. In re J.D., 436
S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.); May v. May, 829
S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1992, writ denied).
Additionally, the factfinder may infer from a parent’s past inability to meet the
children’s physical and emotional needs an inability or unwillingness by the parent
to meet the children’s physical and emotional needs in the future. J.D., 436 S.W.3d
at 118; see also In re A.S., No. 11-16-00293-CV, 2017 WL 1275614, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Mar. 31, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The Evidence Presented at Trial
M.M. was born on January 6, 2024. Eleven-year-old A.M., nine-year-old
L.M., the parents, and the father’s other child were living in a motel room.3 On
January 25, 2024, when M.M. was nineteen days old, the parents were pulled over
in a vehicle with two other adults and M.M. In the vehicle, law enforcement
observed fentanyl, burnt foil, and straws used to smoke the fentanyl. Following the
parents’ arrest for possession of a controlled substance and paraphernalia, law
enforcement notified the Department. Law enforcement searched the family’s motel
room and found more fentanyl, straws, and burnt foil.

The father had a son with another woman in 2018. This child was living with the family when the
3

Department intervened. That child was not a subject of the underlying termination proceeding.

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Department Investigator Kaitlyn Bristow observed that A.M. and L.M. were
“overly dirty” and it appeared that their clothes had not been washed. She was also
alarmed when she noticed that M.M. “would try to breathe really hard,” then “would
stop breathing and start gasping for air again.” Bristow noted that “[i]t was almost
like she had sleep apnea.” Because both parents were arrested and had no safe
alternative caregivers, the Department took custody of the children. See FAM.
§ 262.104 (authorizing the Department to take possession of a child without a court
order when the parent’s current use of a controlled substance “constitutes an
immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the child”).
L.M. and M.M. were placed in a foster home in Breckenridge and remained
there while the case was pending. The Department had difficulty finding a foster
home for A.M. due to his “significant behaviors,” including verbal and physical
aggression. A.M. spent a month in a shelter before he was moved to a group home
in Brownwood. At the group home, he had mentors, counselors, and case managers
to provide treatment plans specifically tailored to his needs.
The mother admitted to police on January 25 and on February 12 that she blew
fentanyl smoke into M.M.’s face. The parents were charged by four-count
indictments—one count for each child in their care at the time—with abandoning or
endangering a child. See PENAL § 22.041. Specifically, the indictments alleged that
the parents engaged in conduct that placed each child in imminent danger “by
smoking [f]entanyl or permitting the smoking of [f]entanyl in the child’s presence.”
The parents remained confined in the Taylor County Jail until they were
convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment—the mother pleaded guilty in
May 2024 and was sentenced to four years imprisonment. The father likewise
pleaded guilty to endangering a child in September 2024, and was sentenced to
confinement in a state jail facility for twelve months. In February 2025, the father

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was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Abilene
Division, of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute fentanyl.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846. He was sentenced to imprisonment for ninety-six months
in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, to run concurrently with his conviction for child
endangerment.
When Bristow visited the parents in jail, the father denied the allegations and
refused to continue speaking with her without a lawyer present. The mother likewise
denied blowing fentanyl smoke into M.M.’s face; she explained that although she
smoked fentanyl while holding M.M. in a baby carrier, she covered M.M. with a
cloth and “didn’t think the fentanyl smoke would get to [M.M.] through that.”
The children were drug tested soon after removal; L.M.’s results were
negative, but A.M. and M.M. tested positive for methamphetamine. M.M. also
tested positive for fentanyl. When the parents were drug tested in February 2024,
the father tested positive for methamphetamine and fentanyl, and the mother tested
positive for fentanyl. The mother told Bristow that when she and the father smoked
fentanyl, they would send A.M. and L.M. into the adjoining motel room where the
children’s paternal grandmother lived. She attributed the children’s
methamphetamine exposure to the father’s use and speculated that M.M. tested
positive due to skin-to-skin contact with the father. According to the mother, A.M.
tested positive because he “was always with [the father].”
The final termination trial commenced before a jury on July 8, 2025, and
concluded on July 11. The mother was brought from prison to appear at trial, and
the father participated remotely from the federal prison facility in Bastrop. The
Department presented the testimony of Bristow, permanency case managers Justin
Uphill and Ethan Pfrimmer, L.M.’s and M.M.’s foster father, and Linda Gabriel, the

