Rupert De Dios Canizales A/K/A Rupert Didios Canizales v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00341-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

RUPERT DE DIOS CANIZALES
A/K/A RUPERT DIDIOS CANIZALES, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 214TH DISTRICT COURT
OF NUECES COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Silva, Peña, and Cron
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Peña

Appellant Rupert De Dios Canizales a/k/a Rupert Didios Canizales appeals an

order adjudicating him guilty of aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a firearm
by a felon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02(a)(2), 46.04(e). After a contested

adjudication hearing, the trial court sentenced Canizales to five years’ imprisonment. By

two issues, Canizales argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the judgment

adjudicating him guilty. We affirm as modified.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 26, 2021, Canizales pleaded guilty to aggravated assault with a

deadly weapon and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and was placed on

deferred-adjudication community supervision for a period of ten years. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 42A.101. The State later filed an amended motion to revoke

Canizales’s community supervision and to adjudicate his guilt on April 16, 2024. The

operative motion to revoke alleged that Canizales violated the conditions of his

community supervision by committing the following offenses: criminal mischief on May

26, 2023 (condition 1(A)); criminal trespass on June 2, 2023 (condition 1(B)); terroristic

threat involving family violence on June 3, 2023 (condition 1(C)); terroristic threat causing

fear of imminent serious bodily injury on June 15, 2023 (condition 1(D)); and assault

causing bodily injury on June 16, 2023 (condition 1(E)).

On June 20, 2024, the trial court held a contested adjudication hearing. The State

abandoned alleged violations of conditions 1(C) and 1(E), and proceeded on the

remaining violations, to which Canizales pleaded not true. The evidence adduced at the

hearing shows that Adriana Ortiz was the owner of certain commercial real estate

properties located in Corpus Christi, Texas. She entered a commercial lease with

Samantha Hurtado, who owned a home remodeling company, for a warehouse located

on Airport Road. Ortiz explained that this warehouse had a shower upstairs which had

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previously been used for oil-field workers to wash off, like many other warehouses she

managed, but that the property had never been zoned or intended to be used for

residential purposes. Hurtado, with Ortiz’s permission, then subleased the property to two

businesses: a business owned by Marcus and Ronnie Garcia, and one owned by Eduardo

Miranda.

In May of 2023, Ortiz moved to terminate her lease with Hurtado and evict her

“[b]ecause she owed me over about $90,000 of monies for non-payment of property tax

for the previous year, that would have been . . . 2022.” Ortiz also told the Garcias and

Miranda to vacate, to which they agreed. Shortly after they began moving out of the

warehouse, on May 24, 2023, Canizales approached Ortiz in her office and explained to

her that he had an agreement with his unidentified “brother” that he would be allowed to

live upstairs in the warehouse in exchange for work. Ortiz testified that she informed

Canizales that nobody had permission to live there, and that she later tried to contact

Hurtado directly about this issue, to no avail. Two days later, Ortiz hired a locksmith to

change the locks in the warehouse, at which point Canizales threatened the locksmith,

and law enforcement was called. Canizales also called his sister, who arrived at the

warehouse and got into a physical altercation with Ortiz. Instead of forcibly removing

Canizales from the property, law enforcement convinced Ortiz to institute formal eviction

proceedings against Canizales because “he has three days.”

Omar Garcia, a worker from across the street from where Canizales was staying,

testified that on June 14, 2023, Canizales approached him and asked for a phone. Omar

refused, and closed a nearby gate to prevent Canizales from entering the property.

Canizales later returned “with a notebook and a knife.” Canizales scratched the knife

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along the fence and said he was going to use the knife to kill him. The next day, Canizales

returned, and said “he had a gun and he was going to come back.” Garcia testified that

Canizales “threatened to kill me.” Omar then called law enforcement and Canizales was

arrested shortly thereafter.

