In the Estate of John Brown v. the County of Freestone, Texas

NO. 12-24-00098-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

IN THE ESTATE OF JOHN BROWN, § APPEAL FROM THE 77TH
APPELLANT

V. § JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

THE COUNTY OF FREESTONE,
TEXAS, § FREESTONE COUNTY, TEXAS
APPELLEE
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Joe Earl Robinson, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals the trial court’s judgment
awarding against him and others delinquent taxes in favor of Appellee the County of Freestone,
Texas (the County). 1 In two issues, Robinson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to issue a bench warrant to permit his presence at trial and the evidence is legally
insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
The County filed the underlying lawsuit for the collection of delinquent property taxes on
March 13, 2020. By its suit, the County sought to recover delinquent property taxes for tax years

1
This case originally was filed in the Tenth Court of Appeals but subsequently was transferred to this court
pursuant to a docket equalization order by the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. 73.001 (West Supp.
2024).
2008 through 2023, for the property bearing property identification number
15015000001/56312000001 (the subject property).
After it filed suit, the County located and served several defendants, including Robinson,
who is an inmate incarcerated in Texas and a purported heir to Brown’s estate. However, the
County was unable to locate several other defendants. Accordingly, the County asked the trial
court to appoint an attorney ad-litem to represent the interests of the remaining, unserved
defendants. The trial court granted the County’s request and appointed an attorney ad-litem.
On February 28, 2024, the trial court conducted a trial on the merits. The attorney ad-litem
and the County’s trial counsel were present and participated in the trial. Lance Rodgers, an heir
of a deceased owner of the subject property, and Misty Dingler, an employee of trial counsel for
the County, testified at trial about the ownership history of the subject property. The County also
offered into evidence Exhibit 1, a Certification of Delinquent Taxes created by the Tax Assessor-
Collector of Freestone County, Texas. Ultimately, the trial court rendered judgment in the
County’s favor. This appeal followed.

BENCH WARRANT
In his first issue, Robinson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in declining to
issue a bench warrant to permit his presence at trial.
Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s determination on an inmate’s application for writ
of habeas corpus ad testificandum, also known as a bench warrant, for abuse of discretion. See In
re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163, 164–65 (Tex. 2003). Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
33.1, to present a complaint for appellate review, the record must reflect that the complaint was
made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion that stated the grounds for the
ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the
trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1).
In general, our rules place the burden on litigants to identify with sufficient specificity the
grounds for a ruling they seek. In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 21; TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A)). A litigant’s status as an inmate does not alter that burden. In re Z.L.T.,
124 S.W.3d at 166. Even when an inmate requests a bench warrant, if he fails to include
information by which the court can assess the necessity of his appearance, the trial court has no

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responsibility independently to inquire into relevant facts where none are provided. See id.
(although inmate/presumed-father listed relevant factors in request for bench warrant, he failed to
provide any factual information showing why his interest in appearing outweighed impact on
correctional system).
Here, Robinson does not identify, nor can we locate based on our review of the record, any
request to the trial court for a bench warrant. Because Robinson bore the burden to establish his
right to relief, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining independently
to inquire into the issue where Robinson made no request nor provided any relevant facts to support
the issue he now raises on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d at 166.
Robinson’s first issue is overruled.

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the
trial court’s judgment.
Standard of Review and Governing Law
We review a trial court’s findings of fact for legal sufficiency under the same standards
applied on review of a jury’s findings. Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994). In
determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we consider all the evidence in the light most
favorable to the challenged finding, crediting favorable evidence if a reasonable fact-finder could,
and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could not. City of Keller v.
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. 2005). We sustain a no-evidence point only when the record
discloses (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2) the court is barred by rules of law
or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence
offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (4) the evidence established
conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. Pierre v. Steinbach, 378 S.W.3d 529, 533 (Tex. App.–
Dallas 2012, no pet.). If there is any evidence of probative force to support the jury’s finding, the
no-evidence challenge fails. Id. However, when the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so
weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no
more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence at all. Id.
Texas Tax Code, Section 33.47, states, in pertinent part, as follows:

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In a suit to collect a delinquent tax, the taxing unit’s current tax roll and delinquent tax roll
or certified copies of the entries showing the property and the amount of the tax and penalties
imposed and interest accrued constitute prima facie evidence that each person charged with a duty
relating to the imposition of the tax has complied with all requirements of law and that the amount
of tax alleged to be delinquent against the property and the amount of penalties and interest due on
that tax as listed are the correct amounts.

TEX. TAX. CODE ANN. § 33.47 (West 2015). Once a prima facie case of delinquent tax payment
is established by a taxing unit, the burden shifts to the taxpayer to introduce competent evidence
that he paid the full amount of the taxes, penalties, and interest, or that there is some other defense
applicable to his case. See Maximum Med. Imp. Inc. v. Cty. of Dallas, 272 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Tex.
App.–Dallas 2008, no pet.).
Discussion
In the instant case, the County introduced into evidence as Exhibit 1, a “Certification of
Delinquent Taxes” for the subject property. Exhibit 1 sets forth a legal description of the subject
property, a list of parties liable for the taxes thereon, as well as the base tax, penalties and interest,
additional penalties, and attorney’s fees owed for tax years 2008 through 2023, which total
$54,542.99. 2 The record contains no evidence which rebuts the presumption that the County made
a prima facie case by the admission of this exhibit into evidence. Moreover, Dingler testified about
her efforts to locate all individuals and heirs possessing an ownership interest in the subject
property. Lastly, the attorney ad-litem testified that, based on his review of the records related to
heirship and his conversation with one of the heirs, as well as the information available to the
County, he was satisfied with the effectiveness of citation by publication as to any unknown heirs.
See, e.g., In re Estate of Stanton, 202 S.W.3d 205, 208 (Tex. App.–Tyler 2005, pet. denied) (“It
is the attorney ad litem’s duty to defend the rights of his involuntary client with the same vigor
and astuteness he would employ in the defense of clients who had expressly employed him for
such purpose”). Accordingly, we hold that the evidence was legally sufficient to support the trial
court’s judgment. Robinson’s second issue is overruled.

2
Account numbers 56312000001 and 15015000001 each relate to the subject property. The total amount
listed as owed for Account number 56312000001 is $466.24. The total amount listed as owed for Account number
15015000001is $54,076.75.

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DISPOSITION
Having overruled Robinson’s first and second issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JAMES T. WORTHEN
Chief Justice

Opinion delivered November 6, 2024.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

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COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

NOVEMBER 6, 2024

NO. 12-24-00098-CV

IN THE ESTATE OF JOHN BROWN,
Appellant
V.
THE COUNTY OF FREESTONE, TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 77th District Court
of Freestone County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. CV20072)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment
of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that all costs of this appeal are hereby adjudged
against the appellant, Joe Earl Robinson, for which execution may issue, and that this decision be
certified to the court below for observance.

James T. Worthen, Chief Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.