In the Interest of P.J.G., a Child v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-24-00087-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN THE INTEREST OF P.J.G., A CHILD

ON APPEAL FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT
OF TRAVIS COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Cron and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron1

Proceeding pro se, P.G. (Father) appeals from an agreed final order in a suit

affecting the parent-child relationship 2 (SAPCR) which, among other things, named him

1 This case is before the Court on transfer from the Third Court of Appeals pursuant to a docket-

equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE. §§ 22.220(a) (delineating
the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from
one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer). We are bound by
the precedent of the transferring court to the extent that it differs from our own. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.

2 As we discuss in this memorandum opinion, there was a jury trial followed by a post-trial hearing;

however, the trial court signed an “AGREED FINAL ORDER IN SUIT AFFECTING THE PARENT-CHILD
RELATIONSHIP.”
and appellee T.H. (Mother), joint managing conservators of their child, P.J.G. 3 Father

argues: (1) the trial court erred in forcing him into the “Title IV[-]D[ 4] program without his

consent and against his will”; (2) “incentive payments given to states from the Title IV-D

program create conflicts of interest with trial court judges”; (3) the trial court violated the

“Due Process Clause of the [Fourteenth Amendment] by having a conflict of interest with

the Title IV-D agency”; and (4) the trial court “violat[ed his c]onstitutionally protected right

as a parent to have equal time with [P.J.G.]” 5 We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On September 12, 2022, Father, pro se, filed a SAPCR concerning P.J.G. That

same day, he filed a motion for temporary orders. Mother filed a counter suit and also

requested temporary orders, including guideline child support during the pendency of the

suit. On October 18, 2022, Father retained counsel who filed a request for a de novo

hearing with respect to temporary orders on “conservatorship, possession, and access,

and child support.”

Temporary orders were entered on November 1, 2022, which directed Father,

among other things, to pay $640.00 per month in child support to Mother. Subsequently,

Father amended his pleading and requested orders restricting P.J.G.’s residence to

Travis County, Texas and contiguous counties and “a week on/week off possession

3We refer to the child and the parties by their initials or a pseudonym. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 109.002(d).

4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–669b.

5 We note that in the “Issues Presented” section of Father’s brief, he states his fourth issue as,

“Can the trial court override federal Supreme Court law, rules and regulations to force [his] child to be on
welfare without his consent.” However, in two other locations in his brief, including in his argument section,
he states his fourth issue as we have quoted it.

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schedule.” Amended temporary orders were entered on January 11, 2023, but the child

support amount to be paid by Father to Mother remained the same.

Father, pro se again, filed a request for a jury trial on January 23, 2023. And on

March 2, 2023, Father filed a “Petition to Terminate Withholding for Child Support.” By

written order on March 29, 2023, the trial court denied Father’s petition. 6 On June 23,

2023, Father filed a “Notice of Motion Demand [sic] to Vacate a Void Judgment Coram

Non-Judice ‘Before a Person Not a Judge’ Void for Violation of the [Fourteenth]

Amendment and Must be Vacated under Federal Rule 60(b)(4) or State Law Equivalent.”

He also filed an unsworn “Affidavit [sic] of Truth” in which he professed to be “a natural

freeborn Sovereign, without subjects,” and stated “I voluntarily choose to comply with the

man-made laws which serve to bring harmony to society, but no such laws, nor their

enforcers, have any authority over me. I am not in any jurisdiction, for I am not of subject

status.”

A jury trial was held in July 2023, and the jury found that Mother should have the

exclusive right to designate the primary residence of P.G.J. with a geographic restriction

of “Travis County and contiguous counties.” During a post-trial hearing, Mother testified

that after the trial, she agreed to be a joint managing conservator with Father. She also

requested guideline child support from Father. Father was opposed to any court-ordered

child support.

