In Re Juan J. Cruz v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-25-00460-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE JUAN J. CRUZ

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron

By petition for writ of mandamus, relator Juan J. Cruz asserts that the trial court 1

abused its discretion by granting a new trial in favor of real party in interest Guillermo

Avellaneda in a personal injury lawsuit arising from a motor vehicle collision. We

conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus.

1 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number CL-20-1280-D in the County Court

at Law No. 4 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Federico Garza Jr. See TEX.
R. APP. P. 52.2.
I. BACKGROUND

Avellaneda filed suit against Cruz on grounds that he sustained “severe personal

injuries” when their vehicles collided on September 20, 2019, in Edinburg, Texas.

Avellaneda alleged that he was traveling eastbound on West Trenton Road in the inside

lane but had come to a complete stop due to traffic when Cruz, “driving at a high rate of

speed,” struck Avellaneda’s vehicle from behind. Avellaneda asserted causes of action

against Cruz for negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence. The parties’

dispute was ultimately submitted to a jury, which heard testimony from four witnesses:

Avellaneda, Cruz, and two of Avellaneda’s treating medical providers—Benjamin N.

Barnett, D.C., a chiropractor, and Yixiang Liu, M.D., a physician specializing in pain

management and anesthesiology.

Dr. Barnett testified that Avellaneda presented for an evaluation and treatment on

September 24, 2019, complaining of lower back pain, mid-back pain, stiffness, weakness,

tenderness, trigger points, contractions, and muscle spasms. Avellaneda also complained

of chest pain consistent with an injury resulting from a seat belt. Dr. Barnett testified that

Avellaneda’s injuries were consistent with those experienced by individuals involved in

vehicular collisions. Dr. Barnett diagnosed Avellaneda with ligament sprains of the

thoracic and lumbar spine and ordered him to undergo conservative physical therapy

several times each week. Dr. Barnett advised Avellaneda to make certain

accommodations regarding his injuries and recommended that he continue to engage in

physical activity. He specifically testified that Avellaneda could continue his workout

regimen at the gym with certain modifications. When Avellaneda did not show enough

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improvement with the prescribed treatment plan, Dr. Barnett ordered an MRI, which

showed that Avellaneda had an L4-L5 posterior disc protrusion and an L5-S1 disc

protrusion. Dr. Barnett thus referred Avellaneda to Dr. Liu. Dr. Barnett testified that he last

saw Avellaneda on January 7, 2020.

Dr. Liu testified at trial that she first saw Avellaneda on November 14, 2019. She

thereafter administered lumbar epidural steroid injections to decrease Avellaneda’s

inflammation and improve his daily activities. According to Dr. Liu, this treatment reduced

Avellaneda’s pain levels from a “nine” to a “seven”; however, Avellaneda continued to

complain of pain. Dr. Liu recommended that Avellaneda undergo another lumbar epidural

shot, provided a prescription for ibuprofen, and referred Avellaneda to Dr. Schroeder, an

orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Liu testified that she last saw Avellaneda on January 15, 2020.

Avellaneda testified that he had just left work at the time of the accident and was

following his boss to an appointment. The weather was clear and dry; however, traffic was

congested, and he characterized the conditions as “stop and go.” Avellaneda explained

that his vehicle was “[c]ompletely stopped” for approximately five seconds prior to the

collision. Avellaneda testified that he was “in shock,” and the collision was a “jarring

experience.” He said that Cruz “apologized profusely for running into [him] because he

was on his phone,” and that Cruz told him that he “wasn’t paying attention.” Avellaneda

reiterated that Cruz claimed fault for the accident at the scene of the collision. They called

the police, who arrived within five to ten minutes after the accident occurred.

