In Re 7-Eleven, Inc. D/B/A Stripes and Sandra Uribe v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-26-00114-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE 7-ELEVEN, INC. D/B/A STRIPES AND SANDRA URIBE

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Tijerina1

By petition for writ of mandamus, relators 7-Eleven, Inc. d/b/a Stripes (7-Eleven)

and Sandra Uribe assert that the trial court 2 abused its discretion by failing to rule on 7-

Eleven’s motions for severance and Uribe’s motion for Rule 91a dismissal within a

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
2 This original proceeding arises from trial court cause number C-0065-24-M in the 476th District

Court 1 of Hidalgo County, Texas, and the respondent is the Honorable Nereida Lopez Singleterry. See id.
R. 52.2.
reasonable period. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a (governing the dismissal of “baseless causes

of action”). We dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus as moot in part, and we

conditionally grant relief in part.

I. BACKGROUND

In the underlying litigation, real parties in interest Irma Moreno and Zaya Zavala

filed suit against relators and Juan Francisco Briones for causes of action including

battery, negligent undertaking, negligence, premises liability, and gross negligence. The

real parties alleged, in short, that Briones, a manager at a Stripes store, committed acts

of sexual violence and rape against them, and that Uribe, another manager, failed to act

appropriately regarding these actions. The real parties complained that 7-Eleven did not

fire Briones and failed to address a “culture of sexual violence” at its stores.

On March 5, 2024, 7-Eleven filed a plea to the jurisdiction regarding Zavala’s

claims based on her failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Texas Labor

Code. See generally TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.201–.211. On July 18, 2024, the trial court

granted 7-Eleven’s plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed all of Zavala’s claims with

prejudice. 3 On October 24, 2024, 7-Eleven filed a motion to sever Zavala’s claims against

it from Zavala’s pending claims against Briones. On December 4, 2024, the trial court

signed an amended order granting 7-Eleven’s plea to the jurisdiction.

7-Eleven thereafter filed motions seeking summary judgment on Moreno’s claims

against it. On October 22, 2024, the trial court signed two separate orders granting

3 Zavala filed a notice of appeal regarding this order; however, she later filed a motion to dismiss

the appeal on grounds that the order was not a final and appealable order. This Court granted that motion.
See Zavala v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 13-24-00370-CV, 2024 WL 3818556, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–
Edinburg Aug. 15, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

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summary judgment in 7-Eleven’s favor. On November 4, 2024, 7-Eleven filed a motion to

sever Moreno’s claims against it from her pending claims against Briones.

On May 22, 2025, the trial court set a hearing on 7-Eleven’s motions for severance

for June 11, 2025. The trial court held a hearing on that date; however, the trial court did

not issue a ruling on 7-Eleven’s motions for severance. On August 1, 2025, 7-Eleven filed

a “Motion to Re-Visit and Re-Urge Severance” of Zavala’s and Moreno’s claims against

it. On August 4, 2025, the trial court set a hearing on 7-Eleven’s motion for September 4,

2025.

In the interim, on August 15, 2025, Uribe filed a Rule 91a motion to dismiss all

claims against her as baseless. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. On August 18, 2025, the trial

court set Uribe’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss for hearing on September 4, 2025.

The September 4, 2025 hearing on 7-Eleven’s “Motion to Re-Visit and Re-Urge

Severance” and Uribe’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss was passed. The record does not

include the rationale for the cancellation of this hearing. On September 5, 2025, the trial

court again set 7-Eleven’s “Motion to Re-Visit and Re-Urge Severance” and Uribe’s Rule

91a for hearing on October 2, 2025. The trial court held a hearing on that date as noticed;

however, the trial court did not issue rulings on these motions.

On January 28, 2026, relators filed this petition for writ of mandamus asserting that

the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on 7-Eleven’s motions for severance

and Uribe’s Rule 91a motion. The Court ordered the real parties to file a response to the

petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.4, 52.5, 52.8. The real parties filed

a response asserting that the petition for writ of mandamus has been rendered moot by

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subsequent orders, and that mandamus relief is improper because relators have not

requested a ruling on Uribe’s Rule 91a motion and the trial court has not refused to rule.

