Franklin Lovon Harris v. the State of Texas

NO. 12-24-00072-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

FRANKLIN LOVON HARRIS, § APPEAL FROM THE 369TH
APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § ANDERSON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Franklin Lovon Harris appeals his conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child under
the age of fourteen. In his sole issue, he contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
Appellant was indicted for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age
of fourteen. 1 Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress his interview on the ground that it was
involuntarily given because he suffered from extremely low intelligence. He based this argument
on the fact that he was later found to be incompetent to stand trial. Appellant’s competency to
stand trial was thereafter restored.
After a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. Appellant
subsequently pleaded “not guilty,” and the matter proceeded to a jury trial, who found him “guilty”
of the offense. After a hearing on punishment, the jury sentenced Appellant to fifty years of
imprisonment. This appeal followed.

1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.02 (West Supp. 2023).
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole issue, Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
his motion to suppress his confession, because his consent to make the statement was involuntary.
Standard of review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of
review. Hubert v. State, 312 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); Carmouche v. State, 10
S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to
suppress is generally reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Shepherd v. State, 273
S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). We give almost total deference to a trial court’s
determination of historical facts, especially if those determinations turn on witness credibility or
demeanor, and we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to facts not based on an
evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). When ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court is the exclusive trier of fact
and judge of the witnesses’ credibility. See Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). Accordingly, a trial court may choose to believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s
testimony. See State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The reviewing appellate court affords the same amount of deference to a trial court’s ruling
on mixed questions of law and fact if the resolution of those questions turns on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The
prevailing party is entitled to “the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 465
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). If the trial judge’s decision is correct under any theory of law applicable
to the case, the decision will be sustained. Ross, 32 S.W.3d at 855–56.
Applicable Law
The State has the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his rights. Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Voluntariness is determined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. See Griffin v. State, 765 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The totality of
the circumstances includes the accused’s experience, background, and conduct. Id. It also includes
the characteristics of the accused. Davis v. State, 313 S.W.3d 317, 337 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225–26, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854

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(1973)). Consistent with our standard of review in motion to suppress cases generally, we review
the trial court’s determination of alleged Miranda violations almost wholly deferring to the trial
court on questions of historical fact and credibility, but reviewing de novo all questions of law and
mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility determinations. Id.
There are three theories by which a defendant may claim that his statement was involuntary
and thus may not be used against him: (1) failure to comply with Article 38.22; (2) failure to
comply with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); or (3) a
violation of due process. See Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169–72 (Tex. Crim. App.
2008). Under the second and third theories, a confession is involuntary “only when there is police
overreaching.” Id. at 169. Absent police misconduct causally related to the confession, there is
no deprivation of due process of law by a state actor and therefore no violation of the Due Process
Clause. Id. at 170. Likewise, Miranda protects against government coercion to surrender Fifth
Amendment rights. Id. Thus, due process claims and Miranda claims of involuntariness involve
an objective assessment of police behavior. Id. at 171.
Claims of involuntariness based on the defendant’s state of mind are “to be resolved by
state laws governing the admission of evidence.” Id. at 171. That state law in Texas is the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.22, the Texas Confession Statute. Id. Although claims of
involuntariness under the Texas Confession Statute may be based on police overreaching, they
may also be based on the defendant’s state of mind. Id. at 172. Whether a suspect voluntarily
waived the rights set out in Article 38.22 Sections (2) or (3) does not turn solely on the behavior
of the police. Id. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that youth, intoxication,
intellectual disability, and other disabilities are usually not enough, by themselves, to render a
statement inadmissible under Article 38.22, but they are factors for the factfinder to consider. Id.
at 173.
The voluntariness of a confession given by a mentally ill person is assessed under the same
standard of review, the totality of the circumstances, as that used for a person who is not mentally
ill. Delao v. State, 235 S.W.3d 235, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Whether the accused is mentally
ill is but one characteristic among many to consider when evaluating the voluntariness of a
confession. Id. at 239–40 (stating that juveniles and individuals suffering from mental retardation
or mental illness share many of the same characteristics). A confession is involuntary if the totality
of the circumstances demonstrates that the confessor did not make the decision to confess of his

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own free will. Vasquez v. State, 179 S.W.3d 646, 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005), aff’d, 225 S.W.3d
541 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Discussion
Appellant’s claim of involuntariness is based on his alleged state of mind at the time he
waived his rights and made the statement, which consequently falls under Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 38.22. See Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 171.
The issuance of the Miranda warnings and Appellant’s confession were conducted on
August 29, 2019. Dr. Timothy Proctor completed a report concerning Appellant’s competency on
April 7, 2021. Dr. Proctor recommended that Appellant was incompetent at that time to stand trial
due to his low intelligence. It is undisputed that Appellant was later found to be incompetent.
However, at the motion to suppress hearing, other than Appellant’s testimony that he did not
understand the warnings when they were given, there was no expert testimony or evidence
Appellant was incompetent at the time the interview was conducted. Moreover, Appellant’s
competency to stand trial has since been restored. During the hearing, the trial court listened to
the recorded video of the Miranda warnings and Appellant’s reaction to the warnings. The trial
court ultimately denied Appellant’s motion to suppress.
The trial court’s determination was a matter that depended on Appellant’s credibility. See
Delao, 235 S.W.3d at 238-39. It may believe all, some, or none of his testimony. See Ross, 32
S.W.3d at 855. Furthermore, the videotaped statement is also evidence of Appellant’s state of
mind at that time. The trial court viewed the video and from it was able to assess Appellant’s state
of mind. “The subsequent finding of incompetency is a relevant factor to determining whether
appellant’s waiver was voluntary but it is not conclusive.” Umana v. State, 447 S.W.3d 346, 357
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d); see also Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 173.
Applying the appropriately deferential standard of review, we conclude the totality of the
circumstances demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, Appellant’s waiver of his rights
was voluntarily made with full awareness of the nature of those rights and the consequences of
waiving them. See Edwards v. State, 691 S.W.3d 703, 719–20 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2024, no pet.) (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in finding defendant voluntarily waived
Miranda and Article 38.22 rights in making confession when, as in present case, defendant was
subsequently found incompetent to stand trial); Umana, 447 S.W.3d 346, 357-58 (same).
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s

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claims in his motion to suppress that his statement was involuntary. See Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d
at 171.
Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice

Opinion delivered August 29, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J, Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals,
sitting by assignment.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

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COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

AUGUST 29, 2024

NO. 12-24-00072-CR

FRANKLIN LOVON HARRIS,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 369th District Court
of Anderson County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 369CR-19-34398)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below
for observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J, Hoyle, J., and Bass, Retired J., Twelfth Court of Appeals,
sitting by assignment.