Avellaneda testified that, immediately after the accident he was in shock and

declined medical care. Later that day, however, he began feeling pain in his upper and

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lower back, chest, and head and noted bruising on his chest. He denied that he had any

such pain prior to the collision. He asked his boss for advice, and his boss directed him

to contact an attorney, which he did, and he went to McAllen Family Urgent Care for

treatment. McAllen Family Urgent Care referred Avellaneda to Dr. Barnett. Avellaneda

testified that physical therapy helped as a “temporary” fix. The injection administered by

Dr. Liu also helped briefly, but his pain increased to an “eight” out of “ten” within two to

three days after he received the injection. Although Dr. Liu recommended a second

injection, Avellaneda explained that he did not proceed with it because he “didn’t have the

financial means” and had “bills stacking up.” At trial, Avellaneda testified that he was still

experiencing pain because of the crash.

Avellaneda testified that Dr. Barnett told him to try to stay active after the collision.

He explained that he continued working out after the crash but changed his routine by

“not lifting as heavy as [he] used to” and instead using light weights and performing

stretches and light core exercises. Avellaneda told the jury that he used to play basketball

competitively, but now he “just shoot[s the ball] around.” Avellaneda stated that he “still

love[s] playing basketball,” and he “want[s] to stay active so this pain doesn’t define the

rest of my life and just take me downhill.” He must “deal with” the pain and “keep going”

because he has two daughters, with another child on the way, and he has “to stay strong,

as strong as possible.” Avellaneda further testified that the collision affected his abilities

concerning his children such as picking them up or installing and removing their car seats.

He also explained that they were “in the middle of a move and [he] can’t move anything

heavy,” so he had to hire movers. In summary, Avellaneda testified that his daily activities

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have been limited because of the accident. Avellaneda further told the jury that the

collision affected his mental health because he experiences “pain every day.”

In terms of damages, Avellaneda told the jury that he wants to obtain more medical

treatment because his injuries have not improved since the crash and have instead

become progressively more painful. Avellaneda also testified that his vehicle, a 2006

Mercedes, was totaled because of the accident, and his property damages comprised

$3,021.20. Avellaneda asserted that he was not seeking compensation for any lost

income or loss of earning capacity.

Upon cross-examination, Avellaneda conceded that he went to the gym

continuously, without stopping, both before and after the accident, as well as during his

medical treatment. In this regard, the jury saw Avellaneda’s Facebook posts indicating his

gym attendance following the accident. Avellaneda’s medical records did not reflect that

Avellaneda worked out routinely at a gym. And while he testified that he suffered bruising

at trial, his medical records indicated that he initially denied bruising because of the

accident.

At trial, Cruz told the jury that he was “wholly and solely responsible for this crash.”

He stated that traffic was in “gridlock” at the time of the collision, and the two vehicles at

issue were located approximately eight to ten cars back from a traffic light which had gone

through several cycles while they were waiting to proceed through the intersection. Cruz

testified that he was “standing still” or “inching away.” Cruz explained that he had his foot

on his brake and did not feel his vehicle move, and he speculated that he “probably let off

a little bit without realizing.” Cruz clarified that his vehicle had come to a complete stop,

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then he apparently lifted his foot off the brake. He characterized the collision as a “tap.”

He acknowledged that his discovery responses indicated that he did not have time to

apply his brakes before the collision; however, he did not agree that the accident was

caused because he failed to control his speed. Cruz told the jury that the air bags on his

vehicle, a Chevy Tahoe, did not deploy because of the collision, he did not need a wrecker

to move his vehicle, and he did not seek medical care.

Cruz testified that he sells solar panels, and that at the time of the collision, he was

going to a 5:30 p.m. appointment. Cruz denied he was in a hurry and stated that he did

not “drive like that.” Immediately before the vehicles collided, Cruz stated that he was

checking his gas gauge because he was approaching a gas station, his “gas was a little

low,” and he was worried that he might not make it to his appointment.

Cruz testified that Avellaneda misunderstood his statements following the crash.

Cruz testified that he was not on his phone at the time of the collision, and instead he

checked his phone after the accident so that he could note the time of the accident and

determine if he should call his boss about the meeting. Cruz acknowledged that he was

apologetic to Avellaneda about the accident. He further acknowledged he was taking

responsibility for the accident and Avellaneda’s injuries but clarified that he had no proof

that he caused Avellaneda’s injuries.

