Jasmine Truvae Hart v. the State of Texas

NO. 12-24-00001-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

JASMINE TRUVAE HART, § APPEAL FROM THE 114TH
APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Jasmine Truvae Hart appeals following the revocation of her deferred adjudication
community supervision. In one issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in assessing the
time-payment fee as a court cost against her. We modify the trial court’s judgment and bill of costs
to remove the time payment fee and affirm the judgment as modified.

BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged with theft of service and pleaded “guilty.” The trial court deferred
finding appellant “guilty” and placed her on community supervision for five years.
Thereafter, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s community supervision and
proceed to final adjudication of guilt, arguing that Appellant violated certain terms and conditions
of her community supervision. At the hearing on the State’s motion, Appellant pleaded “not true”
to the allegations in the State’s motion. Following the presentation of evidence and argument of
counsel, the trial court found the allegations in the State’s motion to be “true,” revoked Appellant’s
community supervision, adjudicated her “guilty” as originally charged, and sentenced her to
imprisonment for twenty months. This appeal followed.
TIME-PAYMENT FEE
In her sole issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by prematurely assessing the
fifteen-dollar time-payment fee in its judgment.
Standard of Review and Governing Law
On appeal, courts review the assessment of court costs to determine whether a basis exists
for the cost, rather than whether there was sufficient evidence offered at trial to prove each cost.
Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see also Armstrong v. State,
340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (court costs are not part of a sentence, but “a
nonpunitive recoupment of the costs of judicial resources expended in connection with the trial of
the case”). Court costs may not be assessed against a criminal defendant when such costs are not
provided expressly by law. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 103.002 (West 2018). When a
trial court improperly includes amounts in assessed court costs, the appropriate appellate remedy
is to reform the judgment to delete the improperly assessed fees. Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250,
252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Bechtel v. State, No. 12-23-00003-CR, 2023 WL 3910362, at *1
(Tex. App.–Tyler June 8, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a person convicted of a felony or
misdemeanor pay a reimbursement fee of $15.00 if the person fails to pay any part of a fine, court
costs, or restitution within thirty days after the court enters the judgment ordering such payment.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 102.030 (West Supp. 2023). However, in Dulin v. State,
620 S.W.3d 129 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that a
pending appeal suspends a defendant’s duty to pay fines, court costs, and restitution, which duty
is triggered only by a final judgment. Dulin, 620 S.W.3d at 133. Thus, the pendency of an appeal
“stops the clock” for purposes of the time payment fee. Id. A trial court’s assessment of a time
payment fee before the appellate mandate issues, therefore, lacks any basis and is premature. See
id.; Pruitt v. State, 646 S.W.3d 879, 886 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2022, no pet.).
Discussion
In the instant case, the Smith County District Clerk’s itemized bill of costs, which was
certified on January 10, 2024, included a $15.00 time-payment fee as part of the $266.50 in total
court costs. Appellant’s timely notice of this appeal suspended her duty to pay the court costs
imposed in the judgment adjudicating her guilt and stopped the figurative clock on the thirty-day
payment period, the expiration of which would trigger the time-payment fee. See Dulin, 620

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S.W.3d at 133. These appellate proceedings still are pending, and no court of appeals has issued a
mandate.
This Court has the authority to modify incorrect judgments when it has available the
information necessary to do so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–
28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Bechtel, 2023 WL 3910362, at *2. Because the imposition of the time
payment fee is premature until thirty days after the resolution of an appeal, the time payment fee
assessed herein must be struck. Appellant’s sole issue is sustained.

DISPOSITION
Having sustained Appellant’s sole issue, we modify both the bill of costs and the trial
court’s judgment to remove the time-payment fee. Our ruling is without prejudice to future
assessment of the time-payment fee if, more than thirty days after our mandate issues, Appellant
fails completely to pay any fine, court costs, or restitution she owes. We affirm the trial court’s
judgment as modified.

GREG NEELEY
Justice

Opinion delivered July 31, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

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COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

JULY 31, 2024

NO. 12-24-00001-CR

JASMINE TRUVAE HART,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 114th District Court
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 114-1450-19)

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the appellate record and the briefs filed herein, and
the same being inspected, it is the opinion of the Court that the judgment and bill of costs of the
trial court below should be modified.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment and bill of
costs of the court below be modified to remove the time payment fee; in all other respects the
judgment of the trial court is affirmed; and that this decision be certified to the court below for
observance.

Greg Neeley, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.