The trial court ultimately took the matter under advisement. On September 14,

2023, the trial court entered a final order which, among other things, appointed both

6 It appears a hearing was held on the petition, but we do not have a record of that hearing.

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parents joint managing conservators of P.J.G., gave Mother the exclusive right to

designate P.J.G.’s primary residence within Travis County and contiguous counties, and

ordered Father to pay Mother child support of $1,008.37 per month. Father filed a motion

for new trial, which was denied by the trial court. Father now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

In his brief, Father groups his first three issues together and relies on three cases,

Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), Holmberg v. Holmberg, 588 N.W.2d 720

(Minn. 1999), and Wehunt v. Ledbetter, 875 F.2d 1558 (11th Circ. 1989), and two federal

statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 658a and 42 U.S.C. § 1301(d). 7

A. Briefing Requirements

Our appellate rules require an appellant’s brief to contain a clear and concise

argument for the contentions made with appropriate citations to authorities and the

record. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); In re C.D.S., No. 13-24-00202-CV, 2025 WL 1982805, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 17, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“An

appellant’s brief must concisely state all issues or points presented for review and contain

a clear and concise argument, including appropriate citations to authority and the

record.”); Turner v. Morton, No. 02-23-00301-CV, 2024 WL 853357, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Feb. 29, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The ‘[f]ailure to cite applicable authority

or provide substantive analysis waives an issue on appeal.’” (citations omitted)). Although

we strive to decide cases on the merits, “an issue can be forfeited or waived.” Borusan

Mannesmann Pipe US, Inc. v. Hunting Energy Serv., 716 S.W.3d 572, 575 (Tex. 2025)

7 Mother did not file a brief.

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(per curiam); see Bertucci v. Watkins, 709 S.W.3d 534, 541 (Tex. 2025).

Pro se litigants, such as Father, are held to the same standard as a licensed

attorney. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Litsinger

v. Litsinger, No. 03-25-00106-CV, 2025 WL 3533270, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 10,

2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[Appellant] is not treated differently as a pro se litigant but is

held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with applicable laws

and rules of procedure.”).

B. Analysis

1. First Three Issues

Blessing, Holmberg, and Wehunt do not support Father’s first three arguments

because: (1) they do not hold that a trial court is prohibited from ordering child support

nor do any of them discuss that issue; and (2) they do not discuss conflicts of interest at

all. See 520 U.S. at 329; 588 N.W.2d at 720; 875 F.2d at 1558. Instead, in Blessing, a

case in which custodial parents sued the director of Arizona’s child support agency

claiming they had an enforceable individual right to have the State’s program achieve

“substantial compliance” with the requirements of Title IV-D, the Court held that “Title IV-

D does not give individuals a federal right to force a state agency to substantially comply

with Title IV-D.” 8 520 U.S. at 332–33. In Holmberg, a consolidated case challenging the

constitutionality of Minnesota’s administrative child support process, the Minnesota

Supreme Court held that current structure of that process violates separation of powers

8 Additionally, we observe that this past year in Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, a

case concerning whether individual Medicaid beneficiaries may sue state officials for failing to comply with
a funding condition, the Supreme Court clarified that courts should no longer consult Blessing (and two
other cases) “when asking whether a spending-power statute creates an enforceable individual right.” 606
U.S. 357, 376 (2025).
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and is unconstitutional because it “infringes on the district court’s original jurisdiction,”

“[administrative law judges] jurisdiction is not inferior to the district court’s jurisdiction,”

and it “empowers nonattorneys to engage in the practice of law.” 588 N.W.2d at 721, 726.

And lastly, in Wehunt, involving a challenge to the program established under the Aid to

Families with Dependent Children program, the court found that “Title IV-D was not

enacted to confer a private cause of action on the appellant or any other person similarly

situated.” 875 F.2d at 1559, 1567.

Apart from reciting 42 U.S.C. § 1301(d) and directing us to 42 U.S.C. § 658a,

Father makes conclusory and unsupported statements. 9 See Ofuani v. Ofuani, No. 05-

24-00861-CV, 2025 WL 2368876, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 14, 2025, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (“[A]though the argument for each issue includes one or two citations to statutes,

rules, and case law, Appellant’s analysis of these issues consists solely of a recitation of

each authority, summary of the authority’s holding, and conclusory statements that the

trial court did not follow the cited authority or violated his rights.”). “We are not required to

make arguments for pro se litigants.” Litsinger, 2025 WL 3533270, at *2 (citation omitted).