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children’s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA). The mother testified as the
Department’s sixth and final witness.
The mother told the jury that she and the father have had an “on and off”
relationship for nearly fifteen years, and that his infidelity and physical abuse began
around 2014. She recounted an incident when she was nine months pregnant with
M.M.; the father thought the mother stole his pills, so he hit her on the head, choked
her against the wall, then threw her against the toilet. It was only when L.M. came
into the motel room and begged the father to stop that he did so.
The mother surmised that the father’s fentanyl use started in 2019 while he
was living with his other child’s mother. The mother began using fentanyl in late
2020 or early 2021 when the father “introduced [her] to it.” According to the mother,
the father “wasn’t home a lot of the time[],” so she had no knowledge that he was
dealing fentanyl. She stopped using fentanyl for approximately six months upon
learning that she was pregnant with M.M., but resumed after giving birth because
she “was in a lot of pain.”
When questioned about the events leading up to her arrest, the mother testified
that the father “had one fentanyl pill on him and there was a bag of fentanyl that was
on top of the baby’s diaper bag.” She and the father had smoked fentanyl in their
motel room earlier that day—they typically smoked “[a] few times a day . . . in the
bathroom.” Because she was under the influence when she was arrested, the mother
purportedly did not recall admitting that she and the father blew fentanyl smoke into
M.M.’s face. Even when confronted with her recorded statements to police, she
denied the allegations.
The mother testified that neither she nor the father left drugs in areas
accessible to the children. And she claimed that neither she nor the father used drugs
in front of the children, who “were always in the other room with their grandmother”

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while they smoked fentanyl in the bathroom. The children’s paternal grandmother,
a retired nurse who lived in the adjoining room, had been paying for the family to
live at the motel. The mother had not been employed in the five months leading up
to her arrest but previously worked in the fast-food industry. The father also held
various jobs in fast food restaurants as well as construction.
The jury heard about each child’s struggles and specialized needs after
removal. M.M. “had very bad acid reflux” due to a dairy allergy, and her
developmental delays required occupational therapy. When she was about a month
old, her foster parents took her to the hospital because “[s]he sounded very, very
congested. . . . Like she couldn’t breath[e].” She was hospitalized for a week after
being diagnosed with failure to thrive. The foster parents switched M.M.’s baby
formula and she was prescribed medication by a gastroenterologist. For the next
three months, the foster mother stayed awake at night to monitor M.M.’s breathing
while she slept. By the time of trial, M.M. no longer needed her medication, was
walking, and was “starting to say a few words.”
The foster parents proactively addressed L.M.’s needs as well. They took
L.M. to Cook Children’s Medical Center to discuss treatment options for her
physical abnormality in her lower arms that limits the rotation of her hands. They
learned that L.M. had been evaluated eight years prior, but the parents missed all
follow-up appointments for treatment. L.M. was also diagnosed with high
functioning autism, ADHD, depression, anxiety disorder, and a possible learning
disability. Since participating in group therapy, individual therapy, and behavioral
therapy, L.M.’s grades, social skills, and self-esteem improved. Because L.M. had
“improved dramatically in school,” it was no longer believed that she has a learning
disability. The foster father recalled how timid and withdrawn L.M. was when she
arrived, and how his wife spent two hours combing the knots out of L.M.’s hair.