At the close of evidence, the trial court found the violation of condition 1(A) to be

not true but found the violations of conditions 1(B) and 1(D) to be true. The trial court

sentenced Canizales to five years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW

“We review a trial court’s order revoking community supervision for an abuse of

discretion.” Carreon v. State, 548 S.W.3d 71, 77 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2018, no pet.) (citing Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). “In

a revocation proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that

the defendant violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion to

revoke.” Martinez v. State, 563 S.W.3d 503, 510 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2018, no pet.) (citing Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en

banc)). “In making this determination, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable

to the trial court’s findings to determine whether it could make the findings that were

returned.” Id. (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)

(plurality op.)). A single violation will support the trial court’s decision to revoke community

supervision. Cazarez v. State, 606 S.W.3d 549, 560 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020,

no pet.) (citing Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

III. DISCUSSION

Canizales argues that the evidence was insufficient as to the criminal trespass

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violation because there was no evidence that he had proper notice that entry was

forbidden. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.05(a) (providing that a person commits

criminal trespass where he or she “enters or remains on or in the property of

another, . . . without effective consent and the person: (1) had notice that the entry was

forbidden; or (2) received notice to depart but failed to do so”). We disagree. Ortiz testified

that she orally informed Canizales on May 24, 2023, that he was not allowed to stay in

the warehouse owned by her. Two days later, he was found on the property.

Contrary to Canizales’s position, simply because Ortiz later availed herself of the

eviction process does not mean that her oral notice on May 24, 2023, was somehow

ineffective. The Texas Penal Code explicitly provides that “notice” includes oral or written

communication by the owner or someone authorized to act on the owner’s behalf. See id.

§ 30.05(b)(2)(A). Canizales offers no case law in support of her argument that, under

these circumstances, Ortiz’s oral notice was ineffective, and we have found none. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Wolfe v. State, 509 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“An

appellate court has no obligation to construct and compose an appellant’s issues, facts,

and arguments with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” (cleaned up));

Briceno v. State, 675 S.W.3d 87, 96 (Tex. App.—Waco 2023, no pet.) (finding waiver

where appellant “inadequately briefed” an issue).

Furthermore, eviction proceedings only pertain to landlord-tenant relations. See

generally TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002 (setting out elements for forcible entry and

detainer, each of which refers to a “tenant”). Here, the evidence established that the

warehouse had only been used for commercial purposes, and that nobody had ever been

allowed to live there. According to the Texas Property Code, a “tenant” of residential real

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property is, in relevant part, “a person who is authorized by a lease to occupy a dwelling

to the exclusion of others.” Id. § 92.001(6) (emphasis added). Accordingly, Canizales’s

reliance on eviction proceedings is unavailing. See id. § 92.001(1) (defining a “dwelling”

as “one or more rooms rented for use as a permanent residence under a single lease to

one or more tenants.” (emphasis added); see also Lopez v. State, No. 10-23-00260-CR,

2024 WL 3717454, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 8, 2024, no pet.) (“The evidence was

sufficient for the jury to conclude that [a]ppellant did not have a right to access the property

as a tenant or otherwise.”).

Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient, by a preponderance standard,

to show Canizales committed criminal trespass, we need not address his second issue

regarding the terroristic threat allegation. See Cazarez, 606 S.W.3d at 560. For all the

above reasons, we overrule Canizales’s two issues.

IV. MODIFICATION

An intermediate appellate court may reform a trial court’s judgment to make the

record speak the truth when it has the necessary data and information to do so. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 43.2(b) (authorizing appellate courts to modify the judgment and affirm as

modified); French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[A]n appellate

court has authority to reform a judgment to include an affirmative finding to make the

record speak the truth.”). The State acknowledges that the judgment adjudicating guilt

incorrectly reflects that Canizales pleaded true to some violations. Accordingly, we modify

the trial court’s judgment to reflect that Canizales pleaded “not true” to violations of

conditions 1(A), 1(B), and 1(D). The judgment should also reflect that the trial court found

condition 1(A) to be “not true.”

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V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified.

L. ARON PEÑA JR.
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the
14th day of August, 2025.

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