Even if we concluded the brief was adequate, we would nonetheless overrule

Father’s first three issues because he has failed to show how the holdings from Blessing,

Holmberg, and Wehunt must be interpreted to demonstrate error in the trial court’s final

SAPCR order. See Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968) (per

curiam) (“The burden is upon a party appealing from a final judgment to show that

judgment is erroneous in order to obtain a reversal.”); Switkowski v. Archibold, No. 15-

9 We note that Father references a “‘Dear Colleague Letter of April 2023” in his brief, but he does

not provide a record citation. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).
6
25-00155-CV, 2026 WL 110883, at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist., Jan. 15, 2026, no pet. h.)

(mem. op.). In other words, these cases do not stand for the arguments Father makes.

Further, and again assuming Father’s brief was adequate, we are not bound to

follow Holmberg or Wehunt. See Penrod Drilling Corp. v. Williams, 868 S.W.2d 294, 296

(Tex. 1993) (“While Texas courts may certainly draw upon the precedents of the Fifth

Circuit, or any other federal or state court, in determining the appropriate federal rule of

decision, they are obligated to follow only higher Texas courts and the United States

Supreme Court.”); see City of Carrollton v. Singer, 232 S.W.3d 790, 797 n.6 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“Although we are not bound by federal authority, we may

rely on it as persuasive.”); Heras v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, Nos. 13-19-00412-CV, 13-

19-00413-CV, 2022 WL 710065, at *3 n.9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Mar. 10,

2022, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[W]e are not bound to follow out-of-state authorities.” (citation

omitted)). Accordingly, Father has forfeited his first three issues. 10 TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

2. Final Issue

In his final issue, with reliance on Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), Father

appears to contend that his parental rights are being infringed upon because prior to the

trial court ordering him to pay child support, he was “already financially supporting [his]

child the way [he] saw fit,” and “[i]f you infringe upon those rights, the right to make

financial decisions about [his] child[,] you are infringing on [his] parental rights.”

10 We note that Father’s conflict-of-interest complaints (issue two and three) appear to focus on a

particular judge that signed the first temporary order (given he specifically names the trial court judge), but
that order is now moot since a final order has been signed. See Litsinger v. Litsinger, No. 03-25-00106-CV,
2025 WL 3533270, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citation omitted)
(“[Appellant’s] complaint about the temporary orders’ recitation that he had appeared and announced ready
became moot when the trial court entered its final order.”).

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Additionally, he argues the “trial court gave [him] LESS time with [his child] so they could

get money from [him] through the Title IV-D program.”

As Father points out, Troxel stands for the proposition “that the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.” Id. at 66. Stated

differently, “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the

fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge

believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.” Id. at 72–73. Apart from this, however, Father

fails to provide a cogent argument as to how his fundamental parental rights are being

infringed upon by the trial court’s child support order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also

In re C.D.S., 2025 WL 1982805, at *2 (“[Mother] cites to the holdings in Troxel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57 (2000), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), but fails to make a cogent

argument as to why they those cases are applicable and relevant to this case.”); Ofuani,

2025 WL 2368876, at *3 (“The right to appellate review in Texas extends only to

complaints made in accordance with our rules of appellate procedure, which require an

appellant to clearly articulate the issues we will be asked to decide, to make cogent and

specific arguments in support of its position, to cite authorities, and to specify pages in

the record where each alleged error can be found.”).

Again, even assuming Father’s brief was adequate, Father’s argument lacks merit

because the trial court appointed Mother and Father as joint managing conservators, and

Mother having a greater amount of possession of P.J.G. does not necessarily control

which parent pays child support. See TEX. FAM. CODE §§ 153.135, .138, 154.001;

Gopalan v. Marsh, 706 S.W.3d 650, 677 (Tex. App.—Austin 2025, pet. filed) (“Which

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parent determines the children’s primary residence and who has the greater amount of

possession of the children does not control which parent pays child support.”); S.L. v.

S.L., No. 02-19-00017-CV, 2020 WL 4360448, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 30,

2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“The appointment of joint managing conservators does not

impair or limit the authority of the court to order a joint managing conservator to pay child

support to another joint managing conservator.” (citations omitted)). Moreover, child

support is to help a custodial parent maintain an adequate standard of living for the child

and is not a “debt.” See In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594, 596 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he

obligation to support a child is viewed as a legal duty and not as a debt.”); In re L.R.P.,

98 S.W.3d 312, 313 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet dism’d). Accordingly,

Father has forfeited his final issue. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i).

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

JENNY CRON
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
26th day of January, 2026.

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