At trial, Avellaneda offered into evidence his medical records and the Texas Peace

Officer’s Crash Report (report) regarding the incident. The report stated that Avellaneda’s

vehicle was stationary at a red light when Cruz failed to control his speed and struck it

from the rear. The report indicated that Avellaneda had sustained a possible injury and

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that Cruz was not injured. The report provided that in the investigating officer’s opinion,

the crash did not result in at least $1,000 damage to any property.

In response to the first question in the jury charge, the jury found that the

negligence of Cruz did not “proximately cause the occurrence in question.” In accordance

with the instructions in the charge, the jury did not answer the remaining questions.

Thereafter, Avellaneda filed an amended motion for new trial and an amended motion for

judgment notwithstanding the verdict. In his amended motion for new trial, Avellaneda

argued that the jury’s answer to the first question in the charge was against the great

weight and preponderance of the evidence and was manifestly unjust. In his amended

motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, Avellaneda again asserted that the jury’s

answer was “against the overwhelming weight of the evidence,” and that Cruz failed to

present “proof of any defense, justification or excuse, or any evidence that [Avellaneda’s]

injuries were [caused by] a previous injury.” Cruz filed a combined response to

Avellaneda’s motion for new trial and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict

asserting, inter alia, that there was legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the

jury’s verdict.

On May 6, 2025, the trial court granted Avellaneda’s motion for new trial; however,

the new trial order did not include a rationale for its ruling. On June 6, 2025, the trial court

vacated that order. On June 10, 2025, the trial court signed a “Second Amended Final

Judgment” 2 which rendered judgment in favor of Cruz, ordered Avellaneda to take

2 We note that the record before this Court does not include an original final judgment or a first

amended final judgment.

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nothing on his suit, and ordered Avellaneda to pay Cruz court costs in the amount of

$2,715.89.

On June 11, 2025, Avellaneda filed a second amended motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict and a separate second amended motion for new trial. These

second amended motions reiterated and expanded on the claims that he had made in his

previous filings. On July 11, 2025, Cruz filed a combined response to these pleadings.

On July 22, 2025, the trial court signed an amended order granting Avellaneda’s

motion for new trial. This order states in relevant part that:

The facts and the record clearly show that [Cruz] testified he crashed into
[Avellaneda] and took responsibility for causing the crash and took
responsibility for [Avellaneda’s] injuries. In the very least, the evidence does
not support a jury verdict of no negligence that [Cruz] did not proximately
cause the occurrence in question. Therefore, no reasonable [] juror or jury
could find that there was no negligence on [Cruz’s] part because the record
shows otherwise.

Because it appeared to the Court that there is no evidence of
probative force to sustain the verdict of the jury, and that a directed verdict
in favor of [Avellaneda] would have been proper as to question number 1, a
Motion for New Trial should be rendered in favor of Plaintiff.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the Court that the motion of
[Avellaneda] for New Trial is granted, and the verdict of the jury is vacated
and set aside, and a new trial be ordered.

Cruz thereafter filed this petition for writ of mandamus. In one issue, Cruz asserts

that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in granting Avellaneda’s motion for new

trial because: (1) the new trial order is facially invalid; and (2) there is no valid merits-

based reason for granting the motion for new trial, and (3) the record does not support

the trial court’s rationale for granting a new trial. Cruz also filed a motion to stay the trial

court proceedings pending the resolution of his petition for writ of mandamus. We granted

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Cruz’s motion to stay, and we requested, but did not receive, a response to the petition

for writ of mandamus from Avellaneda. 3

II. MANDAMUS

Mandamus relief provides an “extraordinary remedy.” In re Rogers, 690 S.W.3d

296, 302 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (quoting In re USAA Gen. Indem.