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Uphill testified that both M.M. and L.M. appear “very comfortable” in their
foster home and have bonded with their foster parents, who hope to adopt them. The
girls have their own rooms, toys, activities, and love the dogs in the home. L.M. told
Uphill that she feels safe there, “like she can be herself” and “can do things that she
wants to do.” Similarly, Pfrimmer told the jury that L.M. has “been very social and
very comfortable in the home,” and is “very much attached” to her foster parents.
M.M. was also described as being “very connected” and “extremely close” to her
foster parents. Gabriel observed that M.M.’s foster mother “is her person.” The
mother agreed that the girls should remain in their foster home because “they are the
only parents that [M.M.] knows,” and “[t]hey have had a good life that [she] could
not provide to them.”
A.M., who was twelve years old at the time of trial, also had multiple
diagnoses when he came into the Department’s care. According to Uphill, the
services he received in the group home “seemed to be helping” him. “[H]e started
to calm down” and regulate his mood with the counseling, mental health
management, and medication management.
However, he regressed when he moved in with his maternal grandmother,
C.R., in November 2024. “He was very defiant” and refused to go to school. C.R.
was also worried about A.M.’s depression and anger, but he refused to engage with
his psychiatrist or therapist. C.R. told Uphill that “she couldn’t handle [A.M.’s]
behaviors,” including punching walls during anger outbursts, and she “actually
became fearful of him.”
In March 2025, A.M. moved into a residential treatment center where he
attended school and received individual therapy, group therapy, and psychiatric
services such as medication management. He called C.R. from treatment at least
once a week, and they began family therapy sessions with the goal of him returning

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to her care. It was also the Department’s goal to place A.M. with C.R. permanently
once his emotional regulation, communication, and school attendance improved.
C.R. testified that A.M. “is doing really good right now” and “is very respectful.”
She agreed that A.M. thrives with structure and does very poorly without it.
Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court issued its order terminating each
parent’s parental rights to the children under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (L)(x),
and (Q), and found termination to be in the best interest of the children. See FAM.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (L)(x), (Q), (b)(2). This appeal followed.
Best Interest of the Children
Each parent challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury’s finding that termination of his or her parental rights is in the best
interest of the children. While the father challenges the jury’s best interest findings
as to all three children, the mother does not dispute that terminating her parental
rights to L.M. and M.M. was in their best interest. We will address the parents’
appellate issues together.
“‘[B]est interest’ is a term of art encompassing a much broader, facts-and-
circumstances based evaluation that is accorded significant discretion.” In re Lee,
411 S.W.3d 445, 460 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72). We
reiterate that the trial court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the witnesses’
credibility. J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 312. We are not at liberty to disturb the
determinations of the factfinder so long as those determinations are not
unreasonable. Id. at 311–12; In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). Giving
the requisite due deference to the trier of fact, we hold that, based on the evidence in
the record and the application of the Holley factors, the jury could have formed a
firm belief or conviction that termination of each parent’s parental rights was in the
best interest of the children. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.

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Evidence of each Holley factor is not required to support a best interest
finding. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 366 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
pet. denied); In re S.O., No. 05-22-01019-CV, 2023 WL 2237084, at *11 (Tex.
App.—Dallas Feb. 27, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). In other words, the absence of
evidence regarding some of these factors does not preclude a best interest finding,
“particularly if [the] undisputed evidence shows the parental relationship
endangered the child’s safety.” In re N.T., 474 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2015, no pet.) (quoting In re A.E., No. 05-14-01340-CV, 2015 WL 1184179, at *6
(Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2015, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). Consequently,
“evidence relating to one single factor may be adequate in a particular situation to
support a finding that termination is in the best interest[] of the child.” J.S., 687
S.W.3d at 552 (quoting In re K.S., 420 S.W.3d 852, 855 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2014, no pet.)). And evidence that is relevant to Section 161.001(b)(1) termination
grounds may be probative of a child’s best interest. See In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d
239, 249–50 (Tex. 2013) (citing C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28).
Neither parent challenges the jury’s and the trial court’s findings that they
endangered the children as set forth in Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Likewise
uncontested on appeal are the jury’s and the trial court’s findings that each parent
was convicted of abandoning or endangering a child under Section 22.041 of the
Penal Code, and that their criminal convictions resulted in their imprisonment and
inability to care for the children for at least two years from when the Department
initiated suit. See FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(L)(x), (Q). So long as the evidence supports
those findings, they are valid grounds for termination. See E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at
249–50; In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 552. In
this regard, the evidence that each parent endangered their children and engaged in
criminal conduct that resulted in their incarceration could be considered by the

