Richard Dewayne Wilson v. the State of Texas

CourtListener 9398837Txctapp12May 10, 2023

Full text

NO. 12-22-00241-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

RICHARD DEWAYNE WILSON, § APPEAL FROM THE 241ST
APPELLANT
§ DISTRICT COURT
V.
§ SMITH COUNTY, TEXAS
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard Dewayne Wilson appeals from his conviction for assault family violence. In one
issue, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
BACKGROUND

On August 24, 2020, L.D. returned late from running errands to the residence she shared
with Appellant, then her dating partner. Appellant accused L.D. of cheating on him and followed
her into their master bathroom, where he struck her on the right side of her face with his hand
and threw her to the floor, at which point L.D. briefly lost consciousness. In the struggle, L.D.
struck her ankle on a metal chair. L.D.’s daughter, A.J., heard noise coming from the bathroom
and went to investigate. Appellant exited the bathroom and told A.J. that L.D. was fine, but as
L.D. returned to consciousness, she heard A.J. pounding on the bathroom door and shouted for
A.J. to call 911. Appellant prevented A.J. from entering the bathroom, then closed and locked the
bathroom door. Appellant straddled L.D., pinned down her arms, and placed his fingers on
L.D.’s neck and face such that she could not breathe. After Appellant stopped, L.D. told
Appellant to collect his belongings and leave.
Following A.J.’s 911 call, law enforcement and emergency medical services
subsequently arrived at the scene. Although L.D. refused to go to the hospital, EMS gave her an
ice pack for a swollen eye and wrapped her injured ankle. Both Deputy Brian Hutchins and
Lieutenant Clayton Taylor of the Smith County Sheriff’s Department noted that L.D.’s injuries
were consistent with her statement that Appellant struck her face. L.D. indicated that she did not
want to press charges, but law enforcement nonetheless arrested Appellant, and he was later
indicted for the offense of assault family violence.1 Specifically, the indictment alleged that
Appellant intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly caused bodily injury to L.D., a person with
whom he had a dating relationship, by hitting and striking her in the face causing physical pain.
The indictment alleged further that Appellant had previously been convicted of assault against a
person with whom he had a dating relationship. Appellant pleaded “not guilty” to assaulting
L.D., but “guilty” to the previous conviction, and this matter proceeded to a jury trial.
At trial, defense counsel questioned L.D. about her criminal history. L.D. testified that
she pleaded “guilty” to theft of a firearm in 1998, although she had not committed the offense.
She further admitted to previous criminal convictions for theft by check, misdemeanor theft, and
felony theft ranging from 1999 to 2015, and a pending charge for burglary of a building. In his
closing argument, defense counsel argued that L.D. was not a credible witness due to her
criminal history and her flawed recollection of the alleged assault.
The jury found Appellant “guilty” of the offense as charged and assessed punishment of
life imprisonment.2
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
conviction.
Standard of Review

The due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a conviction be
supported by legally sufficient evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315–16, 99 S.
Ct. 2781, 2786–87, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). In Texas, the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard that a reviewing
court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a

1
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (West 2021).
2
The indictment’s enhancement paragraphs alleged that Appellant was previously finally convicted of the
felony offense of attempted murder, and subsequent to that conviction, was finally convicted of the felony offense of
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Because Appellant pleaded “true” to these allegations, the jury could
assess a punishment of either life imprisonment, or imprisonment for a term of no less than 25 years and no more
than 99 years. Id. § 12.42 (West 2021).

2
criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence,
we consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether any
rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt based on the evidence and reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whatley v. State, 445
S.W.3d 159, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 898–99 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010). Juries are permitted to draw multiple reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial
evidence. Anderson v. State, 416 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). When the record
supports conflicting inferences, a reviewing court must presume that the fact finder resolved the
conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Clayton v. State,
235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Direct and circumstantial evidence are treated
equally. Id. A conclusion of guilt can rest on the combined and cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances; the duty of a reviewing court is to ensure that the evidence
presented supports a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime charged. See Hernandez
v. State, 190 S.W.3d 856, 864 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2006, no pet.); Williams v. State, 235
S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense(s) as defined by a
hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App.
1997). A hypothetically correct jury charge “accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the
indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict
the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant is tried.” Id.
Applicable Law
In Texas, it is generally a Class A misdemeanor when a person “intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse.” TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.01 (a)(1)(b) (West 2021). However, it is a felony of the third degree if the actor (1)
commits the offense against a person whose relationship to or association with the defendant is
described by Texas Family Code Section 71.0021(b) (dating relationship), Section 71.003
(family member), or Section 71.005 (member of the same household), and (2) has a previous
conviction for assault wherein the victim of that assault was a family member, a member of the
actor’s household, or a person in a dating relationship with the actor. Id. § 22.01(b)(2)(A), (B);

