In Re Jesus R. Salazar v. the State of Texas

NUMBER 13-26-00177-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

IN RE JESUS R. SALAZAR

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Silva, Cron, and Fonseca
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva1

Jesus R. Salazar has filed a “Letter of Intent” in which he requests the trial court to

“start the appeals process” and “appoint [him] an attorney for this process.” Salazar refers

to this pleading as an “action and writ.” Salazar’s pleading concerns trial court cause

number 24FC-4327-B in the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas. Salazar

previously pursued a direct appeal of his conviction from this trial court cause number,

and the Court dismissed that appeal as untimely. See Salazar v. State, No. 13-25-00436-

1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not

required to do so. When granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case.”); id. R.
47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).
CR, 2025 WL 2937450, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 16, 2025, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, we liberally construe Salazar’s

pleading as a petition for writ of mandamus. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2 (governing

the perfection of appeal in criminal cases); In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 189 S.W.3d

400, 403 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“The function of the

writ of mandamus is to compel action by those who by virtue of their official or quasi-

official positions are charged with a positive duty to act.”).

In a criminal case, to be entitled to mandamus relief, the relator must establish that

the act sought to be compelled is a ministerial act that does not involve a discretionary or

judicial decision, and that there is no adequate remedy at law to address the alleged

harm. See In re Meza, 611 S.W.3d 383, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (orig. proceeding);

In re Harris, 491 S.W.3d 332, 334 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).

If the relator fails to meet both requirements, then the petition for writ of mandamus should

be denied. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236

S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding). It is the relator’s burden to

properly request and show entitlement to mandamus relief. See id.; In re Pena, 619

S.W.3d 837, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding); see also

Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig.

proceeding) (per curiam) (“Even a pro se applicant for a writ of mandamus must show

himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks.”).

The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure delineate the required form and contents

for a petition for writ of mandamus. See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3, 52.7. “The petition

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must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate

citations to authorities and to the appendix or record.” Id. R. 52.3(i). The relator must

provide a record that is sufficient to establish the right to mandamus relief. In re Schreck,

642 S.W.3d 925, 927 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2022, orig. proceeding); In re Pena, 619

S.W.3d at 839.

The Court, having examined and fully considered the pleading at issue, and having

construed it as a petition for writ of mandamus, is of the opinion that Salazar has not met

his burden to obtain relief. Salazar’s petition fails to meet the requirements of the Texas

Rules of Appellate Procedure, and without argument, authority, or supporting

documentation, we cannot ascertain the merits of his requests for relief. We further note

that the habeas corpus procedure set out in Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure is the exclusive remedy for felony post-conviction relief in state courts. See

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07; Padieu v. Ct. of Apps. of Tex., Fifth Dist., 392 S.W.3d

115, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (orig. proceeding); In re Briscoe, 230 S.W.3d 196, 197

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding); see also Calton v. Schiller, 498

S.W.3d 247, 252 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied). Accordingly, we deny the

petition for writ of mandamus.

CLARISSA SILVA
Justice

Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).

Delivered and filed on the
27th day of February, 2026.

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