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factfinder in determining whether termination was in the children’s best interest. See
E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249–50; In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.
The record demonstrates that the parents’ endangering conduct was
attributable to their daily drug use, which “implicates most of the Holley factors.”
See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 607 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet.
denied). The mother attested to smoking fentanyl multiple times a day while the
father used methamphetamine in addition to using and distributing fentanyl. A
parent’s continuing pattern of drug use can support a best interest finding due to the
“attendant risks to employment, housing, and prolonged absence from the children.”
In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279–281 (Tex. 2024); see also In re J.A.R., 696
S.W.3d 245, 257 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied) (The parents’
years of drug use supported the trial court’s best interest finding.). Here, such risks
were a reality—the parents’ drug use and drug-related criminal activity directly
resulted in their incarceration and the emergency removal of the children, A.M. and
M.M. tested positive for the same illegal drugs used by the parents, and the family
had been living in a motel room for over a year.
At trial, the mother accepted responsibility for exposing the children to drugs,
but attributed the children’s methamphetamine exposure to the father’s use. Based
on the parents’ endangering conduct, they were indicted for and convicted of
abandoning or endangering a child. See PENAL § 22.041. And the father, a convicted
fentanyl dealer, had served about five months of his ninety-six-month sentence by
July 2025. Any criminal activity that exposes the parent to the potential for
incarceration is relevant to the best interest analysis. In re S.H., No. 01-22-00255-
CV, 2022 WL 17254956, at *18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 29, 2022,
pet. denied) (mem. op.). The mother “guess[ed]” that her projected release date was
October 16, 2025. She was denied parole after her first hearing and had just become

13
eligible again in June 2025. The jury was free to disregard the mother’s proffered
release date as “barely more than conjecture.” In re C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d 696,
699 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Tex. 2006)).
While the parents were incarcerated for the one and one-half years that the
underlying suit was pending, the father sent one letter to the children, and the mother
sent two. See J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at 314 & n.37, 317–18 (considering evidence of
the father’s incarceration and resulting absence, his history of dealing drugs, “his
choice not to monitor [the child’s] safety during his incarceration[,] and his minimal
effort to contact [the child]”); C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28. The father introduced no
evidence of his efforts to arrange for the children’s care during his incarceration, and
there was no indication that the parents made any monetary contributions to assist
with the children’s care. See C.L.E.E.G., 639 S.W.3d at 700. Even before the
parents’ arrest, the father’s stepmother had been financially supporting the family.
Consequently, the parents’ incarceration resulted in their prolonged absence from
the children’s lives and inability to care for the children. See In re B.D.A., 546
S.W.3d 346, 361, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied) (evidence
of father’s lengthy imprisonment and lack of efforts to provide a safe environment
for his children during his incarceration supported best interest finding).
The parents further demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to meet the
children’s medical needs and exposed them to domestic violence in the home. See
In re O.E.R., 573 S.W.3d 896, 905 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.) (“Physical
violence in the home leads to an unstable and unpredictable environment for
children.”). For example, the parents failed to seek medical attention for M.M.’s
breathing and acid reflux that Bristow and the foster parents noticed after a short
period. Moreover, L.M. could have been receiving treatment for her physical
abnormality eight years earlier had the parents attended her scheduled appointments.

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In fact, the parents had just missed a medical appointment for M.M. when they were
pulled over and arrested in January 2024. The record therefore discloses several
circumstances from which the jury may have reasonably discerned a “pattern of
conduct that is inimical to the very idea of child-rearing.” J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d at
316 (quoting C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28). Accordingly, the parents’ acts and omissions
indicated that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, which
supports the best interest finding. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72.
Given the child-centered focus of the best interest inquiry, the jury could
properly afford great weight to the evidence of the children’s improvement since
removal. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742. Several witnesses agreed that it would be
detrimental to the physical and emotional well-being of L.M. and M.M. to uproot
them from their current placement. Even the mother opined that it was in L.M.’s
and M.M.’s best interest for her parental rights to be terminated so they can be
adopted by their foster parents. And although A.M. was in residential treatment at
the time of trial, he and C.R. had been consistently communicating and engaged in
family therapy so that A.M. could return to C.R.’s home. Yet, despite the children’s
desires and bonds that they formed with their respective caregivers, the father
proposed placing all three children in a home together in a foster home in Lancaster,
Texas. It is clear on this record that removing the children from their safe living
situations and leaving them in a state of impermanence and uncertainty would be
indisputably detrimental to their physical and emotional well-being. See Lehman v.
Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513–14 (1982) (“There is
little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty over
whether he is to remain . . . under the care of his parents or foster parents, especially
when such uncertainty is prolonged.”). The children’s close bonds with their current