II. MANDAMUS

Mandamus relief is an extraordinary remedy available only when (1) the trial court

clearly abused its discretion, and (2) the party seeking relief lacks an adequate remedy

on appeal. In re Ill. Nat’l Ins., 685 S.W.3d 826, 834 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding); In re

Liberty Cnty. Mut. Ins., 679 S.W.3d 170, 174 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

“A court abuses its discretion if no evidence supports the finding on which its ruling rests

and if the court could reasonably have reached only a contrary conclusion.” In re

AutoZoners, LLC, 694 S.W.3d 219, 223 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). We

conduct a “benefits-and-detriments analysis” to determine if the relator possesses an

adequate remedy at law. In re Auburn Creek Ltd. P’ship, 655 S.W.3d 837, 843 (Tex. 2022)

(orig. proceeding) (per curiam); see In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124,

136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

III. SEVERANCE

The real parties argue that this original proceeding has been rendered moot

because on January 29, 2026, the trial court issued two orders relevant to the relators’

claims herein. First, the trial court signed an order denying 7-Eleven’s “Motion to Re-Visit

and Re-Urge Severance.” Second, Moreno had filed a motion to reconsider the trial

court’s rulings on 7-Eleven’s motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted

Moreno’s motion for reconsideration, vacated the prior orders granting summary

judgment, and denied 7-Eleven’s motions for summary judgment.

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We agree, in part, with the real parties’ arguments. Specifically, the trial court has

now denied 7-Eleven’s motions for severance, thus rendering 7-Eleven’s contentions

regarding the failure to rule on these motions as moot. See Heckman v. Williamson

County, 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012) (“A case becomes moot if, since the time of

filing, there has ceased to exist a justiciable controversy between the parties—that is, if

the issues presented are no longer ‘live,’ or if the parties lack a legally cognizable interest

in the outcome.”); In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)

(orig. proceeding) (“A case becomes moot if a controversy ceases to exist between the

parties at any stage of the legal proceedings, including the appeal.”); see generally In re

Cont. Freighters, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 810, 813 (Tex. 2022) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

However, we do not agree with the real parties’ contention that this original proceeding

has been rendered moot in its entirety because the trial court’s January 29, 2026 orders

do not address Uribe’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition

for writ of mandamus as moot, in part, as to 7-Eleven’s contentions regarding the trial

court’s failure to rule on its motions for severance, and we proceed to address the trial

court’s failure to rule on Uribe’s Rule 91a motion to dismiss.

IV. RULE 91A MOTION TO DISMISS

Relators assert that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to rule on Uribe’s

Rule 91a motion. In contrast, the real parties assert that “the trial court has now ruled on

the previously pending motion[s] and any remaining issues can be addressed through the

ordinary trial and appellate process.” The real parties further assert that “mandamus is

not appropriate when [relators have] not first sought relief from the trial court,” and the

trial court has not refused to rule on Uribe’s motion.

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A. Rule 91a

Rule 91a provides that “a party may move to dismiss a cause of action on the

grounds that it has no basis in law or fact.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1; see In re First Resrv.

Mgmt., L.P., 671 S.W.3d 653, 659 (Tex. 2023) (orig. proceeding). This rule authorizes the

dismissal of a cause of action “if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences

reasonably drawn from them do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought” or if “no

reasonable person could believe the facts pleaded.” In re Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 716

S.W.3d 525, 531 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1); see In re

Farmers Tex. Cnty. Mut. Ins., 621 S.W.3d at 266. The purpose of Rule 91a is to require

the early and speedy dismissal of baseless claims. In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d 455, 460 (Tex.

App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2016, orig. proceeding); see In re City of Houston, No.

01-24-00629-CV, 2024 WL 4846843, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 2024,

orig. proceeding) (per curiam). In this regard, Rule 91a.3 provides that “[a] motion to

dismiss must be . . . granted or denied within [forty-five] days after the motion is filed.”

TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3. This “deadline is directory, not jurisdictional.” MedFin Manager, LLC

v. Stone, 613 S.W.3d 624, 628 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2020, no pet.) (collecting cases).