Co., 624 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). Mandamus is discretionary in

nature and it is governed by equitable principles. In re First Rsrv. Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d

653, 663 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018)

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam). To obtain mandamus relief, the relator must show that

the trial court clearly abused its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by

appeal. In re Dall. HERO, 698 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re

AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In

this regard, there is no adequate remedy by appeal when the trial court abuses its

discretion by granting a new trial. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary,

L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209–10 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).

III. NEW TRIALS

Trial courts possess “considerable authority to grant new trials” and have the duty

“to do so when they observe problems that threaten the integrity of the process and,

3 After the Court requested Avellaneda to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus,

Avellaneda’s counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file the response. The Court granted
Avellaneda’s motion for extension of time; however, Avellaneda failed to file a response and instead,
Avellaneda’s attorneys filed motions to withdraw on grounds that they were not retained for purposes of
appeal or filling a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. The Court granted the attorneys’ motions
to withdraw and requested Avellaneda to file either a response to the petition for writ of mandamus or a
notice of appearance for appellate counsel within a specified period of time. Avellaneda did neither within
the requisite period and did not seek any further extensions of time to do so.

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therefore, the reliability of [a jury’s] verdict.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d 289,

302 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding). However, because “disregarding a jury’s verdict is an

unusually serious act that imperils a constitutional value of immense importance—the

authority of a jury”—the trial court may only do so “when clearly supported by sound

reasons.” Id.

Those reasons must be specifically set forth in the order. Id.; see In re Davenport,

522 S.W.3d 452, 456–56 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding). In other words, trial courts are

required to provide litigants with “an understandable, reasonably specific explanation” for

setting aside a jury verdict and ordering a new trial. In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d 170, 173 (Tex.

2016) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213). Trial

courts must do so because:

[A] vague explanation in setting aside a jury verdict does not enhance
respect for the judiciary or the rule of law, detracts from transparency we
strive to achieve in our legal system, and does not sufficiently respect the
reasonable expectations of parties and the public when a lawsuit is tried to
a jury. Parties and the public generally expect that a trial followed by a jury
verdict will close the trial process. Those expectations may be overly
optimistic, practically speaking, but the parties and public are entitled to an
understandable, reasonably specific explanation why their expectations are
frustrated by a jury verdict being disregarded or set aside, the trial process
being nullified, and the case having to be retried.

In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. Generally, this requirement is satisfied when

a trial court’s stated reason is “a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate” and

“is specific enough to indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma

template, but rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and

circumstances of the case at hand.” In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173 (quoting In re United

Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 688–89 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding)). The new trial

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order must show that it was granted “only after careful thought and for valid reasons.” In

re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 456 (quoting In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at

688). In this regard, granting a new trial “in the interests of justice and fairness” is not a

sufficiently specific reason to grant a new trial, and such a generic rationale renders the

new trial order facially invalid. In re Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 206, 213; see In

re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 689–90. Similarly, “the mere recitation of a legal

standard, such as a statement that a finding is against the great weight and

preponderance of the evidence, will not suffice.” In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d

at 689.

We may also look past the face of the new trial order to perform a merits-based

review of the validity of the trial court’s reasons for granting a new trial. In re Rudolph

Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 300; In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173. We do so because

“[t]ransparency without accountability is meaningless.” In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,

Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding). The Texas Supreme Court has

further explained that “[i]t is simply impermissible for the district court, no matter how

strongly it disagrees, to substitute its own judgment for the jury’s as a basis for a new

trial.” In re Rudolph Auto., LLC, 674 S.W.3d at 307.

IV. ANALYSIS

Cruz asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial

because the new trial order is facially invalid and there is no valid merits-based reason

supporting the trial court’s reasoning. The order stated that the evidence “clearly” showed

that Cruz testified that he “crashed into” Avellaneda “and took responsibility for causing

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the crash and took responsibility for [Avellaneda’s] injuries.” The order provided that “no

reasonable [] juror or jury could find that there was no negligence on [Cruz’s] part because

the record shows otherwise,” and concluded that a new trial should be granted because

“there is no evidence of probative force to sustain the verdict of the jury” and “a directed

verdict in favor of [Avellaneda] would have been proper.”

