CourtListener 10141417•Donald Mims v. the State of Texas
Full text
NO. 12-24-00096-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT
TYLER, TEXAS
DONALD MIMS, § APPEAL FROM THE 85TH
APPELLANT
V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE § BRAZOS COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Donald Mims appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child. 1 In a single
issue, Appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated sexual assault of a child. The
indictment also included an enhancement paragraph stating that Appellant had a previous felony
conviction for obstruction/retaliation. He pleaded “not guilty,” and the matter proceeded to a
jury trial. The jury found Appellant “guilty.” At the punishment phase, Appellant pleaded “true”
to the enhancement paragraph. The jury ultimately sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment and
a $10,000 fine. This appeal followed.
This case was transferred to this Court from the Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco, Texas, pursuant to a
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docket equalization order. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013).
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole issue, Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Standard of Review and Applicable Law
The Jackson v. Virginia 2 legal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing
court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a
criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v.
State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional
minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal
conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315–16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786–87; see also Escobedo v. State,
6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.–San Antonio 1999, pet. ref’d). The standard for reviewing a legal
sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see
also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined
in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789;
Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186.
A jury is free to believe all or any part of a witness’s testimony or disbelieve all or any
part of that testimony. See Lee v. State, 176 S.W.3d 452, 458 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.]
2004), aff’d, 206 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A successful legal sufficiency challenge
will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31,
41–42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217–18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982).
Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and
circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Rodriguez v. State, 521 S.W.3d
822, 827 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.) (citing Sorrells v. State, 343 S.W.3d 152,
155 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of
the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient
to support the conviction. See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Juries
are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by
the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 15. Juries are not permitted to reach conclusions based on
mere speculation or factually unsupported inferences or presumptions. Id. An inference is a
conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them,
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404 U.S. 307, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
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while speculation is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and
evidence presented. Id. at 16.
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). Such a charge would include one that “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict
the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant is tried.” Id.
A person commits aggravated sexual assault of a child if he intentionally or knowingly
causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means if the victim is
younger than fourteen years of age. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021 (West 2019). The
testimony of a child complainant, standing alone and without corroboration, may be sufficient to
support a conviction for aggravated sexual assault. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.07(a), (b)(1) (West 2023).
Analysis
The victim, M.M., testified that she, her mother, her brother, and Appellant lived on
College Main Street when she was eleven or twelve years old. At the time, Appellant was dating
M.M.’s mother, but they were not yet married. According to M.M., Appellant sexually assaulted
her shortly after her father’s death and her birthday in 2013. Specifically, M.M. stated that while
she was home sick from school and alone in the house with Appellant, he picked her up and took
her to his “man cave” where he placed her on her stomach, covered her mouth, and put his penis
in her vagina. M.M. testified that Appellant continued to sexually assault her by placing his
penis in her vagina multiple other times while they lived on College Main and after they moved
to other residences. 3 In addition, she testified that on one occasion, Appellant placed her on the
couch and licked her vagina. He also made her put his penis in her mouth. The “relationship”
with Appellant continued after she turned seventeen, and she did not make an outcry until 2021.
Valerie Carroll, M.M.’s grandmother, testified that M.M.’s father was murdered on
January 6, 2013, when M.M. was eleven or twelve years old. She described the relationship
between Appellant and M.M. as odd because Appellant gave M.M. extra attention
“materialistically.” For instance, Appellant regularly took M.M. to the beautician. M.M. also
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All residences are located in Brazos County.
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had nice clothes and wore nails. M.M. testified that Appellant began paying for her hair styling
and nails when she was twelve years old. He also bought her clothes, as well as a car and phone
when she grew older. Amanda Paris, a Bryan Police Department detective, testified that
grooming sometimes involves material things such as those received by M.M. from Appellant.
And Ashleigh Thomas, a forensic interviewer at Scotty’s House Child Advocacy Center, also
described grooming as consistent with the way Appellant reportedly treated M.M.
Detective Paris further testified that M.M.’s school records reflected absences in January
and February 2013. These dates were consistent with the dates M.M. reported to police in 2021
as the dates the assaults first occurred.
When Detective Paris spoke with Appellant, he admitted having a sexual relationship
with M.M. However, he claimed the relationship began after M.M. became an adult. Ken Sikes,
a forensic analyst with the Brazos County District Attorney’s Office, testified that a forensic
download of Appellant’s phone disclosed a series of text messages between Appellant and M.M
in 2017 and 2018. Those texts included messages referring to sexual behavior between
Appellant and M.M. before she became an adult. In one message, Appellant told M.M. to clean
up her phone, which Sikes explained meant to scrub her phone of anything incriminating or
embarrassing. There were also messages about withholding gifts if M.M. resisted, which is also
consistent with Thomas’s testimony regarding grooming.
After reviewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
that the evidence is sufficient. M.M.’s testimony is evidence of the assault, and although not
required, it is supported by corroborating circumstantial evidence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 38.07(a), (b)(1). Appellant concedes that M.M.’s testimony is sufficient; however, he
argues that her testimony is not credible. It is the jury’s province to determine the credibility of
the child victim and other witnesses and the weight to be given to that evidence, and we may not
substitute our own credibility determination for that of the trier of fact. See Saxton v. State, 804
S.W.2d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We are satisfied that a rational jury could find the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the evidence is legally
sufficient to support the verdict. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898-99. We overrule Appellant’s
sole issue.
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DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice
Opinion delivered October 9, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
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COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUDGMENT
OCTOBER 9, 2024
NO. 12-24-00096-CR
DONALD MIMS,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
Appeal from the 85th District Court
of Brazos County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 22-02058-CRF-85)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the
judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the
court below for observance.
James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.
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