In the Interest of M.L.A.R., J.M.R., Jr., Children v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00659-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF M.L.A.R., J.M.R. JR., CHILDREN

ON APPEAL FROM THE 430TH DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

Appellants S.K.P. (Mother) and J.M.R. (Father) appeal a trial court’s judgment

involuntarily terminating the parental rights with respect to their minor children, M.L.A.R.

and J.M.R. JR. 1 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001. We affirm.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

1 To protect the identity of minor children in an appeal from an order terminating parental rights,

parents and children are referred to by their initials. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d); TEX. R. APP.
P. 9.8(b)(2).
Court-appointed counsel for S.K.P. and J.M.R. have filed briefs stating that they

have diligently reviewed the entire record but have concluded that there are no “arguable

grounds” to advance an appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967);

Porter v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 56 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.) (“[W]hen appointed counsel represents an indigent client

in a parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for

appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief.”). Each counsel’s brief meets the

requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there

are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,

406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not

specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide

record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal

authorities.”).

Each counsel has informed this Court in writing that he or she: (1) notified their

client that they have filed an Anders brief, with S.K.P’s counsel filing a motion to withdraw;

(2) provided their client with a copy of the Anders brief; (3) informed their client of their

right to file a pro se response, 2 to review the record prior to filing that response, and to

seek review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided each client with

a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. An

2 In the criminal context, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that pro se responses are

not required to comport with all rules of appellate procedure “because its purpose is not to permit the court
of appeals to decide the case on the merits; it is intended only to alert the appellate court to any matters
that the defendant believes might be arguable in a brief on the merits.” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403,
409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

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adequate amount of time has passed, and neither S.K.P. nor J.M.R. have filed a pro se

response.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the

proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75, 80 (1988); see also In re G.M., No. 13-08-00569-CV, 2009 WL 2547493, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). We have reviewed

the entire record and each counsel’s brief, and we have found no reversible error. See

Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of

Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs

and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the

requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”). Further, we have specifically

reviewed the trial court’s findings under parts (D) and (E) of family code § 161.001(b)(1),

and we have found no non-frivolous issues that could be raised on appeal with respect to

those findings. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (holding

that “due process and due course of law requirements mandate that an appellate court

detail its analysis for an appeal of termination of parental rights under [§] 161.001(b)(1)(D)

or (E) of the Family Code”).

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

S.K.P.’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see

also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 & n.17 (“[T]he defense attorney is required to file

a motion to withdraw at the same time that he files an Anders brief.”). However, when an

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Anders brief is filed in a parental termination appeal, the appellant’s right to appointed

counsel extends to “all proceedings in [the Supreme Court of Texas], including the filing

of a petition for review.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (citing

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 107.013(a)(1)). Thus, in the absence of additional grounds for

withdrawal, a motion to withdraw brought in the court of appeals may be premature. Id.

Counsel is permitted to withdraw only for good cause, and counsel’s belief that the client

has no grounds to seek further review from the court of appeals’ decision does not

constitute good cause. Id.

Further, here, S.K.P.’s counsel’s motion does not show “good cause” for

withdrawal other than his inability to identify any non-frivolous grounds for appeal.

Accordingly, S.K.P.’s counsel’s motion to withdraw is denied. 3 See id.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
18th day of June, 2025.

3 The Texas Supreme Court has noted that, in cases such as this, “appointed counsel’s obligations

[in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders
brief.” In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

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