Thus, in sum, the trial court concluded that the jury’s verdict was supported by no

evidence. However, this is not a reason for which a new trial is legally appropriate. When

there is no evidence to support the jury’s verdict, a judgment notwithstanding the verdict

is appropriate, not a new trial. See In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 179 (stating that “judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, not a new trial” is appropriate when a party conclusively

establishes their claim and there is no contrary evidence); In re R.E.S., No. 08-24-00350-

CV, 2025 WL 2646170, at *6, __ S.W.3d __, at __ (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 15, 2025,

orig. proceeding) (stating that if the claimants “conclusively established their claim” and

the opposing party “presented no evidence,” then a new trial would not be appropriate);

see also In re Hernandez, No. 04-23-00246-CV, 2023 WL 5068573, at *3 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio Aug. 9, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Jones, No. 05-16-00081-

CV, 2016 WL 3166080, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 7, 2016, orig. proceeding) (mem.

op.). Accordingly, the new trial order is facially invalid because its stated reason is not

one for which a new trial is legally appropriate. See In re Bent, 487 S.W.3d at 173; In re

United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d at 688–89.

In this regard, we further observe that the trial court’s proffered rationale runs

counter to Texas law. First, “[a]ccidents happen when something has gone wrong, but not

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all accidents are evidence of negligence.” Lozada v. Posada, 718 S.W.3d 262, 267 (Tex.

2025) (per curiam). Second, “[t]he mere occurrence of a rear-end automobile accident is

not of itself evidence of negligence.” Pearson v. DeBoer, Inc., 99 S.W.3d 273, 276 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2003, no pet.). Third, Cruz’s testimony regarding his fault

constituted some evidence of negligence, but it did not establish negligence as a matter

of law. See Roberts v. Staples, 644 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no

pet.) (collecting cases regarding testimonial quasi-admissions). And fourth, “[t]he jurors

are the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their

testimony,” and “[t]hey may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another.” City

of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005).

The jury heard conflicting testimony about Cruz’s use of his phone at the time of

the collision, his comments at the scene of the collision, and the force of the impact

between the cars. Further, the jury heard testimony regarding Avellaneda’s alleged

injuries which may have caused it to view his claims with a degree of skepticism.

Specifically, Avellaneda sought medical care only after consulting with his boss and

counsel. While Avellaneda testified that he suffered extreme pain because of the injuries

that he sustained in the collision, he nevertheless continued working out routinely, lifting

weights, and playing basketball. Avellaneda did not seek any lost wages because of the

accident; thus, the jury may have inferred that he did not miss any time from his job

because of the collision. Further, Avellaneda had not sought or received medical care in

the five-year interval between January 2020, when he last saw Drs. Barnett and Liu, and

the time of trial in February 2025.

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Based on the foregoing, we sustain the sole issue presented in this original

proceeding. We turn our attention to the appropriate remedy. The trial court’s rationale

for granting a new trial was clear but invalid. In cases such as this, we direct the trial court

to enter judgment on the verdict. See, e.g., In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 446 S.W.3d

162, 180–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding); In re City of

Houston, 418 S.W.3d 388, 397–98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, orig.

proceeding); see also In re VSDH Vaquero Venture, Ltd., No. 05–15–01513–CV, 2016

WL 2621073, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 6, 2016, orig. proceeding [mand. denied])

(mem. op.).

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus

and the applicable law, is of the opinion that Cruz has met his burden to obtain mandamus

relief. Accordingly, we lift the stay previously imposed in this case. See TEX. R. APP. P.

52.10. We conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, and we direct the trial

court to vacate its order of July 22, 2025, and to enter judgment on the jury’s verdict. Our

writ will issue only if the trial court fails to act in accordance with this memorandum

opinion.

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
18th day of November, 2025.

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