15
caregivers and the stability of their placements proposed by the Department support
the jury’s and the trial court’s best interest findings. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372.
The mother acknowledges A.M.’s desire to remain in his grandmother’s care,
but argues on appeal that “there is no indication” that he was in favor of terminating
her parental rights. While we do not ignore a child’s desires, it is only one factor
that we consider in the overall best interest analysis. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372;
J.S., 687 S.W.3d at 553; cf. In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 732 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“A child’s love for a parent cannot be
ignored as a reflection of the parent’s ability to provide for the child’s emotional
needs.”). Although a child’s desires or wishes for residing with a parent is an
important consideration in determining the best interest of the child, “it cannot
override or outweigh evidence of danger to the child.” F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d at
732. Moreover, a child’s expressed preference is not binding on the trier of fact;
rather, it is only one factor, among others, that can be considered in determining a
child’s best interest. FAM. § 153.009(c) (West 2014); see Hart v. Kozik, 242 S.W.3d
102, 109 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2007, no pet.) (citing In re Marriage of Stockett, 570
S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1978, no writ)). Here, the Department’s
goal aligned with A.M.’s wishes to live with C.R. Consequently, A.M.’s unknown
desire on the issue of the termination of his parents’ parental rights does not
undermine the evidence supporting the jury’s best interest findings.
Equally unavailing is the mother’s claim that the Department has no plan for
A.M. As set forth above, the Department’s primary plan is for A.M. to live with
C.R., which would benefit his physical and emotional well-being. In the event that
C.R. opts not to care for A.M., the Department’s alternative plan is to find an
adoptive home for A.M. As Pfrimmer explained, unrelated adoption first requires
the termination of the parents’ rights to the children. With respect to A.M., Pfrimmer

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opined that termination of his parents’ parental rights was in his best interest because
he could then find “a place where he can stay permanently . . . where he knows for
sure that he can be loved” and “won’t be moved again.” The mother, on the other
hand, would rather leave “open the possibility” to eventually assist C.R. in caring
for A.M., “assuming that she is clean and stable.” The jury was permitted to
conclude that the mother’s desired outcome would lead to impermanence and
uncertainty for A.M. and would therefore not be in his best interest. See J.A.R., 696
S.W.3d at 257 (“Stability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of
children.”). The father, like the mother, failed to demonstrate the ability to secure
and maintain a safe, stable, drug-free home environment or achieve the permanence
and stability that the children need to thrive. Such evidence permits the rational
inference that relinquishing the children to either parent’s care would again subject
them to a life of uncertainty and instability. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 742
(considering the parent’s unstable and uncertain living situation in upholding the
trial court’s best interest finding); In re E.M., No. 11-24-00310-CV, 2025 WL
1240792, at *10 (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 30, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing In
re R.W., 129 S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)).
Upon considering the evidence as it relates to each parent’s actions and
inactions, the emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future,
the emotional and physical needs of the children now and in the future, each parent’s
lack of parental abilities and stability, and each parent’s criminal conduct and drug
use, we hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s
and the trial court’s findings that termination of each parent’s parental rights is in
the best interest of the children. See J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741; Holley, 544 S.W.2d
at 371–72.
Accordingly, we overrule each parent’s issues on appeal.

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This Court’s Ruling
We affirm the order of the trial court.

JOHN M. BAILEY
CHIEF JUSTICE

February 27, 2026
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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