“If a trial court fails to rule on a Rule 91a motion within the prescribed [forty-five] day

period, a party is entitled to mandamus relief.” In re City of Houston, 2024 WL 4846843,

at *4; see In re Joel Kelley Ints., Inc., No. 05-19-00559-CV, 2019 WL 2521725, at *1 (Tex.

App.—Dallas June 19, 2019, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (conditionally granting

mandamus relief for the failure to rule on a Rule 91a motion).

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B. Failure to Rule

To obtain relief for the trial court’s failure to rule on a motion, the relator in an

original proceeding must establish: (1) the motion was properly filed and the trial court

had a legal duty to rule; (2) the relator requested a ruling on the motion; and (3) the trial

court failed or refused to rule within a reasonable time. See In re GTG Sols., Inc., 642

S.W.3d 47, 49–50 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, orig. proceeding); In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d

225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); see also In re ADUSA Transp.

LLC, No. 13-25-00146-CV, 2025 WL 1351539, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg May 8, 2025, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). The relator must show that the trial

court was aware of the motion and relator asked the trial court to issue a ruling. See In re

Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding); In re

Villarreal, 96 S.W.3d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, orig. proceeding); see also In

re ADUSA Transp. LLC, 2025 WL 1351539, at *2. We determine whether a reasonable

time for the trial court to act has elapsed based on the circumstances of the case. In re

GTG Sols., Inc., 642 S.W.3d at 50; In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 662; In re Chavez, 62

S.W.3d at 228; see also In re ADUSA Transp. LLC, 2025 WL 1351539, at *2. We

determine each case “based upon the totality of the facts and circumstances.” In re GTG

Sols., Inc., 642 S.W.3d at 50; see also In re ADUSA Transp. LLC, 2025 WL 1351539, at

*2.

C. Analysis

The real parties filed an amended petition including claims against Uribe on May

30, 2025, and Uribe filed her Rule 91a motion to dismiss on August 15, 2025. Uribe’s

Rule 91a motion was set for hearing on September 4, 2025; however, that hearing was

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passed, and the motion was ultimately heard on October 2, 2025. Despite the clear

requirement in Rule 91a.3 for the motion to be granted or denied within forty-five days

after filing, or by September 29, 2025, the trial court nevertheless failed to issue a ruling

on Uribe’s motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3(c).

Rule 91a explicitly provides an affirmative duty to rule on a Rule 91a motion within

a specific period. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.3. Here, Uribe procured a hearing on her Rule

91a motion. The real parties concede that “[t]he hearing addressed the merits of Uribe’s

dismissal request.” Thus, we conclude that the trial court was aware of Uribe’s motion

and her request for a ruling. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661; In re Villarreal, 96

S.W.3d at 710; see also In re ADUSA Transp. LLC, 2025 WL 1351539, at *2. Further,

considering the totality of the facts and circumstances present here, including the

intended purpose of a Rule 91a motion as an expedited procedure and the statutory

requirement for the trial court to rule on such motions within a specified period of time, we

conclude that the trial court failed to comply with its ministerial duty to rule on Uribe’s Rule

91a motion to dismiss within a reasonable time. See In re GTG Sols., Inc., 642 S.W.3d at

50; see also In re ADUSA Transp. LLC, 2025 WL 1351539, at *2. Without addressing the

merits of the pending Rule 91a motion, we conclude that Uribe is entitled to mandamus

relief regarding the trial court’s failure to rule. See In re City of Houston, 2024 WL

4846843, at *4; In re Joel Kelley Ints., Inc., 2019 WL 2521725, at *1–2.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court, having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus,

the response filed by the real parties in interest, and the applicable law, is of the opinion

that the petition for writ of mandamus is moot, in part, and that relators have met their

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burden to obtain mandamus relief, in part. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for writ of

mandamus as moot, in part, regarding 7-Eleven’s motions for severance, and we

conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus, in part, regarding Uribe’s Rule 91a

motion to dismiss. We direct the trial court to immediately issue a ruling on Uribe’s Rule

91a motion. Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to act promptly in accordance with

this memorandum opinion.

JAIME TIJERINA
Chief Justice

Delivered and filed on the
19th day of February, 2026.

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