3
see also TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021(b) (West 2021); 71.003 (West 2021); 71.005
(West 2021).
A person acts intentionally when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result; a person acts knowingly when he is aware of the nature of his
conduct or that the circumstances exist; and a person acts recklessly “when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the
result will occur.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a), (b), (c) (West 2021). The jury may infer
intent from circumstantial evidence, such as the defendant’s acts, words, and conduct. Guevara
v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
A finding of causation is appropriate when a result would not have occurred but for the
defendant’s conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause. TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 6.04(a) (West 2021). Bodily injury is defined as “physical pain, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.” Id. § 1.07(a)(8) (West 2021). Any physical pain, no matter
how minor, is sufficient to establish bodily injury, and a fact finder may infer that a victim
actually suffered physical pain even without witness testimony to that effect. Garcia v. State,
367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Analysis

Appellant’s brief states that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the assault of
L.D. ever occurred. He appears to argue that L.D. was so uncredible as a witness that the jury
should not have believed her testimony, and no rational trier of fact could have found each
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt without believing her testimony.
Nevertheless, as a reviewing court, we must afford almost complete deference to a jury’s
decision when that decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility. Lancon v. State, 253
S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “The jury is in the best position to judge the credibility
of a witness because it is present to hear the testimony, as opposed to an appellate court who
relies on the cold record.” Id. The jury is entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses and can
believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
Addressing the mens rea requirement, L.D. testified that Appellant initiated the physical
altercation in the bathroom because he believed L.D. was cheating on him. Deputy Hutchins
testified that Appellant admitted the domestic disturbance began because he believed L.D. was

4
cheating on him, although Appellant denied physically assaulting L.D. Despite Appellant’s
argument to the contrary, it was the sole province of the jury to decide whether L.D. was a
credible witness and the weight it would give her testimony, and we may not re-weigh the
evidence or substitute our opinion for the jury’s. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705. From the verdict,
we assume that the jury found L.D. at least somewhat credible despite her criminal history and
chose to believe at least part of her testimony. Based on the record evidence, the jury could
reasonably have inferred that Appellant was, at a minimum, aware of the nature of his conduct,
and acted intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly in physically assaulting L.D.
As to causation of bodily injury, L.D. testified that Appellant struck her in the face and
threw her to the ground, causing her to strike her ankle on a metal chair as she fell. She stated
that these events caused her pain. A.J. testified that she observed L.D. crying and saw that one
side of L.D.’s face was swollen the next morning. The State introduced photos Hutchins took of
L.D.’s face at the scene, showing that her right eye was beginning to swell shut. The State also
introduced EMS records from August 24, indicating that L.D. had swelling in the area of her
head and acute pain due to trauma, and that EMS personnel wrapped her ankle and instructed her
to ice the swollen area around her eye. Further, both Hutchins and Taylor testified that L.D.’s
physical injuries were consistent with her statement that Appellant struck her face. Based on this
evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Appellant caused bodily injury to L.D.
The jury could likewise reasonably conclude that Appellant and L.D. had a dating
relationship. Texas Family Code Section 71.0021(b) defines a dating relationship as “a
relationship between individuals who have or have had a continuing relationship of a romantic or
intimate nature.” TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 71.0021(b). The existence of such a relationship is
determined by considering (1) the length of the relationship; (2) the nature of the relationship;
and (3) the frequency and type of interaction between the individuals involved in the
relationship. Id. A.J. testified that Appellant was already L.D.’s boyfriend and the two were
living together at the time she moved in with them in July 2018, and L.D. similarly testified that
she had been dating Appellant for over four years at the time of this incident. Moreover,
Appellant’s contention that L.D. was unfaithful to him supports an inference that the two were in
a committed relationship.
As to Appellant’s prior conviction, generally, a defendant’s plea of “true” to an
enhancement allegation satisfies the State’s burden of proving that allegation. Wood v. State, 486

5
S.W.3d 583, 587–88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). In this case, Appellant pleaded “guilty” on the
record to the State’s allegation that he was previously convicted of an assaultive offense against
a person with whom he had a dating relationship.
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude
that a rational jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant intentionally,
knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to L.D., with whom he had a dating relationship.
We further conclude that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdict of “guilty” on the charge
of assault family violence in this case. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01; see also Jackson,
443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781 at 2789. We overrule Appellant’s sole issue.
DISPOSITION

Having overruled appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

GREG NEELEY
Justice

Opinion delivered May 10, 2023.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)

6
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

MAY 10, 2023

NO. 12-22-00241-CR

RICHARD DEWAYNE WILSON,
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee

Appeal from the 241st District Court
of Smith County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 241-1767-20)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed
herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the
judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of
the court below be in all things affirmed, and that the decision be certified to the court below
for observance.

Greg Neeley, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.